JUDGMENT Hon’ble Shishir Kumar, J.—This writ petition has been filed for quashing the order impugned dated 13.11.2007 passed by respondent No. 2 (Annexure 4 to the writ petition) and further quashing the order dated 30.10.2007 passed by Respondent No. 1 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition). 2. The facts arising out of the present writ petition are that the petitioner is a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, having its factory at A-3, Industrial Area, Surajpur, Greater Noida, district Gautam Budh Nagar and is engaged in the business of manufacturing two wheeler motor-cycles. The petitioner company employed its own skilled, non-skilled, technical and other ministerial staff. It is stated that the petitioner company had its own temporary ad-hoc or regular, permanent establishment of workers engaged by the company from time to time. The Respondent No. 3 raised an industrial dispute. The State Government in exercise of power conferred under Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was pleased to refer the dispute for adjudication before the Labour Court (1) U.P. Ghaziabad. The said adjudication was registered before the Labour Court (1) U.P. Ghaziabad as Case No. 682 of 2001. On 7.10.2002, the workman representative submitted that written statement and written statement on behalf of the petitioner was also submitted on 31.3.2003. The petitioner raised various preliminary objections and affidavits were exchanged by the parties. 3. It has also been submitted that the Union which was earlier registered, was de-registered by the Registrar, Trade Union, U.P. Kanpur and a communication to that effect was sent by the Registrar vide its letter dated 31.12.2004. The case remained pending before the Labour Court (1) U.P. Ghaziabad for one reason or another, mainly because there was no presiding officer. The State Government vide its order dated 18.4.2006 established a Labour Court now in district Gautam Budh Nagar vide its order dated 25.10.2007. The State Government exercising the power under Section 6-G of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and under Section 33-B of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central Act), was pleased to transfer all pending cases in the Labour Court (1) U.P. Ghaziabad and the Labour Court (2) U.P. Ghaziabad pertaining to `Noida area’ district Ghaziabad. The State Government exercising the power under Section 6-G of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and under Section 33-B of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central Act), was pleased to transfer all pending cases in the Labour Court (1) U.P. Ghaziabad and the Labour Court (2) U.P. Ghaziabad pertaining to `Noida area’ district Ghaziabad. It has been stated that the industry of which the dispute falls is within the district of Gautam Budh Nagar, as it is clear from the reference and consequently by virtue of the order dated 25.10.2007, meaning thereby the adjudication case No. 682 of 2001 pending before the Labour Court (1) U.P. Ghaziabad stands transferred to District Gautam Budh Nagar. In utter surprise the State Government by another order dated 30.10.2007 transferred the adjudication case No. 682 of 2001 pending before the Labour Court (1) U.P. Ghaziabad to the Labour Court (2) U.P. Ghaziabad. It states that the order has been passed in exercise of powers conferred under Section 6-G of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act read with Section 33-B of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central Act). The reason disclosed in the said order was that presiding officer is unwell. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the order dated 30.10.2007 has been sent to the Employer petitioner. However, on oath it has been submitted that the petitioner has not received the said order at any point of time. The petitioner came to know regarding the aforesaid order on 19.11.2007. Then the petitioner directed his representative to obtain a certified copy of the order and after obtaining a certified copy of the order, it came to the knowledge of the petitioner that at no point of time any notice or opportunity was given before passing of the order of transfer. A submission has been made on behalf of the petitioner that once an earlier order of transfer of jurisdiction to a particular case has been passed in view of formation of the Labour Court, the case cannot be re-transferred again, as it cannot be treated to be pending any more before the Labour Court (1) U.P. Ghaziabad. On the day when the order was passed, the Court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the case on the basis of void and illegal order. On the day when the order was passed, the Court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the case on the basis of void and illegal order. The reason given in the order of transfer is totally misconceived as the jurisdiction of cases pertaining to Gautam Budh Nagar having already been transferred to the Labour Court, Noida, there was no occasion to pass subsequent order transferring the adjudication case No. 682 of 2001 from the Labour Court (1) U.P. Ghaziabad to the Labour Court (2) U.P. Ghaziabad. 4. Further, an argument has been made on behalf of the petitioner that as the Union was already de-registered, therefore, there was no occasion to make an application for transferring the case and the application filed by the Union itself was not maintainable. Further, it has been brought to the notice of this Court that in similar circumstances regarding maintainability of the claim this Court has passed an order that even the de-registered Union can represent the workmen. This Court has allowed the petition and against that order a special leave petition has been filed in which the interim order as regards the further proceedings has been stayed. Therefore, in view of aforesaid facts, the application for transfer on behalf of the Union itself was not maintainable. