JUDGMENT 1. - These three appeals are interlinked as the point involved revolves around the scope and ambit of absorption of retrenched employees of Watch Assembly Unit, Ajmer of the Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation Ltd. (for short 'RIICO'). Learned Single Bench in the impugned order held that Mukesh Kumar (respondent in Appeal No. 981/2001, preferred by RIICO) be allowed to continue as Sr. Assistant, whereas Smt. Kanta Kumari Banafal, Anand Prakash Sharma and Smt. Sukhmani Lakhan (appellants in Appeal No. 215/2001) were treated differently and relief sought by them in the writ petition was declined. 2. The undisputed facts common to all these cases may be noticed. Anand Prakash Sharma, who is deaf and dumb by birth, was initially appointed on August 21, 1984, whereas Smt.Kanta Kumar Banafal and Smt.Sukhmani Lakhan (members of Scheduled Caste) were appointed on December 13, 1989. RIICO asked them to discharge the duties of watch technician in Watch Assembly Unit, Ajmer. Condition No. 4, incorporated in their appointment letters, reads as under:- "You will be posted at Ajmer. The Management however reserves the right to transfer you at any time temporarily or permanently to any of its offices, branches, or place of business including that of its subsidiary or associate Corporation or those under its management and from one place to another on the terms and condition it may deem fit." 3. Mukesh Kumar was also appointed as Junior Assistant on June 12, 1982 in the Watch Assembly Unit, Ajmer. 4. Consequent upon a decision taken by Board of Directors of RIICO in their meeting held on December 27, 2000 to close down Assembly Unit Ajmer, with effect from March 20, 2001 and also to continue the scheme of Voluntary Retirement simultaneously for its employees, notices were served by RIICO to its employees and their services were retrenched from March 20, 2001 due to closure of Watch Assembly Unit and they were directed to collect the compensation amount on account of their retrenchment. 5. Instead of making request for seeking voluntary retirement the above named four employees challenged their retrenchment by filing writ petitions, which were decided by learned Single Bench by common order dated September 14, 2001 as indicated above. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 7. 5. Instead of making request for seeking voluntary retirement the above named four employees challenged their retrenchment by filing writ petitions, which were decided by learned Single Bench by common order dated September 14, 2001 as indicated above. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 7. The question that arises for consideration is as to whether there was any obligation on the part of RIICO - either contractual or statutory, or on equitable considerations to absorb the services of Smt.Kanta Kumari, Smt.Sukhmani Lakhan, Anand Prakash Sharma and Mukesh Kumar (herein after referred to as 'employees'). 8. The employees seek to derive support for the claim on equitable considerations. Although it is not specifically argued the employees appear to have placed reliance on an amalgam of the principles relating to legitimate expectation, fairness in action and natural justice. The plea of legitimate expectation is sought to be supported by reason inter alia that RIICO being instrumentality of the State Government, is 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and it was required to act fairly in protecting the rights of its employees by absorbing them. 9. Legitimate expectation is not a legal right. It is an expectation of a benefit, relief or remedy, that may ordinarily flow from a promise or established practice. Not being a right it is not enforceable as such. It is a concept fashioned by the courts for judicial review of administrative action. It is procedural in character based on the requirement of a higher degree of fairness in administrative action as a consequence of promise made, or practise established. In short a person can be said to have a "legitimate expectation" of a particular treatment, if any representation or promise is made by an authority, either expressly or impliedly. 10. In Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation (1993)3 SCC 499 , the Apex Court explained the nature and scope of the doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' thus (Para 28):- "For legal purposes, the expectation cannot be the same as anticipation. It is different from a wish, a desire or a hope nor can it amount to a claim or demand on the ground of a right. It is different from a wish, a desire or a hope nor can it amount to a claim or demand on the ground of a right. However earnest and sincere a wish, a desire or a hope may be and however confidently one may look to them to be fulfilled, they by themselves cannot amount to an assertable expectation and a mere disappointment does not attract legal consequences. A pious hope even leading to a moral obligation cannot amount to a legitimate expectation. The legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law or custom or an established procedure followed in regular and natural sequence. Again it is distinguishable from a genuine expectation. Such expectation should be justifiably legitimate and protectable. Every such legitimate expectation does not by itself fructify into a right and therefore it does not amount to a right in the conventional sense." 