JUDGMENT Hon’ble V.K. Shukla, J.—This is tenant’s petition questioning the validity of order dated 14.3.2008 passed by Prescribed Authority, in P.A. Case No. 29 of 2004, Sri Sri Manish Chhatwal v. Virendra Kumar Khanna, allowing release application of the landlord under Section 21 (1)(a) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and the order of its affirmance dated 6.9.2008 passed in appeal No. 69 of 2008 preferred under Section 22 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 2. Brief background of the case, as disclosed in the writ petition, is that petitioner is tenant of shop, which forms part of building No. 184, Abulane, Meerut on a monthly rent of Rs. 450/-. Said shop was let out to petitioner by Santosh Kumar Chhatwal on the basis of lease deed dated 7.11.1969 entered into between Santosh Kumar Chhatwal and Virendra Kumar Khanna. Said premises in question was subsequently sold to Manish Chhatwal by registered sale deed dated 28.8.1999. Said Manish Kumar Chhatwal moved release application for eviction of the aforementioned premises, mentioning therein that the said premises was bonafidely required by him as he wanted to settle himself independently by establishing his own business in the shop in question. After the said release application had been filed on 11.3.2004, written statement was filed on behalf of the tenant, clearly and categorically taking the stand that need of the landlord was not at all bona fide and genuine one, and landlord was man of resources and artificially need had been set up, and further inter se parties there was lease deed, and therein it was clearly and categorically mentioned that tenant could be evicted only when he was in arrears of rent for three months. Therefore, in this background, release application was liable to be dismissed. Tenant-petitioner got his written statement amended on 23.4.2006 by adding expression to the effect that the sale deed dated 28.9.2008 was a sham and bogus transaction. The petitioner in support of his case filed his own affidavit and the copy of lease deed. The tenant also produced before the Prescribed Authority documentary evidence to show and substantiate huge transaction of money in respect of landlord, who claimed himself to be unemployed. The petitioner filed affidavit on 4.4.2006, denying his relation with another company M/s. Hindustan Compressors Limited and further denied the alleged status of Managing Director of M/s. Lalco India Private Limited. The tenant also produced before the Prescribed Authority documentary evidence to show and substantiate huge transaction of money in respect of landlord, who claimed himself to be unemployed. The petitioner filed affidavit on 4.4.2006, denying his relation with another company M/s. Hindustan Compressors Limited and further denied the alleged status of Managing Director of M/s. Lalco India Private Limited. It was also re-asserted that entire business of manufacturing and sale of sports goods was in the name of the mother of the respondent-landlord, but it was actually his business. The Prescribed Authority, on the basis of evidence adduced, allowed the release application. Against the said order appeal had been filed, which too has been dismissed. At this juncture present writ petition has been filed. 3. Sri K.N. Tripathi, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri K.K. Arora, Advocate, contended with vehemence that— (i) in view of condition No. 7 as contained in the lease deed dated 7.11.1969, executed by previous owner Santram Chhatwal in favour of Manish Chhatwal, the petitioner-tenant could not have been evicted from the tenanted portion except in terms and conditions of the aforesaid lease deed, which provided for eviction on default in payment of rent for four months, and as there was no default in payment of rent for four months, the application moved under Section 21 (1)(a) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 on the ground of bona fide need was not maintainable; (ii) the facts of the case clearly and categorically demonstrated that the premises in question was not at all bonafidely required and the nature of the proceedings were motivated and lacked bona fide need, as landlord was man of resources and the claim set up by him was sham and ingenuine, as such finding of fact returned on the question of bona fide need is unsustainable; (iii) on the comparative hardship front also perverse finding has been recorded based on the suggestion in respect of alternative accommodation, as the premises so suggested belonged to company, wherein petitioner is mere share holder, as such finding of fact returned on the question of comparative hardship front is liable to be quashed. 4. 4. Countering the said submissions, Sri Promod Jain, Advocate, contended that the lease deed in question did not prohibit the landlord from evicting the tenant on any of the grounds as contained under Section 21 (1) (a) or Section 20 (2) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. On conscious reading of relevant clauses of the lease deed in question, it is clear that the landlord never waived his right available to him under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, and further the lease deed being unregistered document, no benefit or advantage could be derived out of the same, and the finding of fact returned on the question of bona fide need and comparative hardship are just and proper based on appreciation of evidence, and as no attempt has been made by the petitioner-tenant to search for alternative accommodation, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 5. In order to appreciate the respective arguments, the provisions of Section 21 (1)(a) and (4) as well as Section 38 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 are being extracted below : “21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant.—(1) The Prescribed Authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists, namely : (a) that the building is bona fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade, or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust; (b) that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and new construction : (4) An order under [sub-section (1) or sub-section (1-A) or sub-section (2)] may be made notwithstanding that the tenancy has not been determined : Provided that no such order shall be made in the case of tenancy created for fixed term by registered lease before the expiry of such term. 38. 38. Act to override T.P. Act and Civil Procedure Code.—The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or in the Code of Civil Procedure.” 6. On the touchstones of the provisions quoted above, the facts of the present case are being adverted to. At this juncture, the conditions of the lease deed dated 7.11.1969 are being extracted below : “NOW THIS DEED WITNESSETH AS FOLLOWS : (1) That, in consideration of the rent fixed Rs. 450/- per month, the lessor hereby demise to the lessee the shop specified above. (2) That, the tenancy of the leases shall be deemed being from the date on which the possession of the said shop will be handed over after due completion. (3) That the rent reserved above Rs.450/- shall be paid regularly in advance before 10th of the month after adjustment of Rs.150/- per month against advance by the lessee to the lessor through receipt in the event of non-payment of rent continuously for a period of 3 months, the lessor will be entitled to recover arrears and to eject the lessee through Court of law and to determine the lease. (4) That the lessee will be entitled to use the said business except motor or scooter workshop. (5) That every kind of House tax and premium etc. which the Cantonment Board Authorities or Govt. shall be paid by the lessor and if any other tax shall be fixed by the Govt. on tenant that will be payable by the lessee excluding the rent reserved. (6) That, the expenses of white washing, colouring shall be paid by the lessee and repaid by the lessor. (7) That the lessor or his legal heirs, representatives or assignee shall not be entitled to eject the lease except in the event of arrears of rent. (8) That, if in future, the lessee shall himself likes to vacate shop at his own free will, he will hand over the actual vacation of the said shop to the lessor. (9) That, the Electricity and water fitting shall be provided by lessor and water and electricity charges will be paid by the lessee. (10) That both the parties and their legal heirs and representatives successor and assignees shall be bound by the terms and conditions mentioned above. (9) That, the Electricity and water fitting shall be provided by lessor and water and electricity charges will be paid by the lessee. (10) That both the parties and their legal heirs and representatives successor and assignees shall be bound by the terms and conditions mentioned above. (11) That the lessee shall not sub-let, assign or otherwise part with possession of whole or part of the tenanted premises without the written consent of the lessor.” 7. This fact has been admitted that the lease deed is not a registered document. The nature of the lease deed, which, although, has been reduced in writing, but it is an unregistered document, by no stretch of imagination, can be treated to be fixed term lease. At the best, said lease can be treated to be monthly lease. All leases of immovable property are to be deemed in the eyes of law to be month by month and if any person alleges or asserts the lease to be fixed term lease or to be yearly lease, then he has to prove the same by legal means in view of the provisions of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act as well as Registration Act and the Evidence Act. At this juncture view point of this Court qua the nature of lease has to be seen. In this behalf, the case of Punjab National Bank v. Ganga Narain, AIR 1994 All 221 is being looked into. Paragraphs 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58 and 60 being relevant are being quoted below : “52. Section 105 of the T. P. Act defines the lease as the transfer of right to enjoy the property for consideration by transferor to transferee, and the transferor of right to enjoy the property is called lessor while the persons to whom it is transferred and given i.e. the transferee of such right is called lessee and the consideration fixed i.e. paid from time to time is called the rental. The admitted position in this regard is very clear from the allegation contained in the pleadings which are binding on the parties i.e. plaintiff is the landlord lessor the defendant Punjab National Bank and prior to it Hindustan Commercial Bank have been lessees. The admitted position in this regard is very clear from the allegation contained in the pleadings which are binding on the parties i.e. plaintiff is the landlord lessor the defendant Punjab National Bank and prior to it Hindustan Commercial Bank have been lessees. Hindustan Commercial Bank having merged into Punjab National Bank, the Punjab National Bank stepped into the shoes of Hindustan Commercial Bank and became the tenant and subject to the liability of paying the monthly rental of Rs. 2,550/- which was admittedly the monthly rental for the accommodation in dispute as admitted by defendant in pleadings vide in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the plaint and paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the written statement and there was no dispute about the relationship between the landlord and tenant. Thus there is no question and liability to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant on account of the said facts having been admitted. The evidence is required only to prove a fact, which is asserted by a party and has been denied by another and that casts burden of proof on party asserting a fact but where certain state of affairs of fact is per se admitted and is not disputed one. No question of burden of proof of that fact does arise. 