JUDGMENT Honble Amitava Lala, J.—This appeal is arising out of the judgment and order dated 7th March, 2008 passed by the concerned Additional District Judge, Agra refusing to grant an interim order of injunction in an interlocutory application arising out of a suit, being Original Suit No. 13 of 2007, Sri Kanhaiya Lal Bansal v. Sahitya Bhawan Publications and others. Dispute relates to infringement of trademark and logo purportedly of one publisher and/or book seller known as Sahitya Bhawan Publishers and Distributors Private Limited. 2. By consent of the parties the appeal is heard for final disposal on the informal papers. 3. According to the appellant-plaintiff, he is founder of the trade name ‘Sahitya Bhawan’ and maker of the logo, which has been introduced as such in the year 1960. The copyright of the nomenclature and logo had been preserved with the appellant-plaintiff. The publishers and book sellers are normally selling the text books of its publication to various colleges and universities of the country. The business of the appellant-plaintiff continued as proprietorship till 1967 when his elder brother Sri Ram Saran Bansal joined in the same business. In 1969 Sri Ram Saran Bansal and Smt. Chanda Devi, mother of the appellant/plaintiff, became partners of the appellant/plaintiff. A partnership deed was executed on 1st July, 1969. Such trademark and its logo became goodwill of the partnership firm. On 31st March, 1988 Smt. Chanda Devi retired from the partnership and on 14th March, 1989 a new partnership deed was executed between the appellant-plaintiff and said Sri Ram Saran Bansal with effect from 1st April, 1988. Again the new partnership firm took over the goodwill of erstwhile partnership firm. According to the appellant-plaintiff, several eminent writers associated with the firm and wrote various books because of their connection with it which ultimately made the partnership business very famous. However, it has been alleged by the appellant-plaintiff that the intention of said Sri Ram Saran Bansal was not good. Funds of the firm were misused, in which respondents-defendant Nos. 2 to 4 were also involved. Ultimately, he served a registered notice upon Sri Ram Saran Bansal on 26th March, 1995 dissolving the firm. Distribution of assets was started amongst the parties by lottery. Initially the trade name and logo along with goodwill was allotted in favour of Sri Ram Saran Bansal on exchange of Rs. 2 to 4 were also involved. Ultimately, he served a registered notice upon Sri Ram Saran Bansal on 26th March, 1995 dissolving the firm. Distribution of assets was started amongst the parties by lottery. Initially the trade name and logo along with goodwill was allotted in favour of Sri Ram Saran Bansal on exchange of Rs. 10,00,000/- to be paid to the appellant-plaintiff but ultimately he decided to accept Rs. 10,00,000/- on exchange of allotment of the same in favour of the appellant-plaintiff, to which he agreed. Therefore, Sri Ram Saran Bansal and other family members in support of him are clearly prohibited from having such right to use. Immediately after dissolution of the firm, on 17th June, 1995 a cheque of Rs. 10,00,000/- was drawn on Allahabad Bank, Agra being Bankers Cheque No. 636379/56/255 and sent to Sri Ram Saran Bansal by registered post, which has allegedly been refused from receiving by him. It has been further stated by the appellant-plaintiff that he is prior and continuous user of the trademark and logo since 1960 irrespective of changed status of the organisation. However, the appellant-plaintiff had made an application for registration of the trademark under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (hereinafter called as the ‘Act, 1958’) on 17th April, 1995. Such Act, 1958 has been repealed and replaced by the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (hereinafter called as the ‘Trade Marks Act’). Since the registration has been effected from the date of application i.e. 17th April, 1995, it would be deemed to have been made under the new Act. 4. We have gone through Section 159 (2) of the Trade Marks Act at this juncture, whereunder we find that application made under the Act, 1958 shall, if in force at the commencement of this Act, continue to be in force and have effect as if made, issued, given or done under the corresponding provisions of this Act. 5. In any event, the applications for registration in different languages i.e. English and Hindi have also been made, which are pending consideration for registration. The respondent-defendant No. 1 company was formed by said Sri Ram Saran Bansal on 6th December, 1996. The respondents-defendants got registration of their publication of books etc. under the appropriate Act with effect from 4th October, 2002. The respondent-defendant No. 1 company was formed by said Sri Ram Saran Bansal on 6th December, 1996. The respondents-defendants got registration of their publication of books etc. under the appropriate Act with effect from 4th October, 2002. According to the appellant-plaintiff, that application for registration of trademark or logo filed by the respondents-defendants was intentional and concealing the truth that such trademark and logo are already in existence. However, they have started using the logo of the appellant-plaintiff since 2006. The respondents-defendants started printing books and publishing and selling the same in the similar trade name and logo. This amounts to infringement of the trademark and copyright, which caused and is still causing irreparable loss to the appellant-plaintiff as well as his dealers. 