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2008 DIGILAW 21 (PNJ)

Puran Chand v. Jai Gopal

2008-01-08

RAJESH BINDAL

body2008
Judgment Rajesh Bindal, J. 1. The tenant is in revision before this Court against concurrent findings of fact by both the Courts below whereby eviction of the petitioner has been ordered on the ground of personal necessity of the landlord. 2. The petition for eviction was field by the landlord on the ground of change of user, the building having become unfit and unsafe for human habitation, non-payment of rent and for personal necessity. However, on consideration of the pleadings of the parties and also the evidence on record, the learned Rent Controller accepted the same only on the ground of personal necessity. In appeal, the Appellate Authority upheld the order passed by the Rent Controller ordering eviction of petitioner/tenant. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and also learned counsel for the respondents/caveators for final disposal of the present petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner primarily raised an issue that the petition filed by the respondents/landlords was liable to be dismissed on the ground of concealment of material facts and also on account of nondisclosure of necessary ingredient in the petition filed for eviction of the petitioner. He submitted that in view of Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, the landlord was required to plead and state about the ownership and occupancy of other premises and also about the eviction of any other tenant from any other premises. However, the petition filed was totally silent on that score. Accordingly, the petition lacking basic facts, as are statutory required to be pleaded, deserved dismissal. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that there is no allegation that there was a family partition and accordingly the other premises which are in possession of the landlord were not sufficient for them to carry on the business and the need is not properly established. Reliance has been placed upon the judgments of this Court in Prabha Kanta Sharma v. Smt. Gian Mala Verma, 2007(2) RCR(Civil) 683 : 2007(1) RCR(Rent) 410 : 2007(1) Haryana Rent Reporter 259. and Sadhu Ram Verma v. Pawan Kumar, 2006(2) RCR(Rent) 95 : 2006(2) Haryana Rent Reporter 270, and an order passed by this Court in Civil Revision No. 2344 of 2005 (Prem Kapoor v. A.K.Jain), decided on April 3, 2007. 6. and Sadhu Ram Verma v. Pawan Kumar, 2006(2) RCR(Rent) 95 : 2006(2) Haryana Rent Reporter 270, and an order passed by this Court in Civil Revision No. 2344 of 2005 (Prem Kapoor v. A.K.Jain), decided on April 3, 2007. 6. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the landlords have pleaded the basic facts in the petition and there is no concealment as alleged by the petitioner. Further he submitted that in view of the plea raised by the petitioner in the written statement, all the facts had already been clarified in the replication filed thereto and the replication being part of the pleadings, the petitioner cannot be non-suited on that technical ground. He has further submitted that be that as it may the effect of non-mentioning of the facts, as alleged by the petitioner is not that the eviction order has been passed merely on that account. In case mere non- mentioning of a fact does not lead to a conclusion in favour of that party, no benefit can be derived by the other party on the allegation that some facts were concealed or the complete facts were not mentioned. He further submitted that it was a case of a big joint family where all the sons after getting their education had to be established in the business. 7. He further explained that there are three shops with the landlord. In one shop business is being carried on in the sole proprietorship of Ghanshyam Dass, the other is under sole proprietorship of Rajinder Kumar son of Jai Gopal son of Manohar Lal and in third one the business is being carried on by Shiv Kumar as sole proprietor. He further submitted that it was a specific case of landlord that though it is a joint family but their business is separate. The shop in question is required for the purpose of establishment of Surinder Kumar who had completed his education. In the evidence led by the landlord it was their specific case that they do not run business as HUF. It was only till 1960 that the business was being run jointly and thereafter the business is not joint rather is separate. Evidence in the form of income-tax return, certificate of registration etc. In the evidence led by the landlord it was their specific case that they do not run business as HUF. It was only till 1960 that the business was being run jointly and thereafter the business is not joint rather is separate. Evidence in the form of income-tax return, certificate of registration etc. were brought on record to show that various business were being carried on by other persons as sole proprietor thereof and there was no business in the name of Surinder Kumar for whom personal necessity was sought to be pleaded. 8. He further submitted that there is a concurrent finding of facts by both the authorities below holding that the personal necessity in the case is duly proved and eviction on that ground has been ordered and this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction would not like to interfere with the concurrent findings of facts by re-appreciation of evidence. He has placed reliance upon the judgments in Baldev Raj v. Ram Lal, 2006(2) RCR(Rent) 193 (P&H), Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani, 1998(2) RCR(Rent) 268 (P&H)., Punjab State Electricity Board and Another v. Kanwar Varinder Singh Sandhar, 2006(1) RCR(Rent) 527 : 2006(1) LJR 645, Pawan Kumar v. Smt. Pushpa Rani and Others, 2004(1) RCR(Rent) 368. and V.M. Mohan v. Prabha Rajan Dwarka and Others (2006) 9 Supreme Court Cases 606. 