53. As regards, the nature of tenancy whether it was a fixed term tenancy or a tenancy different from or otherwise than fixed term tenancy. The question may arise regarding the burden of proof and the burden of proof lies on that party to prove the said fact i.e. the nature of tenancy to be fixed term, which party asserts i.e. if the defendant as in the present case has asserted the lease to be fixed term lease vide paragraph 15 of the written statement, the burden did lie on him to prove that case because in absence thereof the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act will operate as regards the nature of tenancy. It will be relevant to make a reference to the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as amended by U.P. Act No. 24 of 1954 reads as under : “106. It will be relevant to make a reference to the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as amended by U.P. Act No. 24 of 1954 reads as under : “106. Duration of certain lease in absence of written contract or local usage.— In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, in the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months’ notice, and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by thirty days’ notice. Every notice under this Section must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving it and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants, at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property.” 54. Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act provides the mode which the contract of tenancy can be entered into i.e. in which the lease can be made. Section 107 of the T. P. Act reads as under : “107. Leases how made.—A lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Where a lease of immoveable property is made by a registered instrument, such instrument or, where there are more instruments than one, each such instrument shall be executed by both the lessor and the lessee : Provided that the State Government may, from time to time, by notification in the official Gazette, direct that leases of immovable property, other than leases from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, or any class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession.” 55. A perusal of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act per se shows that it leads a rule of evidence as regards, the duration of certain lease and according to letter and spirit of Section 106 of the T. P. Act in the absence of any contract, local law or usage to the contrary a lease of immovable property for any purpose other than the agriculture or manufacturing purpose, is to be deemed to be lease from month to month, but so far as lease for immovable property taken for the agricultural purpose or manufacturing purpose, these leases are unless there is anything to the contrary in the contract or local law or the usage to be deemed to bea lease from year to year. This is a rule of evidence i.e. all leases of immovable properties are to be deemed in the eye of law to be month to month and, if any, person, alleges or claims to the contrary i.e. in other words, if any person, alleges or as asserts lease on a particularly lease to be a fixed term lease or to be a yearly lease he has to prove the same by legal, valid and reliable evidence. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act as well as the provisions of Registration Act and the Evidence Act. So in the present case, a burden did lie on the defendant to prove allegations of fact made by him in the written statement to the effect that fixed term lease was for five years and the period of lease could be extended at the option (sic) and wish of the lessee. 56. Section 107 of the T. P. Act provides that lease for a fixed term or for a term of more than a year or for year to year or reserving yearly run can be made only by a registered instrument while all other leases of immovable property can be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement complied with delivery of possession. Thus provisions of Section 107 of the T. P. Act by use of expression ‘only’ indicates that legislature or the Parliament intended to prescribe the specific mode for making of the fixed term lease for more than one year or reserving yearly rent. Thus provisions of Section 107 of the T. P. Act by use of expression ‘only’ indicates that legislature or the Parliament intended to prescribe the specific mode for making of the fixed term lease for more than one year or reserving yearly rent. It is well settled principle of law as laid down by Supreme Court in the case of State of U. P. v. Singhepa Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358 as well as by Privy Council in the case of Nazir Ahamad v. King-Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 (2) when the law prescribes a certain mode or specific mode of or for doing a thing or certain mode of exercising certain power of authority or right or for performing certain Act then that Act or thing has got to be done in that manner alone and not otherwise. Other modes in respect thereof are necessarily and by necessary implication taken to have been forbidden and closed. Apart from this, general principles, the further use of expression “only” after the expression can be made “and before expression” by a "registered instrument” indicates the legislative intent that legislature has intended that fixed term lease for a period of more than a year or a lease from year to year or reserving the yearly rent is to be and can be made in no other manner than by entering into the contract of tenancy by a registered lease deed. This being the legal position there can be no lease for fixed term for a period more than a year or the like, if the same has been entered into orally or by some deed which is not registered one, and in those cases, the presumption about the duration of lease under Section 106, T. P. Act will apply. [See Allenbur Engineer Pvt. Ltd. v. Ram Krishna Dalmia, AIR 1973 SC 425 : 1973 (1) SCC 7 ]. 60. Thus considered, the lease in the present case is monthly lease in absence of registration of the deed and the deed in the present case was rightly held to have not been admissible on account of non-registration to determine the tenor or its nature. 60. Thus considered, the lease in the present case is monthly lease in absence of registration of the deed and the deed in the present case was rightly held to have not been admissible on account of non-registration to determine the tenor or its nature. The lease being month to month in view of the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act could validly be terminated by a notice of 30 days on either side in view of amended Section 106 of the T. P. Act, amended in the sense of amendment made therein by the State of Uttar Pradesh.” 8. Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Amal, 1979 (4) SCC 214 , has clarified the provision, that none of the State Rent Acts have abrogated the provisions of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. Relevant portion of the said judgment is being quoted below : “Under the Transfer of Property Act the subject of “Leases of Immovable Property” is dealt with in Chapter V. Section 105 defines the lease, the lessor, the lessee and the rent. Purely as a matter of contract, a lease comes into existence under the Transfer of Property Act. But in all social legislations meant for the protection of the needy, not necessarily the so-called weaker section of the society as is commonly and popularly called, there is appreciable inroad on the freedom of contract and a person becomes a tenant of a landlord even against his wishes on the allotment of a particular premises to him by the authority concerned. Under Section 107 of the Transfer of Pro-perty Act a lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. None of the State Rent Acts has abrogated or affected this provision.” 9. On the touchstone of the judgment quoted above, as far as the facts of the present case are concerned, here also the lease in question is not at all registered, mode of payment of rent is monthly, as such tenancy has to be treated as monthly, and the same cannot be treated as perpetual lease for all the times to come. 10. 10. Lease deed, which was entered into on 7th day of November, 1969 has to be accepted within the parameters as provided for under Transfer of Property Act, and at the said point of time when lease deed was executed, categorical condition has been inserted, providing that lessor or his legal heirs, representatives or assignee shall not be entitled to eject the lessee except in the event of arrears of rent. It was also provided that the lessee would not sublet, assign or otherwise part with the possession of whole or part of the tenanted premises without the written consent of the lessor. The question is, is the landlord estopped in law, in initiating proceedings for eviction on the ground other than mentioned in lease deed. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Raj Narain Jain v. Firm Sukhanand Ram Narain, AIR 1980 All. 78 , wherein it has been observed : “...............One of the terms of the registered lease deed was that the tenants shall not be liable to ejectment at the instance of the landlords except on the ground that they were in arrears of rent for a full year. ........... It was ultimately urged that because of the statutory provision contained in U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 which entitled the landlord to obtain an order of eviction of his tenant on the ground of his personal need under Section 21 (1) (a) of that Act, the covenant which restricted the right of the lessor to evict his tenant only on the ground of non-payment of rent for a year stood obliterated. It is contended that the term in the lease being inconsistent with Section 21(1)(b) of the U.P. Act No.XIII of 1972 ceased to be of any legal effect. .............. U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 does not enlarge the rights which a lessor possessed either under the general law dealing with the subject of Landlord and Tenant or under the provisions of the T.P. Act. The Act has placed restrictions on the rights of the landlord to obtain eviction of his tenant on such grounds as are mentioned in Section 20 or 21 of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. The Act has placed restrictions on the rights of the landlord to obtain eviction of his tenant on such grounds as are mentioned in Section 20 or 21 of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. Like the enactment which came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Trimbak Damodhar v. Assaram Hiraman, AIR 1966 SC 1758 it is a piece of beneficial legislation conferring on the tenant additional rights and protection against eviction as a matter of public policy. If the lease deed had contained a covenant surrendering any protection provided to him by U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 it might have been possible to successfully contend that such a covenant was against public policy and consequently void by reason of Section 23 of the Contract Act. There is nothing in the Act, however, to prevent the landlord from waiving such rights as have been left to him by U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. There is no public policy involved in Sec. 21 of the Act as far as it restricts the rights of a landlord to obtain an order for the eviction of his tenant on certain limited grounds specified in that provision................” (emphasis supplied) Judgment quoted above has been considered in Mohd. Ahmed v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Dehradun and others, 1995 (2) ARC 12, wherein the landlord had agreed that the tenant will continue to remain a tenant as before and that during the pendency of reconstruction and alterations the tenant will not be required to vacate the premises. This Court found that what the landlord had agreed to was that the tenant was entitled to retain his status as a tenant as before even though his tenancy had been terminated and these terms do not indicate that the landlord had waived his right under Section 21 of the Act. The relevant portion of the judgment is quoted below : “As observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. S.B. Sardar Ranjit Singh, AIR 1968 SC 933 , waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is obvious, therefore, that there can be no ‘waiver’ unless the person against whom the waiver is claimed has full knowledge of his right and the facts enabling him to take effective action for the enforcement of such a right. It is obvious, therefore, that there can be no ‘waiver’ unless the person against whom the waiver is claimed has full knowledge of his right and the facts enabling him to take effective action for the enforcement of such a right. There can be no manner of doubt that every one has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity which may be dispensed with without infringing any public right or public policy. