JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.U. Khan, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This is landlords’ writ petition arising out eviction/release proceedings initiated by him against tenant respondent on the ground of bona fide need under Section 21 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 in the form of P.A. Case No.1 of 1994. Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge (J.D.) Jalaun at Orai, allowed the release application through judgment and order dated 22.2.2003. Against the said judgment and order tenant respondent filed rent appeal No. 4 of 2003. District Judge, Jalaun at Orai allowed the appeal through judgment and order dated 25.4.2003, set aside the judgment and order passed by the Prescribed Authority and rejected the release application of the landlord, hence this writ petition by the landlord. 3. Property in dispute is spread over two floors. On the ground floor there is one room and one covered Varandah and on the first floor there are two rooms. The remaining three rooms on the first floor are in occupation of the landlord. Landlord has got six rooms on the ground floor in which he is carrying on business of manufacturing and selling furniture since long. Rate of rent is Rs. 400/- per month according to the landlord and Rs. 75/- per month according to the tenant. Lot of litigation has taken place and is going on in between the parties. 4. Tenant respondent is leading Advocate of the District where property in dispute is situate. He has been D.G.C. (Criminal) also. Para 17 of the counter affidavit filed by tenant respondent himself is extremely interesting and is quoted below : "That Hon’ble Mr.Justice Nasimuddin (Rtd.) when he was posted as District and Session Judge Orai District Jalaun a written test for promoting employee of Group 4 to Group 3 was conducted. One of the questions in examination paper was that ‘what do you know about Mr. Harinath Singh, Advocate, Orai write an essay’. An advocate of such an eminence is litigating with such intensity in respect of tenanted accommodation with his landlord. At this juncture the Court cannot refrain itself from giving an advice to the Advocates particularly in U.P. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in comparison to any other class of persons, landlords are more reluctant to give their houses on rent to the Advocates. At this juncture the Court cannot refrain itself from giving an advice to the Advocates particularly in U.P. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in comparison to any other class of persons, landlords are more reluctant to give their houses on rent to the Advocates. This is a loss of the Advocates in a general sense. In order to change this mind set of the landlords Advocates must try to give a good impression of themselves by their good behaviour as tenants. Advocates are trained to contest the cases of their clients. They must not use this training and skill to an unreasonable extent in respect of their own cases. Landlord generally believe, even though wrongly, that in cases against their advocate tenants, Courts may be inclined towards the advocates or at least cases will be unduly delayed. By practical examples this illusion has to be dispelled." 5. As far as facts of the instant case are concerned, landlord pleaded that he had two sons, one was residing in Kanpur, alongwith his family which consisted of grown up children, some of whom were married, however, the younger son of the landlord was residing with him and he was shortly to be married and accommodation in dispute was required for establishing him in business and for his wife’s and children’s residence. When release application was filed wife of the landlord was also alive. Lower appellate Court has mentioned that during pendency of proceedings, wife of the landlord died and the younger son of the landlord was married and was having two children. Lower appellate Court held that accommodation in possession of the landlord was sufficient for his need. 6. In my opinion ground floor accommodation was being used for commercial purpose by the landlord. He cannot be compelled to convert that into residential accommodation. There was no such allegation that immediately prior to filing of the release application use of the said accommodation had been converted from residential to commercial in order to set up the need. Landlord is carrying on business from the ground floor accommodation in his possession since very long. However, as lot of accommodation on ground floor for commercial purpose is available to the landlord, hence it cannot be said that any commercial accommodation is required for settling the second son of the landlord. 7. Landlord is carrying on business from the ground floor accommodation in his possession since very long. However, as lot of accommodation on ground floor for commercial purpose is available to the landlord, hence it cannot be said that any commercial accommodation is required for settling the second son of the landlord. 7. However, need for additional residential accommodation to the landlord in view of marriage of his second son and birth of two children cannot be denied by any stretch of imagination. Landlord is not expected to squeeze his family in small accommodation so that tenant may continue in possession. 8. Accordingly, landlord fully proved bonafide need for the first floor tenanted accommodation (two rooms). 9. In respect of comparative hardship, it was found that tenant had purchased a plot long before. The tenant himself brought on record the extent of his practice and reputation which he enjoyed which clearly means that he is a man of means. He can very easily arrange another accommodation. Prescribed Authority found that absolutely no effort was made by the tenant to search alternative accommodation. 10. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that need of the landlord for the residential accommodation on the first floor was fully proved. However, need of the landlord for the ground floor accommodation in which respondent is having his office is not at all proved. 11. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed and judgment and order passed by the lower appellate Court is set aside. Judgment and order passed by the prescribed authority is modified. Release application in respect of ground floor accommodation is rejected. However, release application in respect of entire first floor in possession of the tenant is allowed. 12. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J., 2004(2) ARC 64 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J., 2004(2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the Courts below, writ Court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent. 13. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. 13. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and Courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and another, (2008) 5 SCC 287 : 2008 (71) ALR 499, part of Para-29 & Para-34 of which are quoted below : "29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent. 34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and others v. State of Maharashtra and another (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.” 14. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9-A) or government is tenant (Section 21(8)]. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9-A) or government is tenant (Section 21(8)]. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court reported in AIR 1996 SC 2410 , Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, paragraph-11 of which is quoted below : "It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.” 15. Thereafter in Para-8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under : "Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bonafide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C., AIR 1996 SC 2410 , has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ Court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ Court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him in the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.” 16. Thereafter in H.M. Kitchlu v. A.D.J., 2004 (2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ Court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the Courts below. 17. Accordingly rent of the ground floor accommodation left in occupation of the tenant is enhanced to Rs.1000/- per month payable w.e.f. November, 2008 onward. Tenant-respondent is granted six months time to vacate first floor accommodation provided that : (1) Within one month from today tenant files an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority to the effect that on or before the expiry of aforesaid period of six months he will willingly vacate and handover possession of the first floor accommodation to the landlord. (2) For this period of six months, which has been granted to the tenant-respondent to vacate, he is required to pay Rs. 6000/- (at the rate of Rs.1000 per month) as rent/damages for use and occupation of first floor accommodation. This amount shall also be deposited within one month before the Prescribed Authority and shall immediately be paid to the landlord. 18. In case of default in compliance of any of these conditions tenant shall be evicted from first floor accommodation through process of Court after one month. It is further directed that in case undertaking is not filed or Rs. 6000/- are not deposited within one month then tenant shall be liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs. 18. In case of default in compliance of any of these conditions tenant shall be evicted from first floor accommodation through process of Court after one month. It is further directed that in case undertaking is not filed or Rs. 6000/- are not deposited within one month then tenant shall be liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs. 2000/- per month since after one month till the date of actual vacation for first floor accommodation. 19. Similarly, if after filing the aforesaid undertaking and depositing Rs. 6000 the first floor accommodation in dispute is not vacated on the expiry of six months then damages for use and occupation shall be payable at the rate of Rs. 2000/- per month since after six months till actual vacation. ————