JUDGMENT D.V. Shylendra Kumar, J.—This second appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure is by the plaintiffs in OS No 26 of 1981, on the file of court of Munsiff at Gowribidanur, whose suit though had been decreed as prayed for declaring them to be the persons entitled for a 2/3rd share in the suit schedule property, which the sole defendant had purchased from the husband of first plaintiff, who also acted as guardian of plaintiffs 2 to 6 - minor children i.e. plaintiffs 2 to 5 being daughters and sixth plaintiff being the son - and are entitled for recovery of possession of 2/3rd of the suit schedule property with consequential rights etc., that judgment and decree having been reversed by the lower appellate court in RA No 30 of 1983, on the file of court of Civil Judge (Sr Dn), Chikkaballapur in terms of judgment dated 24-6-2000, which is questioned in this second appeal. The plaintiffs are seeking to get over this judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and for restoration of the decree that had been granted in their favour by the trial court and for such purpose this second appeal. 2. A few facts leading to the above appeal are that One Chikkanna had inherited an extent of 5 acre 23 guntas of agricultural land in Sy No 372 of Gangasnadra village, Gowribidanur taluk, in a family partition that had taken place amongst his brothers. This property had been sold on 14-5-1973 [ExP1] in favour of the defendant, indicating the consideration to be Rs. 6,000/-. The vendor Chikkanna, it appears, died on 3-2-1977. This property had been sold on 14-5-1973 [ExP1] in favour of the defendant, indicating the consideration to be Rs. 6,000/-. The vendor Chikkanna, it appears, died on 3-2-1977. It was the case of the plaintiffs that at the time of sale transaction i.e. in the year 1973, Chikkanna had four daughters through his wife Sunandamma, who, it appears, died in unfortunate circumstance, and Chikkanna had married first wife's sister Ratnamma, through whom he had got a son by name Nagendra; that the suit schedule property, which was an ancestral property which he had got by way of partition in the family, had been sold not for any legal necessitates, but because of his bad habits and without any proper consideration; that the sale transaction was a nominal one and therefore the plaintiffs have instituted the suit for declaration that this sale transaction does not bind their 2/3rd share in the suit schedule property and though the defendant may retain the 1/3rd share which Chikkanna would have otherwise got as his share, the other 2/3rd share will have to be parted in favour of plaintiffs and for recovery of this extent and restraint order thereafter from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property by the plaintiffs, the suit had been filed. 3. The original suit itself had been filed in the year 1981, to be precise, on 28-1-1981. The suit was contested. Defendant filed written statement. Plaint averments were all denied and the plaintiffs were put to strict proof of the plaint averments. 3. The original suit itself had been filed in the year 1981, to be precise, on 28-1-1981. The suit was contested. Defendant filed written statement. Plaint averments were all denied and the plaintiffs were put to strict proof of the plaint averments. It was pleaded that the sale transaction was neither a nominal transaction nor one to raise fund for the bad habits of Chikkanna, but it was for legal necessity, in the sense, to discharge the loans that Chikkanna had raised during his life time to maintain the family and other expenses of the family; that the defendant was a bona fide purchaser for valuable sale consideration and ever since the sale transaction, the defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property along with the existing well and jump-set; that the plaintiff did not have any right, title and interest to claim a share in the suit schedule property; that the defendant, after purchase of the property, effected considerable improvements; that there was no cause of action; that the suit is barred by limitation and not tenable in law and therefore pleaded for dismissal of the suit. 4. In the light of such rival pleadings, the trial court has framed the following issues: 1. Do plaintiffs prove that the suit property is the part and parcel of their ancestral undivided joint Hindu family? 2. Do they further prove that after the death of 1st wife of Late Chikkanna he was living with vices and to meet out his addicted vices he executed a nominal deed to the defendant without delivering possession to him? 3. Does the defendant proves that he purchased the suit property from deceased Chikkanna and his vendor sold it for the legal necessities and to discharge debts of the family? 4. Does he further prove that he has improved the suit property by way of spending huge amount on the suit property for better cultivation? 5. Do the plaintiff's prove that they are entitled for 2/3rd share in the property and separate possession thereof and consequential injunction against the defendant? 6. To what reliefs are the parties entitled? 5. On the basis of such issues, the parties went to trial. In support of the plaintiffs' case, the first plaintiff and other four witnesses were examined as PW1s to 5 and documentary evidence as per Ex P 1 to 5 have been marked. 6. To what reliefs are the parties entitled? 5. On the basis of such issues, the parties went to trial. In support of the plaintiffs' case, the first plaintiff and other four witnesses were examined as PW1s to 5 and documentary evidence as per Ex P 1 to 5 have been marked. On behalf of the defendant, the defendant was examined as DW1, besides examining two other witnesses, and also got marked documentary evidence ExDr1 to 13. 6. The learned judge of the trial court, on appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence, answered the issues in favour of the plaintiffs, particularly holding that the suit schedule property was part and parcel of the ancestral properties of Chikkanna - the vendor - and had retained the characteristics of a joint family also; that the vendor Chikkanna had been addicted to bad habits after the death of his first wife and during such time had executed the sale deed in question, even without; proper consideration; that the defendant had failed to prove that the property had been sold to him due to legal necessities and to discharge the debts of the family by Chikkanna; that the so-called improvement was also not made good by the defendant and therefore the trial court held that the plaintiffs were entitled for 2/3rd share in the suit schedule property and decreed for separate possession and consequential injunction was also grated in their favour. 