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Lachhumal v. Radhey Shyam, AIR 1971 SC 2213 , observed that if there is any express prohibition against contracting out of a statute in it then no question can arise of anyone entering into a contract which is so prohibited but where there is no such prohibition, it will have to be seen whether an Act is intended to have a more extensive operation as a matter of public policy. It was noticed in that case that there are many statutory provisions expressed to apply notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. .................... In the present case, in the compromise it was agreed by the landlord that the tenant will continue to remain a tenant as before and that during the period of reconstruction/repairs and alterations, the tenant will not be required to vacate the premises. The aforesaid terms contained in the compromise which were heavily relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to support the plea of waiver and estoppel, it seems to me, do not lead to any such inference as is sought to be drawn. In this connection it may be noticed that what the landlord had agreed was that the tenant inspite of his tenancy having been terminated was entitled to continue to retain his status as the tenant as before and during the period when alterations/reconstructions etc. were being carried out was not be required to vacate the premises. These terms can by no stretch of imagination be deemed to indicate that the landlord had waived his right secured under the statutory provisions contained in Section 21 of the Act or that he stood estopped from prosecuting the application for release filed by him.” (emphasis supplied) 12. were being carried out was not be required to vacate the premises. These terms can by no stretch of imagination be deemed to indicate that the landlord had waived his right secured under the statutory provisions contained in Section 21 of the Act or that he stood estopped from prosecuting the application for release filed by him.” (emphasis supplied) 12. This Court in the case of Moti Lal Pathara v. VIIIth Additional District Judge, Varanasi and others, 1990 All. L.J. 108, took the view that even if there is permanent lease deed, as far as application under Section 21 (1) (a) is concerned, same is fully competent and maintainable. This Court again in the case of Mohd. Ahmad v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Dehradun and others, 1995 (2) ARC 12, took the view that the provisions as contained under Section 21 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 secure a valuable right in favour of the landlord and afford the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds contemplated therein. The provisions contained in the Act strike a just balance between the genuine need of the landlord on the one hand and the inconvenience and troubles of the tenants on the other. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the said judgment being relevant are being extracted below : “6. The provisions contained in Section 21 of the Act secure a valuable right in favour of the landlord and afford the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds contemplated therein. The provisions contained in the Act strike a just balance between the genuine need of the landlord on the one hand and the inconvenience and troubles of the tenants on the other. However, since Section 21 of the Act is meant for the benefit of the landlord, therefore, it must be so construed as to advance the object behind the said provision. 7. The U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is indeed in the nature of social welfare legislation intended to protect the tenant against the harassment and exploitations of the landlord safeguarding at the same time the legitimate interest of the landlords. A statute may be enacted for protecting the oppressed from the oppressor and the oppressed cannot waive a statutory protection under the law. A statute may be enacted for protecting the oppressed from the oppressor and the oppressed cannot waive a statutory protection under the law. Further a statute may be enacted with the intention of protecting the general public or a section of general public and in such a case a member of the protected class cannot waive statutory protection. There may be a situation where the law confronts the estoppel if it seems to represent a social policy to which the Court must give effect in the interest of the public generally or some section of the public, despite any rules of evidence as between themselves that the parties may have created by their conduct or otherwise. This was not clarified in the case of Kok Hoong v. Leong Cheong Kwang Mines Ltc., 1964 (2) WLR 150, decided by the Privy Council. In the aforesaid decision the Privy Council had further observed that a general social policy does from time to time require the denial of legal validity to certain transactions by certain persons. This may be for their own protection. In all such cases there is no room for the application of any general and familiar principle of law that a man may, if he wishes, disclaim a statutory provision enacted for his benefit, for what is for a mans benefit and what is for his protection are not synonymous terms. It was further observed “nor is it open to the Court to give its sanction to departure from any law that reflects such a policy even though the party concerned has himself behaved in such a way as would otherwise tie his hands.” 13. In the case of Sudhangshu Kumar Banerjee v. Radhey Charan Shah and another, 2007 (2) ARC 265 , this Court has considered the Division Bench judgment relied upon by the petitioner as well as another Division Bench judgment, both already quoted above and the Court has distinguished the aforementioned Division Bench judgment, relied upon by the petitioner, and taken the view that application under Section 21 (1)(a) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 is fully competent and maintainable. Relevant paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 37 are being extracted below : “16. Relevant paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 37 are being extracted below : “16. Another aspect of the case, which is a vexed question to be considered, is the effect of such compromise on release application filed by a landlord under Section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 17. Before examining the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it is desirable to have an idea of the scheme of the Act. For this purpose, Sections 12, 20 and 21 of the Act require consideration. Under these provisions, right has been given to a landlord to seek eviction of a tenant under different circumstances. The grounds on which a landlord may seek his remedy under these provisions may some time be overlapping. Under Section 12 read with Section 16 of the Act, a landlord may apply for release of the disputed accommodation though not actually vacant but on the ground that it is deemed vacant under Section 12 where the tenant has substantially removed his effects from the tenanted accommodation or he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family or in the case of a residential building, he as well as members of his family have taken up residence, not being temporary residence, elsewhere. In the case of a non-residential building, where a tenant carrying on business in the building admits a person who is not a member of his family as a new partner, the tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. There are other similar provisions where a building, though not actually vacant, may be deemed vacant by operation of law under Section 12 of the Act. It is open to a landlord to seek release of such building under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act. The District Magistrate shall, after ascertaining existence of facts relevant to Section 12, will proceed to decide the release application of the landlord for release under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act. 18. Section 20 of the Act enumerates various grounds which are available to a landlord to institute a suit for eviction of a tenant from a building after determination of his tenancy before a competent civil Court. 18. Section 20 of the Act enumerates various grounds which are available to a landlord to institute a suit for eviction of a tenant from a building after determination of his tenancy before a competent civil Court. Some grounds which are usually found in other similar Rent Control Legislations, are— default in payment of rent for a specified period of time, causing substantial damages to the building, making such construction or structural alteration in the building as to likely to diminish the value of its utility, inconsistent use of the building, sub-letting, denying the title of the landlord, etc. Such proceedings can be initiated before a Judge, Small Cause Court by institution of a plaint and if ultimately the landlord succeeds and possession is delivered, he would not be entitled to use the building in question unless the building in question is released by an order of the District Magistrate under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act, otherwise it will be open for an allotment. 19. Section 21 of the Act confers a right on a landlord to get the building released under occupation of a tenant on the grounds specified therein, namely, the building is bonafide required in its existing form or after demolition by the landlord or it is in a dilapidated condition and is required for the purpose of demolition and new construction. 