JUDGMENT Honble Amitava Lala, J.—Since common question is involved in both the aforesaid writ petitions, the same are decided by this judgment having binding effect in both the cases. However, the Writ Petition No. 61489 of 2007 is taken as leading one. 2. The aforesaid both the writ petitions have been made with the similar prayers. However, prayers of the first writ petition are as follows : “(i) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing order dated 22.10.2007 (Annexure-12 to the writ petition); (ii) to declare Ordinance No. 21 of 2007 dated 7.8.2007, as well as Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Sugar Mill Societies (Special Provisions) Rules, 2007 as amended vide notification dated 5.10.2007 (Annexure-9, 10 and 11 of the writ petition) ultra-vires to the provisions of Constitution of India and be struck down and be declared invalid piece of legislation; (iii) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus restraining the respondents from, in any manner, proceeding to utilize the amount of Rs. 75 crores secured from U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd., Lucknow, after placing the sugar mill as mortgage and the said amount of Rs. 75 crores may kindly be directed to be either returned to the bank and the mortgage deed be surrendered; (iv) to issue any other writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper under the circumstances of the instant case so that justice be done; (v) to award cost of the petition to the petitioners as against the respondents; (vi) to declare U.P. Act No. 29 of 2007 that is U.P. Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2007 as ultra-vires (Annexure-38 to the writ petition); (vii) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order of the State Government dated 27.12.2007 (Annexure-39 to the writ petition); (viii) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order of the Registrar dated 28.12.2007 (Annexure-40 to the writ petition); (ix) to issue a suitable writ, order or direction commanding upon the Central Government to constitute a high power committee comprising of technical and financial experts to go into the cause which have resulted in losses to the sugar mill society and suggest remedial measures so that the sugar mill society is run as sound business.” 3. Two preliminary issues have been raised by the contesting parties herein. According to the State, the writ petitions are not maintainable by the pen of the petitioners. According to the petitioners, when the concerned sugar factories are governed by the Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 (hereinafter called as the ‘Act, 2002’), any ordinance under the U.P. State Act i.e. Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (hereinafter called as the ‘Act, 1965’) read with Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2007 is nullity. 4. Since the first point is relating to maintainability of the writ petition, let us discuss the same at first. Admittedly, the petitioners are shareholders of Kisan Co-operative Sugar Factory Limited, Majhola, District Pilibhit, Uttar Pradesh (hereinafter called as the ‘Co-operative Society’). They contended that they are vitally interested persons in the affairs of the society itself, therefore, they have locus to file the present writ petition. A co-operative society of such persons is an independent body of joint ownership on principle only to fulfil the constitutional objective therein. The co-operative society is farmers’ co-operative society. If the proposal of the State to consider transfer of co-operative society to the private owners takes place, it will affect the interest of the farmers. The factory after formation of the co-operative society started its function since 1965. The elected body consisting of farmer members controlled and supervised the work of the sugar factory. The petitioner No. 1 was the Director of the elected body during that period. In the balance sheet of the sugar mill society as on 30th June, 1975 subscribed capital of the society consisted of 26017 shares of Rs. 300/- each amounting to Rs. 78,17,100/-. The producer members’ share value was approximately Rs. 35,16,384.83, whereas the share of the State Government was Rs. 30,00,000/-. It is true to say that due to lack of expansion and modernization of plant, condition of the sugar factory plant was deteriorated time to time. Occasionally break down was caused, which ultimately resulted to subsidy coverage etc. of the State. In effect, State also became the shareholder of such co-operative society. By virtue of the sickness an Administrative Officer was appointed by the State who is controlling the state of affairs. No election was held for a considerable period. 5. Occasionally break down was caused, which ultimately resulted to subsidy coverage etc. of the State. In effect, State also became the shareholder of such co-operative society. By virtue of the sickness an Administrative Officer was appointed by the State who is controlling the state of affairs. No election was held for a considerable period. 5. Now the State has issued notification for considering proposal of handing over it to the private owners by the Registrar having no right under the State law. No body is available to represent the interest of the members of the co-operative society excepting the individual members. So far as second writ petition is concerned, the petitioner is not only the shareholder but also elected Vice Chairman of the society. 