9. From a perusal of the pleadings of the parties, it is evident that the plea of personal necessity was sought to be set up for Surinder Kumar, who had completed his education and was presently helping his other brothers in carrying on their business. However, there is nothing on record that he has independent business premises to carry on the same. The petitioner/tenant had mentioned about various other properties owned by the landlord to submit that he has not mentioned all the facts in the eviction petition. However, the same was duly clarified by the landlord by filing replication. From the perusal thereof, it could not be held that the landlord derived any benefit by not mentioning the entire detail of the properties as it was fully mentioned in the replication and also proved in the evidence that the other properties owned by the landlord were in possession of other family members who were carrying on their business as sole proprietors. This Court in M/s British Motor Car Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Sewak Sabha Charitable Trust (Regd.), 2003(2) RCR(Rent) 606 (P&H), while considering the issue as to non-mentioning of all the ingredients in the eviction petition by referring to various judgments of Honble the Supreme Court, opined as under :- "10. Thus, the plea that the landlord has failed to plead necessary ingredients is without any substance. Both the parties have led extensive evidence regarding the requirement of the premises. Parties have understood the case of personal necessity very well. It has been held by Honble Supreme Court in Baba Kashinath Bhinge v. Samast Lingayat Gavali and others, 1995(1) RCR(Rent) 518 : 1995 HRR 131 (SC) that where the parties properly understood each others case and necessary evidence was adduced, technical ground of omission to plead requirement in specific terms cannot be a ground of non- suiting the landlord Trust on technicalities. Recently in P. Purushottam Reddy and another v. Pratap Steels Ltd., 2002(2) RCR(Civil) 70 : 2002(2) SCC 686 the Supreme Court has reiterated the well known principle that where the parties have understood the case, led evidence, the non-framing of issues or lack of pleading is inconsequential. In view of the said judgment reliance of the petitioner on Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ahmedabad New Cotton mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1930 Privy Council 56 and Bhagat Singh and others v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1861 that no amount of evidence can be looked into on a plea which was never put forward is not suitable in law". 10. As far as scope of interference in revisional jurisdiction is concerned, Honble the Supreme Court in V.M. Mohans case (supra) opined that the evidence led by the parties is not to be re-appreciated unless it is found that the finding of fact recorded by the Courts below is perverse in any manner or the material evidence has not been considered by the said Courts or has been misread. Para 3 of the judgment can very well be referred to for this purpose, which is as under :- "3. From a bare perusal of the order of the High Court, it would appear that it has re-appreciated the evidence and come to the conclusion different from the trial Court as well as the appellate Court and held that the plaintiff failed to prove the ground of sub-letting. From a bare perusal of the order of the High Court, it would appear that it has re-appreciated the evidence and come to the conclusion different from the trial Court as well as the appellate Court and held that the plaintiff failed to prove the ground of sub-letting. The High Court has nowhere stated that the finding of fact recorded by the original authority and confirmed by the Appellate Authority were perverse in any manner. It has not been even stated that the material evidence has not been considered by the two Courts of fact or the evidence adduced by the parties have been misread in any manner. This being the position, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the orders passed by the original authority and confirmed by the Appellate Authority. As the revision application was concluded by concurrent finding of fact recorded by the original authority as well as the Appellate Authority, no interference by the High Court was called for. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was not justified in allowing the revision application". 11. This Court in Pawan Kumars case (supra) on this issue, opined as under :- ".....It is trite law that under these circumstances this Court cannot reappraise the evidence to reverse the finding of fact concurrently arrived at by the trial Court and the first Appellate Court. In Shiv Lal v. Sat Parkash and another, 1994(1) RCR(Rent) 495 : 1993 Supp. (2) SCC 345, it has been held by the Apex Court that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, the High Court does not act as a regular third appellate Court and can interfere only within the scope of the sub-section. The High Court cannot re-examine the evidence on record to reverse the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Courts below. Similarly, in Praveen Kumar and Others v. Suresh Chand and Others, 2001(2) RCR(Civil) 707 : 2001 AIR SCW 4779 (2), the Supreme Court has observed that in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can interfere only if the trial Court is shown to have committed any jurisdictional error or it is shown that its decision would have resulted into any manifest injustice. No such case has been made out before me". 12. No such case has been made out before me". 12. In the present case, my opinion on the concurrent finding of facts of both the Courts below regarding personal necessity of premises in dispute for the requirement of Surinder Kumar has been duly established. No evidence has been referred to before me which has either been misread or not considered. 13. For the reasons mentioned above, I do not find any illegality has been committed by the Courts below in accepting the eviction petition filed by the respondents. 14. Accordingly, the present revision petition is dismissed.