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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 208 (MP)

PRIYANKA SHRIVASTAVA v. STATE OF M. P.

2008-02-06

DIPAK MISRA, R.S.JHA

body2008
Judgment Dipak Misra, J. ( 1. ) Regard being had to the similitude of the grievance agitated in this batch of the writ petitions, it was heard analogously and is disposed of by this singular order. For the sake of clarity and convenience, the facts in Writ Petition No. 13397/07 are adumbrated herein. ( 2. ) The petitioners have prayed for issue of a writ of certiorari for quashment of the demand notices as contained in Annexures P-4 and P-5 issued by the respondent No. 3, Modern Dental College and Research Centre, Indore whereby the said institution has directed the petitioners to furnish bank guarantees and F.D.Rs. with a further prayer to command the respondent college not to cancel the admission and allow them to attend regular classes on deposit of the tuition and admission fees in the State quota without insisting for fulfillment of the conditions incorporated in the demand notices. ( 3. ) It is not disputed that the petitioners took admission in the college of the third respondent in B.D.S. course in the academic session 2004-05. It is not controverted that they are prosecuting their studies in the said college. It is admitted at the Bar that the Admission and Fees Regulatory Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) was constituted for fee fixation and it has fixed the fee for a student at Rs. 1,12,000/- per annum as tuition fee. The cavil arose when the college issued the notices for furnishing bank guarantees and F.D.R.s for certain sum as determined by the college as regards the fees in excess of the amount fixed by the Committee. ( 4. ) Assaling the correctness of the said notices it is submitted by Mr. P.K. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioners that the college cannot direct the students to furnish the bank guarantees as the petitioners have no intention to relinquish their studies. It is put forth by him that in the absence of any foundation to the effect that the students would leave the college, there could not have been any demand of this nature. To bolster his submission, he has placed reliance on the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Manoj Mod Vs. State of M.P. and Others, 2007 (4) MPLJ 386 . ( 5. ) Mr. To bolster his submission, he has placed reliance on the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Manoj Mod Vs. State of M.P. and Others, 2007 (4) MPLJ 386 . ( 5. ) Mr. Deepak Awasthy, learned Government Advocate for the State submitted that the demand notices issued by the College deserve to be quashed inasmuch as the petitioners are prosecuting their studies on payment of fee determined by the Committee. ( 6. ) Mr. Ashok Lalwani, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-institution submitted that the determination of fee structure by the Committee is subject to judicial review as per the decision rendered in P.A. Inamdar and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2005) 6 SCC 537 and, therefore, the college is justified in making a demand. Learned counsel further contended that the petitioners are at the verge of completion of the course and they would be leaving the college and in that eventuate the college would not be able to realise the differential amount from the students. Mr. Lalwani to buttress his submission has commended us to the decision rendered by the Bombay High Court in N.K.P. Salve Institute of Medical Sciences and Research Centre and etc Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, AIR 2005 Bombay 18. ( 7. ) To appreciate the submissions raised at the Bar, it is apposite to refer to paragraph 150 of the decision rendered in P.A. Inamdar (supra). It reads as under: "150. We make it clear that in case of any individual institution, if any of the Committee is found to have exceeded its powers by unduly interfering in the administrative and financial matters of the unaided private professional institutions, the decision of the Committee being quasi-judicial in nature, would always be subject to judicial review." ( 8. ) At this juncture it is apposite to refer to paragraph 8 of Islamic Academy of Education and Another Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 697 . In the said paragraph the Constitution Bench has expressed the opinion as under: "8. It must be mentioned that during arguments it was pointed out to us that some educational institutions are collecting, in advance, the fees for the entire course i.e. for all the years. It was submitted that this was done because the institute was not sure whether the student would leave the institute midstream. It must be mentioned that during arguments it was pointed out to us that some educational institutions are collecting, in advance, the fees for the entire course i.e. for all the years. It was submitted that this was done because the institute was not sure whether the student would leave the institute midstream. It was submitted that if the student left the course in midstream then for the remaining years the seat would lie vacant and the institute would suffer. In our view an educational institution can only charge prescribed fees for one semester/year. If an institution feels that any particular student may leave in midstream then, at the highest it may require that student to give a bond/bank guarantee that the balance fees for the whole course would be received by the institute even if the student left in midstream. If any educational institution has collected fees in advance, only the fees of that semester/year can be used by the institution. The balance fees must be kept invested in fixed deposits in a nationalised bank. As and when fees fall- due for a semester/year only the fees falling due for that semester/year can be withdrawn by the institution. The rest must continue to remain deposited till such time that they fall due. At the end of the course the interest earned on these deposits must be paid to the student from whom the fees were collected in advance." (Emphasis supplied) ( 9. ) On a perusal of the aforesaid enunciation of law we fail to fathom how the college can make a demand by way of bank guarantee and also F.D.Rs. from the students on the basis that the fee fixed by the Committee is subject to judicial review. Nothing like that has been stated in Islamic Academy