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2008 DIGILAW 222 (DEL)

VINOD KUMAR VERMA v. MANMOHAN VERMA

2008-02-25

VIPIN SANGHI

body2008
ORDER RCR No. 49/2007 & CM No. 15003/2007 1. In this petition the petitioner challenges the order passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller, Delhi in E-141/07/02 dated 1.9.2007 whereby the eviction petition filed by the respondent/landlord under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (the Act) has been allowed and an eviction order has been passed against the petitioner-tenant. The only point urged before me by the petitioner is that the respondents were not the owners of the suit premises and consequently they were not entitled to invoke the ground of eviction as contained in Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. It is contended that during the course of hearing before the learned ARC, after the parties had led and closed their respective evidence and the matter was at the stage of arguments the petitioner had moved an application to lead further evidence, namely some documents referred to in the Will dated 18.12.1974 executed by late Shri Bhagwan Dass in favour of Shri Shibbo Mal the father of the respondents. This application was rejected by the Additional Rent Controller. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent has drawn my attention to the decision of this Court in Munni Devi v. Manmohan Verma & Ors., 134 (2006) DLT 298 decided on 1.9.2006 pertaining to the same document, namely the Will dated 18.12.1974 executed by Shri Bhagwan Dass and the partition deed dated 17.6.1990 which has been relied upon by the respondent in the present case. 2. Learned Counsel for the respondents submits that this Court has already gone into the aspect of ownership of the respondents in relation to the same property bearing No. 3468-3470, Cali Bajrang Bali, Chawri Bazar, Delhi in the aforesaid decision with regard to another portion of the said property in the tenancy of another tenant viz. Triveni Prasad. It is also contended that in other proceedings filed by the petitioner-tenant, he had in fact admitted that the respondent No.2 and Shri Shibbo Mal were the landlord of the suit premises. 3. Having considered the arguments of the parties, I am not inclined to agree with the submissions of the petitioner. The order whereby the application of the petitioner seeking to place on record additional document was rejected on 23.8.2006, has not even been impugned by the petitioner. 3. Having considered the arguments of the parties, I am not inclined to agree with the submissions of the petitioner. The order whereby the application of the petitioner seeking to place on record additional document was rejected on 23.8.2006, has not even been impugned by the petitioner. Though a ground has been taken that the petitioner should have been allowed to place the additional document on record, that order is not even placed on record. Moreover, from the decision rendered in Munni Devi (supra), it is clear that this Court has already ruled on the aspect of ownership and has held that on the basis of the Will dated 19.12.1974, the partition deed dated 17.6.1990 and the release deed executed by the two sisters of the respondents on 12.4.1997, that the respondents could be considered as owners for the purpose of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. The relevant extract from the said decision reads as follow: 1/7. One Sh. Bhagwan Dass was the owner and landlord of the premises with Sh. Triveni Prasad being the tenant. The respondents have relied upon a letter dated 18.12.1973 addressed by the tenant to the landlord to establish that there is no dispute about this issue. In the said letter, a reference has been made to the past disputes between the parties and a cheque is stated to have been enclosed. A copy of the cheque is also available. 8. Sh. Bhagwan Dass is stated to have survived by Sh. Shibbo Mal, his elder son, who is stated to have inherited the property in pursuance to the Will dated 18.12.1974. A copy of the Will has been placed on record and there is no dispute in that behalf. Sh. Shibbo Mal had four sons and two daughters and a partition deed was executed. In terms whereof the property in question fell to the share of the two sons Manmohan Verma and Ashok Verma. A copy of this partition deed dated 17.6.1990 substantiating this aspect is already on record. There is also a separate release deed executed by the two sisters on 12.4.1997 in respect of the properties in favour of their brothers. 9. The tenant late Sh. Triveni Prasad was survived by four sons and three of the sons in terms of a surrender dated dated 1.8.1989 are stated to have surrendered the tenanted premises in favour of Sh. Shibbo Mal. 9. The tenant late Sh. Triveni Prasad was survived by four sons and three of the sons in terms of a surrender dated dated 1.8.1989 are stated to have surrendered the tenanted premises in favour of Sh. Shibbo Mal. One of the sons Krishan Gopal continued as a tenant and after his demise, his wife, the petitioner herein, is the tenant. 