R. P. DHOLAKIA, J. This appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated 16th February, 1999 passed by the learned Add!. Sessions Judge, Kheda at Nadiad, in Order below Exh. 45-A, whereby the appellant, Prosecution Witness No.2 in Sessions Case No. 142 of 1998, was convicted for the offence punishableunder Sec. 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "the Cr.P.C.") and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 3 months with fine of Rs. 500/-; and in default of payment of fine, simple imprisonment for a further period of 15 days. A copy of the said judgment and order was also directed to be sent to the Medical Council of India with a proposal to take necessary action against the appellant and to inform about the action so taken to the Court within a period of three months thereafter. 2. Before we proceed with the facts of the case, we would like to narrate a brief history as to under what circumstances, the Court below has passed the impugned judgment and order dated 16-2-1999. The appellant herein was examined as P.W. 2 at Exh. 13 in Sessions Case No. 142 of 1999 before the District & Sessions Court, Kheda at Nadiad. In the said Sessions Case, the prosecution had proved the documents at Exhs. 9/7 and 9/8 (Exhs. 14 and 15 respectively) through the appellant (P.W. 2). In his examination-in-chief, the appellant had produced the treatment-sheets of the victim (Exh. 16) which were also proved. In his cross-examination, the appellant had produced a document (Exh. 17) dated 6-3-1998, which was in the nature of a history of the incident given by the victim to him, while she was brought to his Hospital at the first place. However, the Court below, after considering the entire oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, came to a definite conclusion that the appellant had deposed false evidence and produced forged/fabricated document vide Exh. 17 while he was in the Witness Box and that to at the time of his cross-examination for the purpose of helping the original-accused in the said Sessions Case, and accordingly, while passing the judgment and order dated 5-2-1999 convicting the original-accused under Sees. 17 while he was in the Witness Box and that to at the time of his cross-examination for the purpose of helping the original-accused in the said Sessions Case, and accordingly, while passing the judgment and order dated 5-2-1999 convicting the original-accused under Sees. 498A and 302 I.P.c., the Court below issued Notice under Sec. 344 Cr.P.C. to the appellant, making it returnable on 16-2-1999, with a direction to the appellant to remain personally present or through his Advocate before the Court below on the said date. The said Notice was duly served upon the appellant. On 16-2-1999, the appellant remained present before the Court below along with his Advocate and submitted an application for adjournment. However, the said application was rejected by the Court below and the Court below proceeded with the matter on merits. The Court below heard the appellant (P. W. 2) as well as the Advocate appearing on his behalf. At the end of hearing, the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant before the Court below requested the Court that a lenient view may be taken while imposing sentence since the appellant is a Doctor by profession and a respectable person in the society. The said aspect is reflected in Para 7 of the impugned judgment dated 16-2-1998 passed by the Court below. The Court below, after considering the entire evidence available on record, convicted the appellant (P. W. 2) under Sec. 344. Cr. P. C. and imposed sentence as narrated in the earlier Paragraph of this judgment. 3. The facts in brief of Sessions Case No. 142 of 1998 arising out of the complaint being I.C.R. No. 40 of 1998 of Kathlal Police Station, which are relevant for the purpose of deciding this appeal, are as under; 3.1. On 6-3-1998, at around II-DO hrs., while Bhuriben, the wife of the appellant, original-accused, was in her house, the appellant came in a drunken condition and picked up a quarrel with Bhuriben. During that process. the appellant, original-accused, closed the doors of the house from the inside, sprinkled kerosene on Bhuriben, and thereafter, set her ablaze. As a result thereof, victim-Bhuriben sustained severe burn injuries of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd degrees. During the interregnum period the appellant, original-accused, fled the scene of offence. 3.2. On hearing the shouts of the victim, a crowd gathered at the scene of offence. As a result thereof, victim-Bhuriben sustained severe burn injuries of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd degrees. During the interregnum period the appellant, original-accused, fled the scene of offence. 3.2. On hearing the shouts of the victim, a crowd gathered at the scene of offence. The relatives of the appellant, original-accused, took the victim to a private hospital named "Varsha Surgical Hospital", situated in Odhav area of Ahmedabad City. In the said Hospital, the victim was given necessary medical treatment. Here, it is pertinent to note that though it was a medico-legal case, neither the relatives of the original-accused nor the Doctor concerned had informed about the said incident to the police authority. When the father of the victim came to know about the said incident through his nephew, he and his wife came to the Hospital where the victim was admitted. At that time, the victim was totally unconscious. 3.3. On the next day, i.e. 7-3-1998, when the victim became conscious, her parents inquired from her regarding the said incident. At that time, the victim informed them that on 6-3-1998, at around 11-00 hrs., the appellant, originalaccused, came to the house in a drunken condition and picked up a quarrel with her and during that process, he closed the doors of the house. poured kerosene on her, and thereafter, set her ablaze. On hearing the same, the father of the victim decided to file a complaint as it was a serious offence. On the next day, at around 10-00 hrs., the Doctor of said "Varsha Surgical Hospital" gave a telephonic intimation regarding the admission of the victim to his Hospital to Odhav Police Station, which was noted down by the P.S.O., who was on duty at the relevant point of time, in the Station Register. The P.S.O., in turn. ' handed over a yaadi to p.s.i. - Ghanshyambhai Tribhovanbhai Pandya fo.r the purpose of carrying out necessary investigation. The said P.S.I. went to "Varslza Surgical Hospital" and made necessary preliminary inquiry. He noted down the complaint given by the father of the victim and also sent a yaadi to the concerned Executive Magistrate for recording the dying declaration of the victim. As the incident had taken place outside the jurisdiction of Odhav Police Station, the complaint was registered as C.R. No. 0' of 1998 of Odhav Police Station under Sec. 307 I.P.C. 3.4. As the incident had taken place outside the jurisdiction of Odhav Police Station, the complaint was registered as C.R. No. 0' of 1998 of Odhav Police Station under Sec. 307 I.P.C. 3.4. On the same day, i.e. on 8-3-1998, between 12-10 hrs. - 12-30 hrs., the dying declaration of the victim was recorded by the Executive Magistrate after following due procedure. The complaint given by the father of the victim was sent to Kathlal Police Station for the purpose of registering the offence, as the alleged offence had taken place within the jurisdiction of Kathlal Police Station, and ultimately, it came to be registered as Kathlal Police Station I-C.R. No. 40 of 1998 under Sec. 307 I.P.C.. Investigation into the alleged offence was handed over to P.S.I. - Harendrasinh Kiritsinh Rana of Kathlal Police Station. In the meanwhile, as the condition of the victim had started to deteriorate, she was shifted to L. G. Hospital, Ahmedabad at around 14-00 hrs. on 8-3-1998. At L.G. Hospital, the victim was given necessary medical treatment. 