JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—In all these matters, the petitioners were engaged as Lab Technicians/Sputum Microscopist/Tuberculosis Health Visitor (TBHV) for a period of one year and after completion of their tenure, have not been engaged for subsequent period, hence they have sought a writ of certiorari for quashing the order declining to grant extension/renewal of tenure and have also sought a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to continue the petitioners as Lab Technicians/Sputum Microscopist/TBHV so long as the scheme continues. 2. There are three petitioners in writ petition No. 21627 of 2008, namely Vivek Kumar Misra, Dhananjay and Onkar Nath Singh. The Government of India launched the scheme at National Level known as “Revised National Tuberculosis Control Programme” which is to be implemented at District level through Tuberculosis Control Society. The scheme was initially launched for a particular period which was extended from time to time and presently the Directorate General of Health Services, New Delhi’s letter dated 6.1.2006, the same is said to have been extended up to September, 2010. In furtherance of the aforesaid scheme on 6th September, 2006, an advertisement was issued by the District Level Committee inviting applications for the post of Lab Technicians/Sputum Microscopist/TBHV. The said petitioners applied for the same and vide letter dated 5.2.2007 they were appointed on contract basis. The petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 were appointed vide order dated 5.2.2007 on contract basis while the petitioner No. 1 was appointed vide order dated 28.2.2007. They were required to execute contract for appointment on standard form showing that the period of contract was 1.3.2007 to 29.2.2008. It also provided that renewal would depend on good performance and mutual agreement. The contract having completed on 29.2.2008, the respondents decided not to renew the contract of the petitioners and advertised the vacancy vide advertisement dated 19.4.2008/20.4.2008 (Annexures 1 and 2 to the writ petition). 3. The other petitioners were also appointed in the same manner and have not been allowed renewal except Writ Petition No. 26690 of 2007, where the engagement was purely stop-gap. It is contended that once the petitioners’ contract was renewable the respondents could not have denied renewal of the petitioners without assigning any reasons. It is also contended that some other persons have been granted renewal, therefore, it is arbitrary on the part of the respondents not to renew petitioners’ contract and to proceed for fresh selections. It is contended that once the petitioners’ contract was renewable the respondents could not have denied renewal of the petitioners without assigning any reasons. It is also contended that some other persons have been granted renewal, therefore, it is arbitrary on the part of the respondents not to renew petitioners’ contract and to proceed for fresh selections. Reliance has been placed by the petitioners’ Counsel on the judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 16081 of 2006 (Amit Kumar Dwivedi v. State of U.P. and another) decided on 27.3.2006; 50614 of 2006 (Hridayesh Kumar Verma v. State of U.P. and others) decided on 13.9.2006, and the Apex Courts decision in Dr. V.L. Chandra and others v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences and others, AIR 1990 SC 1670 ; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and others, AIR 1979 SC 1628 and U.P. State Electricity Board v. Pooran Chandra Pandey and others, 2007 (7) Supreme 374 . 4. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioners and perused the record. 5. It is not in dispute that the engagement of the petitioners was in a scheme launched by the Government of India. The nature of engagement of the petitioners is purely contractual and not governed by any statutory provision or executive order having force of law. A perusal of the scheme which has been placed before the Court by the learned Counsel for the petitioners showed that the “Revised National Tuberculosis Control Programme” was sought to be implemented at District level with the assistance from District Tuberculosis Control Society (in short “D.P.C.S.”). It provides that appointment on the posts in the scheme shall be either on contractual or on deputation basis and for a maximum period of one year at a time, renewable for six months/one year subject to very good performance. The nature of contractual staff provided in the scheme was/is Senior Treatment Supervisor (STS); Senior Technician Laboratory Supervisor (STLS); Laboratory Technician (LT); Tuberculosis Health Visitor (T.B.H.V.); Data Entry Operator etc. The scheme also provided for execution of a contract by the person engaged thereunder. The contract of appointment is liable to be terminated from either side with one months’ notice. The nature of contractual staff provided in the scheme was/is Senior Treatment Supervisor (STS); Senior Technician Laboratory Supervisor (STLS); Laboratory Technician (LT); Tuberculosis Health Visitor (T.B.H.V.); Data Entry Operator etc. The scheme also provided for execution of a contract by the person engaged thereunder. The contract of appointment is liable to be terminated from either side with one months’ notice. Copy of the agreement in respect to petitioner No. 2 in Writ Petition No. 21627 of 2008 has been placed on record (Annexure 5 to the writ petition) and the relevant clauses of the said agreement are reproduced as under : 01- “This Contract is entered between the District Tuberculosis Control Society (DTCS) Allahabad District on one part and Dr./Mr. Vivek Kumar Misra (hereinafter called the Name of Post S.M. On the other, whereby DTCS Chairman agrees to assign the below mentioned tasks on the Name of the Post and Name of the Post S.M. Agrees to execute the tasks assigned by the DTCS Allahabad District, as per the following terms and conditions. 