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Allahabad High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 222 (ALL)

MANMOHAN ANAND v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

2008-01-30

R.N.MISRA, V.M.SAHAI

body2008
JUDGMENT By the Court.—The short question that arises for our consideration in this petition is whether the period of 90 days has to be counted w.e.f. 15.5.2003, the date on which the notice was served on the petitioners to deposit free hold amount or from the next date i.e., 16.5.2003? 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 30.1.1999, the petitioner applied under the policy of the State Government for getting their residential Nazul Plot No. 7 free hold. The petitioners deposited 25 per cent of the free hold charges. The petitioners on 15.5.2003 received a notice dated 8.5.2003 by which they were directed to pay Rs. 3,44,212.56 as balance amount of free hold charges within a period of 90 days from the receipt of the notice. Rs. 36,446.25 as transfer charges and Rs. 234.50 as lease rent were also demanded. On 13.8.2003, the petitioners deposited the free hold charges and other charges as demanded by the respondents within 90 days of the receipt of the notice after availing the rebate of 20 per cent on the free hold charges as was provided in the Government Policy. On 20.10.2003, the petitioners received a notice dated 15.10.2003, by which the petitioners were directed by the respondents to deposit a further sum of Rs. 86,612.90 as according to the respondents the petitioners were not entitled for rebate of 20 per cent on the amount of the free hold charges as the amount as per the notice received on 15.5.2003 was not paid within a period of 90 days but was paid on the 91st day from the date of receipt of notice. The petitioners on 26.10.2003 filed their reply and stated that they had deposited the amount of free hold charges within a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of notice excluding the date on which the notice was received by them. The District Magistrate, Saharanpur passed an order dated 17.1.2004, which was communicated by the respondent No. 2, Nagar Palika Parishad, Saharanpur to the petitioners along with the letter dated 10.2.2004, which was received by the petitioners on 20.2.2004. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this writ petition. 3. We have heard Shri Mukesh Prasad, learned Counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel for respondents No. 1 and 3. Shri C.S. Singh who has appeared for respondent No. 2. 4. It is this order which has been challenged by the petitioners in this writ petition. 3. We have heard Shri Mukesh Prasad, learned Counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel for respondents No. 1 and 3. Shri C.S. Singh who has appeared for respondent No. 2. 4. The only question involved in this writ petition is as to whether the date on which the petitioners received notice from the respondents has to be counted or it has to be excluded from the period of 90 days for depositing the amount so that the petitioners may avail the benefit of 20 per cent rebate in depositing the free hold charges. The learned Counsel for the parties have very fairly informed the Court that there is no Rule which provides that from when the period of 90 days will start running. Therefore, in such a situation the provisions of General Clauses Act, 1897 and U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904 which are pari materia, have to be considered. Section 9 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904 is extracted below: “Commencement and termination of time.—In any (Uttar Pradesh) Act it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from” and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “to”. 5. In Tarun Prasad Chatterjee v. Dinanath Sharma, (2000) 8 SCC 649 the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph 12 and 13 has held as under : “Para-12 : Section 9 says that in any Central Act or regulation made, after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it shall be sufficient for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from”, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any period of time, to use the word “to”. The principle is that when a period is delimited by statute or rule, which has both a beginning and an end and the word “from” is used indicating the beginning, the opening day is to be excluded and if the last day is to be included the word “to” is to be used. The principle is that when a period is delimited by statute or rule, which has both a beginning and an end and the word “from” is used indicating the beginning, the opening day is to be excluded and if the last day is to be included the word “to” is to be used. In order to exclude the first day of the period, the crucial thing to be noted is whether the period of limitation is delimited by a series of days or by any fixed period. This is intended to obviate the difficulties or inconvenience that may be caused to some parties. For instance, if a policy of insurance has to be good for one day from 1st January, it might be valid only for a few hours after its execution and the party or the beneficiary in the insurance policy would not get reasonable time to lay claim, unless 1st January is excluded from the period of computation. Para-13 : It was argued that the language used in Section 81(1) that "within forty five days from, but not earlier than the date of election of the returned candidate” express a different intention and Section 9 of the General Clauses Act has no application. We do not find any force in this contention. In order to apply Section 9, the first condition to be fulfilled is whether a prescribed period is fixed “from” a particular point. When the period is marked by terminus a quo and terminus ad quem, the canon of interpretation envisaged in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 require to exclude Act, 1951 do not express any contrary intention.” 6. Therefore, the expression “from”, “to” and “within” have to be given the same meaning as explained by Apex Court in Tarun Prasad Chaterjee’s case. The expression “from” would mean that the opening day has to be excluded and the last day has to be included by giving a meaning to the expression “to”. The expression "within” would connote the same meaning as expression “from”. The expression “from” would mean that the opening day has to be excluded and the last day has to be included by giving a meaning to the expression “to”. The expression "within” would connote the same meaning as expression “from”. If we apply this principle to the facts of the case in hand then 15.5.2003, the date on which notice was served on the petitioners would have to be excluded and period of 90 days has to be counted from 16.5.2003 and since the petitioners has deposited the amount availing 20 per cent rebate on 13.8.2003 i.e. on the 90th day, therefore, the petitioners were entitled for rebate having deposited the amount within a period of 90 days. The view taken by the District Magistrate, as communicated by respondent No. 2 to the petitioners cannot be sustained. 7. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the order passed by District Magistrate, Saharanpur dated 17.1.2004 as mentioned in the letter of respondent No. 2 dated 10.2.2004 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition) is quashed. A writ of mandamus is issued to the respondents to grant 20 per cent rebate on the amount of free hold charges deposited by the petitioners treating the same within a period of 90 days and if the entire formalities have been completed by the petitioners, the free hold deed be executed by the respondents within a period of three months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced by the petitioners before the District Magistrate, Saharanpur. 8. Parties shall bear their own costs. ————