I. A. Ansari, J. - The order, under challenge, in the present revision, was, on 24.04.2008, passed, in Title Execution Case No. 15/97, arising out of Title Suit No. 02/78, by the learned Munsiff No. 1, Jorhat, whereby the learned Executing Court has rejected the objection raised by the present petitioners to the execution of the decree, in question. 2. This revision has a long history and the present impugned order has arisen in conse­quence of two different orders passed by the High Court, one of the orders having passed on 26.07.1998 and the other one on 14.02.2007 in CRPs No. 64/82 and 59/2005 respectively. The material facts, which led to the present revision, are closely connected with the events of the past and it would made ap­preciation of the questions, raised in the present revision, easier if the material facts, as mentioned in the order, dated 14.02.2007, and the relevant observations made therein are reproduced. With this end in view, the relevant portion of the order, dated 14.02.2007, is reproduced herein below: "2. The facts giving rise to the present revision may, in a nutshell, be set out as follows: (i) The present petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, Sailadhar Dutta, instituted TS No. 02/ 1978 for eviction of the opposite party herein, as defendant in the suit, from a piece of land, which was described by boundaries and area in the plaint. The suit was decreed on 15.09.1978. The decree, so granted, had two parts, one for possession of the land by evicting the defendant there from and the other part was regarding realization of money. Pursuant to the Title Execution No. 15/1979, which the decree holder initiated, the decree-holder re­ceived delivery of possession of 5 lechas of land, though the defendant-judgment debtor was actually in possession of 15 Lechas of the decree-holder's land. As the decree was in re­spect of 5 lechas of land, the judgment-debtor remained in the remaining portion of the land. The decree-holder, then", applied for amendment of the decree by an application, dated 11.03.1980, his case being, in brief, that it was following an inadvertent error that the measure­ment of the land was mentioned in the sched­ule of the plaint as 5 Lechas instead of 15 lechas and that the mistake, being clerical in nature, be corrected. This petition was summarily re-jected by the learned Munsiff No. 1 on 05.08.1981. This petition was summarily re-jected by the learned Munsiff No. 1 on 05.08.1981. The decree-holder, then, came to this Court with a revision petition, which gave rise to Civil Revision No. 64 of 1982. While the revision was pending in this Court, the decree holder made an application, in the execution proceeding, praying for stay of the said pro­ceeding on account of pendency of the revi­sion petition. This prayer was allowed on 30.05.1980 and it was directed by the learned Executing Court that the execution proceeding shall remain stayed. This direction staying the execution proceeding was not vacated at any later stage. (ii) In the revision, the Court observed as follows: "7. Considering that the petitioner had filed suit for ejectment of the opposite party it may be reasonable to think that the petitioner wanted to eject the opposite party from the entire land in latter's possession. Moreover, the description of the land in the plaint does appear to suggest that the petitioner had in­tended to eject the opposite party from the entire land in his occupation and not from only a portion of it, for it was stated that there was plaintiff's own land of the patta, on the east and north. On the remaining sides were the boundary fencing and the road. In the circum­stances, it appears that the petitioner had raised a substantial question which should have been heard and considered on merits. 8. It is true that the petitioner had in the earlier applications stated that the land in possession of the opposite party was 10 Lechas, and in another application it was stated to be 15 Lechas. While it may be said that there was some negligence but any error by accidental slip or omission or clerical mistake is also not without an element of negligence. The fact therefore that there was some element of negli­gence does not in my opinion mean that there could be no clerical mistake or that the error could be no clerical mistake or that the error could not be due to accidental slip or omission in the preparation of the plaint and conse­quently in the decree or in the application for amendment. In any case, the probability that it can be a clerical mistake or an error due to acci­dental slip or omission in my opinion cannot be and should not be excluded or ruled out." (iii) For the conclusions, as reached above, the Court, on 26.07.1988, allowed the revision, set aside the order, dated 05.08.1981, aforemen­tioned and remanded the case to the learned