03 : Duration of Contract This Contract commences on 1.3.2007. The Contract will be for a period of One Year and expires on 29.2.2008. The first three months of the Contract will be on probation. The Contract is further renewable on a yearly basis, in case of good performance and on mutual agreement. 06 : Remuneration : As sole and full remuneration the Name of the Post S.M. will be paid at the rate of Rs. 6500/- only per month (Rupees Six thousand five hundred only per month), all inclusive. 09 : This contract can be terminated from either side with one months’ notice or in lieu of it by paying one months’ remuneration by the DTCS or by surrendering one months’ salary by the S.M. 10 : Acceptance and Signature The above mentioned terms and conditions are mutually acceptable”. 6. In Writ Petition No. 16081 of 2006 there are two petitioners namely Amit Kumar Dwivedi and D.P. Singh and both were engaged as Tuberculosis Health Visitors (in short “TBHV”) initially for a period of one year which was extended for another one year i.e. 15th March, 2006 and thereafter the respondents have proceeded to make fresh recruitment by publishing an advertisement on 19th March, 2006. In Writ Petition No. 22076 of 2008, the petitioner Smt. Meenu Misra was appointed as Sputum Microscopist pursuant to the contract executed for the period of 1.3.2007 to 29.2.2008 and thereafter vide the impugned order dated 8.4.2008, she has been denied renewal of the contract after assessment of her performance. 7. In Writ Petition No. 26690 of 2007, the petitioner Dhirendra Kumar Singh was not selected but he was placed at serial No. 2 in the wait list. As informed by the letter dated 14.2.2005 passed by Member Secretary, District Tuberculosis Control Committee, Kanpur Nagar and thereafter by letter dated 11.5.2005, he was required to join as Tuberculosis Health Visitor (TBHV) at Ghatampur until further orders. By the advertisement dated 31.5.2007, the respondents have now proceeded for fresh selection and hence he has come in this writ petition. 9. It is not in dispute that agreement was executed by other petitioners (except in Writ Petition No. 26690 of 2007) are also in similar terms. The agreements have come to an end on expiry of the period of engagement. The respondents have assessed the performance of the petitioners in a meeting presided over by the District Magistrate, (the Chairman of the District Level Society) and have decided not to renew their term. Consequently, the petitioners have been terminated by giving a months’ notice. The respondents have also advertised the vacancies for fresh recruitments. 9. From the nature of appointment of the petitioners, it is thus evident that it was a contract appointment for a fixed tenure with condition therein that the same may be renewed subject to good performance and mutual agreement. The existing contract being time bound, came to an end by efflux of time on expiry of the period for which the same was executed. Thereafter, continuance of the petitioners, if any, would not be pursuant to any letter of appointment or agreement. The right of the petitioners to continue in service in the absence of any letter of appointment is neither vested in them nor they can claim as an existing right moreso in the absence of an appointment letter issued by the employer. This Court cannot provide an appointment letter to the petitioners though the employer has chosen not to appoint them after the period of appointment is over. This Court cannot provide an appointment letter to the petitioners though the employer has chosen not to appoint them after the period of appointment is over. The appointment made for a limited period came to an end by efflux of time needs no order of termination. This is what has been held by the Apex Court in Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P. v. Pushpa Srivastava (Smt.), 1992 (4) SCC 33 where dealing with a similar kind of contractual appointment, the Court held that it would end automatically by efflux of time. 10. In Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Uma Devi and others, JT 2006 (4) SC 420, in para 34 of the judgment a Constitution Bench has observed as under : “If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued”. 11. Learned Counsel for the petitioners however submitted that on account of wide-spread unemployment and lack of bargaining power, the petitioners are not in a condition to negotiate with the respondents on equal terms and therefore, had no option but to agree whatever conditions are imposed upon them by the respondents for giving employment. He said, if a condition of employment is ex-facie, unreasonable and exploitative, the same should not be adhered to and the respondents be directed to continue the agreement. 12. In my view the submission cannot be accepted for more than one reasons. However, instead of adding in my words, I find it appropriate to refer Uma Devi (supra), where rejecting a similar contention, the Apex Court in para 36 of the judgment has observed as under : “It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length-since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length-since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the Court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the Court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succour to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term.” 13. A Division Bench of this Court in Alok Kumar Singh (Dr.) and 15 others v. State of U.P. and others, 2002(2) ESC 427 (All) considering similar kind of tenure appointment on contract basis has held that petitioners cannot claim right to continue in service beyond the period of appointment provided in the letter of appointment. This has been followed by a subsequent Division Bench in Sarvesh Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. and others, writ petition No. 25849 decided on 11.5.2006; and Amar Nath Tiwari v. State of U.P. and others, 2006(9) ADJ 678 : 2006(3) ESC 2015 (DB). 