7. It is not very clear on what basis the plaintiffs claim their share to be 2/3rd and on what basis the trial court actually decreed the suit for this ratio, but one can presume that the suit is decreed for separate possession and injunction. 8. Aggrieved defendant appealed to the lower appellate court and met with success. The lower appellate court on examination of rival contentions, formulated the following points for its consideration: 1. Whether 6th Plaintiff Nagendra son of Chikkanna was born prior to the execution of the sale deed dated 14.5.1973 by Chikkanna in favour of defendant? 2. Plaintiffs 1 to 5 are entitled for partition and separate possession of their shares in the suit property in view of Section 8(1)(d) of Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to challenge the sale deed dated 14.5.1973 executed by Chikkanna the father of plaintiffs 2 to 6 in favour of the defendant? 2. Plaintiffs 1 to 5 are entitled for partition and separate possession of their shares in the suit property in view of Section 8(1)(d) of Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to challenge the sale deed dated 14.5.1973 executed by Chikkanna the father of plaintiffs 2 to 6 in favour of the defendant? 4. Whether the sale deed executed by Chikkanna in favour of the defendant is binding on the plaintiffs? 5. Whether the sale deed is nominal, fraudulent and hence liable to be set-aside? 6. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim for partition and separate possession of their 2/3rd shares in the suit property? 7. Whether the judgment and decree of the lower court is capricious, illegal and without application of material facts and that it is liable to be set-aside? 8. What order? 9. All the points were answered in the negative and against the plaintiffs and in favour the defendant-appellant and in this view of the matter, the appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court was set aside and the suit was dismissed. 10. This appeal is in the second round before this Court, as in the earlier round, the defendant though had succeeded in his appeal in RA No 30 of 1983, the plaintiff had carried the matter to this Court by way of second appeal in RSA No 446 of 1985 and this Court in terms of the judgment dated 30-6-1997 had remanded the matter not only to examine the impact on the judgment and decree of the trial court in the light of Section 8(1)(d) of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, but also to examine the question of date of birth of sixth plaintiff, as the lower appellate court had proceeded on the basis that on the date of sale of suit schedule property, sixth plaintiff son had not been born and therefore there was no occasion at all to question the transaction. It was when the matter was remanded to lower appellate court, it yet again took the view that the date of birth of sixth plaintiff-son even in terms of the extract from the school record was about one year two and odd months after the sale and therefore sixth plaintiff will have no right to question the sale transaction and it was also held that the provision of Section 8 of Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 is not attracted to the present situation and with this the appellate court has concluded that the sale transaction was for legal necessity and accordingly the appeal was allowed. 11. It is aggrieved by this judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court, the plaintiffs have filed this second appeal. 12. While admitting this appeal, this Court had formulated the following question of law as arising for determination in this second appeal: 1. Whether the judgment and decree passed by the lower Court is opposed to the provisions of Section 6-A of the Hindu Succession Act as amended in Karnataka by Act 23/1994? 2. Whether lower Appellate Court could have set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court merely on the ground that the appellant No. 6 was not born at the time when the alleged sale deed was executed and whether the same could have been decided by the lower Appellate Court without there being any materials on record? 13. Sri Y K Narayana Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs submits that one another question of law viz., as to whether the lower appellate court was right in concluding that the sale transaction had been treated to be for a legal necessity, is a proper finding in law, particularly by applying the settled legal position as to what constitutes a legal necessity and as to in what manner it can be established and on whom the burden rests to establish and so also a further question as to the impact of the amendment to the parent Act by the Central Act No 39 of 2005 with effect from 9-9-2005, as this is a development in law during the pendency of this second appeal. 14. 14. Submission of Sri Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs is that the lower appellate court has committed a serious error in law in concluding that the sale transaction was for a legal necessity and particularly by pointing out the evidence of PW1, an attesting witness to the document, who had deposed that he had not seer any consideration being passed on at the time of execution of the sale deed, whereas it was the version of the defendant that consideration was paid in the presence of the witnesses at the time of execution of the deed and this coupled with the fact that the defendant had neither pleaded that he had made necessary enquiry to satisfy himself as to the legal necessity for effecting the sale by a member of a joint family and in the absence of such a plea and proof in support of the plea, the burden is on the purchaser to establish that the sale transaction was not only for a legal necessity, but he had made such enquiry and was satisfied that the transaction was for the requirement of the family, the learned judge of the lower appellate court could not have reversed the well reasoned and evidence based finding of the trial court on this aspect, which was issue No 3 in terms of the judgment of the trial court being answered against the defendant. 15. 