3.5. On 9-3-1998, as the condition of the victim had improved, the further statement of the victim was recorded by the P.S.I. of Kathlal Police Station, after following due procedure. Thereafter, the Investigating Officer went to the scene of offence and made necessary inquiry. A panchnama with respect to the place of incident was prepared in the presence of panchas. Necessary muddamal articles were collected. As cogent evidence was found against the appellant, he was arrested on 9-3-1998. Arrest panchnama was prepared in the presence of panchas, and thereafter, the appellant was sent to judicial custody. 3.6. On 16-3-1998 the victim succumbed to the injuries. Inquest panchnama was prepared in the presence of panchas Marnottar form was filled up and necessary arrangements were made for sending the dead body for performing post-mortem. A note was sent to the concerned Magistrate for the purpose of adding offence under Sec. 302 I.P.C. in the complaint. Necessary investigation was carried out and statements of several witnesses were recorded. On completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the husband of the deceasedBhanubhai Shanabhai Zala before the Court of learned J.M.F.C., Kapadvanj. As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate committed the case to the District & Sessions Court, Kheda at Nadiad and it was numbered as Sessions Case No. 142 of 1998. On completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the husband of the deceasedBhanubhai Shanabhai Zala before the Court of learned J.M.F.C., Kapadvanj. As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate committed the case to the District & Sessions Court, Kheda at Nadiad and it was numbered as Sessions Case No. 142 of 1998. The appellant herein was examined as Prosecution Witness No.2 at Exh. 13 in the said Sessions Case. His evidence was recorded by the Court below on 21-12-1998. 3.7. After hearing learned Counsel for the respective parties and appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence on record, the learned Add!. Sessions Judge passed judgment and order dated 5-2-1999 convicting the original-accused - Bhanubhai Shanabhai Zala for the offence punishable under Sec. 498A and 302 I.P.c. While passing the said judgment dated 5-2-1999, the learned Add Sessions Judge issued Notice to Prosecution Witness No.2 in the said Sessions Case, i.e. the appellant herein, under Sec. 344 of the Cr.P.C. to show cause as to why he should not be punished for deposing false evidence and producing forged/fabricated document in Court proceedings, making it returnable on 16-2-1999 with a direction to remain present before the Court below personally or through an Advocate on the said date. The said Notice was duly served upon the appellant. In pursuance of the said Notice, the appellant remained present before the Court below along with his Advocate on 16-2-1999. On that day, the appellant submitted an application Exh. 47 through his Advocate, requesting to grant some time to make his submissions. However, the said application preferred by the appellant was rejected, and on the same day, the Court below proceeded with the further hearing of the Notice Exh. 45(A). 3.8. After hearing the appellant as well as the Advocate appearing on his behalf before the •Court below, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge passed the judgment dated 16-2-1999 convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Sec. 344 Cr.P.C. and imposing sentence, as narrated in the earlier part of this judgment. 4. Mr. B. B. Naik, learned Advocate for the appellant, has submitted that the judgment dated 16-2-1999 passed by the Court below suffers from the vice of gross violation of the principles of natural justice. 4.1. 4. Mr. B. B. Naik, learned Advocate for the appellant, has submitted that the judgment dated 16-2-1999 passed by the Court below suffers from the vice of gross violation of the principles of natural justice. 4.1. Learned Advocate has drawn our attention to the provision of Sec.344 Cr.P.C. and has contented that the Court below could take cognizance of the alleged offence only after giving the accused reasonable opportunity to present his case. 4.2. Learned Advocate has submitted that in the case on hand, the Court below has not given any opportunity, much less any reasonable opportunity, to the appellant before passing the impugned judgment, which is clearly violative of the principles of natural justice. 4.3. Learned Advocate has next submitted that the Court below has also committed serious error of law inasmuch as it has not followed the mandatory provision of Sec. 344(4) Cr.P.C. He has submitted that the convict-accused was required to be given an opportunity to challenge the conclusion recorded by the Sessions Court while passing the judgment dated 5-2-1999, by way of filing appropriate proceedings before the appropriate forum. However, no such opportunity was granted by the Court below and it proceeded with the matter on the first date itself before the expiry of the appeal period. Hence, the impugned judgment deserves to be quashed and set aside on this count also. 4.4. Learned Advocate has contented that there is no evidence on record to support the conclusion arrived at by the Court below that the appellant had forged/ fabricated the document at Exh. 17 and that the said finding arrived at by the Court below is without any foundation. He has submitted that on perusal of the police yaadi sent to the Executive Magistrate at Exh. 11 and the entry made by the P.S.O. of Odhav Police Station in the Station Diary at Exh. 23, it is apparel that the victim had sustained the burn injuries as a result of the accidental fire that took place while preparing tea on a primus. Therefore, undoubtedly, the document at Exh. 17 was genuine and not a false or fabricated one. 4.5. Learned Advocate has further submitted that there is no cogent evidence on record to show that the appellant had forged/fabricated the said document. Hence, the impugned judgment, being totally baseless, deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4.6. Therefore, undoubtedly, the document at Exh. 17 was genuine and not a false or fabricated one. 4.5. Learned Advocate has further submitted that there is no cogent evidence on record to show that the appellant had forged/fabricated the said document. Hence, the impugned judgment, being totally baseless, deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4.6. Learned Advocate has next contented that in view of the provisions of Sec. 344 Cr.P.C., the Court below was required to deal with the matter by following the procedure as prescribed in summary trial cases. However, in the present case, the Court below has not followed the said procedure. Hence, the impugned judgment deserves to be quashed and set aside on this ground itself. 