14. This has been followed by a subsequent Division Bench in Sarvesh Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. and others, writ petition No. 25849 decided on 11.5.2006; and Amar Nath Tiwari v. State of U.P. and others, 2006(9) ADJ 678 : 2006(3) ESC 2015 (DB). 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners at this stage submitted that the law laid down in Uma Devi (supra) would be applicable more appropriately in those cases where engagement/appointment is without following the procedure prescribed for recruitment and is not consistent with Article 16 of the Constitution but here is not a case where the appointment has been made in violation of Article 16 of the Constitution. On the contrary, he pointed out that the vacancies were advertised, applications were invited, selection was made and only thereafter, the petitioners were appointed. Therefore, appointment of the petitioner is not contrary to Article 16 of the Constitution and cannot be said to be illegal. That being so, the petitioners have a right of legitimate expectation to be considered for renewal particularly in view of the fact that such a stipulation was part of their contract and respondents were bound to adhere to such condition. 15. This argument needs some serious consideration for ex-facie, it is true that in the case of the petitioners, vacancies were advertised, selection was made and thereafter the petitioners were appointed. However, I find difficult to help the petitioners. It would be appropriate to consider the matter from three different angles. 16. Here is not a case where the respondents have terminated the petitioners for the reasons of any illegality in the procedure of their recruitment. It is nobody’s case that the petitioners’ appointment was illegal or without following the procedure prescribed in the scheme and inconsistent with Article 16 of the Constitution. In accordance with the conditions of the scheme, vacancies were advertised, selection was made and thereafter the petitioners were appointed. The appointment thus made after due selection, apparently cannot be said to be illegal. However, the scheme specifically provides for engagement of the persons only on contract basis and that too for a fixed tenure i.e. one year at a time which can be renewed for a period of six months or one year based upon their performance. The appointment thus made after due selection, apparently cannot be said to be illegal. However, the scheme specifically provides for engagement of the persons only on contract basis and that too for a fixed tenure i.e. one year at a time which can be renewed for a period of six months or one year based upon their performance. Where an appointment is legal and valid, but if lays certain terms and conditions thereof, the parties are bound to adhere to those conditions and cannot travel beyond that. Once appointment was made for fixed tenure, as already observed, it would come to an end automatically on the expiry of the period for which the appointment was made. The termination is automatic by efflux of time on the expiry of the said period. The continuance of the petitioners thereafter could not be on the basis of the said agreement for appointment letter since it has already come to an end. 17. The question whether the petitioners have any right, legal, constitutional or otherwise enforceable in a Court of Law to insist upon the employer to continue them in employment till the scheme continues or the post is available. In the case in hand the selection was for a limited period. Applications were invited from aspiring candidates informing them that appointments which is to be made is for limited period and that too on contract basis. Once terms and conditions are laid down in the contract, it is not open to anyone to claim that some part of the conditions would be binding and remaining must be ignored. If the petitioners are allowed to continue without there being any renewal of their tenure and appointment letter issued by the employer it would amount to permitting the petitioners to continue contrary to the terms and conditions of their engagement and also the scheme whereunder they have been appointed. It is not the case of the petitioners that any part of the scheme or any clause therein is unconstitutional or ultra vires. The scheme thus has to be given effect as a whole and cannot be read or applied in piecemeal. Therefore, once the petitioners have run out their tenure, thereafter unless renewal is granted, the petitioners have no right to continue. 18. The scheme thus has to be given effect as a whole and cannot be read or applied in piecemeal. Therefore, once the petitioners have run out their tenure, thereafter unless renewal is granted, the petitioners have no right to continue. 18. The doctrine of legitimate expectation in such cases would be limited only to the conditions of appointment or contract and cannot travel beyond that. When the condition says that the petitioners renewal would depend upon the assessment of their performance and such condition has been observed by the employer by making assessment of performance of the petitioners but has found the same to be unsatisfactory, it cannot be said that there is any violation of the contract. The right of legitimate expectation at that stage would come to an end. 19. Secondly, when the right to continue is not based either on the statute or the Constitution or otherwise in law; then a writ of mandamus compelling the authorities to continue the petitioners in employment cannot be issued since for issuance of writ of mandamus, condition precedent is the existence of a legal right upon the aggrieved person and a legal obligation corresponding upon the authorities concerned. In Uma Devi (supra) the Apex Court considering the question as to when