JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Shri M.P. Gupta in person, an advocate of this Court. He has argued the case with great ability. Learned Standing Counsel appears for the State respondent. 2. In these writ petitions, the petitioner, who was initially appointed as Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies on 28th December, 1962, has prayed to quash the orders dated 10.3.1995 and 21.7.1995 and to direct the opposite parties to deem that the petitioner was promoted to the higher post of Deputy Registrar, Joint Registrar and Additional Registrar with effect from the date when his juniors were promoted, and to pay arrears of salary of the posts with 18% interest. 3. In Writ Petition No. 2376 of 1988, Mata Prasad Gupta v. State of U.P. and others decided on 11.7.1994, a Division Bench of the Lucknow High Court observed that the Dhusia Committee made a recommendation for adhoc promotion of the petitioner on the post of Deputy Registrar, but he could not be promoted to the post of Deputy Registrar, because he was placed under suspension on May 19, 1973. A disciplinary enquiry was initiated against him, with the issuance of a charge-sheet dated June 15, 1973. A punishment order was passed against him reducing him in the time scale. He filed a Claim Petition No. 263-III of 1982 before the U.P. Public Service Tribunal. The operation of the punishment order was stayed by the Tribunal. The claim petition was allowed on 21.8.1987, quashing the punishment order dated June 2, 1982, and allowing the punishing authority to proceed in its own discretion, in the matter of punishment in respect of charge No. 4, relating to acquisition of property, and breach of Rule 24, and charge No. 12. He was allowed to be in continuous service with arrears of salary, increments etc. unless some order to the contrary is made by the punishing authority within a period of three months. 4. Aggrieved the State of U.P. preferred a revision in the High Court. Learned Single Judge held that the impugned judgment of the Services Tribunal does not suffer from any infirmity. Learned Single Judge discussed the evidence against the petitioner and found that the Tribunal had considered the record of enquiry and that the judgment of the Tribunal does not suffer from any manifest error of law or any procedural irregularity. 5. Learned Single Judge held that the impugned judgment of the Services Tribunal does not suffer from any infirmity. Learned Single Judge discussed the evidence against the petitioner and found that the Tribunal had considered the record of enquiry and that the judgment of the Tribunal does not suffer from any manifest error of law or any procedural irregularity. 5. The Secretary, Ministry of Cooperative, Government of Uttar Pradesh, by her letter dated 19.2.1992 obtained an opinion from Judicial Department, and found that no order was passed within three or four months of the judgment of High Court, and therefore the petitioner should be given benefit of continuous service, arrear of salary, increments etc. Since the petitioner was not given any punishment, he was also made entitled to full salary. 6. The petitioner then preferred a Writ Petition No. 8672 of 1989 before the Lucknow High Court, in which an order was passed that petitioner’s representation, regarding his promotion with effect from the date his immediate juniors were promoted, should have been considered. A direction was issued to decide petitioner’s representation. The petitioner filed a Contempt Petition No. 357/1990 which was pending. In the meantime by an order dated 5.4.1990 the petitioner was compulsorily retired. He filed the Writ Petition No. 10032 of 1990, which was allowed on 23.4.1992. A Special Leave to Appeal No. 13798/1992 was filed against the judgment which was rejected by the Supreme Court on 27.9.1993. The petitioner thereafter filed a writ petition praying for a writ of mandamus to the respondents to consider him for promotion with effect from the date his junior was promoted and give him all consequential benefits including salary. In this writ petition No. 2376 of 1998 the Division Bench at Lucknow High Court had passed following orders : “We find considerable force in the submission of the petitioner that as there existed nothing adverse against the petitioner, he deserves to be promoted from the date persons junior to him have been promoted, although the petitioner was promoted with effect from 25th June, 1994, but he would be entitled for being promoted with effect from the date he was superseded by his juniors. It is settled position of law that in case a person is not promoted due to the pendency of any departmental proceedings or any adverse remarks in his character roll, such a person deserves to be promoted from the date persons junior to him have been promoted in accordance with the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, in case he has been exonerated or adverse remarks expunged. In view of the aforesaid position, the writ petition succeeds in part. A writ of mandamus is issued commanding the opposite parties to consider the promotion of the petitioner from the date the persons junior to him have been promoted, and pass suitable order in the light of the observations made above, within three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order. Sd/- S.H.A.R. Dated 11.7.94 Sd/- S.P.” 7. The Department thereafter passed an order giving notional promotion to the petitioner with effect from the date his immediate junior was promoted. With regard to the salary, a detailed order was passed on March 10, 1995 by which the Department amended the order dated 25.3.1994. The Additional Director (Administration) Cooperative Society, U.P. found that the petitioner’s salary was to be fixed notionally as Assistant Registrar in the pay scale of Rs. 550-1200 at Rs. 860 on 17.12.1975, and while allowing him increments and promotion it was found that on 1.7.1994 when the petitioner was reinstated as Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, U.P., he had reached to the maximum of the pay scale at Rs. 3000-4050. He was allowed two increments of Rs. 125 on personal basis. These increments were allowed on notional basis. 8. The petitioner however was not paid arrears of salary from 17.12.1975 to 30.6.1994 on the ground that there was no order of the High Court or competent authority to give him back wages. The petitioner superannuated in the year 1995 at the age of 58 years. 9. The petitioner has relied upon a judgment of Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. K.V. Jankiraman and others, 1993 SCC (L&S) 387: (1993) 4 SCC 109; which is directly on the point. In paragraphs 25, 26 and 27 the Supreme Court held as follows : “25. We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on behalf of the authorities. In paragraphs 25, 26 and 27 the Supreme Court held as follows : “25. We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on behalf of the authorities. The normal rule of “no work no pay” is not applicable to cases such as the present one where the employee although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his. This is not a case where the employee remains away from work for his own reasons, although the work is offered to him. It is for this reason that F.R. 17(1) will also be inapplicable to such cases. 