4.7. In support thereof, learned Advocate has relied upon a decision in the case of Emperor v. Kondiba Balaji, reported in AIR 1940 Born. 314 wherein, it has been held that the provisions of Sec. 342 Cr. P. C. of 1898 applies even to summons case tried summarily under Sec. 263 Cr.P.C. 4.8. Learned Advocate has relied upon a decision of the Hon 'ble Punjab High Court in the case of Mohinder Singh v. Stale, reported in 1968 Cri.L.J 427 wherein, it has been held that the procedure prescribed under Sec. 263 Cr.P.C. must be strictly followed. 4.9. Learned Advocate has next relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mohammad Ibrahim v. B. Rama Rao, reported in AIR 1976 SC 1822 wherein, it has been held that under Sec. 479A Cr.P.C. of 1898, not only is it necessary that the Court must form the opinion that the witness had intentionally given false evidence, but it is further necessary that the Court must come to the conclusion that for the eradication of the evils of perjury and in the interests of justice, it is expedient that the witness should be prosecuted for the offence which appears to have been committed by him. 4.10. 4.10. Learned Advocate has also relied upon a decision in the case of Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mirja Khasim AU Beg & Anr., reported in AIR 1977 SC 747 , wherein on the facts of that case, the Court held that the order of dismissal being without jurisdiction and as such void and inoperative having been passed in contravention of Art. 311 (1) of the Constitution of India, the fact that the order was confirmed on appeal by the Head of the Department cannot cure the initial defect. 4.11. Learned Advocate has next relied upon a decision in the case of Murari Mohan Deb v. Secretary to the Govt. of India & Ors., reported in AIR 1985 SC 931 wherein, it has been held that the enquiry proceedings, in which the order of compulsory retirement was passed without following the principles of natural justice, was illegal and vitiated. 4.12. Learned Advocate has also relied upon a decision in the case of Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L. K. Ratna & Ors., reported in AIR 1987 SC 71 : 1986 (4) SCC 537 wherein, it has been held that there is nothing is Regulation 14 of the Chartered Accountants Regulations, 1964 which excludes the operation of the principle of natural justice entitling the member to be heard by the Council when it proceeds to render its finding. The principles of natural justice must be read into the unoccupied interstices of the statute unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary. 4.13. Learned Advocate has next relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Kerala High Court in the case of Varghese @ Sibi v. State of Kerala, reported in 1989 Cri.LJ 2041 wherein, it has been held that when the discretion is exercised in favour of initiating action under Sec. 344 Cr.P.C., there must be satisfaction for the Court that it is necessary and expedient in the interest of justice that the witness should be tried summarily. The said satisfaction is not meant to be subjective only. It must be objective. It must appear from the proceeding that the Court initiated action only on such satisfaction. 4.14. The said satisfaction is not meant to be subjective only. It must be objective. It must appear from the proceeding that the Court initiated action only on such satisfaction. 4.14. Learned Advocate has relied upon a decision in the case of Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India & Ors., related cases reported in AIR 1990 SC 1480 , wherein it has been held that audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. The rule of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application is that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. 4.15. Learned Advocate has also relied upon a decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of Nasib Din v. State of H. P., reported in 1992 (3) Crimes 706, wherein it has been held that in a case of prosecution for perjury, the moment the Court is apprised of the filing of the appeal against the judgment in which the petitioner is alleged to have made a false statement, the Court should proceed slowly as further proceedings of the trial is to abide by the result of the appeal. 4.16. Learned Advocate has also relied upon the decision in the case of T. Bhagi Patra v. State of Orissa, reported in 1996 Cri.LJ 2423, wherein it has been held that in order to make a person liable for false evidence, he should have made a statement on oath regarding the facts on which his statement was based, and then, deny those facts on oath on subsequent occasion. The earlier statements regarding a set of facts must be on oath and his statement also must be on oath. If both the statements become irreconcilable, then only there shall be a scope of forming an opinion for initiation of the prosecution. 4.17. The earlier statements regarding a set of facts must be on oath and his statement also must be on oath. If both the statements become irreconcilable, then only there shall be a scope of forming an opinion for initiation of the prosecution. 4.17. Learned Advocate has next relied upon a decision in the case of Shekhar Ghosh v. Union of India & Anr., reported in 2007 (1) SCC 331 , wherein it has been held that a post-decisional hearing was not called for as the disciplinary authority had already made up its mind before giving an opportunity of hearing. Such a post-decisional hearing in a case of this nature is not contemplated in law and the result of such hearing was a foregone conclusion. 5. Mr. H. L. lani, learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the respondentState, has submitted that the so-called statement made by deceased-Bhuriben on 6-3-1999 at Exh. 17 states that the deceased had sustained the burn injuries in question when the clothes worn by her on the date of the incident in question had caught fire while she was preparing tea on a primus. However, it may be noted that the aforesaid fact has not been narrated anywhere in the medical casepapers of the deceased, i.e. the treatment-sheet dated 20-3-1998 at Exh. 15 and the case-papers from 6-3-1998 to 8-3-1998 at Exh. 16. 5.1. Learned A.P.P. has submitted that in fact, in the said case-papers, i.e. the documents at Exhs. 15 and 16, endorsements have been made to the effect that the police has been informed about the said incident on 8-3-1999 and that the dying declaration of the victim has been recorded on that day itself. Therefore, if at all the appellant had noted down the history of the victim at Exh. 17, then he would have definitely informed about the said fact to the police or to anyone els•e. However, the same has not been done and the said fact has been disclosed, for the first time, only before the Court below and that to at the stage of his cross-examination. The aforesaid conduct of the appellant establishes his intention of producing a forged document and leading false evidence before a Court of law. Learned A.P.P. has submitted that the aforesaid aspect creates serious doubts about the genuineness of the document at Exh. The aforesaid conduct of the appellant establishes his intention of producing a forged document and leading false evidence before a Court of law. Learned A.P.P. has submitted that the aforesaid aspect creates serious doubts about the genuineness of the document at Exh. 17 which is admittedly false evidence tendered with a view to help the original-accused person. 