21. Having set out the statutory scheme, in brief, it is axiomatic that there is a marked difference in between the proceedings under Sections 20 and 21 of the Act. The first and foremost distinction is that under Section 20, before a proceeding can be initiated, termination of tenancy is sine qua non. But it is not so for getting an accommodation which is in possession of a tenant released under Section 21 of the Act. On the contrary, there is an inbuilt intention of the Legislature which is manifested under sub-section (4) of Section 21 that an order of release under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1-A) or sub-section (2) which provide that an order under sub-section (1) or (1-A) or sub-section (2) may be made notwithstanding that a tenancy has not been determined. Section 21 of the Act provides that an application for release under aforesaid sub-sections (a) and (b) can be filed on the availability of any of the grounds specified therein which is relevant to seek a release order against a tenant. Section 21 of the Act provides that an application for release under aforesaid sub-sections (a) and (b) can be filed on the availability of any of the grounds specified therein which is relevant to seek a release order against a tenant. To put it differently, the right conferred by Section 21 of the Act does not depend upon any overt act of the landlord such as determination of tenancy before filing of a release application. It follows that as soon as a statutory ground on a particular set of circumstance is available to a landlord, if he so wishes, may file release application before the Prescribed Authority and the filing of such release application is not in any way is fettered by any act of the landlord. Sub-section (6) of Section 21 which provides for automatic determination of lease by operation of law also supports the above view point. 22. A somewhat similar controversy was referred to a Division Bench to answer the question, whether an agreement between the parties that the landlord will have no right to evict the tenant from the premises in dispute so long as he continues to pay rent provides a complete immunity to a tenant from being evicted from the premises under any condition and precludes the landlord from pressing his application for release of the accommodation under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act even though the need of the landlord may be found to be very pressing, bonafide and genuine. The said question has been answered in favour of the landlord on the footing that a compromise does not take away the right of a landlord to bring the other side for ejectment, if other grounds exist or where he files an application for release under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 21 of the Act. It is Haji Mohd. Amin v. VIIth Additional District Judge and others, 1988 All CJ 627. In the said case, a compromise which has been reproduced in the report, reads as follows : “Yah Ki Agar Muddalay Kiraya Ada Karata Rehega To Muddai Ko Dukan Kirayedari Se Muddalay Ko Bedakhal Karane Ka Hak Hasil Na Hoga.” 23. It is Haji Mohd. Amin v. VIIth Additional District Judge and others, 1988 All CJ 627. In the said case, a compromise which has been reproduced in the report, reads as follows : “Yah Ki Agar Muddalay Kiraya Ada Karata Rehega To Muddai Ko Dukan Kirayedari Se Muddalay Ko Bedakhal Karane Ka Hak Hasil Na Hoga.” 23. In this Division Bench decision, an earlier Division Bench decision in Raj Narain Jain v. Firm Sukhnand Ram Narain and others, AIR 1980 All 78 was distinguished with the following observation : “5.......................As Section 21 (1) (a) is a provision entitling a landlord to apply for release on the ground of his or his family members personal need. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 gives another ground of the landlord for release, that is, when the house is in dilapidated condition and is required re-construction after demolition. If the right of the petitioner-tenant, as claimed before us, is so absolute that neither Section 21 (1) (a) or (1) (b) would apply that will create a situation which is abhorrent to law. A tenant cannot insist on living in a house although the accommodation is in a dilapidated condition. If that is conceded to, his property would come to ruins and in that even he would just watch standing by and doing nothing. 6. In fact there is a difference between Sections 20 and 21. Section 20 enumerates the various grounds on which a suit for ejectment can be brought by a landlord against the tenant whereas Section 21 takes care of the two situations mentioned therein for release of the premises on the ground specified therein. Before filing the application under Section 20, the tenancy would have to be terminated whereas such is not required by Section 21 of the Act. In Sheikh Bundu v. State of U.P. and others, 1977 ARC 454 (a) Division Bench of this Court held that both the proceedings are independent of each other being based on separate causes of action. What is debarred by the compromise arrived at in between the parties is that on the basis of the default already committed, which was the subject matter of Suit No. 123 of 1975, the tenant was not liable to be ejected. What is debarred by the compromise arrived at in between the parties is that on the basis of the default already committed, which was the subject matter of Suit No. 123 of 1975, the tenant was not liable to be ejected. The compromise does not take away the right of a landlord to either bring a suit for ejectment if other grounds exist or where he files an application for release under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 21 of the Act. By the compromise the parties intended only to settle the subject-matter, which was in dispute, in that case.” 24. It has also taken note of a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Indramohan Lal v. Ramesh Khanna, AIR 1987 SC 1986 wherein the Supreme Court with reference to the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act which are pari materia with Section 21 of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 has held that section is complete code itself. The Division Bench has clearly opined that the compromise entered into in a suit under Section 20 does not debar the landlord from moving an application for release under Section 21 of the Act. The said decision fully clinches the issue. 25. While preparing the judgment, I could lay my hand on a judgment of the Apex Court in Laxmi Das Bapu Das Darbar and another v. Rudravva (Smt) and others, (2001) 7 SCC 409 which is also on the subject involved herein. The said decision, though was not relied by the either side, but needs to be noted. It was a case under Karnataka Rent Control Act. The tenant was holding fixed term lease of 99 years. Before expiry of lease of the said term an application for eviction of tenant was filed by the landlord on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement. A controversy arose as to what would be the effect of the lease deed for fixed term, the term of which has not expired vis-a-vis the release application filed by the landlord on the ground of bona fide need. A controversy arose as to what would be the effect of the lease deed for fixed term, the term of which has not expired vis-a-vis the release application filed by the landlord on the ground of bona fide need. The Apex Court considered Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 which is reproduced in para-16 of the judgment and decided the controversy by holding that Rent Control Act is a beneficial piece of legislation and non-obstante clause therein will not in any way prejudice the right of a tenant under a fixed term lease and till the expiry of lease period, the application for eviction is not maintainable. 26. On a first reading of the judgment of the Apex Court, one gets an impression that the law, as laid down therein, impliedly disapproves the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Haji Mohd. Amin (supra), but on a close reading of the said judgment it is not so. The central theme of the judgment of the Apex Court is on the word ‘only’ as used in Section 21 of that Act. The Apex Court has laid emphasis on the word ‘only’ with reference to ground of eviction and held that eviction of a tenant can be sought for only on the grounds mentioned therein and not on any other plea. To my mind, it appears that the observation made by the Apex Court should be read in the statutory set up as contained in Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 and the same principle cannot be imported herein. The reason is that Section 21 of Karnataka Rent Control Act is pari materia to Section 20 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and not to Section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 which provides grounds of release in addition to the ground for filing suit for eviction, as provided under Section 20(2) of the Act. xxx xxx xxx 37. In the nut shell the conclusion of the above discussions is that the decree of the civil Court was not required to be registered under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. Firstly, no lease was created in favour of the petitioner and the execution of the decree for possession was postponed on the fulfilment of the conditions mentioned therein during the life time of the petitioner. Firstly, no lease was created in favour of the petitioner and the execution of the decree for possession was postponed on the fulfilment of the conditions mentioned therein during the life time of the petitioner. Secondly, in view of the judgment of this Court in case of B.P. Sinha (supra), the lease was for uncertain period and was not for more than one year and its registration under the Registration Act was not compulsorily required. The other conclusion is that the terms and conditions contained the compromise decree will not in any way affect or impair or inhibit right of the landlord statutorily conferred on him by virtue of Section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. It follows that the judgment of the Court below is on terra firma and cannot be faulted. No other point was pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner.” 14. This Court in the case of Shyam Lal, 2008 (72) A.L.R. 345, considered the terms and conditions of the lease deed and the judgment relied upon by the petitioner, and took the view that there is nothing which prevented the landlord from filing application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 15. At this juncture, the viewpoint of Hon’ble Apex Court, qua Rent Control Legislations vis-a-vis bona fide need is being looked into. Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Siddalingamma v. Mamta Shenoy, AIR 2001 SC 2896 , observed as follows : “Rent Control Legislation generally leans in favour of tenant, it is only the provision for seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement of landlord for his own occupation or use of the tenanted accommodation which treats the landlord with some sympathy. ..........” 16. Nilesh Nand Kumar Shah v. Sikandar Aziz Patel, (2002) 6 SCC 678 : 2003 SCFBRC 60 is an authority for the proposition that even in absence of non-obstante clause, a Rent Control Legislation being a special beneficial provision shall over ride the provisions of any General Legislation in case of a conflict. 17. ..........” 16. Nilesh Nand Kumar Shah v. Sikandar Aziz Patel, (2002) 6 SCC 678 : 2003 SCFBRC 60 is an authority for the proposition that even in absence of non-obstante clause, a Rent Control Legislation being a special beneficial provision shall over ride the provisions of any General Legislation in case of a conflict. 17. In Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397 , the Apex Court has held that although the purpose of Rent Control Legislation is to restrict increase of rent and eviction of a tenant in urban areas, special legislation has taken care of the grounds provided for eviction, one of them being the requirement of the landlord. The Court has to keep a balance between the need of protecting the tenant from unjustified eviction and need for eviction when ground for eviction is one such as the requirement of the landlord. 