6. Mr. Zafar Naiyar, learned Additional Advocate General, contended before this Court that the writ petition cannot be maintainable because the co-operative society has not filed the same. There is no violation of the fundamental right of the individual members, so that the writ petition can be attracted. Statutory right cannot be said to be fundamental right. As per Section 9 of the Act, 1965, registration of a society shall render it a body corporate by the name, under which it is registered, having perpetual succession and a common seal, and with power to hold the property, to enter into contracts, to institute and defend the suits and other legal proceedings and to do all things necessary for the purpose for which it was constituted. Clause 9 (1) of the bye-laws of the Co-operative Society says that every person before being admitted to the membership of the society shall sign a declaration to the effect that he shall be bound by the Act, Rules and Bye-laws of the society. The only interest of the petitioners is for payment of dividend not exceeding 6% per annum on the paid up share capital, provided that the dividend shall not exceed 4% per annum till such time as the share contributed by the State Government are not redeemed. Question of raising any dispute under the bye-laws of the co-operative society is made in conformity with Section 9 of the Act, 1965. 7. Mr. Ravi Kant, learned Senior Counsel, appeared for the apex body of the co-operative societies, supported the contentions of the State. He said that rights of the shareholders are only confined to the guarantee about the shares. 7. Mr. Ravi Kant, learned Senior Counsel, appeared for the apex body of the co-operative societies, supported the contentions of the State. He said that rights of the shareholders are only confined to the guarantee about the shares. Even when society is in loss, shareholders are entitled for the profit but not the loss. The State has 94½% share in the co-operative society. The co-operative society is a registered body corporate within the State. A co-operative society will be governed by the place where it is registered not where it operates. The State is the public trust of the co-operative society. He said that this point is covered by the eleven Judges’ Bench decision of the Supreme Court as reported in AIR 1970 SC 564 , Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, wherein it has been held that a company registered under the Companies Act is a legal person, separate and distinct from its individual members. Property of the company is not the property of the shareholders. A shareholder has merely an interest in the company arising under its Articles of Association, measured by a sum of money for the purpose of liability, and by a share in the profit. A shareholder, a depositor or a director may not therefore be entitled to move a petition for infringement of the rights of the Company, unless by the action impugned by him, his rights are also infringed. 8. In reply to such question, Mr. Ashwini Kumar Misra, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, contended before us that the impugned ordinance has been issued for the purpose of winding up the co-operative society through the Registrar under the Act, 1965 (the State Act) without any jurisdiction, therefore, the shareholders have a statutory right to resist such action. The business of the co-operative society is the business of the shareholders but not the business of the individual. The point of dispute herein is whether the co-operative society involved herein is governed by the Act, 1965, being State Act, or under the Act, 2002, being Central Act, by virtue of the area of operation. The business of the co-operative society is the business of the shareholders but not the business of the individual. The point of dispute herein is whether the co-operative society involved herein is governed by the Act, 1965, being State Act, or under the Act, 2002, being Central Act, by virtue of the area of operation. The co-operative society under the State Act, by operation of law i.e. Section 103 (1) of the Act, 2002 is deemed to be the co-operative society under such Act i.e. Act, 2002, therefore, neither the State nor the Registrar under the Act, 1965 has any power to take any action under the State Act. The deeming provision will take effect immediately with the implementation of the Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000 (hereinafter called as the ‘Act, 2000’) with effect from 25th August, 2000 by forming two States i.e. States of Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal. This valid point, which has been taken by the petitioners by way of this writ petition, cannot be ignored. If the State and the Registrar under the Act, 1965 are allowed to continue in spite of bringing this fact by the petitioners before this Court, it will lead to nullity. It is an admitted position that since when the State was called upon to interfere with the business of the co-operative society and an Administrator was appointed, no election was held to form an elected body to run the co-operative society and represent it. Therefore, the co-operative society is virtually run by the State itself under the control and supervision of an Administrative Officer and the State itself has taken a decision to consult the Registrar under the Act, 1965 (the State Act) to hand over the private parties. Therefore, the shareholders cannot be the silent spectators. Excepting the members of the co-operative society no body is available to bring such fact into the notice of the Court that by operation of law the co-operative society has become a multi-State co-operative society. Therefore, this gives a locus standi to the writ petitioners to move the writ petition to obtain an order in this regard. Excepting the members of the co-operative society no body is available to bring such fact into the notice of the Court that by operation of law the co-operative society has become a multi-State co-operative society. Therefore, this gives a locus standi to the writ petitioners to move the writ petition to obtain an order in this regard. In Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (supra) eleven Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court itself held that where the petitioner does not seek to enforce the guarantee of freedom of trade and commerce in Article 301 of the Constitution but claims that in enacting