JUDGMENT Hon’ble V.K. Shukla, J.—Present writ petition has been filed questioning the validity of the orders dated 20.5.1985, 8.5.1989 and 23.5.1989 passed by the Prescribed Authority Etah non-suiting the interest of the petitioner qua premises in question. 2. Brief background of the case is that Rajendra Kumar Jain proceeded to file application under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 against Suraj Prasad mentioning therein that decree of ejectment be passed. In the said proceeding so undertaken, on 19.8.1982 parties to the dispute entered appearance and entered into compromise mentioning therein that building in question is in dilapidated condition and as such same may be demolished and reconstruction may be carried there. Said compromise was entered and decree was passed immediately on the basis of the compromise on 19.8.1982. Said decree in question was not placed for execution and Rajendra Kumar Jain ultimately moved an application for execution being Misc. Application No. 2 of 1988 wherein service on respondents was presumed to be sufficient on 30.5.1988. Thereafter Form-D was issued on 8.5.1989 itself and possession was taken from the petitioner by force, it has been alleged by the petitioner. Petitioner claimed that he was occupying shop in question before 1970 as tenant, after eviction of Suraj Prasad, referred to above. The shop in question was taken on rent by the petitioner at Rs. 12/- per month and he was regularly paying the rent to Smt. Bhodevi Kunwar, mother of respondent No. 2. Petitioner has also contended that in the year 1987, he has sensed that eviction was being planned by the landlord, then he filed Original Suit No. 618 of 1987 in the Court of Munsif, Etah and therein petitioner claims that order of status quo was passed on 30.5.1988. Petitioner has contended that in spite of said injunction being there, on the strength of the order passed in Execution Case No. 2 of 1988 he was thrown out from the premises in question and in this background he moved an application under Section 34 read with Rule 22 (f) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 read with Section 151, C.P.C. on 9.5.1989. Against the application moved on 9.5.1989, Rajendra Kumar Jain filed an objection on 10.5.1989. In the said case request was made for summoning of the documents of the Original Suit No. 618 of 1987, sales tax papers etc. Against the application moved on 9.5.1989, Rajendra Kumar Jain filed an objection on 10.5.1989. In the said case request was made for summoning of the documents of the Original Suit No. 618 of 1987, sales tax papers etc. to prima facie prove tenancy right qua the shop in question. Said documents had been summoned. The Prescribed Authority passed order rejecting application moved on behalf of the petitioner. At this juncture present writ petition has been filed questioning the orders dated 23.5.1989 and orders dated 28.4.1989 and 8.5.1989 passed by Prescribed Authority, Etah. 3. Counter affidavit has been filed contending therein that Suraj Prasad was the tenant, who agreed to vacate the premises in question and thereafter, as premises in question was not vacated, then order in question was put to execution and Parwana Dakhal was issued. It has been further stated that godown was 100 years old and was in dilapidated condition and as such it was demolished in the year 1989. In respect of application moved on behalf of the petitioner, it has been rightly rejected on merit. It has also been stated that petitioner was tenant in another Kothari which had fallen down in the year 1982, which petitioner had admitted in Original Suit No. 451 of 1971 (Prakash Chand Jain and others v. Rajendra Kumar Jain and others). It has been stated that claim of the petitioner is unsustainable on the face of it and in this background writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 4. Rejoinder affidavit has been filed disputing the averments mentioned in the counter affidavit and copy of the assessment register has been sought to be brought on record to show and substantiate that tenancy was subsisting there. 5. Supplementary affidavit had also been filed bringing on record, copy of the plaint, copy of the written statement, copy of the replica, copy of the reports dated 26.10.1987 and 15.7.1989. 6. After pleadings mentioned above have been exchanged, thereafter present writ petition has been taken up for final hearing/disposal with the consent of the parties. 7. 5. Supplementary affidavit had also been filed bringing on record, copy of the plaint, copy of the written statement, copy of the replica, copy of the reports dated 26.10.1987 and 15.7.1989. 6. After pleadings mentioned above have been exchanged, thereafter present writ petition has been taken up for final hearing/disposal with the consent of the parties. 7. Sri R.N. Singh, Senior Advocate appearing alongwith Sri V.K. Singh and Sri M.N. Singh Advocates contended with vehemence that in the present case order, which has been passed is totally unjustifiable and unreasonable order for the simple reason that petitioner is victim of fraud and collusive proceedings in between landlord and Sarju Prasad and in the garb of the said decree, petitioner has been illegally evicted and once there was fraud on the Court, then instead of relegating the petitioner to avail remedy of suit, inquiry ought to have been made in the matter and relief as has been prayed for ought to have been accorded by directing restoration of possession of property back to petitioner as such writ petition in the facts of the present case deserves to be allowed. 