of Education (supra). What has been pronounced therein is that if a student is likely to leave the course in the mid-stream, the educational institution can ask them to furnish a bond/bank guarantee. ( 10. ) In the case at hand, there is no allegation that the students are going to leave the college in the mid-stream. Possibly there could not have been such an allegation as the students are on the verge of completion of their course. The colossal complaint that they would leave the institution is without any base. ( 10. ) In the case at hand, there is no allegation that the students are going to leave the college in the mid-stream. Possibly there could not have been such an allegation as the students are on the verge of completion of their course. The colossal complaint that they would leave the institution is without any base. Eventual judicial review cannot be a ground or the basis requiring the petitioners to furnish the bank guarantees/bonds. ( 11. ) In this context, we may refer with profit to the decision rendered in Manoj Modi (supra) wherein this Court relying on Islamic Academy of Education (supra) has expressed the view in paragraphs 5 to 7 as under: "5. Mr. Aditya Sanghi, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the present case, bank guarantee was insisted upon from the petitioner by respondent No.4/college without any assessment that the petitioner may leave the course, to which he has been admitted, in midstream and, therefore, the demand of bank guarantee by respondent No 4/College from the petitioner was not in accordance with the judgment of Supreme Court in Islamic Academy of Education and Another Vs. State of Karnataka and Others (supra). 6. Mr. Satish Sharma appearing for respondent Nos. 3 and 4, submitted that in the brochure published by the Association of Private Dental and Medical Colleges of Madhya Pradesh for admissions in the year 2006, it is mentioned that the College will have the authority to ask a candidate to deposit the bank guarantee if a college feels that certain candidate may leave the course in midstream. 7. The provision in the brochure is in accord with the judgment of the Supreme Court in Islamic Academy of Education and Another Vs. State of Kamataka and Others (supra) but the demand by the respondent No.4/College from the petitioner to furnish the bank guarantee at the time of admission without an assessment whether the petitioner would leave the course midstream is contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Islamic Academy of Education and Another Vs. State of Karnataka and Others (supra) and the brochure published by the Association of Private Dental and Medical Colleges of Madhya Pradesh, respondent No.3." ( 12. State of Karnataka and Others (supra) and the brochure published by the Association of Private Dental and Medical Colleges of Madhya Pradesh, respondent No.3." ( 12. ) The aforesaid decision protects the petitioners inasmuch as there has been no assessment and there could not have been so as the petitioners are prosecuting their studies and in fact, on the verge of completing the same. The only ground that has been urged urged is that there may be a hike in fee structure by the process of judicial review. What would be the scope of judicial review need not be delved into and dwelled upon but it can be stated with certitude and indubitableness that in anticipation of a futuristic scenario a bond/guarantee cannot be demanded from the students. That is not the law laid down in P.A. Inamdar (supra) and Islamic Academy of Foundation (supra). ( 13. ) We would be failing in our duty if we do not take note of the decision rendered in N.K.P. Salve Institute of Medical Sciences and Research Centre (supra) by the Bombay High Court wherein it has been expressed as under: "16. The Academic Year 2004-05 is to commence shortly. Admissions have to be completed immediately. The institutions has urged before us that they may be permitted to charge for the forthcoming Academic Year the same ad hoc fee of 60% of the fee demanded by them, that being a direction which was issued by the Division Bench of this Court on 8th September, 2003 for the previous Academic Year 2003-04. We are of the view, that such a course would not be proper at this stage. An exercise has been carried out by the Committee appointed in pursuance of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Islamic Academy of Education. On 8th September 2003, when this Court issued directions allowing the institutions to charge 60% of the fees demanded by them, subject to adjustment, the exercise was still to be carried out by the Committee. That exercise has been carried out. We have allowed the institutions to bring the attention of the Committee their objections. We request the Committee to consider those objections and render its decision expeditiously, at any rate within a period of three months." ( 14. ) Submission of Mr. That exercise has been carried out. We have allowed the institutions to bring the attention of the Committee their objections. We request the Committee to consider those objections and render its decision expeditiously, at any rate within a period of three months." ( 14. ) Submission of Mr. Lalwani is that since the fee fixed by the Committee is not final and subject to judicial review the view expressed by the High Court of Bombay deserves to be followed. On a scrutiny of the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court it is perceivable that it has been laid down therein that the college can take an undertaking from each student that in the event of fee, that has been paid by him is enhanced by the Committee, the difference shall be paid by him. Thus, the facts in the said case are totally different and, therefore, the Bench has expressed the view on said terms. So is not the fact situation here. In the case at hand the students are prosecuting their studies on the basis of the fee fixed by the Committee. We may also proceed to state that there is no allegation that the students have not paid any amount of fee that has been fixed by the Committee. ( 15. ) In view of the aforesaid analysis, the action by tile respondent-institution in asking the petitioners for furnishing the bank-guarantees/F.D.Rs/bonds is absolutely untenable and accordingly the notices in question issued in each case are hereby quashed. ( 16. ) In the result, the writ petitions are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.