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Allahabad High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 2142 (ALL)

Sona v. Munni Devi

2008-10-18

S.U.KHAN

body2008
JUDGMENT This is tenant's writ petition arising out of eviction/ release proceedings initiated by landlady respondent No.1 against her on the ground of bona fide need under Section 21 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 registered as P.A. Case No.16 of 2001 on the file of Prescribed Authority/ Civil Judge (Junior Division), Jhansi. Prescribed Authority allowed the release application through judgment and order dated 05.11.2004. Against the said judgment and order, R.C. Appeal No.22 of 2004 was filed, which was dismissed on 17.02.2006 by A.D.J./ Special Judge (S.C. & S.T.) Act, Jhansi, hence this writ petition. 2. Map of the property in dispute is on Page-26 of the Paper Book. The area of total tenanted accommodation is about 480 square feet. It consists of one room, open court-yard, kitchen and a make-shift room with cement sheet roof (termed as tapra in the local term). Adjoining to the accommodation in dispute, there are three rooms and open space in occupation of the landlady. The main grievance of the landlady was that she was not having any latrine or bath-room. Para-6 of the release application translated in English is as follows: "That, at present, applicant is having only three rooms and court-yard in her possession and in the said portion neither there is any latrine nor bath room, hence applicant requires space and constructed portion for bath-room etc. for her own use and for the use of her daughters." 3. In the next paragraph, it was stated that accommodation was also short and in case accommodation in dispute was released in her favour, then she would construct latrine and bath-room and she would be able to provide accommodation for her children for sleeping and reading separately. Both the courts below found that the need was bona fide and balance of hardship lay in favour of the landlady. 4. Incidentally, there is no latrine and bath-room in the tenanted accommodation also. 5. Landlady had asserted that the rate of rent was Rs.100/- per month, however tenant asserted that the rate of rent was Rs.5/- per month. 6. Property in dispute was purchased in 1992 by the landlady and the petitioner was continuing as tenant since before its purchase by the landlady. 7. In my opinion, the main need set up by the landlady was for latrine and bath-room. 6. Property in dispute was purchased in 1992 by the landlady and the petitioner was continuing as tenant since before its purchase by the landlady. 7. In my opinion, the main need set up by the landlady was for latrine and bath-room. It has not been shown that status of the landlady is so high that she requires additional accommodation. Status of the tenant is also not much high. This fact is evident that for years landlady and tenant are residing in such accommodations, which do not contain any latrine and bath-room. In this scenario, in my opinion, three rooms for the family of landlady (consisting of herself, her husband, two sons and two daughters) are quite sufficient. However, the need of the landlady for latrine and bath-room is more than bona fide. Learned counsel for the tenant also argued in the alternative that small portion of court-yard in tenancy occupation of the tenant could be released for constructing latrine and bath-room. Ground No.7 in the writ petition added afterwards through amendment also contains the said assertion. 8. Accordingly, writ petition is disposed of. Impugned orders are modified. Release application in respect of constructed portion is rejected. A portion of open land of 8 feet by 4 feet 3 inches towards south-east portion is released. This portion is adjacent to the court-yard of the landlady. Released portion shall consist of 8 feet starting from E towards D in the map on Page-26. 4 feet 3 inches must be towards west from E. In this manner, 8 feet North-South and 4 feet 3 inches East-West portion of open land is released. If in the process, Gate of the tenant is blocked, then it may be shifted towards north. 9. If parties feel any difficulty in execution of this order, then on filing of an application in this regard, Prescribed Authority shall get demarcated the released portion through Amin and deliver possession of the same to the landlady. 10. Rent of the remaining portion in tenancy occupation of the tenant is enhanced to Rs.500/- per month payable from November, 2008 onwards. 11. The rent is being enhanced as I have held in Khursheeda Vs. A.D.J 2004(2) ARC 64 and H.M.Kichlu Vs. 10. Rent of the remaining portion in tenancy occupation of the tenant is enhanced to Rs.500/- per month payable from November, 2008 onwards. 11. The rent is being enhanced as I have held in Khursheeda Vs. A.D.J 2004(2) ARC 64 and H.M.Kichlu Vs. A.D.J 2004(2) ARC 652 that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the courts below, writ court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent. 12. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V.Acharya Vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 1998 SC 602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Union of India and another, (2008) 5 SCC 287 : 2008 (71) ALR 499, part of Para-29 & Para-34 of which are quoted below:- "29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/ or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent. 34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and another (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 01.09.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.03.1998." 13. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 [Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9-A) or government is tenant (section 21(8)]. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court reported in AIR 1996 SC 2410 "Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India", paragraph-11 of which is quoted below:- "It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief." Thereafter in Para-8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under:- "Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bonafide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. Vs. L.I.C (A.I.R 1996 S.C 2410). has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the un-reasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the un-reasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the un-reasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him in the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act." 14. Thereafter in H. M. Kitchlu vs. A.D.J. 2004 (2) A.R.C. 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the courts below. 15. Writ petition is accordingly disposed of with the above direction. 16. Map on Page-26 of the writ petition shall form part of this judgment.