15. In so far as the finding regarding the sixth plaintiff-son being not a person having any right, particularly as he had not taken birth at the time of sale transaction, but was born more than 1 year 2 months after the sale transaction, while Sri Narayana Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs fairly submits that this being a finding of fact cannot be got over in this second appeal, but nevertheless would seek support from the legal position as emerges from the provisions of Section 6A of the Hindu Succession Act 1956, as amended by the Karnataka Act No 23 of 1994 and would submit that this being a later amendment to the parent Act i.e. the central Act 30 of 1956, and having received the assent of the President, the provisions of Section 6A, 6B and 6C as inserted by the Karnataka Amendment Act would prevail in the State of Karnataka and therefore would urge that the plaintiffs 2 to 5, who are the daughters of the vendor Chikkanna, are to be treated on par with the son, in the sense, these daughters have also same right as the male coparceners and if so, they having taken birth at the time of the sale transaction in question, they have every right to question the sale transaction, if it was not for a legal necessity and can definitely claim that when once it is established that the sale transaction was not for legal necessity, to the extent of their share in the sale transaction does not bind them and are therefore entitled to a declaration to this effect. Provisions of Section 6A to 6C of the Karnataka Amendment Act read as under: 6A. Equal rights to daughter in coparcenary property. Provisions of Section 6A to 6C of the Karnataka Amendment Act read as under: 6A. Equal rights to daughter in coparcenary property. Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 6 of this Act, - (a) in a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall by birth become a co-parcener in her own right in the same manner as the son and have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son inclusive of the right to claim by survivorship and shall be subject to the same liabilities and disabilities in respect thereto as the son; (b) at a partition in such Joint Hindu Family the coparcener property shall be so divided as to allot to a daughter the same share as is allotable to a son: Provided that the share which a predeceased son or a predeceased daughter would have got at the partition if he or she had been alive at the time of the partition, shall be allotted to the surviving child of such predeceased son or of such predeceased daughter: Provided further that the share allotable to the predeceased child of the predeceased son or of a predeceased daughter, if such child had been alive at the time of the partition, shall be allotted to the child of such predeceased child of the predeceased son or of such predeceased daughter, as the case may be; (c) any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of the provisions of Clause (a) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcener ownership and shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, as property capable of being disposed of by her by will or other testamentary disposition; (d) nothing in Clause (b) shall apply to a daughter married prior to or to a partition which had been effected before the commencement of Hindu Succession (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1990. 6B. Interest to devolve by survivorship on death. 6B. Interest to devolve by survivorship on death. When a female Hindu dies after the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1990, having at the time of her death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcener property, her interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcener and not in accordance with this Act: Provided that if the deceased had left any child or child of a pre-deceased child, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcener property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. Explanation. - (1) For the purposes of this section the interest of female Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to her if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before her death, irrespective of whether she was entitled to claim partition or not. (2) Nothing contained in the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a person who, before the death of the deceased had separated himself or herself from the coparcener, or any of his or her heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein. 6C. Preferential right to acquire property in certain cases. - (1) Where, after the commencement of Hindu Succession (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1990 an interest in any immovable property of an intestate or in any business carried on by him or her, whether solely or in conjunction with others devolves under Sections 6A or 6B upon two or more heirs and any one of such heirs proposes to transfer his or her interest in the property or business, the other heirs shall have a preferential right to acquire the interest proposed to be transferred. (2) The consideration for which any interest in the property of the deceased may be transferred under Sub-section (1) shall, in the absence of any agreement between the parties, be determined by the court, on application, being made to it in this behalf, and if any person proposing to acquire the interest is not willing to acquire it for the consideration so determined, such person shall be liable to pay all costs of or incidental to the application. (3) If there are two or more heirs proposing to acquire any interest under, this section, that heir who offers the highest consideration for the transfer shall be preferred. Explanation. In this section 'Court' means the court within the limits of whose jurisdiction the immovable property is situate or the business is carried on, and includes any other court which the State Government may by notification in the official Gazette specify in this behalf. 