6. In further as because there were errors in respect of registration of the trademark, said Sri Ram Saran Bansal filed a rectification application before the appropriate Intellectual Property Appellate Board, New Delhi making the appellant-plaintiff party respondent therein along with the Registrar of the Trade Marks, New Delhi for said purpose. It had been prima facie held by the appellate Board in its order dated 03rd August, 2007 that by virtue of dissolution of the firm and division of assets, the trademark, trade name and logo including goodwill of the firm is the share of the respondent No. 1 therein, the appellant-plaintiff herein, and as such he is prima facie the proprietor of the trademark. However, the appellate board held that central issue as to whether the partnership is still in existence or the same has been dissolved and wound up or not, is pending before the Civil Court and the Civil Court only has competence to adjudicate upon the above mentioned issues. Hence, the application for rectification is premature and the appellate board can not decide the application unless it is determined as to which of the partners is entitled to have the goodwill including the trademark, trade name and logo of the firm. The other issues relating to rectification application can be decided by the appellate Board after the above mentioned issues are decided by the Civil Court. Hence, the application for rectification was dismissed for want of decision from the competent Court on the above issues. The other issues relating to rectification application can be decided by the appellate Board after the above mentioned issues are decided by the Civil Court. Hence, the application for rectification was dismissed for want of decision from the competent Court on the above issues. The respondents-defendants contended before the Court that in the year 1960 the appellant-plaintiff was minor, therefore, he cannot be in a position to discover the trade name and logo etc. at that age. The trademark and logo is product of Sri Ram Saran Bansal, the elder brother of the appellant-plaintiff. It is also a part of the partnership firm. The intimation regarding dissolution of partnership inclusive of termination thereof has been denied. Dissolution of the partnership firm is pending consideration before the competent Court. Story of sending cheque and refusal thereof is a fabricated statement. Dissolution of firm has not been acted upon. Therefore, the appellant-plaintiff cannot acquire full right to use the trademark etc. The document with regard to dissolution of partnership does not demonstrate that there was a division on 28th March, 1995. On the other hand, meeting for taking decision on all points concerning the partnership was held on 29th March, 1995. There was a consensus that everything should be resolved by lottery system. The respondents-defendants are using the logo since 1995 but not since 2006. Said Sri Ram Saran Bansal instituted a suit, being Suit No. 1165 of 1995, in respect of various disputes amongst the parties at Delhi, which was returned for presentation before the appropriate Court. Thereafter, the suit was filed in an appropriate Court at Agra, being Suit No. 876 of 1997. Another suit, being Suit No. 370 of 1997 was filed at Agra. Such suit is also for dissolution of partnership firm. Two suits are pending in the appropriate Court of Agra on their behalf. The mother of the appellant-plaintiff and Sri Ram Saran Bansal, namely, Smt. Chanda Devi has expired in December, 1988. She did not leave any will regarding successors amongst her three sons and also three daughters. After the death of mother, an oral division took place in January, 1987 amongst the legal heirs, in which the parties have agreed that trademark, copyright and logo etc. will pass on to the heirs of Sri Ram Saran Bansal for their use. 7. She did not leave any will regarding successors amongst her three sons and also three daughters. After the death of mother, an oral division took place in January, 1987 amongst the legal heirs, in which the parties have agreed that trademark, copyright and logo etc. will pass on to the heirs of Sri Ram Saran Bansal for their use. 7. Learned Judge of the Court below held that an intellectual work could have started with educated person and cannot be done by a person at the age of 16 years when he was a student of Class XI or XII. However, even if it was done, he being minor will not be able to execute any contract nor any contract with such minor can have any legal force. Therefore, the contract in between the writer and publisher during the period from 1961 to 1969 cannot have any legal force. Roll of mother and Sri Ram Saran Bansal can not be ignored. By virtue of their entry, the trademark and logo became the property of the partnership firm. Even assuming as per the appellant-plaintiff’s contention that constitution of firm was done in the year 1969 then from 1969 to 1995 for a period of 27 years, the work of publication was being carried out when Sri Ram Saran Bansal used the trademark and logo, thereby he also became user of the same. It can not be the sole right of the appellant-plaintiff. They had equal share in the partnership business. Therefore, Sri Ram Saran Bansal had same right as Sri Kanhaiya Lal Bansal in respect of the trademark and logo. The partnership is not ceased to take effect as apparent from the facts and circumstances of the case. The partnership is at the will of the partners, therefore, any partner has right