Judgment : This is a claim submitted by the Official Liquidator under S.446 of the Companies Act for recovery of a total amount of Rs.87,125 which is made up of the principal amount of Rs.42,500/- together with interest @ 12% per annum from 18/03/1998, the date of default in the kuri till 31/12/2006, the date of termination of the kuri and future interest at the same rate. The respondent has filed a counter affidavit in which the contention prominently raised is that the claim is barred by limitation. It is pointed out that under S.458(A) of the Companies Act, the Liquidator gets exclusion of only the period from the date of commencement of winding up proceedings till the date of winding up order (in this case the period from 10.12.1999 till 110.2001) and a period of one year immediately following the date of winding up order. It is therefore contended that in this case the claimant will get time till 110.2002 and the normal period of three years period of limitation. The Official Liquidator will get time only till 110.2005. Since the claim is filed only on 11.2007 it is barred by limitation, it is contended. 2. To the above counter affidavit, the Official Liquidator has filed a detailed reply statement. It is pointed out that the kuri question had 40 installments having value of Rs.2500/- per installment. The respondent remitted only the first 17 installments He auctioned the kuri on 21.1997 and received the kuri amount on 22.1997. The date of remittance of the last installment was 17.3.1998. This is why the claim has been filed for realization of the value of the last 23 installments together with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 18.3.1998. The reply affidavit answers the contention that the claim is barred by limitation. It is submitted that the date of remittance of the last installment was on 17.3.1998 and the date of commencement of winding up proceedings was on 10.12.1999 and the date of winding up order was on 110.2001 It is highlighted that as on the date of commencement of winding up proceedings the debt was alive. Due to the operation of S.458 A of the Companies Act, the Official Liquidator gets a period of four years (3+1) + one year 10 months and 9 days from the date of winding up order. Due to the operation of S.458 A of the Companies Act, the Official Liquidator gets a period of four years (3+1) + one year 10 months and 9 days from the date of winding up order. This means that the Liquidator has got time till 28.2007 for filing claims against the debtors of the company. The claim in this case having been filed during the month of March 2007 is not barred by limitation. 3. It was extensive arguments which were addressed before me by Sri. M.C. John, counsel for the respondent. Strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Karnataka Steel & Wire Products and others v. Kohinoor Rolling Shutters & Egg. Works & Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 76), Learned counsel would argue on the basis of the above judgment that the date of passage of winding up order is the date of accrual of cause of action and that maximum period which the Official Liquidator will get excluded from the reckoning for limitation in this case is a total period of four years from 110.2001. Sri. M.C. John also relied on the judgment of a Division Bench of this court in Kochupoly v. M/s Holy Family Chits and Loans Pvt. Ltd. ((2007 (4) KLT SN 36 (C.NO.36). 4. Smt. S. Jasmine, standing counsel for the Official Liquidator would answer Sri. M.C. Johns submissions on the basis of the judgment of the Full Bench of this court in Ulahannan v. Wandoor Jupiter Chits (P) Ltd. (1988 (2) KIT 636). She submitted that though the Supreme Court had considered the above Full Bench judgment in Karnataka Steel & Wire Products case, the court had not chosen to overrule the Full Bench judgment, which endorses the argument of the Official Liquidator in this case. 5. I have considered the rival submissions addressed at the Bar. As rightly noticed by the Division Bench in the judgment in Kochupolys case, the position emerging from the relevant provisions of the Companies Act namely Ss.446 and 458 A is as follows: 1) Under S.446(2) of the Companies Act, the Official Liquidator can enforce only the claims, which are not already barred at the time of commencement of the winding up proceedings. 2) Art.137 of the Limitation Act apply to the claims preferred by under S.446(2)(b) of the Companies Act. 2) Art.137 of the Limitation Act apply to the claims preferred by under S.446(2)(b) of the Companies Act. 3) The right of the Official Liquidator to prefer claims under S.446(2)(b) of the Act arises only on the passing of the winding up order or on the appointment of a provisional Liquidator and therefore, the starting point of limitation for preferring claims under S.446(2)(b) of the Act is the date on which the winding up order is passed or when a provisional liquidator is appointed. 4) The Official Liquidator is entitled to a period of three years from the date of winding up order or the date of appointment of provisional liquidator as well as the duration of the pendency of winding up proceedings and one year immediately following the winding up order as provided under S.458 A (1) and (2) of the Companies Act. 6. The Division Bench also held that even if there is a stipulation in the kuri security bond or agreement that in, case of default of payment of one or more installments on the respective due dates the foreman is entitled to recover the entire subsequent installments in a lump, unless and until the kuri company under liquidation had exercised its option as provided under S.32(1) of the Travancore Chitties Act or under S.33(1) of the Chit Funds Act, 1982, the Official Liquidator is entitled to recover the installments which fell due within three years prior to the institution of the winding up proceedings and not barred by time under Art.137 of the Limitation Act even if the claim is preferred in respect of the entire balance due from the subscriber from the date of default. 