5.2. Learned A.P.P. has further submitted that even if we believe the document at Exh. 17 to be genuine, then also, on a perusal of the same with the naked eye, it transpires that, the said document bears three different handwritings. Apart from that the same was produced by the appellant only during his cross-examination before the Court below in Sessions Case No. 142 of 1998 as P.W. 2 at Exh. 13. The fact regarding possession of such a document by the appellant was never disclosed to the prosecution by the appellant, at any time prior to his cross-examination, which also creates serious doubts about its genumeness. 5.3. Learned A.P.P. has drawn our attention to Clause (XV) of Para 60 of the judgment dated 5-2-1999 passed in Sessions Case No. 142 of 1998, which reads as under : "60(XV) The P.W. 2, Dr. Yogendra Shah, has fabricated the document Exh. 17 and have also either forged or got forged signature of the deceased, Bhuriben, as false declaration purported to have been given by the deceased, Bhuriben, and he is liable to be prosecuted under Sec. 344 of the Criminal Procedure Code for giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence, with an intention that his evidence may be used in the proceedings." 5.4. Learned A.P.P.. has contented that on a bare perusal of Clause (XV) of Para 60 and Clause (V) of the operative order of the judgment dated 5-2-1999 delivered in Sessions Case No. 142 of 1998 makes it amply clear that the Court below had reached to the objective satisfaction that the appellant had fabricated/forged the document at Exh. 17, and thereafter only, has issued Notice under Sec. 344 CLP.C. Thus, "reasonable opportunity", as contemplated in Sec. 344 CLP.C. was given to the appellant at the relevant point of time. 5.5. Learned A.P.P. has further contented that no such contention that the Court below ought not to have heard the matter, in view of the provision of Sec. 344(4) CL P. c., was raised before the Court below. 5.5. Learned A.P.P. has further contented that no such contention that the Court below ought not to have heard the matter, in view of the provision of Sec. 344(4) CL P. c., was raised before the Court below. The said contention is being raised, for the first time, only before this Court, which cannot be permitted. Hence, the Court below was completely justified in passing the impugned judgment. 5.6. Learned A.P.P. has next submitted that during the course of hearing of Exh. 45(A) Notice, the appellant and the Advocate appearing on his behalf before the Court below had in fact requested the Court below to take a lenient view in the matter while imposing sentence, after the judgment dated 5-2-1999 below Exh. 47 was passed. Therefore, the say of the learned Advocate for the appellant that the provisions of Sec. 344(4) Cr.P.C. were not complied with, holds no ground and is devoid of any merits. 5.7. Learned A.P.P. has further contented that in his deposition before the Court below as P. W. 2 at Exh. 13 in the Sessions Case in question, the appellant has deposed that when the victim was brought to his Hospital on 6-3-1998, she had sustained burn injuries on several parts of her body, except the hands, viz. palm and all five fingers. However, the Court below, after carefully scrutinizing the entire evidence on record, arrived at the subjective satisfaction that the appellant had committed offence under Sec. 344 Cr. P. C., and thereby, recorded a conclusion to that effect in Clause (XV) of Para 60 of the judgment dated 5-2-1999. Consequently, Notice under Sec. 344 Cr.P.C. was directed to be issued to the appellant while delivering the judgment dated 5-2-1999 in the Sessions Case in question and on 6-2-1999 the impugned Notice came to be issued to the appellant. He has, therefore, submitted that the Court below was completely justified in passing the impugned judgment and no interference is required from this Court in this appeal. 6. We have heard learned Counsel for the respective parties and have also gone through the oral as well as documentary evidence as shown to us by the learned Counsel for the respective parties. Before proceeding with the matter on merits, we would like to refer to the provision of Sec. 344 Cr.P.C., as the entire case essentially revolves around the said Section. Before proceeding with the matter on merits, we would like to refer to the provision of Sec. 344 Cr.P.C., as the entire case essentially revolves around the said Section. Section 344 Cr.P. C. reads as under : "344. Summary procedure for trial for giving false evidence :- (1) If, at the time of delivery of any judgment or final order disposing of any judicial proceeding, a Court of Sessions or Magistrate of the First Class expresses an opinion to the effect that any witness appearing in such proceeding had knowingly or willfully given false evidence or had fabricated false evidence with the intention that such evidence should be used in such proceeding, it or he may, if satisfied that it is necessary and expedient in the interest of justice that the witness should be tried summarily for giving or fabricating, as the case may be, false evidence, take cognizance of the offence, and may, after giving the offender a reasonable opportunity of showing cause why he should not be punished for such offence, try such offender summarily and sentence him to imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or to fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. (2) In every such case the Court shall follow, as nearly as may be practicable, the procedure prescribed for summary trials. (3) Nothing in this Section shall affect the power of the Court to make a complaint under Sec. 340 for the offence. where it does not choose to proceed under this Section. (4) Where, after any action is initiated under sub-sec. (1), it is made to appear to the Court of Sessions or Magistrate of the First Class that an appeal or an applications for revision has been preferred or filed against the judgment or order in which the opinion referred to in that sub-section has been expressed, it or he shall stay further proceedings of the trial until the disposal of the appeal or the application for revision, as the case may be, and thereupon, the further proceedings of the trial shall abide by the results of the appeal or application for revision." 6.1. From the language used in the aforesaid provision, it is apparent that an opinion has to be formed to the effect that the witness has given false evidence and satisfaction has to be recorded that it is necessary and expedient, in the interest of justice, that the witness should be tried summarily. The purpose of this provision is to create a restraint on the witness from stating falsehood in a Court. No witness should foster the idea and nourish the hope that he can tender false evidence in a Court of law and escape. In the temple of justice, one is expected to speak the truth. The majesty of law condemns statements based on falsehood. On an erroneous assumption, one may state with regard to a particular situation in his own individualistic manner, but a deliberate and conscious act of stating falsehood in a Court of law is deplorable and reprehensible. 