to dissolve and terminate it. Dissolution had taken effect with an agreement between the appellant-plaintiff and Sri Ram Saran Bansal regarding division of assets of the firm. The documents with regard to taking steps about division of properties are already on record. Everything inclusive of goodwill of the firm was to be decided by lottery. The party, which will get the name of the firm, will have to pay an amount of Rs.10,00,000/- to other party which has not taken effect. The documents with regard to taking steps about division of properties are already on record. Everything inclusive of goodwill of the firm was to be decided by lottery. The party, which will get the name of the firm, will have to pay an amount of Rs.10,00,000/- to other party which has not taken effect. Unless the payment is accepted by Sri Ram Saran Bansal, the consideration for division of the properties as per the document for dissolution of the partnership firm cannot take effect. Therefore, when consideration is not passed on for division of goodwill of firm or trademark or logo between the partners, the same cannot be the sole right of the appellant-plaintiff. No division had taken place. Copyright, if any, cannot be the sole right. It is not the personal property of the appellant-plaintiff unless actual partition takes effect. In this way, no prima facie case has been made out by the appellant-plaintiff, hence the order of injunction is refused. 8. We find from the record that the suit was filed in the Court below on 13th December, 2007. It appears to us from the order impugned that direction was given to put up the case on 25th March, 2008 for written statement and for framing issues. At an initial stage, the appellant-plaintiff failed to obtain any interim order from this Court. However, hearing of the appeal was expedited. The parties have argued at length. Mr. V.B. Upadhyaya, learned Senior Counsel duly assisted by Mr. Manu Khare, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-plaintiff, contended before this Court that in a case of injunction the Court will have to go by the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. The property in the nature of trademark is an intellectual property. The partnership business has actually been dissolved leaving aside acceptance of consideration of Rs.10,00,000/- by the respondent/s. This is part and parcel of giving effect of the dissolution but not the dissolution itself. Therefore, as and when the dissolution of firm has taken place, the appellant-plaintiff becomes entitled to get the interim order of injunction restraining the respondents-defendants from using the trademark and logo. Belatedly the respondents started using the same only to harass the appellant-plaintiff. As soon as the consideration is despatched on account of those rights, liability of the appellant-plaintiff is discharged. Belatedly the respondents started using the same only to harass the appellant-plaintiff. As soon as the consideration is despatched on account of those rights, liability of the appellant-plaintiff is discharged. Thereafter, whether the respondents-defendants have received it or not, is not relevant to obtain an interim order. Therefore, the Court below has committed gross mistake from refusing to pass an order of injunction. In the case of infringement of trademark only question of similarity of trademark and logo as well as user of the same are to be seen irrespective of the date of actual registration. Sometimes registration takes effect after a long period and in such case, date of making application can be construed to make him holder of trademark and logo. Even then making of application is not so important but the date of actual use of the same. Therefore, longevity of the use is the prime consideration to determine prior user. It has been used since 1960 by the proprietorship concern, which has subsequently become partnership and by virtue of dissolution again became proprietorship. Therefore, right to use remains with the appellant-plaintiff irrespective of nature and character of the business. A person concerned, who left the business on account of dissolution or termination, cannot have any right whatsoever with regard to use of the trademark. Assuming that trademark is registered in the name of both the parties, one is before and another is after then the Court will have to determine the issue on the basis of the actual use of the same. No doubt the appellant-plaintiff is prior user. Therefore, he is entitled for an interim order in his favour. From the judgement cited by Mr. Upadhyaya as reported in 2003 (3) SCC 445 , Pamuru Vishnu Vinodh Reddy v. Chillakuru Chandrasekhara Reddy and others we get the ratio that when from the findings of fact it is recorded that one had retired from the partnership firm, he had no right to claim any further share in the profits of the firm. In a case of non-payment of value of the share of the plaintiff therein pursuant to the agreement for retiring from the firm, it has become a debt on the defendants and the plaintiff is entitled to recover the same with interest. In a case of non-payment of value of the share of the plaintiff therein pursuant to the agreement for retiring from the firm, it has become a debt on the defendants and the plaintiff is entitled to recover the same with interest. After the retirement from the partnership firm and particularly when the firm was reconstituted with new partners, there was no question of using the plaintiff’s share for earning profit in the reconstituted firm. So far