the Act the Parliament has violated a constitutional restriction imposed by Part XIII on its legislative power and that in determining the extent to which his fundamental freedoms are impaired, the statute which the Parliament is incompetent to enact must be ignored, the petition cannot be thrown out because the guarantee of freedom of trade does not occur in Part III. Even in 1972 (2) SCC 788 , Bennett Coleman & Co. and others v. Union of India and others five Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court observed that in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (supra) the Supreme Court held that the statute to be void for infringing the rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner therein was a shareholder and a director of the company which was acquired under the statute. As a result of such decision, a question arose whether the legislative measure directly touches the company of which the petitioner is a shareholder or not. It has been held that shareholder is entitled to protection of Article 19. That individual right is not lost by reason of the fact that he is a shareholder of the company. Such right is not lost when they associate to form a company. When their fundamental rights as shareholders are impaired by the State action, their rights as shareholders are protected. The reason is that the shareholders’ rights are equally and necessarily affected if the rights of the company are affected. By and large, such principle is adopted in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India and others etc. etc., AIR 1983 SC 937 . 9. Mr. The reason is that the shareholders’ rights are equally and necessarily affected if the rights of the company are affected. By and large, such principle is adopted in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India and others etc. etc., AIR 1983 SC 937 . 9. Mr. S.P. Kesarwani, learned Standing Counsel, assisting the learned Additional Advocate General, interrupted with the support of the judgment reported in 2004 (1) SCC 712 , Dharam Dutt and others v. Union of India and others and relying upon paragraph-30 of the same contended that the business of the co-operative society is business of the shareholders, therefore, shareholders have no independent right to challenge the ordinance. It is not in violation of Article 19 (1)(c) of the Constitution of India. He said that fundamental right to form an association cannot be coupled with the fundamental right to carry on any trade or business. As soon as citizens form a company, the right guaranteed to them by Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution has been extinguished and no restraint has been placed on that right and no infringement of that right is made. Once a company or a corporation is formed, the business which is carried on by the said company or corporation is the business of the company or corporation, and is not the business of the citizens who get the company or corporation formed or incorporated, and the rights of the incorporated body must be judged on that footing alone and cannot be judged on the assumption that they are the rights attributable to the business of individual citizens. The same principle would apply to a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Based on paragraph-11 of 1985 (2) SCC 670 , Daman Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others he also said that once a person becomes a member of a cooperative society, he loses his individuality qua the society and he has no independent rights except those given to him by the statute and the bye-laws. He must act and speak through the society or rather, the society alone can act and speak for him qua rights or duties of society as a body. He must act and speak through the society or rather, the society alone can act and speak for him qua rights or duties of society as a body. Relying upon paragraph-10 of 1992 (4) SCC 683 , R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, he further said that one cannot be allowed to take advantage of the transaction and challenge the same thereafter following the principles of approbate and reprobate. Mr. Misra contended before this Court that there is a big gap between the fundamental right and the constitutional right. If the committee of management is available, no question arises for the shareholders to challenge the same but since only an Administrator, being executive of the State, has been appointed making the committee as functus officio, the individual shareholders can not be deprived from challenging the validity of the ordinance. 10. Dr. Ashok Nigam, learned Additional Solicitor General of India, contended before this Court that it is true to say that the co-operative society is a multi-State co-operative society by operation of law itself. Both the Acts i.e. Act, 2000 and Act, 2002 are the Central Acts. Although Entry-43 of the List-I i.e. Union List of Seventh Schedule under Article 246 of the Constitution of India excludes the co-operative societies but the Parliament is not debarred from its residuary powers of legislation as under Article 248 of the Constitution but has exclusive power to make any law with respect to any matter. We also find that as per Article 246 (4) of the Constitution, the Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter with regard to any part of the territory of India not included in the State List notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List. 11. We are of the view that both the issues are so intermingled with each other and arguments are advanced so long before us irrespective of the question of maintainability of the writ petition even after exchange of affidavits, it is very difficult for this Court to ignore consideration of both the issues particularly in view of the ratio propounded in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (supra) and Bennett Coleman & Co. (supra). (supra). In K.C. Pazhanimala and others v. State of Kerala