18. In Balwant Singh and others v. Anand Kumar Sharma and others, (2003)3 SCC 433 ; the Apex Court has quoted an observation from its earlier judgment in E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy, (2003) 1 SCC 123 ; which reads as follows : “5. Recently, in E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy a Division Bench of this Court observed : “The rent legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance with the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration has no place in such matter. 6. It is also pertinent to note that the Rent Control Act is not only a beneficial enactment for the tenant but also for the benefit of the landlord (see Shri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. Syeda Vajhiunnissa Begum.” 19. Recently, Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India, 2008 (3) ARC 1, proceeded to mention that there has been definite shift in the Courts approach while interpreting Rent Control Legislations. Analysis of judgments of 1950s’ to early 1990s’ would indicate that in majority of cases the Courts heavily leaned in favour of an interpretation which would benefit the tenant. Now a different trend is clearly discernible in the latter judgments, wherein view has been taken that the legislation has to be fair to tenant and landlord both. Analysis of judgments of 1950s’ to early 1990s’ would indicate that in majority of cases the Courts heavily leaned in favour of an interpretation which would benefit the tenant. Now a different trend is clearly discernible in the latter judgments, wherein view has been taken that the legislation has to be fair to tenant and landlord both. The Courts will have to adopt a reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting Rent Control Legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to both the sections of the society. Paragraphs 11, 12, 38, 39 and 40 being relevant are being extracted below : “11. Before proceeding further we consider it necessary to observe that there has been a definite shift in the Court’s approach while interpreting the rent control legislations. An analysis of the judgments of 1950s’ to early 1990s’ would indicate that in majority of cases the Courts heavily leaned in favour of an interpretation which would benefit the tenant [Mohinder Kumar and others v. State of Haryana and another, 1985 (4) SCC 221 ; Prabhakaran Nair and others v. State of Tamil Nadu and others (supra); D.C. Bhatia and others v. Union of India and another, 1995 (1) SCC 104 and C.N. Rudramurthy v. K. Barkathulla Khan, 1998 (8) SCC 275 ]. In these and other cases, the Court consistently held that the paramount object of every Rent Control Legislation is to provide safeguards for tenants against exploitation by landlords who seek to take undue advantage of the pressing need for accommodation of a large number of people looking for a house on rent for residence or business in the background of acute scarcity thereof. However, a different trend is clearly discernible in the latter judgments. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and others v. State of Maharashtra and another (supra), this Court considered the question whether determination and fixation of rent under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses, Rates Control Act, 1947, by freezing or pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on the date of first letting was arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The three-Judge Bench answered the question in affirmative but declined to strike down the concerned provisions on the ground that the same were to lapse on 31.3.1998. Some of the observations made in that judgment are worth noticing. The three-Judge Bench answered the question in affirmative but declined to strike down the concerned provisions on the ground that the same were to lapse on 31.3.1998. Some of the observations made in that judgment are worth noticing. These are : “Insofar as social legislation, like the Rent Control Act is concerned, the law must strike a balance between rival interests and it should try to be just to all. The law ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society. When there is shortage of accommodation it is desirable, nay, necessary that some protection should be given to the tenants in order to ensure that they are not exploited. At the same time such a law has to be revised periodically so as to ensure that a disproportionately larger benefit than the one which was intended is not given to the tenants. It is not as if the government does not take remedial measures to try and off set the effects of inflation. In order to provide fair wage to the salaried employees the government provides for payment of dearness and other allowances from time to time. Surprisingly this principle is lost sight of while providing for increase in the standard rent the increases made even in 1987 are not adequate, fair or just and the provisions continue to be arbitrary in today’s context.” “When enacting socially progressive legislation the need is greater to approach the problem from a holistic perspective and not to have narrow or short sighted parochial approach. Giving a greater than due emphasis to a vocal section of society results not merely in the miscarriage of justice but in the abdication of responsibility of the legislative authority. Social Legislation is treated with deference by the Courts not merely because the Legislature represents the people but also because in representing them the entire spectrum of views is expected to be taken into account. The Legislature is not shackled by the same constraints as the Courts of law. But its power is coupled with a responsibility. It is also the responsibility of the Courts to look at legislation from the altar of Article 14 of the Constitution. This Article is intended, as is obvious from its words, to check this tendency; giving undue preference to some over others.” 12. But its power is coupled with a responsibility. It is also the responsibility of the Courts to look at legislation from the altar of Article 14 of the Constitution. This Article is intended, as is obvious from its words, to check this tendency; giving undue preference to some over others.” 12. In Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, 2002 (5) SCC 397 , the Court after noticing several judicial precedents on the subject observed as under : “The Rent Control Legislations are heavily loaded in favour of the tenants treating them as weaker sections of the society requiring legislative protection against exploitation and unscrupulous devices of greedy landlords. The legislative intent has to be respected by the courts while interpreting the laws. But it is being uncharitable to legislatures if they are attributed with an intention that they lean only in favour of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of being unfair to the landlords. The legislature is fair to the tenants and to the landlords-both. The courts have to adopt a reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting Rent Control Legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to both the sections of the society. In spite of the overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpreting such of the provisions as take care of the interest of the landlord the court should not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. Such provisions are engrafted in Rent Control Legislations to take care of those situations where the landlords too are weak and feeble and feel humble. [Emphasis added] 38. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India insofar as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the latter’s right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only. 39. 39. However, the aforesaid declaration should not be misunderstood as total striking down of Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act because it is neither the pleaded case of the parties nor the learned counsel argued that Section 14(1)(e) is unconstitutional in its entirety and we feel that ends of justice will be met by striking down the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e) so that the remaining part thereof may read as under : “that the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation.” While adopting this course, we have kept in view well recognized rule that if the offending portion of a statute can be severed without doing violence to the remaining part thereof, then such a course is permissible [R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628 and Bhawani Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1996 (3) SCC 105 ]. As a sequel to the above, the explanation appearing below Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act will have to be treated as redundant. 40. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is partly struck down. Section 14(1)(e) shall now read as indicated in para 39 above. Consequently, the writ petitions filed by the appellants shall stand allowed and the orders impugned therein shall stand quashed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.” 20. Hon’ble Apex Court in the said case in spite of the fact that there was no provision for getting the premises in question released for bona fide need qua commercial buildings, proceeded to partly strike down the provisions and re-read the Rules, by harmonizing the provisions that when landlord has bona fide need, he can apply for release for residential as well as commercial purpose. This decision has been cited with the object in mind that in the event landlord bona fidely needs the premises in question, then he can apply for release of the premises. Said right cannot be lightly permitted to be defeated. This decision has been cited with the object in mind that in the event landlord bona fidely needs the premises in question, then he can apply for release of the premises. Said right cannot be lightly permitted to be defeated. Section 21 (4) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 also takes care of this situation, inasmuch as it clearly provides that such order of release cannot be passed in the case of a tenancy created for a fixed term by a registered lease before the expiry of such term. In case there is tenancy for fixed term by registered lease then Section 21 (4) itself prohibits building in question from being released, but once there is no fixed term tenancy by registered lease deed, then by no stretch of imagination, it can be conceived that application under Section 21 (1)(a) of the Act is not competent and maintainable. 