as the question of intellectual property is concerned, it is well settled that in cases of infringement of either trademark or copyright, normally an injunction must follow. Mere delay in bringing action is not sufficient to defeat order of injunction in such cases. Grant of injunction also becomes necessary if it prima facie appears that adoption of mark was dishonest. In a Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court as reported in AIR 1978 Del 250 , Century Traders v. Roshan Lal Duggar & Co. and others it has been held that the law is pretty well settled that in order to succeed at this stage the appellant had to establish user of the aforesaid mark prior in point of time than the impugned user by the respondents. The registration of the said mark or similar mark prior in point of time to use by the appellant is irrelevant in an action for passing off and the mere presence of the mark in the register maintained by the trade mark registry did not prove its user by the persons in whose names the mark was registered and was irrelevant for the purpose of deciding the application for interim injunction unless evidence had been led or was available of user of the registered trade marks. 9. In Yash Arora v. Tushar Enterprises and others, 2008 (36) PTC 523 (Del) (DB), it has been held that prior use of a trademark is in law sufficient to entitle such user to relief in a passing off action against the registered user of such mark. Subsequent registration of trademark in favour of the defendants would pale into insignificance in a passing off action. 10. Mr. Rahul Agarwal, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents-defendants led by Mr. Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel, contended before this Court that infringement cannot take place unless the partnership is ceased to effect fully and finally. Dissolution is yet to take effect. 10. Mr. Rahul Agarwal, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents-defendants led by Mr. Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel, contended before this Court that infringement cannot take place unless the partnership is ceased to effect fully and finally. Dissolution is yet to take effect. The debts of dissolution, which has been stated to be held, is based on signatures obtained fraudulently. A unilateral action of the appellant-plaintiff cannot be treated to be sufficient for dissolution in a partnership between the parties. Factum of sending draft is factually incorrect. A notice dated 17th June, 1995 was sent with the pay order to Sri Ram Saran Bansal through one Sri N.C. Gupta, Advocate, and such notice was also delivered through Sri M.K. Saraswat, Advocate of Sri Ram Saran Bansal. The notice and the pay order was returned undelivered by the postman with the remarks that addressee has gone out and has not come back and it is not known when he will come back, hence returned. Thus, the process of dissolution is in continuance and has not reached to its finality. Therefore, it cannot be said that the firm was dissolved. Sri Ram Saran Bansal has also filed a suit in the appropriate Court of Agra after being returned by the Delhi High Court, in which there is a dispute with regard to court fees. There the prayer has been made that a decree be passed to the effect that the partnership between the parties is treated to be dissolved or stands dissolved from a particular date. The dispute has been initiated on the basis of the averments made in paragraph-31 therein, which speaks that although goodwill of the firm was supposed to go to Sri Kanhaiya Lal Bansal, defendant therein, after his payment of Rs. 10,00,000/- to the plaintiff (Ram Saran Bansal), the defendant is using the name of the firm without paying the amount as settled to the plaintiff. Such fact is a statement but the relief is in the nature of dissolution. Therefore, dissolution only can speak about the fate of trademark, goodwill and logo. 10,00,000/- to the plaintiff (Ram Saran Bansal), the defendant is using the name of the firm without paying the amount as settled to the plaintiff. Such fact is a statement but the relief is in the nature of dissolution. Therefore, dissolution only can speak about the fate of trademark, goodwill and logo. He relied upon a Special Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in AIR 1972 All 1 , Narendra Bahadur Singh v. Chief Inspector of Stamps, U.P. to establish that from the provisions of the Partnership Act it will be clear that a mere dissolution of a firm does not bring about a complete extinction of the firm itself. The firm, even though for the limited purposes mentioned in the relevant sections, continues to exist until its affairs are finally and completely wound up. It is only after the dissolution of the firm that its affairs can be wound up at the instance of any of the partners. Till the debts and liabilities of the firm have been fully paid off no partner can claim any particular property as his own nor can he claim that he has any specific share or interest in any property of the firm. In AIR 1973 SC 2572 , Sohan Lal and others v. Amin Chand & Sons and others we find that the suit, in which the injunction order was passed, was filed for a declaration that the firm constituted by two surviving partners alone was entitled to use the assets of the firm, of which he was a partner and it was for restraining the appellants therein from using that firm’s assets, namely, the two trade marks in question, that the order of injunction was sought. The Supreme Court held that prima facie, it would appear that the respondents are not entitled to the exclusive use of the two trade marks which formed part of the assets of the partnership of which the three brothers were partners. The appellants, being legal representative of one of such brothers, were also entitled to a share of the assets of the partnership. If that be so, the Courts were not justified in granting the injunction restraining the appellants from using trademarks. The appellants, being legal representative of one of such brothers, were also entitled to a share of the assets of the partnership. If that be so, the Courts were not justified in granting the injunction restraining the appellants from using trademarks. In these circumstances, the appropriate course to adopt is to continue in force the order passed by this Court (Supreme Court) when it granted the special leave on the basis of the application filed by the appellants for stay of the order of injunction, after setting aside the order under appeal. 11. In reply to such submission, Mr. Manu Khare, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant led by Mr. V.B. Upadhyaya, learned Senior Counsel contended before us that there should be a sanctity of an understanding. When the appellant-plaintiff is prior user and even for the argument sake the dissolution of partnership is in the process, the appellant-plaintiff cannot be refused from using trademark and logo. Schedule of the properties are already declared. Only issue is with regard to trademark and logo. Moreover, as per the General Clauses Act, when consideration is paid by registered post, it should be presumed that it has been sent. However, in the midst of such argument of Mr. Khare, Mr. Agarwal intervened and referred Section 14 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (hereinafter called as the ‘Partnership Act’) to establish that properties of the firm include goodwill of the business. 12. In any event, there is no dispute that the goodwill of the business is also the property of a partnership firm. We can also see the following paragraphs, being paragraph Nos. 67, 68, 69 and 70, of the Supreme Court judgement reported in 2004 (1) SCC 497 , Ramnik Vallabhdas Madhvani and others v. Taraben Pravinlal Madhvani for better understanding, as under : “67. “Goodwill”, as Lord MacNaghten described is “a thing very easy to describe, very difficult to define”, in IRC v. Muller & Co., [1901 AC 217 : (1900-03) All ER Rep 413 : 70 LJKB 677 : 84 LT 729 (HL)]. 68. The term “goodwill” signifies the value of the business in the hands of a successor, so far as increased by the continuity of the undertaking being preserved in the shape of the right to use the old name and otherwise. 68. The term “goodwill” signifies the value of the business in the hands of a successor, so far as increased by the continuity of the undertaking being preserved in the shape of the right to use the old name and otherwise. It is something more than a mere chance or probability of old customers maintaining their connection, though this is a material part of the practical fruits. “Goodwill” may be the whole advantage belonging to the firm, its reputation as also connection thereof. It, thus, means that every affirmative advantage as contrasted with negative advantage that has been acquired in carrying on the business whether concerned with the premises of business or its name or style, everything connected with or carrying the benefit of the business. 69. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol 35, at pp. 114-15, the law is stated in the following terms : “201. Goodwill generally; right to use name; sale to a partner.—The goodwill of the business carried on by a partnership forms part of the assets to be realised on distribution. If the goodwill is not sold, each partner may use the name of the firm, if by doing so he does not hold out the other partners as still being partners with him. If a partner agrees to retire and his partners buy his share but do not take any express assignment of the goodwill, they are not entitled to continue the use of his name as part of the firm name; and where a business is carried on under the name, solely or with any addition, of an outgoing partner who is still living and not bankrupt, a purchaser of the business including the goodwill is not entitled to use the name of the outgoing partner in such a way as to suggest that he is still connected with the business, unless the right to use the firm name is expressly assigned. On dissolution, a partner may advertise that he is no longer connected with a periodical that the firm publishes. Where the goodwill becomes on dissolution the property of one of the partners (either by purchase in the ordinary way or pursuant to a provision in the articles), the outgoing partner or partners may not carry on a similar business in the name of the old firm, and may not solicit old customers.” 70. Where the goodwill becomes on dissolution the property of one of the partners (either by purchase in the ordinary way or pursuant to a provision in the articles), the outgoing partner or partners may not carry on a similar business in the name of the old firm, and may not solicit old customers.” 70. The goodwill is generally considered to be an asset of the partnership....” 