Court below for considering afresh the decree-holder's application for amendment of the de­cree. [See Shri Sailadhar Dutta Vs. Shri Kanai Dutta, reported in 1988 (2) GLJ 298]. Following the remand, the learned Munsiff No. 1, on 16.09.1988, passed an order, in Title Execution No. 15/1979, aforementioned allowing the de­cree-holder's prayer by amending, in the de­cree, the area of the decretal land as 15 Lechas in place of 5 Lechas. However, the decree-holder, thereafter, did not take necessary steps for execution of the amended decree. Upon his death, the legal representatives of the decree-holder applied, on 10.12.2004, in Title Execu­tion No. 15/1979 aforementioned, for execution of the amended decree It is worth emphasizing that until 10.12.2004 e., till making of the said application seeking execution of the amended decree, the said execution proceeding had remained stayed by a subsequent order passed on 21.07.1980, in the said execution proceed­ing. (iv) The application, so made, on 10.12.2004, for execution of the amended decree was re­sisted by the judgment-debtor on the ground that the decree, having been amended on 16.09.1988 and the same having been remained without being executed for more than 12 years, is barred by Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The learned Court'below accepted the objection so raised by the judgment-debtor and has dismissed the execution proceeding. It is against this order that the present revision has been filed by the petitioners as legal represen­tatives of the decree-holder. 3. I have heard Mr. GN. Sahewalla, learned Senior Counsel, for the petitioners, and Mr. D.C. Mahanta, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the opposite party. 4. Presenting the case on behalf of the peti­tioner, Mr. Sahewalla has submitted that since the Title Execution No. 15/1979 had been kept stayed, the time could not have been held to have started running with effect from 16.09.1988, when the amended decree was drawn. In sup­port of this submission, Mr. Sahewalla places reliance on Government of Rajasthan & Anr. Vs. Sangram Singh & Ors. Sahewalla has submitted that since the Title Execution No. 15/1979 had been kept stayed, the time could not have been held to have started running with effect from 16.09.1988, when the amended decree was drawn. In sup­port of this submission, Mr. Sahewalla places reliance on Government of Rajasthan & Anr. Vs. Sangram Singh & Ors. ( AIR 1962 RAJ 43 (FB) & AIR 1978 P&H 233 ). In the present case, contends Mr. Sahewalla, the learned executing Court committed serious error of jurisdiction in treating the decree, in question, as having stood barred by limitation merely on the ground that the stay of the execution proceeding was at the request of the decree-holder. This view taken by the learned Court below is, according to Mr. Sahewalla, completely incorrect and not sustainable in law. 5. Controverting the submission made on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. Mahanta has sub­mitted that under Article 136, a decree must be executed within 12 years from the date, when the decree becomes enforceable. In the present case, according Mr. Mahanta, the amended decree came into force on 16.09.1988, i.e., the date on which the decree was amended, and since pursuant to this decree, no execution pro­ceeding was initiated until 2004, the decree, so amended, had become non-executable by efflux of time. Support for this submission is sought to be derived by Mr. Mahanta from the deci­sion in Fatimunnisa Begum Vs. Mohammed Zainulabuddin Sahed (deceased by LRs) & Ors. (AIR 1986 Andhra Pradesh 355) and Ratan Singh Vs. Vijay Singh & Ors, reported in (2001) 1 SCC 469 . 6. While considering the correctness or oth­erwise of the rival submissions made before me on behalf of the parties, what is of utmost importance to note is that under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1908, a decree was enforce­able on the date on which the decree was made. As the meaning of the expression "date of the decree" had led to divergent interpretations, the legislature did away with the expression "date of the decree" as the date for commence­ment of the period of limitation and made the date of enforceability of the decree as the date on which the period of limitation shall be treated to have commenced. It is in this backdrop that Article 136 of the Limitation Act needs to be considered. 7. To some extent, the reliance placed by Mr. It is in this backdrop that Article 136 of the Limitation Act needs to be considered. 