7. At this stage, we would like to record that this Court had provided an opportunity to the learned Advocate for the appellant to give a satisfactory explanation with regard to the show-cause notice issued to the appellant under Sec. 344 Cr.P.C. by the Court below. We also placed a suggestion to the learned Advocate that if the appellant personally desires to remain present before this Court and explain the position, then he shall be free to do so. 7.1. However, the learned Advocate for the appellant was not in a position to give any explanation, much less any satisfactory explanation, with regard to the show-cause notice issued to the appellant under Sec. 344 Cr.P.C. by the Court below nor accepted the said suggestion put by this Court, and ultimately requested the Court that the matter may be remanded to the Court below, else, the appellant will lose his right to prefer any appeal/revision. 8. Before proceeding further, we would like to reproduce the relevant portion of the evidence of the appellant before the Court below as P. W. 2 at Exh. 13 in Sessions Case No. 142 of 1998. It reads as under: "Deposition of Prosecution Witness NO.2: 1 do hereby state on oath that my name is Dr. Yogendra, Father's name is Dashrathlal Shah, aged about 45 years, Occupation Medical Officer, residing at Odhav Road, Ahmedabad. Examination-in-chief by the learned P.P. Shri R. F. Parmar. 1. 2. ..... 3. 13 in Sessions Case No. 142 of 1998. It reads as under: "Deposition of Prosecution Witness NO.2: 1 do hereby state on oath that my name is Dr. Yogendra, Father's name is Dashrathlal Shah, aged about 45 years, Occupation Medical Officer, residing at Odhav Road, Ahmedabad. Examination-in-chief by the learned P.P. Shri R. F. Parmar. 1. 2. ..... 3. On 6th March, 1998, when Bhuriben was brought to the hospital, I admitted her as an indoor patient and treated her. Upon asking Bhuriben, she informed that she had sustained burn injuries in an accident. She had sustained burn injuries on the chest, stomach and both the legs. There were no burn injuries on the face and hair. She had sustained burn injuries on the chest and stomach and on the back portion of the body. There were burns patches. Her hands were not burned. Bhuriben was admitted in my hospital on 6-3-1998 from 5-30 p.m. to 7-3-1998, and thereafter, on 8-3-1998 at 2-00 p.m., she was referred to Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad and I also gave a note regarding that. I informed the persons who had brought Bhuriben to my Hospital on 6-3-1998 to inform the police. But they didn't inform the police as they were busy in this. So, I telephonically informed Odhav Police Station between 9-30 a.m. to 9-45 a.m. on 8-3-1998. The Executive Magistrate came to my hospital at 12-10 p.m. for the purpose of recording the dying declaration of Bhuriben. I was asked about the condition of the patient. I wrote on the yaadi Exh. 11 that the patient is conscious. By saying that Bhuriben was fully conscious I mean to say that she was able to speak on that day. Bhuriben was not under the influence of any sedative drugs when the dying declaration was recorded. I had made an endorsement on Exh. 11 and my signature is appended therein which I identify. The writings on the bottom area of the left-hand side are in my hand-writings and the facts mentioned therein are true. I examined Bhuriben prior to recording the dying declaration. She appeared to be sound while understanding questions and giving answers thereto. So, I made a note accordingly in Exh. 11. I have issued two certificates, which are produced vide List - 9/6 and 9/7. My signature is appended therein and it is in my hand-writing, which I identify. I examined Bhuriben prior to recording the dying declaration. She appeared to be sound while understanding questions and giving answers thereto. So, I made a note accordingly in Exh. 11. I have issued two certificates, which are produced vide List - 9/6 and 9/7. My signature is appended therein and it is in my hand-writing, which I identify. The facts mentioned therein are true. The List 9/6 and 9/7 are given Exh. Nos. 14 and 15 respectively. I produce the treatment papers at Exh. 16. Cross-examination by the Advocate Shri C. M. Rangwani for the accused. 4. ……… 5. One Dr. Govindbhai Zala and one Abhesing Kiri and one another person were with the patient, when she was brought to me. Abhesing was patient's uncle-in-law. I do not know as to whether there were other women with Abhesing. I know Dr. Govind Zala as a Doctor. He comes with cases to me. There was no material improvement in the burn injuries sustained by Bhuriben when she was referred to Civil Hospital. Bhuriben was in a sound condition. Urine was passing and so she was conscious. But, healing had not taken place. She had temporary recovery. During inquiry, I came to know that the patient had been to Kathlal Hospital also. But, I do not know as to what had happened there. By Court :- Question :- Have you made any such note in any case paper? Answer :- I have not made any such note in any case paper. Question :- Can you disclose as to where did the other patient go and then came? Answer :- No Sir, I can not indicate without making a note. Question :- In this case, how could you remember that Bhuriben has come after approaching Kathlal because no such note has been made in the document at Exh. 16? Can you explain? Answer Question 6-3-1998 apart Answer Question Answer Question Answer By Advocate :- 6. ..... I came to know by hearsay. How many patients were admitted In your hospital on from Bhuriben? Two other patients. What are their names? I cannot say without referring to the record. In which hospital did those two patients approach? I cannot say. 7. I talked with Bhuriben. Bhuriben informed me that while she was preparing tea at her home as guests had come, she had sustained the burn injuries from the stove. Dr. Two other patients. What are their names? I cannot say without referring to the record. In which hospital did those two patients approach? I cannot say. 7. I talked with Bhuriben. Bhuriben informed me that while she was preparing tea at her home as guests had come, she had sustained the burn injuries from the stove. Dr. Govindbhai also informed the same thing. The consent of a patient or a relative should be taken if a patient is to be operated. I asked the relatives of Bhuriben to call her parents. By Court :- Question :- Answer Did the husband of Bhuriben come with her? I do not know even if he had come. Cross-examination by Advocate :8. 9. 10. ..... By Court :- Question Answer Have you read the Rules of the Medical Council? I have not read all the Rules. Question Do you know that any patient, battling between life and death, should not be discharged from an Hospital on the ground of money? Answer I know• that. Question Answer Question Answer How much amount was deposited by Bhuribens' relatives? Five thousand rupees. Did you give a receipt thereof? No. Question If Bhuribens' relatives had deposited the amount, would you have referred her to the Civil Hospital? Answer :- No. As Bhuribens' relatives had refused to deposit the amount she was referred to the Civil Hospital. Question How is Bhuriben's husband? Answer I have not seen him. It is true that when Bhuriben was brought to my hospital, I told Govindbhai and Abhesing to inform the police, but they did not inform the police. It is true that it is a rule for a Doctor that the Doctor should inform the police on receiving a medico-legal case. It is true that I myself have not informed to the Police Station on 6th and 7th. There was no vacancy at the time when the rounds I, 2 apd 3 were made in Exh. 16. I am shown the reverse portion of Exh. 16. It is true that the writings on the second and third papers after Exh. 16 were written on the whole page. My writings are near the margin line on page No. 3 of Exh. 16. I am shown Exh. 17. It is true that the writings of Exh. 17 are not in Exh. 16. There is no signature of Bhuriben in Exh. 16. 