11. Constitution Bench of the Apex Court referring to the doctrine of legitimate expectation observed in Confederation of Ex-Servicemen Association v. Union of India, 2006(4) SCT 128 : (2006)8 SCC 399 , as under:- "33. No doubt, the doctrine has an important place in the development of Administrative Law and particularly law relating to 'judicial review'. Under the said doctrine, a person may have reasonable or legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no right in law to receive the benefit. In such situation, if a decision is taken by an administrative authority adversely affecting his interests, he may have justifiable grievance in the light of the fact of continuous receipt of the benefit, legitimate expectation to receive the benefit or privilege which he has enjoyed all throughout. Such expectation may arise either from the express promise or from consistent practice which the applicant may reasonably expect to continue." "35. In such cases, therefore, the Court may not insist an administrative authority to act judicially but may still insist it to act fairly. The doctrine is based on the principle that good administration demands observance of reasonableness and where it has adopted a particular practice for a long time even in absence of a provision of law, it should adhere to such practice without depriving its citizens of the benefit enjoyed or privilege exercised." 12. The doctrine is based on the principle that good administration demands observance of reasonableness and where it has adopted a particular practice for a long time even in absence of a provision of law, it should adhere to such practice without depriving its citizens of the benefit enjoyed or privilege exercised." 12. Let us now examine whether the principles of legitimate expectation can have any application in the cases on hand. 13. Indisputably Watch Assembly Unit Ajmer was one of the integral part of RIICO and had a functional intigrality. Even if the decision with regard to closure of unit is considered to be valid, the employees working in substantive capacity had right to seek absorption in other units of RIICO. The employees had placed on record before Single Bench the statement of available vacancies lying in the other units of RIICO and made prayer to adjust them against the available posts in the cadre of helper since nature of work of Technician and Helper was the same. 14. RIICO which is running as many as 30 units, framed Rajasthan State Industrial and Investment Corporation Ltd. Service Rules that came into effect from November 25, 1967. In sub-clause (XXXV) 'Service' has been defined as service under the Corporation or any unit under the control of Corporation. Thus the employees, who were serving in the substantive capacity in Watch Assembly Unit Ajmer, were the employees of RIICO and that is why condition No. 4, as noted earlier, was incorporated in their appointment order. The management of RIICO reserved its right to transfer the employees at any time temporarily or permanently to any of its offices, branches or place of business including that of its subsidiary or associate corporation or those under its management and from one place to another on the terms and conditions it may deem fit. In view of this condition the RIICO at the time of closure of its Watch Assembly Unit Ajmer was duty bound to act fairly and to protect the rights of the employees working in substantive capacity in Watch Assembly Unit Ajmer, by absorbing them in its other 30 units. We, therefore, are of the considered opinion that principles of legitimate expectation are applicable to the facts of the instant case. 15. We, therefore, are of the considered opinion that principles of legitimate expectation are applicable to the facts of the instant case. 15. That takes us to the submissions of learned counsel for RIICO that since another Division Bench dismissed appeal No. 957/2001 on September 16, 2002 preferred against the impugned order of learned Single Judge, no interference is called for in the instant appeals also. We find no merit in this submission. The order dated September 16, 2002 reads as under:- "The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the decision of Andhra University through its Registrar v. M. Sivaram & others reported in 1994 Supp.(3) SCC 750. This case is clearly distinguishable. In the present case the facts are that the unit is being closed, therefore, there is no question of absorption. We see no reason to interfere with the decision of the learned Single Judge. This appeal is accordingly dismissed." 16. Since above order is not an speaking order it has no statutory force. 17. For these reasons, we dispose of all these appeals in the following terms:- (i) Since appellants in DB Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 215/2001 sought voluntary retirement it has become infructuous and accordingly stands dismissed. (ii) We find no merit in the appeal preferred by Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation (DB Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 981/2001) against respondent Mukesh Kumar and it accordingly stands dismissed. (iii) We allow DB Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 216/2002 and set aside the impugned order of learned Single Bench so far it related to appellants Smt.Kanta Kumari Banafal, Anand Prakash Sharma and Smt.Sukhmani Lakhan. We direct respondent No. 1 Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation, Jaipur to absorb the appellants Smt.Kanta Kumari Banafal, Anand Prakash Sharma and Smt.Sukhmani Lakhan in other units of RIICO in the cadre of Helper with all consequential benefits. Respondent No. 1 shall ensure compliance of this order within thirty days from the date of receipt of copy of this order. These appellants are also entitled to cost which is quantified as Rs. 6000/-. Appeal allowed. *******