ORDER :- Arguments heard. 2. This petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ("Code" for short), is directed against the order dated 9-1-07, passed by IVth Additional Sessions Judge, Rewa, in Criminal Revision No. 286/ 06 affirming the order of removal of flour-mill and oil-mill (hereinafter referred to as "the mills") installed by the petitioners in their premises situated near Jai Stambh Chowk, Tahsil Huzur, District Rewa. 3. The facts leading to the filing of this petition are not in serious dispute and may be summarized as under : On 3-3-05, the respondents Nos. 1 and 2, made a complaint before S. D. M., Tahsil, Huzur, District Rewa to the effect that the mills, being run in a densely populated area, were causing nuisance to the public at large as not only the dust and obnoxious smell emanating from the crushing machine and the oil spiller were creating an adverse effect on the health of people living in the vicinity but were also formidable sources of noise-pollution. Taking cognizance of the alleged public nuisance, the S. D. M. issued notice to the petitioners. In reply, they submitted that the mills were in operation for a period of more than 7 years and none of the other inhabitants of the locality was, in any way, aggrieved by the running of the mills there. According to them, it was due to a personal grudge only that their neighbours-respondents Nos. 1 and 2, had made a false complaint. 4. After giving opportunity to the parties to substantiate the rival contentions and inspecting the spot, the SDM, vide order dated 30-5-05, directed the petitioners to remove or close the mills. This order was subject matter of challenge in the revision preferred by the petitioners and registered as Criminal Revision No. 156/05. It was allowed vide order dated 18-1-2006 passed by IVth ASJ, Rewa and the matter was remanded for further inquiry within three months. While complying with the direction, the SDM also passed an interim order on 14-3-06, directing the petitioners to close the mills till further orders. Being aggrieved, the petitioners came up before this Court by filing a petition under Section 482 of the Code for quashing the entire proceedings. However, their prayer was rejected by this Court vide order dated 18-8-06, passed in M. Cr. Being aggrieved, the petitioners came up before this Court by filing a petition under Section 482 of the Code for quashing the entire proceedings. However, their prayer was rejected by this Court vide order dated 18-8-06, passed in M. Cr. C. No. 6652/05 with the following observations : "I perused the complaint Annexure D-1 and the order passed on 14-3-06 by S. D. M. in which it has been stated that oil spiller and flour mill situated in thickly populated area are causing bad effects on the health of the public. Sub-Divisional Magistrate has to consider whether it is a dispute between the petitioners and the respondent No. 1 only or the health of the public is badly affected by the act of the petitioners. If he finds that it is a dispute between two private parties, then certainly, the proceedings under Section 133 of Cr. P. C. shall be dropped, but if it is found that it is a dispute between the petitioners and the public, certainly the proceedings under Section 313 of Cr. P. C. shall be continued. So, in these circumstances, the proceedings pending in the Court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate cannot be quashed. 5. Thereafter, in the proceedings registered as Case No. 05/05, the S. D. M. passed the final order on 10-10-06 (Annexure D/2) requiring the petitioners to finally remove the mills. The petitioners have termed the order of the S. D. M., as affirmed by the Revisional Court by the order under challenge, as contrary to law and facts on the following grounds :- (i) The impugned proceedings under Section 133 of the Code were absolutely unwarranted, as only some of the members of the locality were having problem with the operation being carried out in the mills for a considerable period of more than 7 years. (ii) The area, where these mills were installed (iii) The Revenue Inspector in his spot inspection report dated 17-5-05 had categorically mentioned that the operation of the mills was not causing any discomfort. (iv) Most of the witnesses produced by the complainants/respondents Nos. 1 and 2, in support of the allegations made, were not the residents of the locality. 6. To buttress the first contention, learned counsel for the petitioners has invited attention to the ratio laid down in Vasant Manga Nikumba and others v. Baburao Bhikanna Naidu, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 54. (iv) Most of the witnesses produced by the complainants/respondents Nos. 1 and 2, in support of the allegations made, were not the residents of the locality. 6. To buttress the first contention, learned counsel for the petitioners has invited attention to the ratio laid down in Vasant Manga Nikumba and others v. Baburao Bhikanna Naidu, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 54. In that case, while approving the view expressed by the Madras High Court in T. K. S. M. Kalyanasundaram v. Kalyani Ammal, 1975 Cri LJ 1717, that no action under Section 133 of the Code can be taken only where the nuisance has been in existence for a long period, the Supreme Court observed that the proceedings are not intended to settle private disputes. Attention has also been invited to the contents of the relevant documents indicating that the flour mill was installed in the year 1998, whereas the oil mill was commissioned in the year 2005. However, as pointed out already, the complaint was made by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 on 3-3-2005 only. On these facts, the decision in Vasant Manga's case (supra) is of no avail to the petitioners. 