8. Countering the said submission, Sri P.C. Sharma, Advocate appearing for landlord on the other hand contended that petitioner is not at all tenant of the premises in question and he has got no concern with the godown in question and once he is not at all tenant of the premises in question, then rightly his application has been rejected by the Prescribed Authority. Orders are speaking for itself, and further self contradictory statement of fact are there on behalf of the petitioner himself which would totally discredit his version and as such no interference be made with the orders impugned and writ petition be dismissed, specially after such a long duration and specially when tenanted premises in question as claimed by the petitioner does not exist on the spot and widow landlady has reconstructed the same and same is her source of livelihood. 9. 9. After respective arguments have been advanced, undisputed factual position, which is emerging in the present case is that Suit No. 18 of 1982 was filed before the Prescribed Authority, Etah by Rajendra Kumar Jain against Suraj Prasad mentioning therein that godown in question, was not at all being used and said building was in dilapidated condition and as such it was liable to be demolished and reconstructed and as such decree of ejectment be passed. In the said proceeding compromise in question was entered inter se Suraj Prasad and Rajendra Kumar Jain and based on the same, compromise decree was passed on 19.8.1982 wherein Suraj Prasad was to deliver possession on 27.8.1982. It has been mentioned therein that in the event of non handing over of possession, decree in question could be put for execution. It is true that said decree was not put for execution for sufficiently long time, then an application was moved for execution of the said decree numbered as Misc. Application No. 2 of 1988 and in the said proceeding legal heirs of Suraj Prasad were impleaded and notice were sent to them. As they had not entered appearance, as such service was presumed to be sufficient on 30.5.1988 and as eleven month had passed, no objections had been filed, order of release was passed by directing for issuance of writ of possession in favour of the applicant. After said order was passed on 20.4.1989 steps were taken by the landlord on 8.5.1989 and ‘Parwana Dakhal’ was issued and pursuant thereto possession had been handed over to the landlord. At this juncture petitioner appeared and filed application mentioning therein that decree in question is collusive decree and in the garb of the said decree petitioner, who is tenant of the premises in question has been illegally ejected and as such this is fraud on the Court, inquiry be conducted in the matter and possession be restored back. Said application has been considered by the Prescribed Authority, same has been rejected on 23.5.1989. 10. Said application has been considered by the Prescribed Authority, same has been rejected on 23.5.1989. 10. Record in question reflects that as to whether petitioner is tenant or not of the premises in question, in his independent capacity, qua the same for the purposes of prima facie satisfaction, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer/Prescribed Authority has undertaken exercise and has found that material available on record clearly discredited the case of petitioner that he has been tenant of the premises in question. Petitioner’s specific case has been that he has been tenant of the premises in question since 1970 and mother of Rajendra Kumar Jain has issued receipt in his favour and entry of the same was being made in the diary maintained. It has also been specifically mentioned in para 4 of application, which has been moved that after evicting Suraj Prasad from the premises in question i.e. godown, petitioner was inducted as tenant of the godown in question. In para 11 of the counter affidavit filed before this Court precise stand has been taken that in fact petitioner was tenant of another Kothari, which had fallen down in the year 1982, which the petitioner admitted in Original Suit No. 451 of 1971(Prakash Chand Jain and others v. Rajendra Kumar Jain and others) in which the petitioner was plaintiff No. 5 from which it is clear that petitioner was not tenant of the godown in dispute. To this specific statement of fact mentioned in para 11 of the counter affidavit, petitioner has come up with the case in paragraph 4, 5, 9 and 12 that there were two accommodation in his possession. One accommodation being in dilapidated condition fell down, which was on rent at the rate of Rs. 4/- per month. Second one was vacant land given to him by the landlord at the rate of Rs. 12/- per month, and on this vacant land petitioner-tenant had constructed godown by investing more than Rs. 2,50,000/-. Petitioner has also mentioned that Suraj Prasad has no concern with the godown in question and he was never tenant of the same. 4/- per month. Second one was vacant land given to him by the landlord at the rate of Rs. 12/- per month, and on this vacant land petitioner-tenant had constructed godown by investing more than Rs. 2,50,000/-. Petitioner has also mentioned that Suraj Prasad has no concern with the godown in question and he was never tenant of the same. All these facts clearly show and substantiate that totally false and self contradictory