16 were written on the whole page. My writings are near the margin line on page No. 3 of Exh. 16. I am shown Exh. 17. It is true that the writings of Exh. 17 are not in Exh. 16. There is no signature of Bhuriben in Exh. 16. Bhuriben was not able to sit. She could not stand even. Bhuriben has signed while she was lying on the cot in the ward. It is true that the word Primus (stove) is overwritten in Exh. 17. Generally, I mention the treatment of the patient in Exh. 16 and I note if there are injuries. If a certificate or anything else is required to be issued, I write on other papers. It is true that other writings, over and above the injuries and medicines, are written in Exh. 16. Question :- When you have written other particulars over and above the medicines and injuries in Exh. 16 then why have you written the particulars of Exh. 17 on a different paper? Answer :- I cannot give any explanation thereto. Question :- If the Court says you that you have subsequently falsely created the document at Exh. 17 with an intent to help the accused and that the signature of Bhuriben is doubtful. What have you to say? Answer :- It is not true. Dr. Govindbhai is 'practising near Amba Hotel in Tanjal Village which is situated between Kathlal and Ahmedabal road. Question :- If the writings of Exh. 17 is in your hand-writing in your presence, then why have you not signed therein? Answer :- It might have been left over by me and so it is not signed. Question :- Who had told you that the Certificate Exh. 17 has to be produced in the Court? Answer :- I have brought of my own and have also brought the case papers of the patient.It is true that I have produced the xerox of Exh. 16. I was not inclined to produce the xerox copy of Exh. 16 because the Certificate Exh. 17 was kept loosely pinned in the case papers. It is true that pin-holes are not seen in Exh. 17. The witness explains that the stapler pins are fixed and stuck out. I cannot say as to on which side of the paper this writing was fixed. Cross-Examination by the accused. 9. 16 because the Certificate Exh. 17 was kept loosely pinned in the case papers. It is true that pin-holes are not seen in Exh. 17. The witness explains that the stapler pins are fixed and stuck out. I cannot say as to on which side of the paper this writing was fixed. Cross-Examination by the accused. 9. Mamlatdar has not met me in the chamber. He went in the ward and I also went in the ward. I met him in the ward. I was not present in the ward when the dying declaration was being recorded. I was in the office. There were two indoor patients. Cross-Examination by the Advocate Shri Parmar. Question :- Did you think it proper to produce the paper Exh. 17 before the police or did you find it necessary to show these papers to the Magistrate? Answer :- I have not stated as I am not asked. Question :- Have you been asked in the Court summons to bring the papers Exh. 17? Answer :- It is mentioned in the Court summons to attend with the papers. Question :- Have you informed the police that - I have recorded the statement at Exh. 17". Answer :- Yes. It is true that the police have given me a paper which I produced. My signature is not therein, but I produced the same at Exh. 18. It is true that the Investigating Officer had asked for the document at Exh. 18, i.e. the treatment papers. It is true that the papers at Exhs. 14 and 15 were produced. It is true that I did not give the paper at Exh. 17 at the relevant time. In reply to the question - "Date 6-3-1998 is written by pressing the pen" - I state that the pen is damaged. The body writing in Exh. 17 is written with another pen and Bhuriben had signed with the same pen. In reply to the question - the writing of Exh. 17 is written with two pens - I state that it is true that I have written the writing Exh. 17 in my office and the signature of Bhuriben in Exh. 17 is taken in the ward. It is true that the signature of anyone else is not taken in order to establish that Bhuriben has willingly stated the writing Exh. 17." 9. 17 in my office and the signature of Bhuriben in Exh. 17 is taken in the ward. It is true that the signature of anyone else is not taken in order to establish that Bhuriben has willingly stated the writing Exh. 17." 9. On a bare perusal of the documents at Exhs. 14, 15 and 17 and the oral evidence of the appellant before the Court below as P. W. 2 at Exh. 13, it transpires that the conclusion recorded at Clause (XV) of Para 60 has been arrived at after recording the objectionable evidence given by the appellant. It is an undisputed fact that the document at Exh. 17 dated 6-3-1998 was produced on record of the Court below, for the first time, only when the appellant was in the Witness Box and cross-examined by the learned Advocate for the originalaccused in the said Sessions Case. The said document at Exh. 17 is in the nature of a history given by the victim to the appellant when the victim was brought to the Hospital of the appellant, at the first place, on the date of the incident in question, i.e. on 6-3-1998 by her in-laws, meaning thereby, that the said statement is purported to have been recorded on 6-3-1998. The so-called statement dated 6-3-1998 made by the victim before the appellant states that she had sustained the burn injuries when the clothes worn by her at the relevant point of time had caught fire from the primus while she was preparing tea. The said document is also purported to have been signed by the deceased. 9.1. However, on a bare perusal of the said document with the naked eye, it appears that the same bears three different hand-writings. While appreciating the evidence of the Executive Magistrate, who recorded the dying declaration of the victim and the Medical Officer, who performed the postmortem of the deceased, in the aforesaid Sessions Case, it has come out that the victim was not in a position to put her signature as she had sustained severe burn injuries on both her hands, viz., palm and• all five fingers. The said aspect also gets support from the fact that on the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate on 8-3-1998 at Exh. 12, the victim has put her right big toe mark. 10. The said aspect also gets support from the fact that on the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate on 8-3-1998 at Exh. 12, the victim has put her right big toe mark. 10. We shall now carefully scrutinize the evidence led by the appellant (P.W. 2 at Exh. 13) in Sessions Case No. 142 of 1998 in detail. In his deposition, the Doctor has stated that the victim was brought to his Hospital by her relatives on 6-3-1998 at around 17-30 hrs. and on examining her it was found that she had sustained about 50 % - 55 % burn injuries on the body as a whole. He has further deposed that when he inquired from the victim about the history of the incident, she informed' him that she had sustained the burn injuries as a result of an accident. The victim had sustained burn injuries on the face, chest, stomach, legs and the back portion of her body. He has categorically deposed that the victim had not sustained any burn injuries on both the hands. He has further deposed that on 6-3-1998 he had instructed the relatives of the victim to inform the police about the said incident. However, they could not inform the police, and therefore, on 8-3-1998, at around 9-30 hrs., he gave a telephonic intimation about the said incident to Odhav Police Station. He has further deposed that for the purpose of recording the dying declaration of the victim, the Executive Magistrate had arrived at his Hospital at about 12-10 hrs. and that on an inquiry being made from him by the Executive Magistrate regarding the condition of the victim, he made an endorsement on the yaadi Exh. 11 that the victim was in a conscious state of mind and that she could depose. This witness has identified the said endorsement made by him on the yaadi at Exh. 11 before the Court below. He has also proved the Certificates at Exhs. 14 and 15 and the casepapers of the victim at Exh. 16. 