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance upon the powers conferred under the Act as referred to Section 4-K of the Act and submitted that in view of aforesaid provisions reference is always to a particular Court or tribunal. As such though there is a power conferred to the State Government under Section 6-G of the Act but that has to be exercised in total consonance of the aforesaid provision. As such though there is a power conferred to the State Government under Section 6-G of the Act but that has to be exercised in total consonance of the aforesaid provision. Section 4-K and 6-G of the Act are being reproduced below : “4-K. Reference of disputes to Labour Court or Tribunal.—Where the State Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time by order in writing refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute to a Labour Court if the matter of industrial dispute is one of those contained in the First Schedule, or to a Tribunal if the matter of dispute is one contained in the First Schedule or the Second Schedule for adjudication : Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule and is not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen, the State Government may, if it so thinks fit, make the reference to a Labour Court.” 6-G. Power to transfer certain proceedings.—(1) The State Government may by order in writing for reasons to be recorded withdraw and transfer a proceeding from— (i) one Labour Court to another Labour Court or any Tribunal; (ii) one Tribunal, to another Tribunal or to a Labour Court if the dispute is within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, for the disposal of the proceeding and the Labour Court or Tribunal to which the proceeding is so transferred may, subject to any special directions in the order of transfer, proceed either de novo or from the stage at which the proceeding was so transferred. (2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1) any Tribunal, if so authorized by the State Government, may transfer any proceeding under Section 6-E or Section 6-F pending before it to any one of the Labour Courts specified for the disposal of such proceedings by the State Government by notification in the official Gazette and the Labour Court to which the proceeding is so transferred shall dispose of the same.” 6. Taking support of the aforesaid contention, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there is no doubt that the State Government has a power to transfer the case from one Labour Court to another Labour Court or any Tribunal but that power has to be exercised in writing for reasons to be recorded for the purpose of withdrawal of the said case from one Court and to transfer the same to another Tribunal. As the petitioner has never been afforded an opportunity and as such he was not in a position to submit before the State Government that once the order of transfer after formation of the Labour Court at Gautam Budh Nagar has already been exercised no further order can be passed. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in 1990 (60) FLR 785, Management, M/s. M.N. Nally Bharat Engineering Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others, and reliance has been placed upon two paragraphs mentioned at page 792. The same is being reproduced below : “In the present case, the State has withdrawn the pending reference from the Labour Court, Dhanbad and transferred it to another Labour Court at the distant District of Patna, on the representation of the workman, without getting it verified from the management. The State in fairness ought to have got it verified by giving an opportunity to the management which is a party to the pending reference. Denial of that opportunity is a fatal flaw to the decision of the Government. The management need not establish particular prejudice for want of such opportunity. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan (19), Chinnappa Reddy, J., after referring to the observation of Donaldson, J., in Altco Ltd. v. Sutherland (20), said that the concept that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done is basic to our system and it is concerned not with a case of actual injustice but with the appearance of injustice or possible injustice. It was emphasized that the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary.” 8. It was emphasized that the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary.” 8. Further, reliance has been placed by the counsel for the petitioner upon a judgment reported in 2002 (95) FLR 589 , M/s. Escorts Yamaha Motor Ltd. v. Secretary, Branch of Labour Secretariat, U.P. Kanpur and others. Taking support of the aforesaid judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in paragraph 4 of the said judgment, it has been held by this Court that transfer of reference from one district to another on the application of the Union Workmen without affording an opportunity to the petitioner employer the order of transfer is not sustainable in law. Reliance has also been placed upon a judgment in the case of Management, M/s. M.S. Nally Bharat Engineering Co. Ltd. (supra). Further submission has been made on behalf of the petitioner upon a judgment reported in AIR 1973 SC 2281 , Shree Sita Ram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court and others. Taking support of the aforesaid judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there is no dispute to this effect that power of transfer is there but that has to be exercised judicially in accordance with the provisions of law and the State Government has got no jurisdiction to withdraw a case already referred for adjudication. 9. On the other hand, Sri Shyam Narain learned Advocate has filed an impleadment application on behalf of various workmen and Ms. Bushra Maryam has filed a counter affidavit on behalf of the Union. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted and placed reliance upon paragraphs 5, 6(a) and 6(b) of the counter affidavit filed on their behalf, stating therein that the petitioner company is situate in village Surajpur which falls in Greater Noida Area separate from the Noida area. In support of the aforesaid pleading he has annexed the documents to that effect as Annexure CA-3 and CA-4 to the counter affidavit and wanted to show that in the list mentioned regarding the jurisdiction of Industrial Court, the name of petitioner company is mentioned at serial No. 102 of the said list. In support of the aforesaid pleading he has annexed the documents to that effect as Annexure CA-3 and CA-4 to the counter affidavit and wanted to show that in the list mentioned regarding the jurisdiction of Industrial Court, the name of petitioner company is mentioned at serial No. 102 of the said list. Further submission has been made that in the facts and circumstances of the present case as the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court (1) U.P. Ghaziabad Sri Swant Singh was suffering from cancer and was not able to hold Court and was not doing any judicial work with effect from February, 2007 and, as such, in that circumstances as the matter was pending from 2001 and it was not being decided, therefore, an application was made for transfer of the said case to another Court in the same premises. Further an argument has been made on behalf of the respondents that petitioner company is not able to show regarding any prejudice caused to him by transferring the case from the Labour Court (1) U.P. Ghaziabad to the Labour Court (2) U.P. Ghaziabad as it was fully proved from the record that officer of the Court No. (1) U.P. Ghaziabad was not doing any judicial work and was suffering from a disease as such in that circumstances the State Government has passed the order transferring the case from one Court to another as such it cannot be said that the order passed by the State Government is in any way illegal and without jurisdiction. 10. Further, submission has been made that an application to recall of order was made by the petitioner and an order was passed to that effect considering the claim of petitioner and application filed by the petitioner was rejected by order dated 11.12.2007. 11. Further, submission has been made on behalf of the respondents that fact remains to this effect that the Presiding Officer was not proceeding with the matter due to illness, it was not necessary in such circumstances to give a notice and opportunity to the petitioner as in view of the order impugned no prejudice was going to be caused to the petitioner. 13. 13. Sri Shyam Narain learned counsel for Workman has placed reliance upon a judgment reported in (2006) 8 SCC 647 , Punjab National Bank and others v. Manjeet Singh and another, and reliance has been placed to Para 17 of the said judgment. The same is being reproduced below : “17. In an industrial dispute referred by the Central Government which has an all-India implication, individual workmen cannot be made party to a reference. All of them are not expected to be heard. The unions representing them were impleaded as parties. They were heard. Not only were the said unions heard before the High Court, as noticed hereinbefore from a part of the judgment of the High Court, they had preferred appeals before this Court. Their contentions had been noticed by this Court. As the award was made in the presence of the unions, in our opinion, the contention of the respondents that the award was not binding on them cannot be accepted. The principles of natural justice were also not required to be complied with as the same would have been an empty formality. The Court will not insist on compliance with the principles of natural justice in view of the binding nature of the award. Their application would be limited to a situation where the factual position or legal implication arising thereunder is disputed and not where it is not in dispute or cannot be disputed. If only one conclusion is possible, a writ would not issue only because there was a violation of the principles of natural justice.” 13. Further, reliance has been placed upon a judgment reported in (2007) 5 SCC 65 , State of Manipur and others v. Token Singh and others, and reliance has been placed on paragraph 22 and 30 of the said judgment. The same are being reproduced below : “22. The respondents, therefore, in our opinion, were not entitled to hold the posts. In a case of this nature, where the facts are admitted, the principles of natural justice were not required to be complied with, particularly when the same would result in futility. It is true that where appointments had been made by a competent authority or at least some steps have been taken in that behalf, the principles of natural justice are required to be complied with, in view of the decision of this Court in Murugayya Udayar.” “30. It is true that where appointments had been made by a competent authority or at least some steps have been taken in that behalf, the principles of natural justice are required to be complied with, in view of the decision of this Court in Murugayya Udayar.” “30. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, this Court developed the “useless formality” theory stating: (SCC pp. 246-47, para 22) “More recently Lord Bingham has deprecated the `useless formality’ theory in R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p Cotton by giving six reasons. (See also his article `Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?’ 