7. To some extent, the reliance placed by Mr. Sahewalla, on the decision of Sangram Singh(supra), is not misplaced, for, the Full Bench of Rajasthan High Court, in Sangram Singh(supra) speaking through Bhandari, J. observed as follows: "33. Thus in the present case, I find that the record of the previous application for the enforcement of the decree was consigned to record room by the order of the Court. The pre­vious application for enforcement of the de­cree was not dismissed at the instance of the decree-holder. In considering whether an ap­plication is for the revival of the previous ap­plication or not there is no question of partial or total stay. What is to be considered is whether the previous execution application was disposed of or was kept pending. If it was kept pending, it automatically follows that it can be revived either suo moru by the Court or being invited to do so by the decree-holder. This part should be borne in mind while applying the principles of revival. Considering of a case to record without properly disposing it off is an act of the Court and a decree-holder cannot be penalized by treating such application as dis­posed of and not pending. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the present application of the decree holder for the-enforcement of the de­cree is an application for the revival of their old execution application which was not disposed of but was only consigned to record. In this view of the matter, I would dismiss the appeal with costs." 8. In the light of what has been observed in Sangram Singh(supra), it is clear that when the execution proceeding was kept pending, it could have been revived either suo motu by the Court or on a prayer of the decree-holder. Thus, when the decree- holder, in the present case, had not moved the Court and the Court had also not suo moto vacated the stay of the execution proceeding, the logical conclusion has to be that the period of limitation had not started running against the decree, when it was amended on 16.09.1988. 9. There can be no dispute with the propo­sition of law advanced by Mr. 9. There can be no dispute with the propo­sition of law advanced by Mr. Mahanta that under Article 136, the period of limitation would start running against a decree from the date, when the decree becomes enforceable. In the present case, however, 16.09.1988 is not the date of the original decree; rather, 16.09.1988 is the date of the amended decree. This amended decree would have been, ordinarily, enforce­able with effect from 16.09.1988. However, this amended decree could not have been executed without the executing Court having vacated the stay, which it had imposed on the said ex­ecution proceeding. An amended decree, one must bear in mind, is not a decree wholly di­vorced from, or completely independent of, the original decree. In fact, on amendment of a de­cree, the original decree is subsumed by, and merges into, the amended decree. An amended decree comes into force on the date, when the amended decree is prepared. If an execution proceeding was already pending before the decree, sought to be executed, was subse­quently amended, the amended decree would not give rise to a fresh execution proceeding, but has to be made a part of the execution pro­ceeding which was already pending on the date, when the amended decree was prepared. It is, thus, clear that an independent execution pro­ceeding could not have been started on the strength of the amended decree. No wonder, therefore, that it has not been questioned, in the execution proceeding, that the present pe­titioners ought to have initiated a separate ex­ecution proceeding on the strength of the amended decree. 10. What follows from the above discus­sion is that the amended decree could not have been executed unrtil the stay, granted by the learned executing Court on further progress of the execution proceeding, was vacated. It is, no doubt, true that since the stay was granted at the behest of the decree holder, the decree-holder could have prayed for vacating the stay. The fact, however, remains that as long as the execution proceeding had remained stayed, the amended decree could not have been executed. 11. What, thus, emerges from the above discussion is that notwithstanding the fact that the decree was amended on 16.09.1988, the pe­riod of limitation cannot be said to have been started running until the time the stay on the execution proceeding was vacated. 11. What, thus, emerges from the above discussion is that notwithstanding the fact that the decree was amended on 16.09.1988, the pe­riod of limitation cannot be said to have been started running until the time the stay on the execution proceeding was vacated. In other words, though the amended decree became en­forceable on 16.09.1988, the fact remains that the period of limitation did not start running, because of the stay of the execution proceed­ing and since the stay had not been vacated, this decree could not have been executed and a decree, which cannot be executed because of a stay order, the period of limitation cannot be held to have started running against such a decree. 12. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, I have no hesitation in holding that the learned executing Court ought to have vacated the stay on the execution pro­ceeding and, then, proceeded to execute the amended decree. 13. In the result, and for the reasons dis­cussed above, this revision succeeds. The im­pugned order, dated 22.03.2005, is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned Court below with direction to pass appropriate orders in the light of the-observations made hereinabove and proceed with the execution of the said decree." 3. In terms of the directions, given in the order, dated 14.02.2007, aforementioned, when the execution proceeding was, once again, taken up by the learned Executing Court, the present petitioners, claiming to be the legal representatives of the deceased-judgment-debtor, filed a petition resisting ex­ecution of the decree, broadly speaking, on three grounds, namely, (i) the judgment-debtor, namely, J. D. Kanai Dutta had ex­pired, on 21.01.2007, leaving behind six num­bers of legal heirs, but the decree-holder had substituted only three of these legal heirs omit­ting thereby substitution of the present peti­tioners as legal representatives of the said deceased-judgment-debtor; (ii) that the de­cree is vague inasmuch as the decree, in ques­tion, does not give proper identification of the decretal land; and (iii) the original decree was in respect of five lechas of land and the ex­ecution of the decree in respect of five Lechas of the decretal land having been completed, there is no scope for execution of the decree in respect of 15 Lechas of land as is being sought to be done now. 4. 4. By the impugned order, dated 24.04.2008, the objections, raised by the present petitioners, having been turned down and the execution proceeding having been decided to be continued, the petitioners are before this Court with the help of the present revision against the order, dated 24.04.2008, aforementioned. 5. I have heard Mr. D.C. Mahanta, learned Senior Counsel, for the petitioners, and Mr. G. N. Sahewalla, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the decree-holder opposite party. 6. While considering the present revision, what is of utmost importance to note is that it was by the order, dated 13.05.98, passed in Civil Revision No. 64/82, as indicated above, that the High Court had remanded the case and directed the learned Executing Court to consider afresh the decree-holders' petition for amendment of the decree. This order was never challenged and, thus, this direction for considering afresh the decree-holder's peti­tion for amendment of the decree remained unchallenged by the judgment-debtor (since deceased). It is, therefore, clear that the cor­rectness or otherwise of the order, dated 13.05.98, is not open to challenge and has, in fact, not been challenged before this Court at the time of hearing of this revision. In con­sequence of the order, dated 13.05.98, the decree stood amended and the amendment of this decree was also not challenged by the judgment-debtor. When, however, the amended decree was put into execution, it was execution of the amended decree, which was challenged by the decree holder on the ground that the execution of the decree stood barred by the period of limitation. This con­tention was rejected by order, dated 14.02.2007, passed in CRP No. 59/2005. This order too has never been challenged by anyone so far. 7. The limited challenge, which has been made, therefore, at the time of hearing of the present revision, is that the decree, which was, originally, passed, having been satisfied in re­spect of five Lechas of the decretal land, the question of the decree being executed, once again, could not have arisen at all. In support of this contention, Mr. Mahanta has placed reliance on Shew Bux Mohata & Anr. Vs. Bengal Breweries Ltd. & Ors. ( AIR 1961 SC 137 ). 8. In support of this contention, Mr. Mahanta has placed reliance on Shew Bux Mohata & Anr. Vs. Bengal Breweries Ltd. & Ors. ( AIR 1961 SC 137 ). 8. While considering the case of Shew Bux Mohata (supra), what needs to be noted is that in Shew Bux Mohata (supra), what the Apex Court has laid down is that it is not open to the decree-holder to accept delivery of possession of a decretal land without actual removal of the person in possession and if he had remained satisfied without the person, who was in possession of the decretal prop­erty, from being removed by execution of the decree and, thus, remained contended with the constructive delivery of possession of the decretal land and without actual removal of the person in possession, then, the decree-holder cannot, later on, say that he has not been given possession to which he was en­titled to under the law. The present one is a case, where the decree-holder did seek re­moval of the judgment debtor from the pos­session of the decretal land, which is, now, covered by the amended decree. So long as the amended decree remains in force and is not interfered with, execution has to be car­ried out and the persons in possession of the decretal land, specified in the amended decree, have to be removed. If the decree suf­fers from lack of proper identification, the decree may become impossible to be ex­ecuted, but this would not make the execu­tion proceeding bad under the law, for, if the decretal land is not identifiable, the decree would not be executed. 