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Allahabad High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 2146 (ALL)

SANGEETA AGARWAL. v. GYASI LAL.

2008-10-20

S.U.KHAN

body2008
JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.U. Khan, J.—This is landlady’s writ petition arising out of eviction/release proceedings initiated by her against original tenant-respondent-Gyasi Lal on the ground of bona fide need under Section 21 of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 in the form of case No. 129 of 1984. Release application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority. Appeal was also dismissed. Thereafter writ petition No. 13827 of 1987 was filed in this Court which was allowed on 3.4.2003 and matter was remanded to the lower appellate Court to decide the appeal again. 2. The matter was remanded for considering the affidavit of Ram Prasad, father in law of the landlady-petitioner. Ram Prasad had filed affidavit before Prescribed Authority. However, lower Appellate Court had mentioned that he had not filed any affidavit. After remand the appeal was heard again and dismissed by Additional District Judge, Court No. 5, Jhansi through judgment and order dated 21.8.2003 and initial order of Prescribed Authority, Jhansi dated 19.9.1986 rejecting the release application was maintained. 3. Property in dispute is in the form of a small gallery, width/frontage of which is slightly less than 4 feet. Towards north of the accommodation in dispute there is a shop in occupation of the landlady width/frontage of which is about 9 feet 3 inch. Towards back/west side of the accommodation in dispute and the adjoining shop there are several portions in occupation of the landlady. The entire accommodation was purchased by the landlady through registered sale-deed dated 21.1.1981. Her father-in-law was tenant since before its purchase. It is also admitted to the parties that father-in-law of the landlady let out/sub-let the accommodation in dispute to the original tenant-respondent according to the landlady about 15 years before and according to the tenant about 25 years before i.e. either about 1959 or 1989. According to the landlady rate of rent of the accommodation in dispute is Rs. 50/- per month however, according to the tenant rate of rent is Rs. 25/- per month. Tenant further pleaded that behind the accommodation in dispute/gallery another portion is in tenancy occupation of the tenant. 4. Copy of the release application is Anneuxre-1 to the writ petition. According to the landlady rate of rent of the accommodation in dispute is Rs. 50/- per month however, according to the tenant rate of rent is Rs. 25/- per month. Tenant further pleaded that behind the accommodation in dispute/gallery another portion is in tenancy occupation of the tenant. 4. Copy of the release application is Anneuxre-1 to the writ petition. According to the allegations made in the release application, in the shop towards north of the accommodation in dispute Ram Prasad father-in-law of the landlady was doing business of goldsmith and he had sub-let the accommodation in dispute to the respondent which was in the form of gallery for repairing the ornaments. In para-6 of the release application it was stated that the gallery was let out with the condition that tenant would do the job of repairing ornaments and family of Ram Prasad would also pass through the said gallery for ingress and outgress from the residential accommodation towards west of the accommodation in dispute and adjoining shop where Ram Prasad was doing the business. It was further stated that tenant was not permitting the landlady and her family members to pass through the said gallery hence they were passing through the shop situate towards north of the accommodation in dispute facing great difficulty. Both the Courts below recorded a finding of fact that from the accommodation in dispute landlady and her family members never passed through and the said gallery was never used as passage. This finding is basically a finding of fact. Even otherwise I do not find any error in the said finding. Accommodation having width of less than 4 feet cannot be used for dual purposes of repairing the ornaments and using it as passage. Moreover, the tenant must be keeping his tools and other items in the accommodation in dispute and he could not be supposed to leave that open even after working hours and during night time. 5. It is somewhat doubtful as to whether an accommodation may be released only for being used as passage under Section 21 of the Act or not. By virtue of Section 21 of the Act an accommodation may be released either for being used as residence or for commercial purposes. However, I am not basing my judgment upon this aspect. 6. It is somewhat doubtful as to whether an accommodation may be released only for being used as passage under Section 21 of the Act or not. By virtue of Section 21 of the Act an accommodation may be released either for being used as residence or for commercial purposes. However, I am not basing my judgment upon this aspect. 6. Even if it is assumed that the need of landlady for using the accommodation in dispute as passage can be considered under Section 21 of the Act still in the instant case such consideration is not permissible or atleast desirable due to the reason that the landlady took up false case that initially her family was using the accommodation in dispute as passage. 7. In view of above there is no need to consider comparative hardship or availability of other accommodation to the tenant. Writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. 8. I have held in Khursheeda v. A.D.J., 2004(2) ARC 64 and H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J., 2004(2) ARC 652, that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the Courts below, writ Court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent. 9. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M.V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 602 , where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and Courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and another, (2008) 5 SCC 287 : 2008(71) ALR 499, part of Para 29 and Para 34 of which are quoted below : “29. This authority has recently been followed by the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (dead) by L.Rs. v. Union of India and another, (2008) 5 SCC 287 : 2008(71) ALR 499, part of Para 29 and Para 34 of which are quoted below : “29. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and reationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent. 34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and others v. State of Maharashtra and another (supra), the Court found that the criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998.” 10. Under U.P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 (Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (Section 9-A) or Government is tenant (Section 21(8)]. In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court reported in AIR 1996 SC 2410 , Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, paragraph 11 of which is quoted below : “It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.” 11. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief.” 11. Thereafter, in Para 8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda, I held as under : “Rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, sub-letting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S.F.P. v. L.I.C. ( AIR 1996 SC 2410 ) has laid down that while granting relief to a party the writ Court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ Court, therefore, while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him in the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however, inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act.” 12. Thereafter, in H.M. Kichlu v. A.D.J., 2004(2) ARC 652, I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so writ Court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the Courts below. 13. Tenant is doing the business of gold smith from the accommodation in dispute. 13. Tenant is doing the business of gold smith from the accommodation in dispute. Even though its frontage is quite small still rent of Rs. 25/- per month or Rs. 50/- per month is highly inadequate. According to the tenant the rent was settled around 1960. Accordingly, it is directed that with effect from November 2008 onwards tenant shall pay to the landlady rent at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month. ———