13. Now let us strike a balance between the rival contentions. There are altogether three suits pending before the District Court at Agra. Respondents-defendants have two prior suits filed in the year 1997, being Suit No. 370 of 1997 and Suit No. 876 of 1997 respectively. In Suit No. 370 of 1997 the prayers are made either for dissolution of the partnership firm or for giving effect of dissolution from a particular date and distribution of properties, whereas Suit No. 876 of 1997 is for injunction against the appellant-plaintiff from using assets of the partnership firm. On the other hand, the appellant-plaintiff instituted a suit in the year 2007, being Suit No. 13 of 2007, with a similar prayer for injunction. There is a big gap of ten years in between the period of instituting the suits by or between the respondents and the appellant. Therefore, it appears to us that the dispute amongst the parties is long standing. It appears to us that all the suits are, by and large, made for the purpose of getting the appropriate order/s in connection with dissolution of partnership firm and/or distribution of the properties including the goodwill and for restraining either of the parties in interfering with the business. The goodwill of the partnership business is trademark of ‘Sahitya Bhawan’ and logo. Unless and until the property has actually been distributed amongst the parties out of dissolution, if any, normally a right for exclusive use cannot be available. There is hardly any scope to pass an order of interim injunction in a suit for injunction to allow a party to use the trademark and logo keeping the partnership dispute alive. If we pass such order, it will amount to granting of final relief at an interlocutory stage. 14. There is hardly any scope to pass an order of interim injunction in a suit for injunction to allow a party to use the trademark and logo keeping the partnership dispute alive. If we pass such order, it will amount to granting of final relief at an interlocutory stage. 14. A question of prior user of the trademark and logo by the appellant-plaintiff is prima facie not disputed as per the order of the appropriate Intellectual Property Appellate Board, New Delhi, but the goodwill of the property of the proprietorship stepped in the shoes of the partnership firm, which was also appreciated by the Board. Partnership at will may be dissolved by notice of dissolution under Section 43 of the Partnership Act but when Court intervenes upon being called to arrive at a final conclusion as regard dissolution as per Section 44 of such Act, mere service of notice cannot reach to any finality. Moreover, it is a firm amongst two brothers. In such circumstances, when one partner has served notice upon the other for dissolution, unless all pros and cons are considered by the Court, there will be every likelihood of deprivation of one by the act of the other. Partnership amongst the parties is a contract. A notice is a proposal for dissolution. If the parties are settled about the partnership properties amongst themselves on the basis of notice, no intervention of the Court is required. But when the Court intervenes upon being called, change of composition and/or status is an ultimate decision. A notice specially in such circumstances will be construed as a proposal for dissolution. Section 7 of the Contract Act says that in order to convert a proposal into a promise, the acceptance must be absolute and unqualified. The stage before us can not be said to be proper for conversion of proposal to promise being absolute and unqualified. In the case of Amin Chand & Sons (supra) the Supreme Court has held that it would not be proper to grant order of injunction at a prima facie stage when one can not seem to have any exclusive use of the trademark, which forms part of the assets of a partnership firm amongst the brothers. Therefore, it will not be proper for us to pass any affirmative order in favour of the appellant-plaintiff at this stage. Therefore, it will not be proper for us to pass any affirmative order in favour of the appellant-plaintiff at this stage. But at the same time we should not allow the respondents-defendants to delay the cause of justice particularly when the concerned Intellectual Property Appellate Board, New Delhi opined that the appellant-plaintiff is prima facie the Proprietor of the trademark. 15. Having so, we are of the view that the appeal can be disposed of with certain directions as given herein. All the three suits, being Suit Nos. 370 of 1997, 876 of 1997 and 13 of 2007, will be analogously heard by the concerned Court upon framing the common issues inclusive of preliminary issue on the question of court fees and others, if any, and as a common cause the same will be disposed of preferably by the end of December, 2008. However, if it appears to the Court that one of such suits is likely to be dismissed only on the basis of insufficiency of court fees etc. being preliminary point, there is no need to pass any order on merit in such suit and the analogous hearing will be given only in respect of the regularly available suits by eliminating the same. No unnecessary adjournments will be granted by the Court. In case of necessity day-to-day hearing will be given for the purpose of early disposal of the suits. 16. However, the Court is not debarred from hearing any interlocutory application if it is made afresh by the appellant-plaintiff in case of necessity. But if the Court is convinced by the submission to pass an order with regard to main relief, the same will be made only on imposition of the condition to deposit the entire sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lacs only) in the Court. 17. Thus, the appeal is disposed of, however, without imposing any cost. Honble Shishir Kumar, J.—I agree. ————