16. Sri Narayana Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs would submit that though this amended Act has come into force with effect from 30-7-1994, in the light of the provisions of Section 6A(a), the right of a daughter in respect of properties which are joint family governed by Mitakshara law, which is a right a coparcenar by birth and daughters have the same right and characteristics of a male member born in the family and therefore such rights relates back to the date of her birth, though the amended Act itself is operative with effect from 30-7-1994. However, with regard to the provisions of clause-b of Section 6A of the amended Act, which is a provision which carves out an exception to the provision of Section 6A, operating in a situation where the daughter had got married or partition had taken place prior to the amended Act came into force viz., prior to 30-7-1994, Sri Sharma would submit that while the saving regarding the partition does not apply in the present set of facts, there: is no actual partition, with regard to the exclusion of the applicability of the Section to married daughters is concerned, would draw attention to a single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sugalabai Vs. Gundappa A. Maradi and Others, ILR (2007) KAR 4790, indicating that the provision excluding the applicability of Section 6A to daughters married prior to the commencement of the Act having been held to be void, the provision cannot operate as of now and therefore all daughters can claim the relief in the suit and to the extent their entitlements for a share in the coparcener property, the sale transaction in question does not bind them and a decree to this effect should be granted in favour of the appellants-plaintiffs. 17. In the alternative. 17. In the alternative. Sri Narayana Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs, submits that on facts, it is not in dispute that the two daughters only were married before the Karnataka Act came into operation on 30-7-2004 and two daughters remained unmarried as on that date and the exception carved out in clause-b would not in any way affect their rights. 18. With regard to the impact of the later central amendment to the parent Act, amending Section 6 of the parent Act, submission of Sri Sharma is that while it is true that the central act makes an exception to the applicability of the provisions of Section 6, which reads as under: 6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property. - (1) On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, in a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall, - (a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son; (b) have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son; (c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son, and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener. Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall affect or invalidated any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004. (2) Any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of Sub-section (1) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force in, as property capable of being disposed of by her by testamentary disposition. (2) Any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of Sub-section (1) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force in, as property capable of being disposed of by her by testamentary disposition. (3) Where a Hindu dies after the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, his interest in the property of a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship, and the coparcenary property shall be deemed to have been divided as if a partition had taken place and, - (a) the daughter is allotted the same share as is allotted to a son; (b) the share of the pre-deceased son or a pre-deceased daughter, as they would have got had they been alive at the time of partition, shall be allotted to the surviving child of such pre-deceased son or of such pre-deceased daughter; and (c) the share of the pre-deceased child of a pre-deceased son or of a predeceased daughter, as such child would have got had he or she been alive at the time of the partition, shall be allotted to the child of such pre-deceased child of the predeceased son or a pre-deceased daughter, as the case may be. Explanation. - For the purposes of this sub-section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Explanation. - For the purposes of this sub-section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. (4) After the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, no court shall recognise any right to proceed against a son, grandson or great-grandson for the recovery of any debt due from his father, grandfather or great grandfather solely on the ground of the pious obligation under the Hindu law, of such son, grandson or great-grandson to discharge any such debt: Provided that in the case of any debt contracted before the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, nothing contained in this subsection shall affect - (a) the right of any creditor to proceed against the son, grandson or great-grandson, as the case may be; or (b) any alienation made in respect of or in satisfaction of, any such debt, and any such right or alienation shall be enforceable under the rule of pious obligation in the same manner and to the same extent as it would have been enforceable as if the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 had not been enacted. Explanation. - For the purposes of Clause (a), the expression 'son', 'grandson' or 'great-grandson" shall be deemed to refer to the son, grandson or great-grandson, as the case may be, who was born or adopted prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. (5) Nothing contained in this section shall apply to a partition, which has been effected before the 20th day of December, 2004. Explanation, - For the purposes of this section "partition" means any partition made by execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) or partition effected by a decree of a court. Explanation, - For the purposes of this section "partition" means any partition made by execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) or partition effected by a decree of a court. and would exclude all such alienation which had taken place before the 20th day of December 2004, in view of the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Amended Act, would nevertheless submit that while this proviso under the later central Act seems to carve out an exception from the applicability of the Sub-section (1) of Section 6 in situations such as any sale, partition or even testamentary dispossession of property which had taken place before 20-12-2004, so far as the earlier State amendment to the Act is concerned, the state Act having made an exception only in respect of the partition which had taken place prior to the commencement of the state amended Act i.e. the partitions which had taken place prior to 30-7-1994 and sale transaction which had taken place prior to the commencement of the amended Act having not been so saved by any express provision, the State Act, which provides or confers the benefits of a coparcener's right in favour of daughters, is not affected by the prior alienation, in the sense, the prior alienation is also subjected to same restrictions and limitations, to which it will have to be subjected to and decided under the customary Hindu Law vis-a-vis rights of a co-parcener and the central Act not providing for such exception in respect of the very right, the State Act can continue to operate without any impediment and therefore submits that in so far as the exception mentioned in the Central Act to exclude the alienation prior to 2004 from the applicability and the effect of the central amendment is not attracted to the present situation, but it is only the State provisions that prevail and as such the plaintiffs had become coparceners by birth under the State Act earlier and continued to retain all rights and the exception carved out in the Central Act cannot affect such rights. 