9. The specific finding of the learned Ex­ecuting Court is that the decree gives specific boundary and, hence, the decree is execut­able. This finding of fact is not a fact, which has been determined without jurisdiction. Since it was within the jurisdiction of the Ex­ecuting Court to determine the question as to whether the decretal land, as specified in the amended decree, is or is not identifiable and the Executing Court has decided the ques­tion in the affirmative, this exercise of power cannot be interfered with in revision, for, it is entirely a question of fact and there is nothing perverse in the finding so reached. At no stage of the proceedings, the decree holders indi­cated that they were not interested in remov­ing the person(s) in possession of the decre­tal land. At no stage of the proceedings, the decree holders indi­cated that they were not interested in remov­ing the person(s) in possession of the decre­tal land. In fact, what the decree- holders had contended was that there was clerical error in mentioning the exact measurement of the land and, hence, the decree needed amend­ment and when the revisional Court had di­rected the Executing Court to consider the application for amendment of the decree and when the amendment, made in the decree, was never challenged by the judgment-debtor, when he was alive, his legal representative can­not challenge the amendment of the decree, for, whatever was binding on the judgment-debtor would remain binding on his legal rep­resentatives as well. Even if the present petitioners are legal representatives of the de­ceased-judgment-debtor and they were not made parties, the fact remains that as far as amendment of the decree is concerned, it was made during the lifetime of the judgment-debtor and since the judgment-debtor did not challenge the amendment of the decree, his legal representative cannot challenge the same. The amended decree is, therefore, binding on the present petitioners as the legal representatives. 10. I may point out that when a decree has been passed by a competent Court and the same has been put to execution, the en­deavour of the Executing Court must be to execute the decree by removing all conflicts regarding the identity of the decretal prop­erty by resorting to all such means as may be available in law. 11. In Bhavan Vaja & Ors. Vs. Solanki Henuji Khodaji Mansang & Anr, AIR 1972 SC 1371 , the Apex Court has held as fol­lows:- "But that does not mean that it (executing Court) has no duty to find out the true effect of that decree. For construing a decree, it can and in appropriate cases, it ought to, take into con­sideration the pleadings as well as the proceed­ings leading up to the decree. In order to find out the meaning of the words employed in a decree the Court often has to ascertain the cirsumstances under which those words came to be used. That is the plain duty of the execu­tion Court and if that Court fails to discharge that duty it has plainly failed to exercise that jurisdiction vested in it. In order to find out the meaning of the words employed in a decree the Court often has to ascertain the cirsumstances under which those words came to be used. That is the plain duty of the execu­tion Court and if that Court fails to discharge that duty it has plainly failed to exercise that jurisdiction vested in it. The jurisdiction of ex­ecution court does not begin and end with merely looking at the decree as it is finally drafted." 12. From the observations, made in Bhavan Vaja(supra), it becomes clear that while executing the decree, the Executing Court may have regard to the pleadings of the parties and may also take into consideration the judg­ment on which the decree was founded. An Executing Court may even appoint a Com­missioner, if required, for the purpose of iden­tification of the decretal property. Thus, aim of law is to ensure, as far as possible, legally permissible execution of a decree and not to defeat it. (See Rajwnat Singh Gulati & Ors. Vs. Haradhan Dutta, reported in (2002) 2 GLT 171, and Bhavan Vaja & Ors. Vs. Solanki Henuji Khodaji Mansang & Anr. AIR 1972 SC 1371 ). 13. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, I find no merit in the present revision. This revision is, therefore, not admitted and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed.