JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.U. Khan, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2.This writ petition by the tenant is directed against order of remand passed by lower revisional Court respondent No.1 in the revision, which was filed by the landlord respondent No. 3 against judgment and decree passed by trial Court/ J.S.C.C., Allahabad dismissing the suit of plaintiff respondent No. 3 landlord. 3. This writ petition involves pure questions of law and learned counsel for both the parties at the time of hearing addressed the Court on all the points involved. Learned counsel for the landlord respondent No.3 challenged those findings of the revisional Court also, which were recorded against it. Supreme Court in AIR 2002 SC 2562 , Nalakath Sainuddin v. Koorikadan Sulaiman under similar circumstances has held on the principles of Order 41 Rule 33, C.P.C. that in revision filed by the tenant, landlord can raise other points, which were decided by the trial Court against him. 4. The suit giving rise to the instant writ petition was filed in the year 1978, i.e. exactly 30 years before. Suits in between landlord and tenant filed before J.S.C.C. deserve to be heard more expeditiously than ordinary suits. 5. The Supreme Court in the following authorities has held that all efforts must be made to avoid remand and in case it is possible to decide the case finally, then High Court shall decide the matter finally instead of remanding the matter. (1) AIR 2002 SC 200 : 2001 (2) ARC 603, G.C. Kapoor v. N.K. Bhasin. (In this case, release application of the landlord filed on the ground of bona fide need was rejected by all the three Courts, i.e. prescribed authority, revisional Court and High Court. Supreme Court quashed all the three judgments and finally allowed the release application of the landlord.) (2) AIR 2003 SC 4548 : 2004 SCFBRC 66 : 2004 (1) ARC 137 : 2004 ACJ 304 (SC), R. V. E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple. (3) 2002 (2) ARC 298 (SC), R.C. Kesharwani v. Dwarika Prasad. (4) Shail v. Manoj Kumar, 2004 ACJ 1213 6. (3) 2002 (2) ARC 298 (SC), R.C. Kesharwani v. Dwarika Prasad. (4) Shail v. Manoj Kumar, 2004 ACJ 1213 6. In this authority, Supreme Court has held after placing reliance upon Surya Dev Raj v. R.C. Rai, 2003 (6) SCC 675 : 2003 (2) ARC 385 that in exercise of writ jurisdiction High Court has got the jurisdiction also to pass itself such a decision or direction as the inferior Court or Tribunal should have made. 7. Plaintiff respondent No. 3 is described as follows : “The Board of Directors of Allahabad Agricultural Institute, Naini, Allahabad through its Secretary.” (The words - "through its Secretary" were not there in the plaint or the writ petition as filed. They were added in the writ petition with permission of the Court.) 8. The respondent No. 3 filed S.C.C. Suit No. 58 of 1978 against petitioners for their eviction from the tenanted accommodation, which is a residential house situate within Allahabad Agricultural Institute building. Allahabad Agricultural Institute is an educational institution. According to the plaint case defendant petitioner No. 1 was an employee of the Institute and by virtue of his employment, he was provided a residential accommodation on token or nominal monthly rent of Rs. 11.10/- and according to the relevant Rules tenant was required to vacate the premises within 48 hours of cessation of his employment. Services of defendant petitioner No. 1 were terminated w.e.f. 31.5.1973. Earlier Suit No. 1073 of 1973 was filed against the petitioner before J.S.C.C., Allahabad. The suit was decreed but on revision the decree was set aside on the ground that no valid notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act had been served upon defendant petitioner No. 1. It was further alleged in the plaint that tenancy of the tenant had been terminated through notice and that virtue of Section 2(1)(b) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972, the Act was not applicable to the building in dispute. The said provision is quoted below : “Nothing in this Act shall apply to any building belonging to or vested in a recognized educational institution.” 9. It was also alleged that defendant was defaulter. In respect of default, the trial Court held that the entire amount had been deposited by the tenant in Court, hence he was not defaulter. The said provision is quoted below : “Nothing in this Act shall apply to any building belonging to or vested in a recognized educational institution.” 9. It was also alleged that defendant was defaulter. In respect of default, the trial Court held that the entire amount had been deposited by the tenant in Court, hence he was not defaulter. Absolutely, no argument on the question of default was raised during arguments in this writ petition. 10. Defendant also pleaded that plaintiff was not educational institution. It was only a registered society and in any case building did not belong to and could not belong to educational institution. 11. The trial Court held that Board of Directors, which had filed the suit, was not recognized educational institution, hence Section 2(1)(b) was not attracted. Plaintiff asserted that Section 2(1)(f) of the Act was also applicable to it. The said provision is quoted below : “Nothing in this Act shall apply to any building and held by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act,1860 (Act No. LXII of 1860), or by a co-operative society, company or firm, and intended solely for its own occupation or for the occupation of any of its officers or servants, whether on rent or free of rent, or as a guest house, by whatever name called, for the occupation of persons having dealing with it in the ordinary course of business.” 12. The trial Court held that the said provision was also not attracted. Ultimately, suit was dismissed by Additional J.S.C.C., Allahabad on 12.11.1982. Revision was filed against the said judgment (C.R. No. 804 of 1980). Revisional Court through interim order directed the trial Court to decide issue No. 5, which was regarding validity of notice. The said issue was decided by the trial Court on 22.9.1988 and it was held that the notice under Section 106, T.P. Act was valid but that part of the notice which related to demand of rent as required by Section 20(2)(a) of the Act was not concerned was not applicable. Thereafter, revisional Court/XIIth A.D.J., Allahabad decided the revision through judgment and order dated 25.8.1989. Revision was allowed. Judgment and order of the trial Court dated 12.11.1982 was set aside and trial Court was directed to decide the case afresh in the light of the observations made in the body of the judgment and in accordance with law. Thereafter, revisional Court/XIIth A.D.J., Allahabad decided the revision through judgment and order dated 25.8.1989. Revision was allowed. Judgment and order of the trial Court dated 12.11.1982 was set aside and trial Court was directed to decide the case afresh in the light of the observations made in the body of the judgment and in accordance with law. The said order of remand has been challenged by the tenant through this writ petition. 13. Revisional Court confirmed the finding of the trial Court that “the College run by the Board of Directors of Course is recognized institutional education.” It was also recorded that “the college run by the landlord society was affiliated College of Allahabad University.” Revisional Court also held that the building in dispute belongs to the society and not to the college. Revisional Court placed reliance upon the following authorities : (1) Arya Kanya Pathshala v. Girdhari, 1980 AWC 443; (2) Atar Singh v. A.D.J., 1982 ARC 624; (3) Awadh Behari Lal Saxena v. J.P.A. Sanskrit Educational Association, Khurja, 1982 ARC 1124; (4) Bal Niketan Nursery School v. Kesari Prasad, AIR 1987 SC 1970 . 14. In the above authorities, the argument that an educational institution is neither a person nor legal entity, hence it cannot own any building was considered. In the authority of Arya Kanya Pathshala (supra), this argument was accepted. However, the said authority was strongly dissented in Atar Singh’s case (supra). Supreme Court in Bal Niketan Nursery School (supra) categorically held that a recognized educational institution (recognized under U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972 in the said case). Supreme Court further held that the person through whom school sued was not only the Manager of the school but also the Secretary of the Registered Society, hence suit was fully maintainable. It was further held that school acquired rights by reason of the statutory recognition given to it under the U.P. Basic Education Act and to that extent the school stood clothed with legal status. It was not therefore a non-entity in the eye of law. Therefore, the school was entitled to file the suits through its Manager to seek eviction of the tenants. It was also held that school constituted the landlord of the tenants as property in dispute was purchased in its name and rents from the tenants were collected by it. 15. It was not therefore a non-entity in the eye of law. Therefore, the school was entitled to file the suits through its Manager to seek eviction of the tenants. It was also held that school constituted the landlord of the tenants as property in dispute was purchased in its name and rents from the tenants were collected by it. 15. Lower revisional Court placing reliance upon Awadh Behari Lal Saxena’ case (supra) held that college run by a Society may be recognized but it was neither the plaintiff nor the owner of the building and concluded that building does not belong to nor vests in the recognized educational institution, hence it cannot be exempted from the operation of the Act. 16. Ultimately, matter was remanded only for consideration of exemption clause in respect of the societies provided under Section 2(1)(f) of the Act. 17. The words used under Section 2(1)(b) are belonging to’ or vested in’. These words do not necessarily mean ownership’. They may mean something less than ownership also. The Supreme Court in AIR 1965 SC 1923 , Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur has held that the phrase belonging to’ is capable of connoting interest less than absolute title. Similarly, in AIR 1957 SC 344 , Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust, it was held that vest in’ may be in a limited sense also. Similarly, in AIR 1995 SC 605 , M. Ismail Faruqui, Dr. v. Union of India, it was held that word vest’ has got different shades. 18. At this juncture, definition of landlord given under Section 3(j) of the Act may also be noticed according to which “landlord” in relation to a building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building, were let would be, payable. 19. In the copy of the plaint, which has been supplied by the learned counsel for the landlord, plaintiff is described as “Board of Directors of the Allahabad Agricultural Institute, Naini Allahabad.” 20. In initial paragraphs of the plaint, it has been mentioned that plaintiff is registered society, which runs recognized educational institution in the name and style of Allahabad Agricultural Institute Naini, Allahabad and principal of the institute is Executive Head and Executive Secretary of the Board of Directors. 21. In view of the aforesaid, both the exemption clauses are clearly attracted. In initial paragraphs of the plaint, it has been mentioned that plaintiff is registered society, which runs recognized educational institution in the name and style of Allahabad Agricultural Institute Naini, Allahabad and principal of the institute is Executive Head and Executive Secretary of the Board of Directors. 21. In view of the aforesaid, both the exemption clauses are clearly attracted. The society runs college and the building where college is situate or those residential buildings which are allotted to the employees of the college may be held to belong to the college or vest in it. In any case, Section 2(1)(f) is also squarely applicable as the building was held by the Society and it was given for the accommodation of its servant having dealing with it in the ordinary course of the business, which was running the educational institution. The authority of A.B.L. Saxena (supra) has got no application. In any case the point is covered by the Supreme Court authority of Bal Niketan Nursary School (supra). 22. In my opinion, Section 20(2)(g), which is quoted below, was also applicable:- “A suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted on the ground that the tenant was allowed to occupy the building as part of his contract of employment under the landlord, and his employment has ceased.” 23. However, as the Courts below have decided this question against the landlord, hence I am not basing my judgment on this ground. 24. Accordingly, writ petition is disposed of. Revision filed by landlord respondent No. 3 (Civil Revision No. 804 of 1982) is allowed. Judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is set aside. Suit of the plaintiff for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent is decreed. 25. Tenants-petitioners are granted six months time to vacate provided that : (1) Within one month from today tenants file an undertaking before the J.S.C.C. to the effect that on or before the expiry of aforesaid period of six months they will willingly vacate and handover possession of the property in dispute to the landlord-respondent. (2) For this period of six months, which has been granted to the tenants-petitioners to vacate, they are required to pay Rs. 6000 (at the rate of Rs. 1000 per month), as rent/damages for use and occupation. (2) For this period of six months, which has been granted to the tenants-petitioners to vacate, they are required to pay Rs. 6000 (at the rate of Rs. 1000 per month), as rent/damages for use and occupation. This amount shall also be deposited within one month before the J.S.C.C. and shall immediately be paid to the landlord-respondent. (3) Within one month from today tenants shall deposit entire decreetal amount due till date after adjusting any amount already deposited, before J.S.C.C. for immediate payment to landlord-respondent. 26. In case of default in compliance of any of these conditions tenants-petitioners shall be evicted through process of Court after one month and shall also be liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs. 2000/- per month since after one month till the date of actual eviction. 27. Similarly if after complying with the above conditions shop in dispute is not vacated on the expiry of six months then since after six months till actual eviction tenants petitioners shall be liable to pay rent/damages for use and occupation @ Rs. 2000/- per month. It is needless to add that this direction is in addition to the right of the landlord to file contempt petition for violation of undertaking and execution application. ————