19. 19. Submission proceeded on the premise that while the State Act does not have a provision and operates to the extent of making an exception to prior partition, the central Act, which has this provision with regard to the alienation, operates on its own and there being no conflict or inconsistency in the state Act and the central Act, the provision of state Act continues to operate and therefore submits that daughters can impugn the validity of the sale transactions as coparceners and the later central enactment does not in any way affect this right. 20. It is also submitted that the later central Act having not expressly repealed the State enactment, if at all by way of implied provision, there is no repugnancy and conflict between the state and the central Acts and there being no conflict, repugnancy and therefore the state amended Act operates in its field, and if so, the right as given by the state Act in favour of daughters to be coparceners in the joint family property continue to operate without any limitations. 21. Sri Narayana Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs, has placed reliance on the following decisions in support of his submissions. Submission that the amendment in terms of Section 6A by the State amended Act should make applicable is sought to be supported by the law declared by the Supreme Court in the case of S. Sai Reddy Vs. S. Narayana Reddy and Others, (1991) 3 SCC 647 , which arose from the Andhra Pradesh Act in the context of a like amendment that had been effected by the state of Andhra Pradesh to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and in the context of the daughters' acquiring a right under this Act during the pendency of the final decree proceedings, though there was no preliminary decree in their favour for their share, but they had only a right for maintenance and marriage expenses against the family properties, which had been sought to be shared amongst the three male members of the family. Submission is that on the ratio of this decision, the Karnataka Amended Act, which had come into effect during the pendency of the appeal before this Court in the first round of litigation, which had not been noticed by this Court, attention was only drawn to Section 8 of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 and the amended provision had escaped the attention of the lower appellate court also after the remand from this Court. 22. With regard to the principles of law applicable in cases where a purchaser of a joint family property has to make good that it was for a family necessity, Sri Narayana Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs, has placed reliance on the decision of our High Court in the case of Ganapati Santaram Bhosale v. Ramachandra Subbarao Kulkarni ILR 1988 Kar 1115 and would submit that on the ratio of this case, the finding of the lower appellate court that the sale transaction was for a legal necessity clearly not tenable and cannot be sustained. 23. With regard to the share that the plaintiffs are entitled to, submission of Sri Narayana Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs, is that that while the first plaintiff - mother, who was the wife of Chikkanna, who sold the property - is entitled for a share even in termed of the amended Section 6A of the Karnataka Act, submits that the four daughters who were living at the time of the sale transaction have every right and if their share is to be ascertained in the suit schedule property, it will have to be on the basis of notional partition prior to the sale transaction, in which event, the father and the four daughters, who are on par with other coparceners, have to share the property in equal shares and if so, each will get 1/5th share and therefore the plaintiffs even otherwise are entitled to 4/5th share in the suit schedule property and to the extent of this share, the sale transaction does not bind them. 24. 24. In the alternative, it is submitted that assuming two of the daughters had been married prior to the Karnataka Act comes into force and the exception carved out under the State Act does operate independently of the later central amendment, even then the two daughters with their father who constitute the co-parcenery, each will get 1/3rd share and the defendant can claim only 1/3rd share, which the father of the plaintiffs 2 to 6 can claim and 2/3rd share will have to be given to the two unmarried daughters and if so, the decree as granted by the trial court will have to be sustained. 25. Appearing on behalf of the defendant-respondent, Sri S H Prasannakumar, learned Counsel, would submit that while it is no doubt true that the Karnataka Act of the year 1994 did confer right in favour of daughters to be treated on par with sons and to be treated as coparceners in the joint family, would nevertheless submit that if the later central amended Act having come into force with effect from 9-9-2005, on the very reasoning as the State Act would have applied, will have to be applied to the present fact situation, and if so applied, submission is that in view of the proviso to Section 6 of the parent Act as amended by the 2005 Act, even alienation made prior to 20-12-2004 are all saved from the applicability of the amended Section 6 of the Act and if so, the daughters cannot seek to get over the sale transaction of the year 1973. Submission is that while assuming that the daughters can claim a right by birth, such rights cannot be enforced in respect of a sale transaction, which had become concluded before 2004 and therefore submits that the plaintiffs are not entitled for a declaration as sought for in respect of the suit schedule property, which had been sold way back in the year 1973. 