JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 23.08.2001 passed by the learned Single Judge in writ petition No. 2372/1999, whereby the writ petition of the petitioner-State respondents herein (hereinafter referred to as 'respondents') seeking to set aside the award dated 02.01.1998 passed by the Labour Court, has been dismissed. 2. The appellant was engaged by the respondents as daily wager in the month of March, 1988. The respondents disengaged him w.e.f. 09.07.1987. Aggrieved of his disengagement, the appellant raised industrial dispute before the Re-Conciliation Officer. The reconciliation officer on failure of the reconciliation proceedings, submitted a failure report to the Government. Consequently, a reference was made to the Labour Court for adjudication. The Labour Court passed an award in favour of the appellant on 02.01.1998 directing the respondents to reinstate the appellant in service and in lieu of back wages, Rs. 2,000/- yearly were awarded. 3. Aggrieved of the order passed by the Labour Court, the respondents preferred a writ petition seeking to set aside the award on the ground that the workman has not completed 240 days in a year, therefore, the Labour Court was not justified in passing the award in favour of the appellant. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that appellant has worked only for 210 days and not 240 days with the employer in a year. The learned Single Judge arrived at this conclusion without counting the holidays and paid lays. 4. This appeal has been preferred by the workman challenging the legality and correctness of the order of the learned Single Judge on the ground that the learned Single Judge erred in law in reckoning the days in terms of Section 25-B read with Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 5. It is not in dispute that the workman had worked for 210 days physically with the respondents. The dispute is only, whether the workman is entitled to the benefits of holidays and paid days for reckoning a period of 240 days in a year, prior to the termination. This legal position is no longer res-integra as this legal controversy has been resolved by the Apex Court in case title Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management of American Express International Banking Corporation, reported in AIR 1986 SC 458 . This legal position is no longer res-integra as this legal controversy has been resolved by the Apex Court in case title Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management of American Express International Banking Corporation, reported in AIR 1986 SC 458 . The plea before the Apex Court was that the workman has not completed 240 days in 12 months period immediately preceding from the date of termination. On the basis of the argument, question was formulated for adjudication which is extracted below- "The question for consideration is whether Sundays and other holidays for which wages are paid under the law, by contract or statute, should be treated as days on which the 'employee actually worked under the employer' for the purpose of Section 25-F read with Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act." 6. While dealing with this plea the Apex Court in para 5 of the judgment observed as under- "Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act is plainly intended to give relief to retrenched workmen. The qualification for relief under section 25-F is that he should be a workman employed in an industry and has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer. What is continuous service has been defined and explained in section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the present case, the provision which is of relevance is section 25-B(2)a)(ii) which to the extent that it concerns us, provides that a workman who is not in continuous service for a period of one year shall be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year if the workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which the calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days. The expression which we are required to construe is 'actually worked under the employer'. This expression, according to us, cannot mean those days only when the workman worked with hammer, sickle or pen, but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which he was in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statue, standing orders, etc. This expression, according to us, cannot mean those days only when the workman worked with hammer, sickle or pen, but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which he was in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statue, standing orders, etc. The learned counsel for the Management would urge that only those days which are mentioned in the Explanation to section 25-B(2) should be taken into account for the purpose of calculation the number of days on which the workman had actually worked thoi;gh he had not so worked and no other days. We do not think that we are entitled to so constrain the construction of the expression 'actually worked under the employer'. The explanations is only clarificatory, as all explanations are, and cannot be used to limit the expanse of the main provision. If the expression 'actually worked under the employer' is capable of comprehending the days during which the workman was in employment and was paid wages - and we see no impediment to so construe the expression - there is no reason why the expression would be limited by the explanation." 7. The learned Single Judge reckoned only physical working days, which come to 210 days in a year. If Sundays and paid days are included in that event, it comes to 240 days in a year and this fact has not been disputed by the parties. 8. The learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the appellant's services were not terminated, rather he opted to abandon the job. This plea has been taken by the respondents in their reply before the Labour Court and the Labour Court on consideration upon of the plea and other evidence, has come to the conclusion that the service of the workman was terminated by the employer and the workman has not abandoned his job. In Supervisory jurisdiction it is not legally permissible for us to re- evaluate the evidence, as held by the Supreme Court in case title Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. In Supervisory jurisdiction it is not legally permissible for us to re- evaluate the evidence, as held by the Supreme Court in case title Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., reported in (2003)3 SCC 524 , observing as under- "The Supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is confined only to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within its parameters and not to correct an error apparent on the fact of the record, much less of an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or the tribunal. It is also not permissible to a High Court on a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the inferior court or tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision." 9. For these reasons, we find that the learned Single Judge in calculating the working days of the appellant with his employer has erred and we find that his approach is not in accordance with law. The judgment of the learned Single Judge, therefore, cannot be maintained and is accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed and the award of the Labour Court is maintained. *******