10.1. Here, we would like to refer to the said Certificates at Exhs. 14 and 15 purported to have been issued by this witness on 18-3-1998 and 203-1998 respectively and the alleged history given by the victim at Exh. 17 dated 6- 3-1998. 14 and 15 and the casepapers of the victim at Exh. 16. 10.1. Here, we would like to refer to the said Certificates at Exhs. 14 and 15 purported to have been issued by this witness on 18-3-1998 and 203-1998 respectively and the alleged history given by the victim at Exh. 17 dated 6- 3-1998. The said documents read as under EXHIBIT 14 Date: 18-3-1998 Certificate This is to certify that Bhuriben Bhanubhai Zala 50 to 55 % burns admitted to my clinic from 6-3-1998 (5-30 p.m.) to 8-3-1998 (2-00 p.m.) and was shifted elsewhere on 8-3-1998 in good condition. Sd/- EXHIBIT 15 Date 20-3-1998 Certificate (Treatment-Sheet) Odhav Police informed' 10-30 a.m. D. D. taken on 8-3-1998 at 12-00 to 12-30 p.m. Sd/Seal EXHIBIT 17 Date: 6-3-1998 I, Bhuriben Bhanubhai Zala, in my full consciousness, say that as the corner of my saree catched fire while preparing tea on a primus, I sustained burn injuries. Sir, kindly give me good treatment for the future of my children. __sd/-___ Bhuriben 10.2. This witness (P.W. 2) has been cross-examined at length before the Court below. From his cross-examination, it has come out that the document at Exh. 17, purported to have been executed by the victim on 6-3-1998, was produced on record only at the time of his cross-examination before the Court below. This witness has not even made a mention about the said document at Exh. 17 in his examination-in-chief before the Court below. 10.3. We have scrutinized the said document at Exh. 17 in light of the other evidence on record, more particularly, the documentary evidence in the form of inquest panchnama at Exh. 30 and the post-mortem report at Exh. 33 and the oral evidence in the form of depositions of the Executive Magistrate (P.W. 1 Pramod Hajarilal Jain at Exh. 10) and the Medical Officer who performed the post-mortem of the deceased (P. W. 7 Dr. Manish Tulsidas Kapadia' at Exh. 32). In the inquest panchnama at Exh. 30, it has been categorically mentioned that both the hands of the victim were completely burnt. The said aspect gets support from the evidence of the Executive Magistrate - Pramod Hajarilal Jain (P.W. 1 at Exh. 10) who has categorically deposed that both the hands of the victim were completely burnt. In the post-mortem report at Exh. 30, it has been categorically mentioned that both the hands of the victim were completely burnt. The said aspect gets support from the evidence of the Executive Magistrate - Pramod Hajarilal Jain (P.W. 1 at Exh. 10) who has categorically deposed that both the hands of the victim were completely burnt. In the post-mortem report at Exh. 33, more particularly, in Column No.7 therein, it has been mentioned that there was violet ink-stains on the right big toe. The said aspect gets support from the evidence led by the Medical Officer - Dr. Manish Tulsidas Kapadia (P. W. 7 at Exh. 32) who has categorically deposed that at the time of performing post-mortem, violet ink was present on the right big toe of the victim and that it appeared that the right big toe impression of the victim has been taken. Even the inquest panchnama at Exh. 30 shows the presence of violet ink on the right big toe of the victim. 10.4. The above evidence leads us to the one and only conclusion that in the alleged incident, the victim had sustained severe burn injuries on a major part of her body, including both the hands, viz. palm and all five fingers, which would have completely left her handicapped, so far as her ability to put any signature/thumb-mark on anything with any of her hands is concerned. However, the Doctor, i.e. P.W. 2 at Exh. 13, has categorically deposed in his examinationin-chief that both the hands of the victim were not burnt. From the crossexamination, the intention of this witness has been established. It transpires that for the purpose of producing the false document in the form of the alleged history given by the victim vide Exh. 17, a situation was attempted to be created by P.W. 2 to show that both the hands, viz. palm and all five fingers, of the victim were allright and that they had not sustained any burn injuries. The said document at Exh. 17 was produced on record of the Court below, for the first time, only during the stage of cross-examination though he was very well aware of the fact that both the hands, viz. J1alm and all five fingers, of the victim had sustained severe burn injuries. The said document at Exh. 17 was produced on record of the Court below, for the first time, only during the stage of cross-examination though he was very well aware of the fact that both the hands, viz. J1alm and all five fingers, of the victim had sustained severe burn injuries. Unfortunately, the said false and concocted story brought forth by P. W. 2 did not hold any ground in view of the evidence discussed hereinabove. 10.5. It would not be out of place to state that if the document at Exh. 17 was a genuine one, then it would have definitely found place in the Certificate at Exh. 15 since in the said document at Exh. 15, every single aspect pertaining to the treatment of the victim has been narrated. The wardhi at Exh. 23 also does not disclose any time or date. The records of L. G. Hospital, Ahmedabad show that the victim was admitted in the Hospital on 8-3-1998 at around 14-35 hrs. It is pertinent to note that the document at Exh. 17 is a letter-head of the appellant. If we believe the story that the victim was conscious when she was brought to the Hospital of the appellant and that the appellant had noted down the history given by the victim, then in normal circumstances, the same would have been reduced into writing in the case-papers of the patient concerned. In the case on hand, the case-papers of the victim are produced on record vide Exh. 16. However, the same does not reveal any such "noting" made by the appellant. No explanation has been put forward as to why the alleged history vide Exh. 17 has been noted down on a separate piece of paper. The fact remains that the appellant himself has admitted in his cross-examination that he himself has written the contents of the document at Exh. 17 in his chamber, and thereafter, obtained the signature of the victim in it in the ward. The said fact creates serious doubts in our minds regarding the genuineness of the document at Exh. 17. 11. We have evaluated the evidence on record in detail as also the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respective parties. It is established from the record that both the hands of the victim, viz. palm and all five fingers, were completely burnt. 17. 