a writ of mandamus can be issued by the Court directing employer either to absorb the employee in permanent service or to allow him to continue has held as under : “In order to that a mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on the authority and the aggrieved party had a legal right under the statute or rule to enforce it.” 20. Thirdly, even otherwise, enforcement of contract of personal service in a writ jurisdiction is not permissible except of certain limited circumstances. The petitioners’ appointment was not in a Department of Government and instead they were engaged by a Society constituted for the purposes of implementation of a scheme launched for a fixed period. Thirdly, even otherwise, enforcement of contract of personal service in a writ jurisdiction is not permissible except of certain limited circumstances. The petitioners’ appointment was not in a Department of Government and instead they were engaged by a Society constituted for the purposes of implementation of a scheme launched for a fixed period. This Court is not delving into the investigation as to whether the ‘Society’ answers the description of ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution and I proceed with the assumption that the ‘Society’ is a ‘State’ under Article 12 but that by itself would not mean that the petitioners can be said to be a Government servant or holding a post governed by status. The scheme launched by the Government of India is under an executive order. It does not have the status of a statute or statutory order. The nature of the engagement of the petitioner, therefore, is not to be governed by status but is like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. In Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India and others, AIR 1967 SC 1889 drawing distinction between the employment under a contract and status, it was held that there is no vested contractual right in regard to the terms of service where the employment is one of the statu. The origin of Government service is contractual. There is an offer and acceptance in every case. But once appointed to the post or office, the Government servant acquires a statu and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by consent of both parties, but by statute or statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by the Government. In other words, the legal position of a Government servant is more one of status than of contract. The hall-mark of status is the attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by public law and not by mere agreement of the parties. The relationship between the Government and the Servant is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The legal relationship is something entirely different, something in the nature of status. In the language of jurisprudence, status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned. The legal relationship is something entirely different, something in the nature of status. In the language of jurisprudence, status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned. Thus, in the cases where the appointment and conditions of service are governed by statute, the relationship is that of status and not mere a contract. However, in other cases, it is purely a contract of service resulting in a relationship of ordinary master and servant. In the present case, it cannot be said that the petitioners employment is that of a status since it is not governed by the statutory provisions in any manner. It is purely and simply an ordinary contract of service between master and servant. In such cases, where the contract of service is not governed by the statutory provisions, it is well-settled that contract of service cannot be sought to be enforced by seeking reinstatement or continuance in employment since such a relief is barred under the Specific Relief Act. In Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation, Lucknow v. C.K. Tyagi, AIR 1970 SC 1244 considering the question as to when such a relief is granted the Apex Court observed : “Under the common law the Court will not ordinarily force an employer to retain the services of an employee whom he no longer wishes to employ. But this rule is subject to certain well-recognised exceptions. It is open to the Courts in an appropriate case to declare that a public servant who is dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 continues to remain in service, even though by doing so the State is in effect forced to continue to employ the servant whom it does not desire to employ. Similarly under the Industrial Law, jurisdiction of the Labour and Industrial Tribunals to compel the employer to employ a worker whom he does not desire to employ, is recognised. The Courts are also investigated with the power to declare invalid the act of a statutory body, if by doing the act the body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statute,....................." 21. Again in para 25 of the judgment, the Court held : “The position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted. Again in para 25 of the judgment, the Court held : “The position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted. But there are certain well-recognized exceptions to this rule and they are : To grant such a declaration in appropriate cases regarding (1) a public servant, who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311. (2) Reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals. (3). A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute”. 22. The above view has been reiterated in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and others v. Lakshmi Narain and others, AIR 1976 SC 888 (paras 9, 10, 13 and 17) ; Smt. J. Tiwari v. Smt. Jawala Devi Vidya Mandir and others, AIR 1981 SC 122 (paras 4 and 5) ; Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd. and others, AIR 1986 SC 1370 (paras 101, 102). Similar view has been taken by this Court also in A.K. Home Chaudhary v. National Textile Corporation U.P. Ltd., Kanpur, 1984 UPLBEC 81 and B.M. Varma v. State of U.P. and others, 2004 (4) AWC 2866 . 