26. Alternative submission is that even if the State Act would operate only from 30-7-1994 and a transaction of the year 1973 cannot have any bearing and therefore also the transaction is not affected either by the Stare Act or the later central Act. 27. 26. Alternative submission is that even if the State Act would operate only from 30-7-1994 and a transaction of the year 1973 cannot have any bearing and therefore also the transaction is not affected either by the Stare Act or the later central Act. 27. In so far as the other submissions of Sri Narayana Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs are concerned, Sri Prasannakumar would submit that the lower appellate court has rightly concluded regarding the sale transaction being one for legal necessity and therefore even otherwise there is no warrant for interference in the judgment and decree as passed by the lower appellate court, as if the transaction would bind a co-parcener, as to whether effected for a family necessity, it does not make any difference, whether it is a daughter has right as a coparcener or son as a co-parcener and therefore would urge for dismissal of the appeal. 28. I have bestowed my anxious consideration to the submissions at the Bar, perused the pleadings and evidence adduced in support of the pleadings as also the judgments and decrees passed by the courts below. 29. While the finding recorded on the legal necessity as rendered by the lower appellate court does not appear to be very correct in law, particularly for the reason that the lower appellate court has proceeded on mere assumptions and surmises as valid consideration has passed in respect of the transaction, based on the evidence of DW1 to 3 and based on the recital in the document itself. It is well settled that the burden to prove the aspect of legal necessity is on the purchaser and it is discharged only when the purchaser has made good the case that he had made commensurate enquiry regarding the need for sale [of a property] by a member of a joint family and was satisfied about it. Only this aspect is stated, the defendant-purchaser is bound to make good this position in law to sustain the validity of the sale transaction effected by a member of the joint family, on the premise that it is a transaction for a legal necessity of the family and binds all other members of the family also. Of course, the person impeaching the validity of such transaction should have a right to impeach the same and such right must have been affected by the transaction. Of course, the person impeaching the validity of such transaction should have a right to impeach the same and such right must have been affected by the transaction. While plaintiffs 2 to 5 were undoubtedly minors at the time of the transaction and therefore their father while had legal authority to effect the sale on their behalf also, if it was for their benefit and for a legal necessity of the family and the transaction will automatically bind them. 30. The only reason assigned by the learned judge of the lower appellate court for concluding that the transaction was for a legal necessity, proceeds on the premise that vendor Chikkanna had no other source of livelihood; that the suit schedule property was the only source of livelihood and it was not a productive land and this coupled with the fact that he had suffered bereavement in the form of losing his first wife and contracting another marriage with some litigation in the family and there being huge debts incurred in this regard and therefore could conclude that the sale transaction was to meet or discharge such loan transaction etc. the entire inference is on assumptions. It is not based on actual evidence, but on a reasoning that the vendor being the head of the family and being not very economically sound position, definitely would have incurred debts and therefore would have sold the property for discharging such debts. 31. A possibility or probability which is inferred assuming a set of facts and circumstances is definitely not a substitute for providing proof that the transaction was for a legal necessity of the family. This coupled with the fact that a witness who is the attestor to the document has deposed that he did not see any consideration being paid at the time of the execution of sale deed, casts doubt about the transaction being a true, bona fide transaction, as in so far as the proof to establish the legal necessity is concerned, it should be necessarily established that the sale transaction was also for adequate consideration to bind the other members of the family. There is nothing on record to indicate that the sale transaction was either for adequate consideration or consideration was actually passed on, but on the contrary, a doubt about the payment is created as the very attesting witness has spoken contrary to the version of the defendant that the defendant had paid the sale consideration in favour of the vendor. It is for this reason, I hold that the learned judge of the lower appellate court has committed an error in concluding that the sale transaction was one for the legal necessity of the family. 32. While it is true that if the sale transaction is not for a legal necessity, the transaction does not bind the other members of the joint family, other than the share of the person executing the sale deed, it is only if such other members have a right and not otherwise. It is for this reason that Sri Narayana Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellants, has vehemently submitted that the daughters have a right as coparceners in the family and that right having been acquired by birth, in the light of the provisions of Section 6A of the Karnataka Act, amending the central Act. While it is true that a change of law, if has taken place during the pendency of a proceeding has to be applied and the decision in the case of S. Saireddy [supra], relied upon by Sri Y R Narayana Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs is definitely an authority for this proposition, for the same reason the central Act of 2005 having further amended the parent Act, the impact of this amendment cannot escape the applicability to the present situation. 