Honble JAIN, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. Plaintiff-respondent No.4 Roop Singh filed a suit for perpetual injunction in respect of land, in dispute, along-with an application for temporary injunction under Section 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. The defendant-petitioner also filed an application under Section 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act along-with counter-claim. 3. The Assistant Collector, Dudu, vide its order dated 17th January, 1997 dismissed the application filed by the plaintiff and allowed the application filed on behalf of the defendant-petitioner and restrained the plaintiff not to interfere with the possession of the defendant during the pendency of the suit. Being aggrieved with the same, the plaintiff preferred an appeal but the same was dismissed by the Revenue Appellate Authority vide judgment dated 16th July, 1997. Thereafter the plaintiff preferred a revision petition before the Revenue Board, which was allowed in part vide judgment dated 31st December, 2001, and the Revenue Board directed that both the parties shall not alienate the disputed property by way mortgage or sale. The remaining part of the order passed by two courts below, whereby the plaintiff was restrained, was setaside. Thereafter the defendant-petitioner filed a review petition before the Revenue Board but the same was dismissed vide order dated 3rd August, 2007. Hence this writ petition has been preferred on behalf of the defendant-petitioner. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that his application under Section 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 was allowed by the Assistant Collector as well as the Revenue Appellate Authority, but, without recording any finding of possession, the Revenue Board wrongly set-aside the orders passed by both the courts below. He, therefore, contended that the Revenue Board committed an illegality in setting-aside the order of injunction passed by two courts below whereby the plaintiff was restrained from interfering with the possession of the defendant. He, therefore, contended that the order passed by the Revenue Board be set-aside. 5. I have examined the impugned orders in the light of submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. He, therefore, contended that the order passed by the Revenue Board be set-aside. 5. I have examined the impugned orders in the light of submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. The Revenue Board, in Para 7 of the impugned judgment dated 31st December, 2001, has specifically recorded that the plaintiff-respondent is recorded tenant of the land, in dispute; the defendant has not placed on the record any documentary evidence or agreement whereby the land, in dispute, was sold to him; the courts below relied upon the affidavits of the defendant whereas the plaintiff had also filed affidavits showing his possession. The Revenue Board recorded a finding that the defendant never remained in possession of the land in dispute. The revenue receipts have also been issued in the name of the plaintiff. So far as the report of the Tehsildar, which was relied upon by the courts below, is concerned, the same were prepared in absence of the plaintiff. The Revenue Board, while setting aside the part of the order of the Assistant Collector and the Revenue Appellate Authority, whereby the plaintiff was restrained, directed both the parties not to alienate the property, in dispute, by way of sale or mortgage. The Revenue Board further considered the matter while deciding the review petition. 7. After considering the reasons assigned by the Revenue Board in the light of submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, I do not find any illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in the order passed by the Revenue Board so as to interfere with the same. 8. The Honble Supreme Court in Babhutmal Raichand Oswal vs. Laxmibai R. Tarte – AIR 1975 SC 1297 , held that the High Court cannot, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227, interfere with finding of fact recorded by the subordinate court or tribunal. Its function is limited to seeing that the subordinate court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. It cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence and reappreciating it. 9. The Honble Supreme Court in Mohd. Yunus vs. Mohd. Mustaqim – AIR 1984 SC 38 , held that in exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. 10. In view of the above, there is no merit in this writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed in limine.