26. We are, therefore, broadly in agreement with the finding of the Tribunal that when an employee is completely exonerated meaning thereby that he is not found blameworthy in the least and is not visited with the penalty even of censure, he has to be given the benefit of the salary of the higher post along with the other benefits from the date on which he would have normally been promoted but for the disciplinary/criminal proceedings. However, there may be cases where the proceedings, whether disciplinary or criminal, are, for example, delayed at the instance of the employee or the clearance in the disciplinary proceedings or acquittal in the criminal proceedings is with benefit of doubt or on account of non-availability of evidence due to the acts attributable to the employee etc. In such circumstances, the concerned authorities must be vested with the power to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period and if he does the extent to which he deserves it. Life being complex, it is not possible to anticipate and enumerate exhaustively all the circumstances under which such consideration may become necessary. To ignore, however, such circumstances when they exist and lay down an inflexible rule that in every case when an employee is exonerated from disciplinary/criminal proceedings he should be entitled to all salary for the intervening period is to undermine discipline in the administration and jeopardise public interests. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the Tribunal that to deny the salary to an employee would in all circumstances be illegal. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the Tribunal that to deny the salary to an employee would in all circumstances be illegal. While, therefore, we do not approve of the said last sentence in the first sub-paragraph after clause (iii) of paragraph 3 of the said Memorandum, viz., “but no arrears of pay shall be payable to him for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion”, we direct that in place of the said sentence the following sentence be read in the Memorandum : “However, whether the officer concerned will be entitled to any arrears of pay for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion, and if so to what extent will be decided by the concerned authority by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the disciplinary proceeding/criminal prosecution. Where the authority denies arrears of salary or part of it, it will record its reasons for doing so.” 27. To this extent we set aside the conclusion of the Tribunal on the said point.” 10. In the present case the competent authority has not considered whether the petitioner was entitled to the back wages. The High Court did not allow the petitioner back wages or consequential benefits which the petitioner may have been entitled to. The fact remains that the State Government, which is the competent authority and is authorised to decide whether the petitioner was entitled to be given back wages, has not passed any order after considering the circumstances, in which the petitioner is entitled to salary for the intervening period. 11. The petitioner was in service. He was drawing the salary as if he was not promoted. He however, as it was found by the High Court, deserved promotion from the date his junior was promoted, though he was promoted w.e.f. 25.6.1994. It was further found by the High Court that in case a person was not promoted due to the pendency of any departmental proceedings or any adverse remarks in his character roll, such a person deserves to be promoted from the date persons junior to him were promoted in accordance with the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, in case he has been exonerated, or adverse remarks expunged. The petitioner was not in employment for three years after he was compulsorily retired on 5.4.1990 and was thereafter reinstated after the Special Leave to Appeal No. 13798/1992 against the judgment of the High Court quashing the order of compulsory retirement was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 27.9.1993. The petitioner however was not paid the salary for three years. 12. Ordinarily, we would have sent the matter back to the competent authority to consider whether the petitioner was entitled to back wages from 17.12.1975 to 30.6.1994, or to consider the periods for payment of arrears of salary on the post on which he was notionally promoted. The salary has been fixed by the State Government but the fixation of pay scale was held to be notional, and thus the petitioner was not paid the arrears on the promoted post from 17.12.1975 to 30.6.1994. The petitioner had already spent almost 26 years in litigations. Now he is 71 year’s old. It would be extremely unjust and harsh to send back the matter back to the State Government for considering whether the petitioner was entitled to arrears of back wages for the period for which the salary has been notionally fixed. The order of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 2376 of 1988 dated 11.7.1994 was not challenged by the State Government. The observations “there exist nothing adverse against the petitioner" have become final. The circumstances, in which the petitioner should have been allowed back wages therefore are in favour of the petitioner. 13. We cannot allow the entire back wages as such an exercise and the circumstances are to be considered by the competent authority. We however feel that relegating the petitioner at this stage to the State Government will only increase his agony and that inspite of having won at every stage he would be again asked to initiate proceedings before the State Government for the purposes of getting back wages. We asked the petitioner whether he has calculated the amount which is payable to him. He has fairly stated that the amount will come about Rs. 3 lacs. 14. Upon considering the entire facts and circumstances and upon hearing the petitioner, who is now 71 years of age, and the counsel of the State Government, we are of the opinion that interest of justice would be served if the petitioner is paid a lumpsum amount of Rs. 3 lacs. 14. Upon considering the entire facts and circumstances and upon hearing the petitioner, who is now 71 years of age, and the counsel of the State Government, we are of the opinion that interest of justice would be served if the petitioner is paid a lumpsum amount of Rs. One lac towards the back wages for notional promotion allowed to him from 17.12.1975 to 30.6.1994. This would also avoid any future litigation and save the petitioner from further harassment. 15. We also find that the petitioner is entitled to Rs. 10,000/- for the costs of the writ petition. 16. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed to the extent that the respondent will pay to the petitioner Rs. 1,10,000/- (Rupees one lac ten thousand only) within a period of three months from the date a certified copy of the order is served upon him. ————