33. There are two ways of understanding the impact of the later central amendment. One is that the state amendment was to the provisions of Section 6 to the parent central Act Though the state amendment is virtually one supplementing the provisions of Section 6 of the parent central Act, are sought to prevail over the provisions of Section 6 of the parent central Act, in view of the non-absent clause at the very beginning of Section 6A, as introduced by the state Act and that the amended state Act having received the assent of the President. It is for this reason, in terms of the provisions of Article 254 of the Constitution of India, the provisions of Section 6A of the Act as amended by the state legislature would prevail over the provisions of Section 6 of the parent central Act, notwithstanding such provision being either in conflict or in any way inconstant with Section 6 of the parent central Act. It is no doubt true as to whether there is any conflict or otherwise has to be ascertained on an examination of the provisions of the two enactments and the sections contained therein. 34. While the position in terms of the state amended Act is clearly in favour of the plaintiff, particularly as the right given to a daughter is in terms of the language of Section 6A(a) being clear that daughter becomes a co-parcener in her own right by birth and quite naturally this right has to operate from the day she takes birth in the family and this position could have remained without any obstructions, the later amendment to the central Act has made some difference to this. The later central amendment having virtually substituted the original Section 6 of the parent central Act and being a later central legislation, necessarily has to prevail and the state Act has to yield. One possibility as indicated in the state Act is in substitution of the earlier Section 6 of the parent central Act and if the earlier Section 6 of the parent central Act itself is amended, the state amendment automatically goes. But, in the present case, the state amendment being in the nature of supplement to the provisions of Section 6 of the parent central Act, the impact of the state amendment on the original Section 6 of the parent central Act and the effect of the later central enactment both will have to be examined. 35. One view is that if the non-obstinate clause contained in Section 6-A of the State Amended Act is only with reference to the original Section 6 in the parent central Act and that Section 6 in the parent central Act itself having now undergone a change, this is no more applicable. 35. One view is that if the non-obstinate clause contained in Section 6-A of the State Amended Act is only with reference to the original Section 6 in the parent central Act and that Section 6 in the parent central Act itself having now undergone a change, this is no more applicable. The other possibility is if the state amendment were by way of supplement and could still constitute a supplement to an amended Section of the parent central Act as amended by the central Act, then the question will arise as to whether they can stand together without any conflict and if so, whether both the provisions can co-exist 36. In so far as the applicability of the amended law in pending proceedings is concerned, this is an aspect which is beyond any doubt or controversy now and the amended law does apply to the pending proceedings. It is because of this reason, that while the state amendment in the first instance applied to the proceedings which were at the stage of first round of second appeal before this Court and so also the central amendment of the year 2005, which now becomes applicable in the second round of second appeal before this Court. It is because both the state amendment and the central amendment have become applicable, the effect of the applicability of these two statutory provisions as has come into existence is required to be examined and the matter decided on such basis. 37. The subject matter of legislation being in Concurrent List, both the state legislature and the union parliament have competence to legislate on such matters. It so happens the parent Act was a piece of legislation by the union parliament. It is for this reason that such legislation is governed by the provisions of Article 254 of the Constitution of India. A perusal of Article 254 indicates that the parliamentary process is very apparent and while normally law made by the parliament prevails and the law made by the state legislature can be in force in the state so long as it co-exists with the law made by the parliament. If there is a conflict or what is described as repugnancy in this Article, it is the law made by the parliament, which prevails. If there is a conflict or what is described as repugnancy in this Article, it is the law made by the parliament, which prevails. Only exception to this rule is when a supplement state enactment makes a departure to the earlier law made by the parliament and that the state legislation having been reserved for the assent of the President and has so received the assent and in such an event, to the extent of the inconsistency or conflict, it is only the state legislation which prevails in the particular state, notwithstanding that being in conflict with the earlier law made by the parliament. However, if the parliament later in any other manner amends the law, it is the later union legislation that prevails and the earlier state legislation yields. 38. In the present case, as noticed earlier, the legislation i.e. the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was a piece of legislation by the union parliament. It is later that the state legislature by way of a state amendment supplemented Section 6 of the central parent Act, introduced Section 6A, 6B and 6C. This legislation having been received the assent of the President, quite naturally, prevails in the state of Karnataka, but the parliament having again amended Section 6 of the central parent Act, it is the law made by the parliament that can have ascendancy and will prevail. Of course, if both the laws can co-exist without any conflict i.e. in the event of repugnancy not arising between the two laws, each law can operate in its own spelt out area and can remain in force. The provisions of Article 254 operate even in a situation where there is repugnancy between a law made by the state legislature and the union parliament, even when they are under two separate enactments. It is a fortiori so in the case of a law which is made by the parliament, to which the state legislature supplements act, amends and operates by the assent of the President till the parliament again modifies or amends the provision. 39. In the present case, all variations of the amendments are to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 [central Act No 30 of 1956]. 