JUDGMENT Mahesh Grover, J.:-This is an appeal directed against judgment/ award dated 22.4.1991 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Karnal (for short, ‘the Tribunal’) in M.A.C.T. Case No. 43 of 1990. 2. The facts of this case are peculiar. On 26.4.1989 at about 6.30 P.M., Ram Kumar, husband of appellant no.1 and son of appellants nos. 2 & 3, was sitting in his shop situated on Karnal- Kaithal Road from where he was selling juice. A bus owned by Haryana Roadways, bearing registration No. HNQ-2913 being driven by Jagdish-respondent no.3, passed by. One of the stones lying there in connection with the repair of the road came in the contact of the tyre of the aforesaid bus and flew off hitting the deceased on his head, as a result of which he died. 3. A claim petition was filed by the appellants for grant of compensation. 4. After appraisal of the entire evidence on record, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that there was no fault of the driver of the bus in question in causing the death of the deceased and, therefore, it granted only Rs.25000/- to the appellants under ‘no fault liability’. 5. Feeling dissatisfied with the award, the appellants are in appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants, by his arguments, wanted this Court to conclude that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the bus by its driver, who was driving it at such a speed as a result of which the stone flew off. It was his contention that in case, he had been driving the bus slowly, the stone would not have flown and hit the deceased. He further contended that in any eventuality, even if no negligence was attributed to the driver of the offending bus, according to the rule of strict liability, the appellants were still entitled to compensation. Reliance was placed on Kaushnuma Begum and others Versus New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and others, 2001 A.C.J. 428, wherein it was held as under:- “Jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not restricted to decide claims arising out of negligence in the use of motor vehicles. Negligence is only one of the species of the causes of action for making a claim for compensation in respect of accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles. There are other premises for such cause of action. Negligence is only one of the species of the causes of action for making a claim for compensation in respect of accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles. There are other premises for such cause of action. Even if there is no negligence on the part of the driver or owner of the motor vehicle, but accident happens while the vehicle was in use, should not the owner be made liable for damages to the person who suffered on account of such accident? Like any other common law principle which is acceptable to our jurisprudence, the rule of strict liability propounded in Rylands v. Fletcher, 1861-73 All ER 1, can be followed at least until any other new principle which excels the former can be evolved,or until legislation provides differently. Hence, we are disposed to adopt the rule of strict liability in claims for compensation made in respect of motor accidents. `No fault liability’ envisaged in section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act is distinguishable from the rule of strict liability. In the former the compensation amount is fixed and is payable even if any one of the exceptions to the rule can be applied. It is a statutory liability created without which the claimant should not get any amount under that count. Compensation on account of accident arising from the use of motor vehicle can be claimed under the common law even without the aid of a statute. The provisions of Motor Vehicles Act permit that compensation paid under `no fault liability’ can be deducted from the final amount awarded by the Tribunal. Therefore, these two are resting on two different premises. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even apart from section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, a victim in an accident which occurred while the motor vehicle was in use, is entitled to get compensation from the Tribunal unless any one of the exceptions would apply. Winfield has elaborated seven defences recognised in common law against action brought on the strength of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. Winfield has elaborated seven defences recognised in common law against action brought on the strength of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. They are: (1) Consent of the plaintiff, i.e., volenti non fit injuria; (2) Common benefit, i.e., where the source of the danger is maintained for the common benefit of the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant is not liable for its escape; (3) Act of stranger, i.e., if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply; (4) Exercise of statutory authority,i.e., the rule will stand excluded either when the act was under a statutory duty or when a statute provides otherwise; (5) Act of God or vis major; (6) Default of the plaintiff; and (7) Remoteness of consequences.” 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 and 2 contended that the award of the Tribunal is correct and does not warrant any interference. 8. I have thoughtfully considered the rival contentions. 9. A perusal of the above quoted observations of their Lordships in the Supreme Court are based on the judgment in Rylands Versus Flecher, 1861-783 All E.R. 1, wherein the rule of ‘strict liability’ was propounded. However, certain exceptions were made which included the ‘act of God’. 10. As mentioned above, the manner in which the accident in the instant case had taken place, reveals that it was only an act of God, as a result of which the deceased died and not the result of the rash & negligent driving of the bus in question by its driver or from the use of a motor vehicle. Consequently, the appeal is held to be without any merit and is dismissed. ----------------------