and others, AIR 1969 Ker 154 (FB), it has been held that power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is so wide, it cannot only be restricted to a question of enforcement of fundamental right but also for other purpose. Any person, who has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, can file a writ even though he has no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject matter thereof. The words “aggrieved person” are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. Similar principle is also available in AIR 1966 SC 828 , Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others. In Union of India and another v. W.N. Chadha, AIR 1993 SC 1082 it has been held that the rule of audi alteram partem is a rule of justice and its application is excluded where the rule will itself lead to injustice. There is exclusion of the application of audi alteram partem to cases where nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present and meet a case. This rule cannot be applied to defeat the ends of justice or to make the law ‘lifeless, absurd, stultifying and self-defeating or plainly contrary to the common sense of the situation’ and this rule may be jettisoned in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. In contra, it has been held in State of U.P. v. C.O.D. Chheoki Employees’ Coop. Society Ltd., AIR 1997 SC 1413 that no individual member of a co-operative society is entitled to assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, rules and bye-laws as he has his right under the Act, rules and bye-laws and is subject to its operation. In Zoroastrian Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. District Registrar, Coop. Societies (Urban), AIR 2005 SC 2306 again it was decided by saying that a member being a stream cannot rise higher than the source i.e. cooperative society. No individual member is entitled to assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, rules, under which the society is registered, and the bye-laws as he is subject to their operation. In the present case the situation is otherwise. No individual member is entitled to assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, rules, under which the society is registered, and the bye-laws as he is subject to their operation. In the present case the situation is otherwise. The petitioners are assailing the State without being backed by law and in absence of the elected body or office bearers. Therefore, the situation is peculiar in this particular case. Here, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (supra) and Bennett Coleman & Co. (supra) are squarely applicable. A question of nullity if arises before the Court at the instance of the party, cannot be ignored on the ground of locus standi particularly when the parties have argued at length on this point irrespective of such question of locus standi and on exchange of affidavits. According to us, if we say that the co-operative society is not a multi-State co-operative society as per the deeming provision of the Act, being Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2000, in spite of admission on the part of the learned Additional Solicitor General of India, our judgment will remain existable with judicial fallibility. It will be more so when the co-operative society is unrepresented by any elected body. It will be further so when we can be able to see that unless someone has represented the co-operative society, the applicability of the notification of the State and the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act will be effective without jurisdiction. It is not a mere or bare submission of the shareholders for their right being aggrieved attached to the co-operative society but in absence of the right of audience of the co-operative society they are the only persons to represent it. Therefore, writ cannot be said to be not properly represented. 12. Now we have to see how the question of nullity comes forward. Two Central Acts are involved in this respect. The Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000 was implemented with effect from 25th August, 2000. Provisions of certain Corporations are given hereunder since the position of Corporations, Co-operative Societies and Companies stand on a similar footing of Corporation. In Daman Singh and others (supra) five Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court held that there cannot be the slightest doubt that a co-operative society is a corporation as commonly understood. Provisions of certain Corporations are given hereunder since the position of Corporations, Co-operative Societies and Companies stand on a similar footing of Corporation. In Daman Singh and others (supra) five Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court held that there cannot be the slightest doubt that a co-operative society is a corporation as commonly understood. Therefore, Sections 66 and 67 of such Act are quoted hereunder to give some impressions in this respect : “66. Provisions as to certain Companies.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Part, each of the companies specified in the Ninth Schedule to this Act shall, on and from the appointed day and until otherwise provided for in any law, or in any agreement among the successor States, or in any direction issued by the Central Government, continue to function in the areas in which it was functioning immediately before that day; and the Central Government may from time to time issue such directions in relation to such functioning as it may deem fit, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or in any other law. (2) Any directions issued under sub-section (1) in respect of a company referred to in that sub-section, may include directions— (a) regarding the division of the interests and shares of existing State of Uttar Pradesh in the Company among the successor States; (b) requiring the reconstitution of the Board of Directors of the Company so as to give adequate representation to all the successor States. 