11. We have evaluated the evidence on record in detail as also the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respective parties. It is established from the record that both the hands of the victim, viz. palm and all five fingers, were completely burnt. In the said circumstances, the say of the appellant that the victim had signed the document at Exh. 17, at the relevant point of time, is absolutely false and contrary to the evidence on record. Even, the subsequent conduct of the appellant of not informing anyone, including the police, about the said alleged document and of disclosing the same, for the first time, only at the time of his cross-examination before the Court below, leads us to the only conclusion that the Court below had not called for the said document at Exh. 17, but it was the appellant who had voluntarily produced the said document at Exh. 17 on the record of the Court below and that to at the time of his cross-examination. It is a matter of record that in the examination-in-chief also, the appellant had not disclosed to anyone nor informed the concerned learned A.P.P. about his possessing the document at Exh. 17. His conduct of producing the said document at Exh. 17 on the record of the Court below in person and that to at the time of his cross-examination clearly leads us to believe that he had forged the document and had deposed false evidence with an intention to help the original-accused. Thus, the Court below was completely justified in issuing Notice to the appellant while passing delivering the judgment dated 5-2-1999 in Sessions Case No. 142 of 1999. 12. So far as the contention raised by the learned Advocate that the appellant was not given any opportunity while passing the impugned judgment is concerned, it is a matter of record that while passing the judgment and order dated 5-2-1999 in Sessions Case No. 142 of 1999, the Court below has issued Notice under Sec. 344 Cr. P. C. to the appellant and directed the appellant to remain present before the Court below, either personally or through his Advocate, on the returnable date, i.e. on 16-2-1999. The said Notice was duly served on the appellant on 14-2-1999. P. C. to the appellant and directed the appellant to remain present before the Court below, either personally or through his Advocate, on the returnable date, i.e. on 16-2-1999. The said Notice was duly served on the appellant on 14-2-1999. Thereafter, on 16-2-1999, the appellant remained present before the Court below along with his Advocate and submitted an application requesting to grant some time to make his submissions, which was rejected by the Court below, by way of passing a reasoned order. It is a matter of record that during the course of hearing of the Notice at Exh. 45(A), the Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant before the Court below had submitted before the Court to take a lenient view while imposing punishment on the appellant, which implies that the order passed below Exh. 47 was accepted by the appellant. Therefore, now ,it does not lie in the mouth of the appellant to say that no opportunity was given to him by the Court below. Thus, there does not appear to be any violation of the principles of natural justice by the Court below while passing the impugned judgment. 13. Once, it is established that opportunity was given to the appellant before the Court below, we would like to record that even before this Court, at the time of final hearing of this appeal, a suggestion was put by us, as recorded in the earlier part of this judgment, to the learned Advocate to explain the position. However, the said opportunity was also not utilized and instead it was requested by the learned Advocate that the matter may be remanded to the Court below in view of the fact that if he would avail of the said opportunity, then he would lose his valuable right of preferring appeal/revision before this Court. Accordingly, he was not interested in the said suggestion put forth by us. 14. So far as the contention raised by the learned Advocate for the appellant as regards the applicability of Sec. 344(4) CLP.C. to the facts of the case is concerned, it is pertinent to note that no such request was made by the appellant or his Advocate before the Court below at the relevant point of time. The said contention has been raised, for the first time, before this Court in this appeal. The said contention has been raised, for the first time, before this Court in this appeal. In that view of the matter, the said contention raised by the learned Advocate for the appellant is devoid of any merits, and is accordingly, rejected. 15. So far as the contention raised by the learned Advocate with regard to summary trial is concerned, we are of the considered opinion that the same has also been followed by the Court below while passing the impugned judgment. The definition expressed by the learned Advocate for the appellant regarding summary trial does not deserve any acceptance, as in this case, the impugned judgment has' been passed after giving due opportunity to the appellant, as discussed in detail in the earlier paragraphs of this judgment. Hence, in our opinion, the procedure followed by the Court below was just and sufficient. Therefore, the said contention raised by the learned Advocate also deserves to be rejected, and is accordingly, rejected. 16. No other contention has been raised by the learned Advocate for the appellant. 17. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the Court below was completely justified in convicting the appellant for the offence under Sec. 344 Cr.P.C., as it had arrived at the subjective satisfaction that false evidence was led by the appellant willfully in judicial proceedings with an intention to help the original-accused for which he was liable to be summarily tried. We are in complete agreement with the reasonings given by and the findings arrived at by the Court below in the impugned judgment dated 16-2-1999. Merely because the appellant is a Doctor by profession, he cannot be permitted to walk away scot-free after committing such a serious offence. However, so far as the quantum of sentence imposed by the Court below is concerned, we find the same to be on the higher side, and therefore, it deserves to be reduced. 18. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is partly allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 16-2-1999 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Kheda at Nadiad is modified, to the extent that the conviction under Sec. 344 Cr.P.C. is confirmed, and consequently, the appellant is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of ten days. The rest of impugned judgment and order is quashed' and set aside. The appellant is on bail, and therefore, the bail bonds stand cancelled. Sessions Judge, Kheda at Nadiad is modified, to the extent that the conviction under Sec. 344 Cr.P.C. is confirmed, and consequently, the appellant is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of ten days. The rest of impugned judgment and order is quashed' and set aside. The appellant is on bail, and therefore, the bail bonds stand cancelled. He is directed to surrender to the custody within a period of eight weeks from today failing which it shall be open to the Investigating agency to take necessary action in accordance with law. 18.1. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly. Office is directed to send the records and proceedings to the trial Court concerned forthwith. (NRP) Appeal partly allowed.