23. Learned Counsel for the petitioners at this stage submitted that denial of renewal of contract to the petitioners is arbitrary and therefore, is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. This Court is unable to agree for the reasons that firstly there is no material to show that the decision of the respondents can be said to be arbitrary; secondly, the work and performance of the petitioners has been assessed by the Committee and the decision of the Committee cannot be interfered by the Court like an Appellate Authority. In the absence of any cogent material it cannot be said that the Committee has not taken decision objectively. Moreover, the condition of the contract is that the renewal is subject to good performance and mutual agreement. Therefore, the consent of the employer is also very much necessary and in the absence of mutuality, the renewal cannot be directed. 24. In the absence of any cogent material it cannot be said that the Committee has not taken decision objectively. Moreover, the condition of the contract is that the renewal is subject to good performance and mutual agreement. Therefore, the consent of the employer is also very much necessary and in the absence of mutuality, the renewal cannot be directed. 24. Judgments cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in Amit Kumar Dwivedi (supra) and Hridayesh Kumar Verma (supra) based on the law laid down by the Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, (1992) 4 SCC 118 wherein it was observed that an ad-hoc appointment cannot be substituted by ad-hoc. In my view none of the aforesaid authorities could help the petitioners in the present case. Here is not a case where an ad-hoc appointment without any limitation of period was made and is sought to be substituted by another ad-hoc. Here is a case where a time bound appointment was made and after completion of the tenure, the respondents are proceeding to make fresh selection having decided not to renew the tenure of the earlier appointee. The question of substitution of the petitioners does not arise since they have already ceased to be in employment after expiry of the period for which they were appointed. The question as to what a “tenure appointment” means was considered by the Apex Court in Dr. L.P. Agarwal v. Union of India and others, AIR 1992 SC 1872 wherein the Court observed that : “Tenure means a term during which an office is held. It is a condition of holding the office. Once a person is appointed to a tenure post, his appointment to the said office begins when he joins and it comes to an end on the completion of the tenure unless curtailed on justifiable grounds. Such a person does not superannuate, he only goes out of office on completion of his tenure.....” 25. Considering the case of the petitioners, it is obvious that their tenure has already exhausted and therefore, in law they are neither in employment nor are holding any post. Such a person does not superannuate, he only goes out of office on completion of his tenure.....” 25. Considering the case of the petitioners, it is obvious that their tenure has already exhausted and therefore, in law they are neither in employment nor are holding any post. If that be so, this Court finds no reason to direct the respondents to continue the petitioners in service otherwise such an order would be without any extension of a letter of appointment issued by the employer on the basis whereof an employee can claim a right to hold the post or continue in the office. 26. In the case of Uma Devi (supra) the Apex Court has also observed that it is always open to the employer to make short term temporary appointment on contract basis and there is no inherent vice therein. Such employees do not have any right either to hold the post or continue in service. Therefore, the two judgments namely Amit Kumar Dwivedi (supra) and Hridayesh Kumar Verma (supra) are not at all applicable in the case in hand. Moreover, the issue which this Court has considered in this judgment, neither raised nor argued in the aforesaid judgments and therefore, it cannot be said that the aforesaid judgments laid down in binding law that a person appointed on a fixed tenure is entitled to continue in service even after expiry of the said tenure. 27. So far as the reliance placed on UPSEB (supra) is concerned, the decision is based on the peculiar facts of that case inasmuch as a decision was taken by the Electricity Board on 28.11.1996 to regularise the services of the employees working on daily wage basis on or before 4.5.1990 whereupon the Society was taken over by the Electricity Board. The said decision was claimed to be applicable to those employees also concluding that they became employees of UPSEB. The Apex Court held that the said employees cannot be treated to be new employees of the Board, not governed by the said decision and it was held that regularization to those employees cannot be denied. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of UPSEB (supra) was not in respect of the tenure employees as are involved in the present case. 28. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of UPSEB (supra) was not in respect of the tenure employees as are involved in the present case. 28. The Writ Petition No. 26690 of 2007 needs to be dealt with further since therein, the petitioner was not even given an appointment by execution of a contract but he was in waiting list and was required to join duties until further orders. The appointment by its very nature was purely stop gap and would not confer any right upon him to claim continuance in service at all. 29. In the result, I do not find any merits. The writ petitions are, accordingly, dismissed. 30. The interim orders shall stand vacated. ————