7. The Division Bench in Kochupolys case noticed the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Liberty Finance (P) Ltd In Re Official Liquidator v Pandit Radha Mohan & Ors. ((1979) 49 Com. Cases 287) which held that applications have to be filed by the Official Liquidator within a period of four years of the date of passage of the winding up order. According to the Division Bench, the Delhi High Courts view has been followed with approval by the Full Bench in Ulahannan v. Wandoor Jupiter Chits (P) Ltd and taking that view, the Division Bench held that the claims ought to have been filed within four years of the date of passage of the winding up order. According to the Division Bench, the Delhi High Courts view has been followed with approval by the Full Bench in Ulahannan v. Wandoor Jupiter Chits (P) Ltd and taking that view, the Division Bench held that the claims ought to have been filed within four years of the date of passage of the winding up order. I also notice that the Full Bench has not expressed any disapproval the view of the Delhi High Court in Liberty Finance (P) Ltd. In Re Official Liquidator v. Pandit Radha Mohan & Ors. ((1979) 49 Com. Cases 287. 8. Smt. S. Jasmine submitted that the full Bench has actually decided that the claim in that case which was filed more than four years after the passage of the winding up order will be within the period of limitation. This the Full Bench did by taking the date of passage of the winding up order as the date of accrual of right to sue and by adding period of one year plus the period during which the winding up proceedings were pending on to the normal period of limitation of 3 years, as the period of limitation. 9. Considering the stiff contest between the parties I called for and perused the records relating to the case decided by the Full Bench. That case reached the full Bench on a reference order passed by a Division Bench consisting of Justice U.L. Bhat and Justice K.T. Thomas. That Division Bench noticed that S. 458A contemplates exclusion of two periods in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit or application viz., (1) the period from the date of commencement of the winding up of the company to the date on which the winding up order is made (both inclusive) and (2) the period of one year immediately following the winding up order. The question, which arose, was whether the first period which is obviously a period prior to the date on which the right to sue accrued to the liquidator (date of winding up order) was liable to be deducted. The Division Bench noticed conflict of judicial opinion on the question and passed the order of reference. On going through the Full Bench Judgment it is seen that the question referred was not specifically answered by the Full Bench. The Division Bench noticed conflict of judicial opinion on the question and passed the order of reference. On going through the Full Bench Judgment it is seen that the question referred was not specifically answered by the Full Bench. At the same time what the Full Bench did was to add the two periods on to the normal three year period allowed under Art.137 from the date on which the right to sue accrued to the Official Liquidator and hold that the claims are not barred. Significantly the Full Bench did not answer the question whether the Official Liquidator will be entitled for a period of more than 4 years after the passage of the winding up order specifically. 10. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Karnataka Steel & Wire Products v. Kohinoor Rolling Shutters & Engg. Works ((2003) 1 SCC 76) in my opinion settles the question. In the last para of the judgment it is stated as follows: "On a plain reading of the provisions contained in S.458A of the Companies Act, it is crystal clear that the aforesaid provision merely excludes the period during which a company was being wound up by the Court from the date of the commencement of the winding up till the order of winding up is made and an additional period of one year immediately following the date of the winding up. In other words, in respect of a legally enforceable claim, which claim could have been made by the company on the date on which the application for winding up is made, could be filed by the Official Liquidator by taking the benefit of S.458A of the Companies Act and getting the period of four years to be excluded from the period of three years, as provided under Art.137 of the Limitation Act". In other words what the Supreme Court has ruled out is that S.458A will not have the effect of reviving a claim which had become time barred as on the date of winding up proceedings. But as regards claims which are not time barred the starting point of limitation from the point of view of the Liquidator will be the date on which the Liquidator obtained the right to sue, i.e., the date of passage of the winding up orders. Since Art.137 governs the period of limitation is three years from that date. But as regards claims which are not time barred the starting point of limitation from the point of view of the Liquidator will be the date on which the Liquidator obtained the right to sue, i.e., the date of passage of the winding up orders. Since Art.137 governs the period of limitation is three years from that date. But while calculating that period of three years a period of one year after the passage of the winding up order and the period during which the winding up proceedings were pending will be excluded under S.458A. It should be remembered that it is the specified period between commencement of winding up proceedings and passage of winding up order a period anterior to the winding up order that S.458A excludes. Any interpretation which allows addition of the period during which winding up proceedings were pending on to the normal three plus one year period after the passage of winding up order, in my opinion will be inconsistent with the basic idea underlying the provisions in the Limitation Act providing for exclusion of certain given periods. 11. Following the judgment of the Supreme Court in karnataka Steels case (supra) and the judgment of the Division Bench in Kochupolys case (supra) I hold that the present claim in as much as it is filed long after the expiry of the period of four years from the date of passage of the winding up order is barred by limitation. The C.C. is rejected as time barred.