case has been sought to be set up by petitioner, inasmuch as, application which had been moved before the Prescribed Authority on 9.5.1989 by petitioner-tenant categorical stand has been taken to the effect in para 2 that he was tenant since 1970 at the rate of Rs. 12/- per month and in para 4 categorical statement of fact has been mentioned that after Suraj Prasad has been evicted he was let out the premises in question i.e. godown. In para 12 of the rejoinder affidavit before this Court totally new plea has been sought to be set up by the petitioner by mentioning that open land was let to him at the rate of Rs. 12/- per month and on this open vacant land from his own personal investment he had constructed godown in question and in fact, at no point of time Suraj Prasad was ever let out godown in question and he was original tenant. Prescribed Authority in the present case has not at all ruled out that application moved on behalf of the petitioner was not maintainable but before that petitioner was burdened to establish that he was tenant on his own rights. Prescribed Authority has clearly proceeded on the presumption that at least for the prima facie satisfaction, petitioner will have to substantiate that he was tenant in his own rights of the premises in question. Tenant’s case has been found to be untruthful and said untruthfulness is also substantiated even before this Court. Prescribed Authority has clearly proceeded on the presumption that at least for the prima facie satisfaction, petitioner will have to substantiate that he was tenant in his own rights of the premises in question. Tenant’s case has been found to be untruthful and said untruthfulness is also substantiated even before this Court. Rent Control and Eviction Officer has taken note of the fact that in the year 1971 suit had been filed by the petitioner being Suit No. 451 of 1971 and therein petitioner has given details of the premises in question of which he was in possession and qua the said premises this fact has been admitted by the petitioner that said premises in question has fallen down and totally new plea has been sought to be carved out by the petitioner that two premises were given to him on rent, and as far as present premises in question same is godown, which was open piece of land over which he had constructed his godown by investing huge amount. Said case is totally belied from the fact that in case said godown would have been constructed from his own personal fund the reference to the same in all eventuality would have been mentioned in the said plaint map and coupled with this petitioner himself has mentioned that premises in question i.e. godown was in tenancy of Suraj Prasad and after Suraj Prasad had vacated it was let to him. Before this Court totally new plea has been taken by petitioner that open piece of land was rented to him wherein he constructed godown, said story has various loopholes and has rightly not impressed the Prescribed Authority. Document of sales tax department have also been considered. Said documents are after 83-84, and it had been stated in paragraph 19 of the objections filed by Rajendra Kumar Jain, that possession, if any has been obtained, same is through legal heirs of Suraj Prasad. In this background conclusion has been drawn that petitioner has failed to show and substantiate his own independent rights. 11. Section 23 authorities Prescribed Authority to use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary for evicting any tenant against whom order under Section 21 or an Appeal under Section 22, as the case may be, or against any other person found in actual possession and for putting the landlord into possession. 11. Section 23 authorities Prescribed Authority to use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary for evicting any tenant against whom order under Section 21 or an Appeal under Section 22, as the case may be, or against any other person found in actual possession and for putting the landlord into possession. An incumbent found to be in actual possession and against whom no order has been passed either under Section 21 or Section 22, in the event of being evicted in exercise of authority under Section 23, has every right to approach the Prescribed Authority, pointing out that he has no concern with the incumbent against whom order under Section 21 or 22 has been passed and qua the property in concern he has his own independent tenancy rights, then Prescribed Authority is fully empowered to make enquiry qua the independent right claimed, and in case it is found that incumbent had been illegally evicted and he has his own independent rights in the premises in question, then in that event Prescribed Authority is fully empowered to exercise authority vested under Section 34 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, read with Rule 22(f) of 1972 Rules, wherein Prescribed Authority can exercise powers referred to in Section 151, C.P.C. to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority concerned, by directing restoration of possession of property from where he has been evicted in exercise of authority under Section 23 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. Application moved has been held to be maintainable, but on merits, petitioner miserably failed to make out prima facie case of his independent rights. Here in the present case considering the facts which have emanated before this Court as well as the facts noted by Prescribed Authority, findings do not suffer from such infirmity which may justify interference while this Court proceeds to exercise its authority of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12. Much emphasis has been laid, placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Suleman v. Prescribed Authority/IVth Additional Civil Judge, Lucknow and others,1997(1) A.R.C. 46, that petitioner has been asked to approach Civil Court, for declaration of his tenancy rights, whereas under the provisions of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, suit is completely barred. 