67. General provision as to statutory Corporations.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided by the foregoing provisions of this Part, where any body corporate constituted under a Central Act, State Act or Provincial Act for the existing State of Uttar Pradesh or any part thereof has, by virtue of the provisions of Part II, become an inter-State body corporate, then, the body corporate shall, on and from the appointed day, continue to function and operate in those areas in respect of which it was functioning and operating immediately before that day, subject to such directions as may from to time be issued by the Central Government, until other provision is made by law in respect of the said body corporate. (2) Any directions issued by the Central Government under sub-section (1) in respect of any such body corporate shall include a direction that any law by which the said body corporate is governed shall, in its application to that body corporate, have effect subject to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified in the direction.” 13. Now we have to see what is the meaning of law under such Act, 2000. The meaning as given under Section 2 (f) of such Act is reproduced hereunder : “(f) “law” includes any enactment, ordinance, regulation, order, bye-law, rule, scheme, notification or other instrument having, immediately before the appointed day, the force of law in the whole or in any part of the existing State of Uttar Pradesh;” 14. Against this background, we have to see the Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002, which was implemented after two years of implementation of earlier Act i.e. on 3rd July, 2002. Firstly, we have to see the objects and reasons of the Act, 2002, which is as follows : “An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to co-operative societies, with objects not confined to one State and serving the interests of members in more than one State, to facilitate the voluntary formation and democratic functioning of co-operatives as people’s institutions based on self-help and mutual aid and to enable them to promote their economic and social betterment and to provide functional autonomy and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.” 15. Now we see Section 103 under Chapter XIII of the Act, 2002 with the heading ‘Societies which become Multi-State Co-operative Societies consequent on reorganisation of States’, as follows : “103. Co-operative societies functioning immediately before reorganisation of States.—(1) Where, by virtue of the provisions of Part II of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956 (37 of 1956) or any other enactment relating to reorganisation of States, and co-operative society which immediately before the day on which the reorganisation takes place, had its objects confined to one State becomes, as from that day, a multi-State co-operative society, it shall be deemed to be a multi-State co-operative society registered under the corresponding provisions of this Act and the bye-laws of such society shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, continue to be in force until altered or rescinded. (2) If it appears to the Central Registrar or any officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government (hereinafter in this section referred to as the authorised officer) that it is necessary or expedient to reconstitute or reorganise any society referred to in sub-section (1), the Central Registrar or the authorised officer, as the case may be, may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, place before a meeting of the general body of that society, held in such manner as may be prescribed, a scheme for the reconstitution or reorganisation, including proposals regarding— (a) the formation of new multi-State co-operative societies and the transfer thereto in whole or in part, of the assets and liabilities of that society; or (b) the transfer, in whole or in part, of the assets and liabilities of that society to any other multi-State co-operative society in existence immediately before the date of that meeting of the general body (hereinafter in this section referred to as the existing multi-State co-operative society). (3) If the scheme is sanctioned by a resolution passed by a majority of the members present at the said meeting, either without modifications or with modifications to which the Central Registrar or the authorised officer agrees, he shall certify the scheme and upon such certification, the scheme shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, regulation or bye-laws for the time being in force, be binding on all the societies affected by the scheme, as well as the shareholders and creditors of all such societies. (4) If the scheme is not sanctioned under sub-section (3), the Central Registrar or the authorised officer may refer the scheme to such Judge of the appropriate High Court, as may be nominated in this behalf by the Chief Justice thereof, and the decision of that Judge in regard to the scheme shall be final and shall be binding on all the societies affected by the scheme as well as the shareholders and creditors of all such societies. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, “appropriate High Court” means the High Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the principal place of business of the multi-State co-operative society is situated. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, “appropriate High Court” means the High Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the principal place of business of the multi-State co-operative society is situated. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a scheme under sub-section (2) includes any proposal regarding the transfer of the assets and liabilities of any multi-State co-operative society referred to in clause (b) thereof, the scheme shall not be binding on such multi-State co-operative society or the shareholders and creditors thereof, unless the proposal regarding such transfer is accepted by that multi-State co-operative society by a resolution passed by a majority of the members present at a meeting of its general body.” 16. Therefore, from the plain reading of the provisions we cannot say that the co-operative societies hereunder can be said to be the State co-operative societies to attract the State laws. With the support of above laws, now we have to see the applicability of the word ‘nullity’ in this respect. 17. According to us, it is a settled principle that question of fraud and nullity can be raised by any body at any point of time even in a collateral proceeding. In 2007 (3) SCC 184 , Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, a five Judges’ Bench of the Supreme Court elaborately discussed the issue even following Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (supra). There, on a question of locus standi about the Members of the legislature it was held that a Member of a legislature is also a citizen of the country and entitled to protection of the same fundamental rights, especially when the impugned action entails civil consequences. It was further held following Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (supra) that all the provisions of the Constitution are required to be read conjointly as to the effect and operation of fundamental rights of the citizens when the State action infringed the rights of the individuals. An ouster clause attaching finality to a determination does ordinarily oust the power of the Court to review the decision but not on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction or being a nullity for some reason such as gross illegality, irrationality, violation of constitutional mandate, malafides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity. An ouster clause attaching finality to a determination does ordinarily oust the power of the Court to review the decision but not on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction or being a nullity for some reason such as gross illegality, irrationality, violation of constitutional mandate, malafides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity. In view of the power of judicial review under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court and High Courts have jurisdiction to decide the legality or otherwise of the action taken by the State authorities and that power cannot be taken away from the judiciary. 18. A ‘Nullity’ is non est in the eye of law. A non est action with the support of the State law cannot be regularised taking plea that the persons who are assailing it have no locus standi to say. Nullity leads to a question of ultra vires, lack of jurisdiction, outcome of fraud and various other things, which are material for the purpose of establishing such question. In this case, notification has been issued by the State proposing the Registrar, an executive of the State, at the instance of the co-operative society, which is also being represented by the executive of the State, to determine the question whether it can be handed over to the private parties or not. We are not on the issue whether by handing over to the private parties it will cause benefit or not. It is to be determined only by the appropriate authority in accordance with law. If the State under the State Act is not permitted to take such decision by virtue of operation of the Central Act, any action arising out of such State notification is contrary to law and as such will lead to a nullity in perpetuity unless and until it is brought to the notice of the Court. Therefore, we cannot stop the petitioners from bringing such fact to the notice of the Court only on the ground of locus standi. When such issue raised before the Court is not ignorable, question of locus standi can be ignored. Procedural law cannot supersede the substantive law. So far as the question of fundamental right vis-a-vis statutory right is concerned, it has to be looked from the angle that the impugned ordinance is void ab initio. When such issue raised before the Court is not ignorable, question of locus standi can be ignored. Procedural law cannot supersede the substantive law. So far as the question of fundamental right vis-a-vis statutory right is concerned, it has to be looked from the angle that the impugned ordinance is void ab initio. A determination is no determination if it is contrary to the constitutional mandate of Article 19. While a law on a matter not within the competence of the legislature is a nullity, a law on a topic within its competence but repugnant to the constitutional prohibitions is unenforceable. 19. Hence, in totality we are of the view that the question of locus standi of the petitioners, as raised by the respondents, is unsustainable in nature in view of the circumstances. Therefore, the writ petitions are held to be maintainable by the pen of the petitioners. So far as the question of nullity and/or unenforceability of the impugned State ordinance is concerned, we are of the view that the deeming provision of the Central Act, 2002 is squarely applicable in this case. Therefore, the Central Government or its authority is entitled to take appropriate steps under Section 103 (2) of the Act, 2002 as early as possible. However, the Central Government and/or its authority is not debarred from making any consultation process with the State or States involved in this regard. In any event, this order will not affect the right of the State to make the ordinance effective for necessary public purposes or for the benefit of the State Co-operative Societies and by no means the order of this Court will be construed as interference with the ordinance made under the State Act and its applicability towards co-operative societies of the State. 20. Thus, the writ petitions are disposed of, however, without imposing any cost. Honble Shishir Kumar, J.—I agree. ————