7. The contention that it was not a case of emergency or urgency, is also not acceptable in view of the fact that any nuisance that exists at a place, deserves removal immediately. The point canvassed also reminds me of the following observations made in the case of Andrea v. Selfridge and Company Ltd. (1937) 3 All ER 255 :- "But that the complaints were substantial complaints, I, for one, am satisfied, and I certainly protest against the idea that, if persons, for their own profit and convenience, choose to destroy even one night's rest of their neighbours they are doing something which is excusable. To say that the loss of one or two nights' rest is one of those trivial matters in respect of which the law will take no notice appears to me to be quite a misconception, and, if it be a misconception existing in the minds of those who conduct these operations, the sooner it is removed the better." 8. Further, the fact that the nuisance was objected to by a comparatively smaller number of neighbours also had no bearing on its nature. Further, the fact that the nuisance was objected to by a comparatively smaller number of neighbours also had no bearing on its nature. This Court in Krishna Gopal v. State of M. P., 1986 Cri LJ 396, placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in R. L. and E. Kendra, Dehradun v. State of U. P., AIR 1985 SC 652 , has already held that a complaint by only one person would not change the nature of nuisance. In that case, SDM's order, directing removal of Glucose Saline Factory, being run with the permission of the authority concerned in a residential locality was maintained. 9. Accordingly, the fact that the petitioners had obtained necessary permissions from the Municipal Council and the Joint Director, Town and Country Planning respectively for running the mills did not assume any significance. The Apex Court in Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardichan, AIR 1980 SC 1622 has observed that the S. D. M., under Section 133 of the Code, can even compel the Municipality to remove nuisance affecting the health and convenience of the public at large. 10. In support of other contentions, reference has been made to the following observations made by the Supreme Court in Kachrulal Bhagirath Agrawal v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 9 SCC 36 : (2004 Cri LJ 4634) :- "A proceeding under Section 133 is of a summary nature..............The provisions of Chapter X of the Code should be so worked as not to become themselves a nuisance to the community at large. Although every person is bound to so use his property that it may not work legal damage or harm to his neighbour, yet on the other hand, no one has a right to interfere with the free and full enjoyment by such person of his property, except on clear and absolute proof that such use of it by him is producing such legal damage or harm. Therefore, a lawful and necessary trade ought not to be interfered unless it is proved to be injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community. ........the word 'community' in clause (b) of Section 133(1) cannot be taken to mean residents of a particular house; it means something wider, that is, the public at large or the residents of entire locality. 11. ........the word 'community' in clause (b) of Section 133(1) cannot be taken to mean residents of a particular house; it means something wider, that is, the public at large or the residents of entire locality. 11. Adverting to the case on hand, it will be seen that learned Additional Sessions Judge has referred to the report dated 17-5-05 wherein Regional Officer of M. P. Pollution Control Board, Rewa, had indicated that the noise level was more than the standard prescribed. It was in this report only that he had proposed an appropriate action for removal of public nuisance. In this view of the matter, the contention that the entire locality had not raised objection against the nuisance has no merit or substance. Needless to say that this report, in a way, superseded the report of an apparently vague report submitted by the 12. Still asserting that the area in question is a semi-commercial area situated on a Highway, learned counsel for the petitioners has questioned the correctness of report of the Regional Officer on the ground that it was not clarified as to whether the level of noise had increased due to running of the mills or on account of heavy vehicular traffic passing through the adjoining Highway. 13. However, it would not be possible to examine these technical aspects of the matter at this juncture. The fact remains that running of the mills is not only in violation of the M. P. Noise Pollution Control Rules, but is also causing discomfort to some of the residents of the same locality. In Vasant Manga's case (above), it was also explained that nuisance is an inconvenience which materially interferes with the ordinary physical-conform of human existence. 14. For these reasons, none of the contentions raised against the legality and propriety of the order in question deserves acceptance. As such, no interference under the inherent powers is called for. 15. The petition is, hereby, dismissed with the observation that the petitioners shall be at liberty to approach the civil Court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate relief in accordance with law. As an obvious consequence, the interim stay granted on 12-3-2007 stands vacated. Petition dismissed.