13. Much emphasis has been laid, placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Suleman v. Prescribed Authority/IVth Additional Civil Judge, Lucknow and others,1997(1) A.R.C. 46, that petitioner has been asked to approach Civil Court, for declaration of his tenancy rights, whereas under the provisions of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, suit is completely barred. 13. At this juncture Sections 36, 37, 38 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 is being looked into. "36. Protection of action taken in good faith.—No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or purported or intended to be done in pursuance of the provisions of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder. 37. Finality and presumption.—(1) No order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any Court. (2) Where an order purports to have been made and signed by exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act, a Court shall, unless the contrary is proved, presume that such order was so made by that authority. 38. Act to override T.P. Act and Civil Procedure Code.—The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1982 (Act No. IV of 1982), or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908." 14. Said provision, has been interpreted by this Court in the case of Suleman v. Prescribed Authority/IVth Additional Civil Judge, Lucknow and others,1997(1) A.R.C. 46. Relevant paras 7, 8 and 9 are being extracted below : "7. Learned Counsel for petitioner has urged that Suleman has filed a suit in the Court of Munsif South, Lucknow, which has been registered as O.S. No. 257 of 1994 in which the landlord as well as Smt. Bismillah Begum had been impleaded as defendants besides other person. This is a suit for declaration and permanent injunction in regard to the status of the petitioner which is claimed to be that of a tenant in respect of the premises in dispute, seeking to restrain the landlord from evicting the tenant without taking legal action through Court of Law. The trial Court in that case has granted a temporary injunction indicating that the plaintiff should not be dispossessed otherwise than in accordance with law. The trial Court in that case has granted a temporary injunction indicating that the plaintiff should not be dispossessed otherwise than in accordance with law. The Prescribed Authority in its impugned order has considered the implication arising under the aforesaid impugned order and has come to the conclusion that the said interim order could not be treated to be an impediment in the ejectment of the petitioner in the proceedings for executing its order of release in question 8. Provisions contained in Section 38 of the aforesaid Act further provide that provisions of the said Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1982 or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 9. From the aforesaid provisions it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the matters in regard to the enforceability of the orders passed by the competent authority as provided for under the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is of a very limited nature and in fact should be treated to be confined to only those cases where it can be established that the order is a nullity having been passed without jurisdiction or in excess of the jurisdiction. However, once the order is passed by the Competent Authority in exercise of the jurisdiction contemplated under the provisions of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 after taking into consideration, the evidence and the materials on the record in that case, the Civil Court could not be deemed to be competent to pass any such order assuming any purported jurisdiction, which has the effect of interfering with the findings recorded by such an authority. It is not open to the Civil Court to go into the question of the correctness or the propriety of such findings which are recorded on an appraisal of evidence in the exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction secured in favour of the competent authority under the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972." 15. Jurisdiction of Civil Court has not at all been totally excluded, rather it has been made clear that same is of very limited nature and in fact should be treated to be confined to only those cases where it can be established that order passed is nullity having been passed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. It is now well settled that the provision of excluding jurisdiction of Civil Court are to be strictly construed, and are not to be inferred readily. [See 2005 AIR SCW 2548, Swami Atmananda and others v. Sri Ram Krishna Tapovanam]. Jurisdiction of Civil Court is determined having regards to averments mentioned in the plaint. Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Smt. Sulochna v. Rajendra Singh, 2008 AIR SCW 4379, wherein title of landlady was disputed, took the view, that any matter which stricto sensu does not come within the purview of Chapter IIIA would be entertainable by Civil Court. 16. U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, has been introduced with the intention of regulating of letting and rent of and the eviction of tenants from the certain classes of building situated in urban areas and for matters connected therewith. Section 3(a) defines tenant, in relation to building, means a person by whom its rent is payable, and on tenants dealt (i) in the case of residential building, such only of his heirs, as normally residing with him in the building at the time of his death; (ii) in the case of non residential building his heirs. Landlord has been defined under Section 3(j) in relation to building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building were let, would be, payable and includes, except in clause (g) the agent or attorney or such person. Section 21 visualizes of release proceedings vis-a-vis landlord and tenant. Section 23 as mentioned above deals with enforcement of eviction order, against tenant or against any other person found in actual occupation. Once incumbent ousted, fails to establish his independent tenancy right and right to continue in occupation, then his remedy lies in filing suit for declaration of his right, if any qua the premises in question. Section 23 as mentioned above deals with enforcement of eviction order, against tenant or against any other person found in actual occupation. Once incumbent ousted, fails to establish his independent tenancy right and right to continue in occupation, then his remedy lies in filing suit for declaration of his right, if any qua the premises in question. The order passed by Prescribed Authority, cannot be faulted , as under U.P. Act XIII of 1972, Prescribed Authority deals with dispute inter se landlord and tenant as defined under Section 3(a) and 3(g) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, and once prima facie status claimed by incumbent is not falling within the parameter of Section 3(a) and Section 3(g) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, then remedy of said incumbent lies in filing suit for declaration of his rights. Such a matter would stricto sensu does not fall within the ambit of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 17. It has also been argued that finding recorded by Prescribed Authority would operate as res-judicata, in terms of Explanation VIII of Section 11 of C.P.C. In the present case, principle of res-judicata will not at all be attracted, as opinion which has been formed by the Prescribed Authority is prima facie opinion, and it has been made clear, by Prescribed Authority that under U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, it has no authority to accord declaration of status, and for said purpose petitioner will have to go to Civil Court. Plea raised as such on this score is unsustainable. 18. It has also been argued that compromise decree before Prescribed Authority was an outcome of fraud and manipulation, and in term of Order XXIII Rule 3-A suit would not be maintainable. Order XXIII Rule 3 provides for compromise of suit, and further provides for passing of decree based on compromise, so far as it relates to the parties of the suit. Order XXIII Rule 3-A is not to be read in isolation rather it has to be read alongwith the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3. The words “so far as it relates to parties to suit” do not leave any doubt that recording of an agreement or compromise or passing a decree accordingly shall be between the parties to the suit only, and not beyond the same. The words “so far as it relates to parties to suit” do not leave any doubt that recording of an agreement or compromise or passing a decree accordingly shall be between the parties to the suit only, and not beyond the same. Order XXIII Rule 3-A is not at all applicable to incumbent who is not at all party to proceeding and is total stranger to proceedings. Suit to set aside compromise decree at the behest of incumbent who is not party to compromise and who claims his independent rights bereft of compromise decree is fully competent and maintainable. 19. This fact has been admitted that petitioner had earlier filed O.S. No. 618 of 1987, Chandra Pal v. Rajendra Kumar Jain, praying therein for injunction, wherein order of status quo was passed on 30.5.1988. Said suit it has been informed is still pending. This fact has also been admitted, that till date no amendment has been made in the plaint of the said suit, seeking declaration of his status as tenant and for restoring back the possession. This fact has also been admitted that till date no suit has been filed for declaration of petitioners status as tenant and for restoring back possession. As on date, both the reliefs i.e. for declaring petitioners status as tenant and that of restoring back possession are clearly barred by limitation. Coupled with this more than nineteen years back petitioners has been dispossessed, and as on date widow has made altogether new constructions, as such in the fact of the case, no relief or reprive can be accorded to petitioner. 20. Consequently, writ petition is dismissed. As writ petition has been dismissed, consequently Contempt Petition No. 258 of 2007 is also dismissed. ————