1991 PL, p. 64.) A detailed and emphatic criticism of the `useless formality theory’ has been made much earlier in `Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow’ by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL, pp. 27-63) contending that Malloch and Glynn were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn., 1996, p. 323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., p. 596) and others say that the Court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority. De Smith (5th Edn., 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says Courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the Court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn., 1994, pp. 526-30) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a `real likelihood’ of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the Courts can, in exercise of their `discretion’, refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the Courts can, in exercise of their `discretion’, refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived.” 14. Ms. Bushra Maryam who appeared on behalf of respondent No. 3 Union, on the contention raised by the petitioner regarding unregistered Union and regarding maintainability of the application, has placed reliance upon a judgment reported in AIR 1960 SC 1328 , Newspapers Ltd., Allahabad v. U.P. State Industrial Tribunal and others. In support of the aforesaid contention, learned Counsel for the respondent submits that as it was urged that the Union was unregistered who made reference was invalid. The Apex Court has held that “It was not necessary that a registered body should sponsor a workman’s case to make it an industrial dispute. Once it is shown that a body of workmen either acting through their Union or otherwise had sponsored a workman’s case it becomes an industrial dispute.” As such the learned counsel submits that the contention of the petitioner to this effect that the application on behalf of unregistered union was not maintainable, is no correct. 15. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after perusal of the records, it is clear from the record that the State Government has referred the matter to the Labour Court (1) U.P. Ghaziabad. The matter was pending from 2001 but it was not decided due to any reason, has not been disputed by the petitioner. As regards the contention raised by the respondents that due to illness of Presiding Officer the matter was not being considered and decided as such an application was moved to the State Government by the Union to transfer the said case to another Presiding Officer in same premises. As regards the contention raised by the respondents that due to illness of Presiding Officer the matter was not being considered and decided as such an application was moved to the State Government by the Union to transfer the said case to another Presiding Officer in same premises. The State Government after considering the grounds mentioned in the application exercising power conferred under the Act has given reason that under what circumstances the case is being transferred. The reason given in the order of transfer is that as the Presiding Officer before whom the case was pending was suffering from a serious disease and he was not in a position to proceed with the case and as such taking into the aforesaid circumstances the order has been passed transferring the case from one Court to another Court in the same premises. 16. Two judgments are cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to the effect that if any order is being passed like this exercising the power conferred under the Act transferring the case to another place, notice and opportunity is necessary. It is not disputed that if the case is being transferred from one district to another, notice to both the parties effected by that order has to be given. In both the cases cited by the counsel for the petitioner the case has been transferred from one district to another. In that circumstances this Court as well as the Apex Court have held that without any notice to the employer or the concerned parties the order cannot be passed and if any order has been passed exercising the powers confered under Section 6-G of the Act that has to be exercised judicially after following the principles of natural justice. Admittedly the transfer is made from the Labour Court (1) U.P. Ghaziabad to the Labour Court (2) U.P. Ghaziabad in the same premises. The petitioner is not able to show from the record regarding prejudice caused to him. The contention of the petitioner to that effect is not acceptable. Admittedly the transfer is made from the Labour Court (1) U.P. Ghaziabad to the Labour Court (2) U.P. Ghaziabad in the same premises. The petitioner is not able to show from the record regarding prejudice caused to him. The contention of the petitioner to that effect is not acceptable. If some prejudice is being caused to the petitioner in case the State Government exercising its power, transfer a case from one district to another district without any notice and opportunity to the petitioner but in the present case, in my opinion, if the case has been transferred from one Court to another Court in the same premises then it cannot be said that any prejudice is being caused to the petitioner and in that circumstances if the State Government has not given any notice to the petitioner, the order cannot be said to be violative of principles of natural justice. 17. In the case of Newspapers Ltd. (supra) the Apex Court has held that the unregistered Union can also take up the case for the workmen. On that ground it cannot be said that any order or reference made by the State Government is not valid. 18. In view of the aforesaid facts, I am of the opinion that as the matter was being delayed and after due consideration the State Government on an application made by the representative of the respondent workmen passes an order transferring the case from one Court to another Court in the same premises it cannot be held that order is without jurisdiction. 19. In view of aforesaid, the writ petition is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands discharged. 20. No order as to costs. ———