39. In the present case, all variations of the amendments are to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 [central Act No 30 of 1956]. Therefore, it can be generally assumed that when once a later amendment to Section 6 of the central parent Act is effected by a central legislation, that alone should prevail and the earlier state amendment automatically yields to the central legislation. 40. However, Sri Narayana Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellants has submitted that Section 6A of the Act as amended by the state legislature by Karnataka State Act No 23 of 1994, not coming into conflict with the provisions of the amended Section 6 of the central parent Act, as amended by the central Act No 39 of 2005, this aspect can also be examined by applying the test of existence of repugnancy. Submission of Sri Sharma is that the state law has not made any saving in favour of the earlier alienation which had taken place any time prior to the state amendment coming into force and therefore the right given to a daughter to acquire the rights of a co-parcener by birth operates, notwithstanding an earlier alienation and is subjected to only such limitation, as the other coparceners may be found. This question does assume significance, as I have already answered the issue relating to the finding of the learned judge of the lower appellate court on the aspect of legal necessity against the defendant and therefore if the daughters get a right of coparcener property on par with other coparceners, they virtually stand in the position of sons, who, by themselves could have challenged the legality or validity of the earlier transaction, if it was not for a family necessity and not for adequate consideration and could have claimed that such transaction does not bind the share of the questioning coparcener. 41. It is in this background, the question of existence of repugnancy between the two laws, which is required to be examined for the present case. 41. It is in this background, the question of existence of repugnancy between the two laws, which is required to be examined for the present case. Though it is contended that the state law did not contain a provision like the subsequent central law with regard to the savings of prior alienation and therefore the two provisions can operate independently, particularly the possibility of the later amendment by the union parliament coming into conflict with an existing state law does not happen at all, the argument is only too good to be accepted for the reason that it is not what the words or sentences are in existence in the two enactments, but the impact or the operation of the two provisions in a given situation. This test has been very succinctly and effectively indicated in Colin Howard's Australian Federal Constitutional Law, Second Edition, as under: An obvious inconsistency arises when the two enactments produce different legal results when applied to the same facts. ... This test has been followed and applied by the Supreme Court in the case of M. Karunanidhi Vs. Union of India and Another, AIR 1979 SC 898 and subsequent other cases and in fact was followed and applied by our high court in the case of Sugalabai [supra], for the very purpose of declaring that the provisions of Section 6A(d) of the state enactment are repugnant to the provisions of Section 6 of the central Act of 2005 and therefore it is rendered void to the extent of repugnancy. 42. If the said test is applied to the present situation, while the result in the state enactment can be that an earlier alienation like one questioned in the present case, is not saved by any exception and therefore the plaintiffs could succeed, if other aspects are made good, and if the provisions of Section 6 of the later central Act is applied, notwithstanding the fact situation being the same, the plaintiffs fail in securing a decree for the reason that the alienation being prior to 20-12-2004, is exempted from the applicability of the amended Section 6, which expressly confers right in favour of daughters on par with other male coparceners and therefore the daughters though a co-parcener cannot still question the legality of the earlier sale transaction and if that is the only ground on which the declaration is sought for, the suit fails. That means two different results are forthcoming as on the application of the state law, the suit has to be decreed but on the application of the later central Act, the suit has to be dismissed. If this is the outcome, then there is repugnancy between the two provisions. It is not material whether the earlier state Act did not contain any such savings and therefore it can be said that there are no inconsistent provision and both the enactments do not contain the same provisions. It is not the existence of the particular provision that matters, but the overall effect of the statutory provisions in a given situation. 43. It is, therefore to be held that Section 6A(d) of the state Act though does not contain a saving clause in favour of a prior alienation like in the central Act, the central Act necessarily operates and it is immaterial whether the state Act did contain any such provision to the extent that the state Act brings about a contrary result, such provision cannot operate and the provision of the central Act which brings about such a result inevitably operates and therefore the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 6 as amended by the central Act No 39 of 2005 to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 has to be applied to the present fact situation, in which event, the claim of the plaintiffs cannot be entertained and the suit inevitably has to be dismissed.) 44. Though the dismissal of the suit is not for the very precise reasons, which were given by the learned judge of the lower appellate court, I find that the findings as recorded by the learned judge of the lower appellate court were wrong and the very findings as given by the trial court are right i.e. on the issue of legal necessity having not been proved for effecting the transaction, nevertheless, the plaintiffs i.e. the four daughters of Chikkanna, having no right to question the alienation in the light of the provisions of Section 6 of the parent central Act, as amended by Central Act No 39 of 2005, the suit has to fail and accordingly this appeal is dismissed, confirming the dismissal of the suit by the lower appellate court, though for different reasons. 45. Parties to bear their respective costs.