21. Section 38 of the said Act clearly provides that the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or in the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, any lease which has been created in consonance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the same has to be read in conjunction with the provisions as provided for under U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and not in abrogation of the said Act. Framers of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 were conscious of this fact that once lease was there, which was registered in terms of Section 107 of Transfer of Property Act, wherein the term of said lease had been provided for qua the same release application could not be allowed, as such conscious provision has been incorporated under U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 22. In this background, once admittedly lease deed in question is unregistered document, then the same has to be treated as tenancy on month to month basis and in view of the same protection as envisaged under Section 21 (4) of the Act is not at all provided for. 22. In this background, once admittedly lease deed in question is unregistered document, then the same has to be treated as tenancy on month to month basis and in view of the same protection as envisaged under Section 21 (4) of the Act is not at all provided for. Lease deed which was there inter se parties, at the said point of time was as per the provisions as contained under Transfer of Pro-perty Act, and once it was unregistered document, then as mentioned above, it is monthly lease and qua the same, at all point of time, it is open to landlord to terminate the tenancy and to proceed with the eviction proceeding in terms of Section 20. But as far as proceedings under Section 21 (1)(a) of the Act are concerned, same are special proceedings, wherein termination of tenancy is not required, and it can be taken straightaway by filing application for release, as is clear from Section 21 (4) which contains non-obstante clause. The terms and conditions of the lease deed that only in the event there being arrears of rent, suit could be filed is not to be read in isolation and same has to be read on the whole and in conjunction with statutory provisions. In the lease deed, there is specific mention that lessee shall not sublet, assign or otherwise part with possession of whole or part of the premises, without the written consent of lessor. Only ground for eviction as per the lease deed is arrears of rent. Suppose in contravention of the provisions of lease deed, premises in question is sublet, without the written consent of lessor, then can stand be taken by the tenant, that yes he has flouted the terms and conditions of lease and has flouted the provisions of Section 20 (2)(e) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972, even then he can not be evicted, as terms and conditions of eviction inter se parties are binding and he could be evicted only when he is in arrears of rent. The answer would be no, as Rent Control Legislation confers additional rights and protection against eviction to tenants and similarly provides additional grounds to landlords for proceeding with eviction. The answer would be no, as Rent Control Legislation confers additional rights and protection against eviction to tenants and similarly provides additional grounds to landlords for proceeding with eviction. Section 20 enumerates various grounds on which suit for ejectment could be brought by landlord against tenants, whereas Section 21 takes care of the two situations mentioned (i) building in question bonafidely required for himself or family members either for residential purpose or for commercial purpose (ii) building is in dilapidated condition and is required for the purposes of demolition and new constriction. Lease deed will have to be read in conjunction with the provisions of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 has not at all abrogated provisions of Section 107 of Transfer of Property Act, rather rights created under leases covered under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, have been clearly protected and reserved, under Section 21 (4) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 23. Division Bench judgment, which has been relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, namely Raj Narain Jain (supra) will not come to rescue of the petitioner, inasmuch as in that case lease deed was registered and as such benefit of Section 21 (4) of the Act were extended. In the facts of the present case application moved under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act was fully competent and maintainable. 24. Now coming to the question of bona fide need, much stress has been laid from the side of the petitioner that in the present case nature of the business was not at all disclosed, and the need set up in the release application was not at all bona fide and genuine one, as landlord was moneyed man and already engaged in his family business. 25. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Raj Kumar Khaitan and others v. Bibi Zubaida Khatun and another, AIR 1995 SC 576 answered this question in unequivocal term by mentioning “it was not necessary for the appellant-landlord to indicate precise nature of business which they intended to start in the premises. Even if nature of business would have been indicated no body could bind the landlord’s to start the same business in the premises after it was vacated.” 26. Even if nature of business would have been indicated no body could bind the landlord’s to start the same business in the premises after it was vacated.” 26. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co., 2000(1) SCC 679 has held as follows : “It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. [See: Prativa Devi (Smt.) v. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 ]. In the case in hand the plaintiff-landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted.” 27. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of T. Shiv Subramanium v. Kashi Nath and others, JT 1999 (6) SC 405 has taken the view that mere desire of the landlord to live separately from his father, cannot be attributed to his need in the premises occupied by the tenant, rather requirement of law is that the landlord must set up his need for the premises and his petition and establish such a need is bonafide. The need must change in good faith. Relevant para 4 is being extracted below : “4. From the aforesaid decisions it is clear that mere desire of the landlord to live separately from his father cannot be attributed to his need for the premises occupied by the tenant. It is often seen that a desire often takes its origin from what one likes and dislikes and necessarily it is not depended upon his need. But we cannot lose sight of the fact that sometimes the desire may be outcome of one’s need. So when a landlord desires a premises, the requirement of law is that the landlord must set out his need for the premises in his petition and establish that such a need is bona fide. The need must be bona fide, genuine, honest and conceived in good faith. In the present case, what we find is that, it was not pleaded by the landlord in his petition that he for certain compelling reasons desires to live separately from his father and for that reason he required the premises. We also do not find any evidence on record to show that the landlord required the premises and his need was bona fide. We also do not find any evidence on record to show that the landlord required the premises and his need was bona fide. The only material on record for eviction of the tenants before the Rent Control Authority was mere desire of the landlords to live separately from his father. Such a desire is not substitute of the need for the premises which a landlord is required to plead and establish. Thus, we are of the view that the landlord’s desire to live separately was not a valid ground for eviction of the tenants from the premises. We, therefore, find no substance in the submission of learned Counsel for the appellants.” 28. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, AIR 2002 SC 2256 in respect of bona fide need of the landlord has construed the expression for “his own use” to be assigned wider, liberal and practical meaning. Under U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 bona fide requirement is for self or any member of family. Said expression has not to be narrowly construed. Relevant para 30 and 32 are being extracted below : “30. In providing key to the meaning of any word or expression the context in which it is set has significance. Colour and content emanating from context may permit sense being preferred to mere meaning depending on what is sought to be achieved and what is sought to be prevented by the legislative scheme surrounding the expression. Requirement of landlord for his own use, is an expression capable for attributing an intention to the legislature that what was intended to be fulfilled is such requirement as would persuade the landlord to have the premises vacated by the tenant, to forego the rental income, and to put the premises to such use as the landlord would deem to be his own use and in the given facts and circumstances of a case the Court too would hold it to be so in contradistinction with a mere ruse to evict the tenant. The legislature intending to protect the tenant also intends to lift the protection when it is the requirement of landlord to put the accommodation to such use as he intends, away from leasing it out. 32. The legislature intending to protect the tenant also intends to lift the protection when it is the requirement of landlord to put the accommodation to such use as he intends, away from leasing it out. 32. Our conclusions are crystallised as under : (i) the words ‘for his own use’ as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 must receive a wide, liberal and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow construction. (ii) The expression - landlord requires for ‘his own use’, is not confined in its meaning to actual physical user by the landlord personally. The requirement not only of the landlord himself but also of the normal ‘emanations’ of the landlord is included therein. All the cases and circumstances in which actual physical occupation or user by someone else, would amount to occupation or user by the landlord himself, cannot be exhaustively enumerated. It will depend on a variety of factors such as inter-relationship and inter-dependence-economic or otherwise, between the landlord and such person in the background of social, socio-religious and local customs and obligations of the society or region to which they belong. (iii) The tests to be applied are : (i) whether the requirement pleaded and proved may properly be regarded as the landlord’s own requirement? and (ii) whether on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case actual occupation and user by a person other than the landlord would be deemed by the landlord as ‘his own’ occupation or user? The answer would, in its turn, depend on (i) the nature and degree of relationship and/or dependence between the landlord pleading the requirement as ‘his own’ and the person who would actually use the premises; (ii) the circumstances in which the claim arises and is put forward, and (iii) the intrinsic tenability of the claim. The Court on being satisfied of the reasonability and genuineness of claim, as distinguished from a mere ruse to get rid of the tenant, will uphold the landlord’s claim, (iv) while casting its judicial verdict, the Court shall adopt a practical and meaningful approach guided by the realities of life, (v) in the present case, the requirement of landlord of the suit premises for user as office of his chartered accountant son is the requirement of landlord ‘for his own use’ within the meaning of Section 13(3)(a)(ii).” 29. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Akhileshwar Kumar and others v. Mustaqim and others, AIR 2003 SC 532 took the view that simply because educated unemployed son was provisionally assisting his father does not mean that he should not start own independent businsess. Relevant para 3, 4 and 5 are being extracted below : “3. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court cannot be countenanced and has occasioned a failure of justice. Overwhelming evidence is available to show that the plaintiff No. 1 is sitting idle, without any adequate commercial activity available to him so as to gainfully employ him. The plaintiff No. 1 and his father both have deposed to this fact. Simply because the plaintiff No. 1 is provisionally assisting his father in their family business, it does not mean that he should never start his own independent business. What the High Court has overlooked is the evidence to the effect, relied on by the trial Court too, that the husband of plaintiff No. 4, i.e. son-inlaw of Ram Chandra Sao, was assisting the latter in his business and there was little left to be done by the three sons. 4. So is the case with the availability of alternative accommodation, as opined by the High Court. There is a shop in respect of which a suit for eviction was filed to satisfy the need of plaintiff No. 2. The suit was compromised and the shop was got vacated. The shop is meant for the business of plaintiff No. 2. There is yet another shop constructed by the father of the plaintiffs which is situated over a septic tank but the same is almost inaccessible inasmuch as there is a deep ditch in front of the shop and that is why it is lying vacant and utilized. Once it has been proved by a landlord that the suit accommodation is required bona fide by him for his own purpose and such satisfaction withstands the test of objective assessment by the Court of facts then choosing of the accommodation which would be reasonable to satisfy such requirement has to be left to the subjective choice of the needy. The Court cannot thrust upon its own choice on the needy. Of course, the choice has to be exercised reasonably and not whimsically. The Court cannot thrust upon its own choice on the needy. Of course, the choice has to be exercised reasonably and not whimsically. The alternative accommodation which have prevailed with the High Court are either not available to the plaintiff No. 1 or not suitable in all respects as the suit accommodation is. The approach of the High Court that an accommodation got vacated to satisfy the need of plaintiff No. 2, who too is an educated unemployed, should be diverted or can be considered as relevant alternative accommodation to satisfy the requirement of plaintiff No. 1 another educated unemployed brother, cannot be countenanced. So also considering a shop situated over a septic tank and inaccessible on account of a ditch in front of the shop and hence lying vacant cannot be considered a suitable alternative to the suit shop which is situated in a marketing complex, is easily accessible and has been purchased by the plaintiffs to satisfy the felt need of one of them. 5. We find it difficult to sustain the observation of the High Court that the requirement pleaded by the plaintiffs falls short of felt need and is merely a desire. The judgment of the trial Court is a detailed and exhaustive judgment which has taken into consideration each and every available piece of evidence and relevant circumstances, assessed with objectivity, consistently with the relevant principles of law and hence the finding is one which could not have been upset by High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Moreover, as we have pointed out, the manner in which the High Court has proceeded to form an opinion at variance with the findings of the trial Court is wholly unsustainable.” 30. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Smt. Sushila v. 2nd Additional District Judge, Banda and others, 2003 (1) ARC 256 has taken the view that need for settling married and major son is bona fide need, and he cannot be compelled to join his father and do work. Relevant paragraphs 5,10 and 11 of the said judgment are being extracted below : “5. We find that Prem Prakash is a young man who is unemployed. He is married and has children. There is every justification for him or for his mother to settle him in life independently. Relevant paragraphs 5,10 and 11 of the said judgment are being extracted below : “5. We find that Prem Prakash is a young man who is unemployed. He is married and has children. There is every justification for him or for his mother to settle him in life independently. He cannot be compelled to join his father in his Goldsmith and money-lending work in his small shop. In our opinion, he is entitled to start business of his own choice and independently. The appellate Court took a view, as indicated above, which is palpably wrong and wholly unacceptable. 10. In the case in hand we find that even though the period of tenancy of the respondent is no doubt long but availability of another shop to him where he can very well shift his business as found by the Prescribed Authority, neutralises the factor of length of tenancy in the accommodation in dispute. We further find that the landlady has no other shop where she can establish her son who is married and unemployed. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the business of father of Prem Prakash is so huge or that it is a very flourishing business so as to attract application of clause (c) of Rule 16(2). As observed earlier it is clear that length of period of tenancy as provided under clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 of the Rules, 1972 is only one of the factors to be taken into account in context with other facts and circumstances of the case. It cannot be a sole criterion or deciding factor to order or not the eviction of the tenant. Considering the facts in the light of Rule 16 pressed into service on behalf of the respondent, we find that according to the guidelines provided therein balance tilts in favour of the unemployed son of the landlady whose need is certainly bona fide and has also been so accepted by the respondent before us. 11. It may be mentioned that we are not taking into account of clause (d) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 of the Rules; where yet another factor is to be borne in mind, in favour of releasing the shop, if the person has some technical education to his credit but not employed in any Government service and wants to engage in self-employment. The Petitioner had shown that her son Prem Parkash had undergone a training course in household electrical wiring and had obtained a certificate from Industrial Training Institute, Banda. He did not get any Government job and wanted to be self-employed by starting a shop of electrical goods and utensils. The Prescribed Authority considered this factor but we find that the appellate Court expressed doubt on the fact that the certificate related to Prem Parkash being lead by the fact that his residence was shown as village Lukhtara, undisputedly that village also falls in the district of Banda. It was also observed by the appellate Court that it could not be shown as to what Government job Prem Parkash could get by virtue of the certificate he had obtained from Industrial Training Institute, Banda. The whole approach to the point was misdirected. Be that as it may, we make it clear that even by excluding the factor of Prem Parkash being technically educated, otherwise as well as find that the need and requirement of the landlady is bona fide even after considering the same in the light of Rule 16 of the Rules and in the background of comparative hardship which we find would be more to the landlady, in the event of disallowing the application for eviction.” 31. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Yadvendra Arya and another v. Mukesh Kumar Verma, 2008 (1) ARC 256 has taken the view that it is landlord who is the best judge of his requirement. He has complete freedom in the matter and the landlord has got every right to file release application for settling his unemployed son in independent business, and the son cannot be accommodated with the father in his business. 32. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shamshad Ahmad v. Tilak Raj Bajaj, 2008 AIR SCW 6201, disapproved the view of High Court, wherein release application was non-suited on the ground that the landlord is rich person. Relevant paragraphs 27 to 32 and 44 are being quoted below : “27. On merits in our judgment, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is well founded that the Prescribed Authority was wrong in dismissing the application filed by the landlords. We had already observed that the Prescribed Authority negatived the contention of the tenant that the application was not maintainable. On merits in our judgment, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is well founded that the Prescribed Authority was wrong in dismissing the application filed by the landlords. We had already observed that the Prescribed Authority negatived the contention of the tenant that the application was not maintainable. It, therefore, entered into the merits of the matter and decided it against the landlords. It observed that applicant No. 6 hailed from “a reputed family of Dehradun” and “they had a very big business of timber wood”. It also noted that applicant No. 6 had been enjoying the facilities of car, scooter, telephone etc. 28. In our opinion, the grievance voiced by the learned counsel for the appellants is well founded that the above grounds and reasons were irrelevant and extraneous so far as the requirement of the landlords was concerned. The authority can undoubtedly decide whether the need or requirement of landlords was or was not bona fide. It can record a finding against the landlords if such requirement is not proved. But the authority cannot decline the payer of the landlords on the ground that they belonged to upper class society having facilities of car, etc. Similarly, the Prescribed Authority was wrong in commenting on the experience of the landlords in business of readymade garments. Again, the authority went wrong in stating that if the applicants wanted to do business in readymade garments, they needed ‘an office’ and place of godown for preparation of readymade garments to be exported. 29. The complaint of the learned counsel for the landlords is that the authority was wholly wrong in holding that for doing business in readymade garments, there must be need and necessity of office or place for preparation of garments or godown. It was equally wrong in coming to the conclusion that for such business ‘technical education’ was necessary. The appellate authority, therefore, rightly set aside the said finding describing the ground weighed with the authority as ‘flimsy’. 30. The counsel is also right in submitting that admittedly, Matloob Ahmad had retired from service. Even if the tenant was right in submitting that the landlords belonged to a higher strata of society, it did not mean that all throughout his life after retirement, Matloob Ahmad, husband of applicant No. 6 should not do any work. 30. The counsel is also right in submitting that admittedly, Matloob Ahmad had retired from service. Even if the tenant was right in submitting that the landlords belonged to a higher strata of society, it did not mean that all throughout his life after retirement, Matloob Ahmad, husband of applicant No. 6 should not do any work. If he wanted to get himself engaged in doing some business, it could not be held that he would not be entitled to possession of property for doing business since he was rich and even without doing any business, he could maintain himself. A finding as to bona fide requirement for doing readymade business by Matloob Ahmad has been expressly recorded by the appellate authority. The said finding was finding of fact. Neither it could have been interfered with, nor it has been set aside by the writ court. In view of the above position, the High Court was wrong in allowing the writ petition. 31. As observed earlier, statutory remedy has been provided under the Act against an order passed by the Prescribed Authority by filing an appeal before the District Judge (Section 22). There is no further remedy under the Act. The tenant, in the circumstances, approached the High Court by filing a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 32. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a Court of Appeal or a Court of Error. It can neither review nor re-appreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate Court or inferior Tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior Court or Tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Courts and inferior Tribunals within the limits of law. 44. In the case on hand, a finding had been recorded by the appellate authority that requirement of landlords for doing business by Matloob Ahmad, husband of applicant No. 6 was bona fide and genuine. 44. In the case on hand, a finding had been recorded by the appellate authority that requirement of landlords for doing business by Matloob Ahmad, husband of applicant No. 6 was bona fide and genuine. Thus, the requirement of the landlords was established. The said finding stands today. The High Court by a cryptic order, without disturbing the said finding which was based on appreciation of evidence, set aside the order of eviction against the tenant, inter alia, observing that Matloob Ahmad was a ‘retired person’ and was getting pension and was living in his village at a distance of five kilometers from Dehradun. It is no doubt true that the tenancy was created before about fifty years but that should not be a ground for depriving the landlord for doing business if the requirement of the landlord is bona fide and reasonable.” 33. On the parameters as set out in the judgments quoted above, landlord was not at all obliged to disclose as to what business he would carry from the shop in question. This fact has come on record and finding of fact has been recorded by both the Courts below that the landlord was unemployed young man and had been assisting his parents in their business. This fact is fully reflected that the landlord is man of resources and intends to settle himself independently. Thus, need set up cannot be termed to be ingenuine and said need has to be accepted as bona fide and genuine one. Once a young man has tried to settle himself independently bereft of his family, irrespective of his financial status, the need set up cannot be said to be ingenuine. Much stress has been laid that the transaction in question with regard to purchase of shop was sham and bogus one. As far as validity of sale deed is concerned, same cannot be permitted to be questioned collaterally. Much stress has been laid that the transaction in question with regard to purchase of shop was sham and bogus one. As far as validity of sale deed is concerned, same cannot be permitted to be questioned collaterally. The new landlord who has purchased the property is entitled to move release application after expiry of a period of three years, and in case the landlord in the present case had such intention, release application would have been moved immediately after expiry of three years’ period, but in the present case release application has come after five years of the date of purchase when the young man has married and has proceeded to mention that his wife was facing difficulty in staying with the parents, and on account of this he intends to settle himself independently. The Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority has accepted the need of the landlord to be bona fide and genuine one. In this background if tenant says that the landlord is moneyed man, the same will not dilute the bona fide and genuine need, as such the finding of fact returned qua bona fide and genuine need is confirmed. 34. Now the next question which is to be adjudicated is the question of comparative hardship. In the present case, it is true that Courts below have suggested alternative accommodation which is available to the tenant, namely, M/s. Lalco India Pvt. Ltd., which is lying closed. The important matter which remains is, as to whether petitioner has made any effort to find out any alternative accommodation than the one as suggested. The mention which has been made by the Courts below can only be treated to be suggestion, but as far as endeavour on the part of the petitioner for searching alternative accommodation is concerned, the same has not at all been discharged. 35. In Mst. Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan (Dead) by Lrs and others, 1979 (1) SCC 273 Hon’ble Apex Court had occasion to deal in detail with the comparative hardship’s aspect as follows : “Moreover Section 11(h) of the Act uses the words ‘reasonable requirement’ which undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court has done in this case. It seems to us that the connotation of the term ‘need’ or ‘requirement’ should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for one landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts, prevalent in other State in the country. This Court has considered the import of the word requirement and pointed out that it merely connotes that there should be an element of need. In this connection our attention was drawn to the evidence led by the defendants that the main source of their income is the hotel business carried on by them in the premises and if they are thrown out they are likely to get any alternative accommodation. The High Court has accepted the case of the defendants on this point, but does not appear to have considered the natural consequences, which flow from a comparative assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the landlord and the tenant if a decree for eviction follows. It is no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from the house if a decree for eviction is passed, but such an event would happen whenever a decree for eviction is passed and was fully in contemplation of the legislature when Section 11(1)(h) of the Act was introduced in the Act. This by itself would not be valid ground for refusing the plaintiffs for eviction. Thus, on careful comparison and assessment of the relative advantage and disadvantages of the landlord and the tenant it seems to us that the scale is titled in favour of the plaintiff. The inconvenience, loss and trouble resulting from denial of a decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiffs far outweigh the eviction from that point of view.” 36. Thus, on careful comparison and assessment of the relative advantage and disadvantages of the landlord and the tenant it seems to us that the scale is titled in favour of the plaintiff. The inconvenience, loss and trouble resulting from denial of a decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiffs far outweigh the eviction from that point of view.” 36. Judgment quoted above has been followed by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Badrinarayan Chunnilal Bhutada v. Govind Ram Mundada, 2003 (2) SCC 320 , and apart from the same in paragraph 13 mentioned as follows : “13. In Piper v. Harvey, (1979) 1 SCC 273 the issue as to comparative hardship arose for the consideration of the Court of Appeal under the Rent Act, 1957. Lord Denning opined : (All ER p. 457E-F) “When I look at all the evidence in this case and see the strong case of hardship which the landlord put forward, and when I see that the tenant did not give any evidence of any attempts made by him to find other accommodation, to look for another house, either to buy or to rent, it seems to me that there is only one reasonable conclusion to be arrived at, and that is that the tenant did not prove (and burden is on him to prove) the case of greater hardship.” Hodson, L.J. opined: (All ER p. 458) “The tenant has not been able to say anything more than the minimum which every tenant can say, namely, that he has in fact been in occupation of the bungalow, and that he has not at the moment any other place to go to. He has not, however, sought to prove anything additional to that by way of hardship, such as unsuccessful attempts to find other accommodation, or, indeed, to raise the question of his relative financial incompetence as compared with the landlord.” 37. Hon’ble Apex Court in recent judgment of Ganga Devi v. District Judge Nainital, 2008 (7) ADJ 501 , where tenant has not made any effort to search accommodation, has not accorded any relief to the tenant. Paragraphs 15, 16 and 19 of the said judgment are being extracted below : “15. Hon’ble Apex Court in recent judgment of Ganga Devi v. District Judge Nainital, 2008 (7) ADJ 501 , where tenant has not made any effort to search accommodation, has not accorded any relief to the tenant. Paragraphs 15, 16 and 19 of the said judgment are being extracted below : “15. There is also nothing on record to show that for the last so many years the appellant had made any effort to find out a tenanted premises for herself so that she can continue with her business. No such material at least has been brought on record. Any subsequent event as regards thereto has neither been pleaded nor proved. The provisions of the statutory rules must be interpreted so as to give effect to the object and purport of the Act. It cannot be applied in a vacuum, as the statute requires comparison of the hardship of both the tenant as also the landlord. It is, therefore, not a case where Rule 16 has any application. 16. The Court would not determine a question only on the basis of sympathy or sentiment. Stricto sensu equity as such may not have any role to play. 19. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion, that six months’ time should be granted to the 1st respondent to vacate the premises, which should serve the ends of justice. It is directed accordingly. Subject to the aforementioned directions, this appeal is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to cost.” 38. Recently, Hon’ble Apex Court, again in the case of Shamshad Ahmad v. Tilak Raj Bajaj, 2008 AIR SCW 6201, considered the conduct of tenant in not searching alternative accommodation. Relevant paragraph 48 of the said judgment is being quoted below : “48. Regarding comparative hardship, nothing has been stated by the tenant as to whether any attempt has been made by him to get alternative accommodation and he failed to get such accommodation. In the circumstances, in our opinion, the appellate authority was right in observing that there was no evidence to show that no shop was available to the tenant. It is quite possible, as noted by the appellate authority, that the tenant might have to pay more rent. In the circumstances, in our opinion, the appellate authority was right in observing that there was no evidence to show that no shop was available to the tenant. It is quite possible, as noted by the appellate authority, that the tenant might have to pay more rent. But that would not preclude the landlords from getting possession of the suit-shop once they had proved genuine need of the property.” 39. Consequently, in the present case as no attempt has been made by tenant to search for alternative accommodation for all these years, then vis-a-vis requirement of unemployed landlord, who is a young man and wants to settle independently, on comparative hardship front also, the scale will tilt in favour of the landlord in the facts of the case. 40. Consequently, writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. Petitioner is accorded six month’s time to vacate the premises in question and hand over its peaceful vacant possession to the landlord, subject to the condition that within one month from today affidavit shall be filed by the tenant before the Prescribed Authority that premises in question will be vacated on or before expiry of the period as aforesaid. In the event of affidavit not being filed within one month from today, the interim protection shall cease to operate, and landlord would be at liberty to proceed accordingly, and interim protection of this Court would not come to rescue of petitioner. ————