10. The past litigation between the parties includes a Civil Suit No. 32 of 1975 filed by late Sh. Bhagwan Das against late Sh. Triveni Prasad seeking prohibitory injunction pleading that the tenant was making unauthorized construction and should be prohibited from doing so. On the demise of the landlord, application to implead the legal heirs was filed. At that stage, there were some differences, between the legal representatives and one of the issues framed was as to which the LR was entitled to substitution in place of the plaintiff. Evidence was led in that behalf and thereafter the application for impleadment by Mr. Shibbo Mal was allowed. The suit was disposed of as withdrawn in view of the statement made by the LRs of the defendants that they would not make any construction in the tenanted premises. 11. There appears to have been even subsequent litigation in Civil Suit No. 522/90 filed by Mr. Shibbo Mal against Ms. Munni Devi again for permanent injunction which is stated to have resulted in a decree dated 7.3.1995 restraining the tenant from making/raising any alteration/construction. The respondents herein in June, 1998 applied for mutation to MCD and are stated to have been paying the house tax. The aforesaid facts have been set out to show that the respondents are not outsiders, but legal heirs of the deceased-landlord. 12. The petitioner has claimed that the forefathers of her husband had been tenants since 1892 and sought to place on record electricity and water bills in the name of Sh. Krishan Gopal. The Additional Rent Controller rightly noted that these established only the possession of the husband of the petitioner but at no stage of time was hostile possession claimed in respect of the suit property which is a mandatory requirement for establishing the claim or adverse possession which the petitioner sought before the Additional Rent Controller. 13. Krishan Gopal. The Additional Rent Controller rightly noted that these established only the possession of the husband of the petitioner but at no stage of time was hostile possession claimed in respect of the suit property which is a mandatory requirement for establishing the claim or adverse possession which the petitioner sought before the Additional Rent Controller. 13. The Trial Court has taken note of the material on record and the judgments cited to come to the conclusion that the proceedings under the said Act are not title proceedings. In this behalf, the judgment of the learned Single judge of this Court in Ram Chander v. Ram Pyari, 2004 Raj. L.R. 188, was referred where a similar plea of adverse possession has been rejected. The plea of the petitioner to challenge the Will of late Sh. Bhagwan Das was also similarly rejected on the ground that it was not the domain of the tenant to challenge the Will of the landlord. In this behalf, the judgment of this Court in Plastic chemicals Company v. Ashit Chadha & Anr., 114 (2004) DLT 408, has been relied upon for proposition that if a landlord is able to show that there is a testament in his favour, landlord is deemed to have discharged his burden of ownership vis-a-vis the Rent Control Act and such a testament can at best be challenged by the heirs of the owner and not by the tenant. 14. The Trial Court has also found that the Will executed by the grand father dated 18.12.1974 is more than 30 years old document and a registered one and there is thus a presumption regarding its genuineness under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The registered relinquishment deed executed by the sisters in favour of the brothers have also been placed on record as also the registered partition deed. 15. In my considered view the approach of the Additional Rent Controller can hardly be faulted. The proceedings under the said Act cannot be converted and utilized by a tenant to prevent eviction merely on the ground that he seeks to cast doubt on the title of the property which has been inherited when there is really no one else claiming right to the property. In any case this is matter between the legal heirs of the owner. 16. In any case this is matter between the legal heirs of the owner. 16. It must be kept in mind that the context in which the word owner has been used in Section 14(1)(e) of the said Act has been succinctly set out in the judgment of the Supreme Court Smt. Shanti Sharma & Ors. v. Smt. Ved Prabha & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 2028 . This Court in a recent judgment in CRP No. 153/2001, Mis. Gay ties Manufacturing Company v. Sh. Kanwaljit Singh, decided on 3.8.2006 had the occasion to refer to the said judgment of the Supreme Court. The relevant portion of the judgment in Smt. Shanti Sharma & Ors. case (supra) is reproduced as under- (1) The word owner has not been defined in this Act and the word owner has also not been defined in the transfer of Property Act. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant appears to be that ownership means absolute ownership in the land as well as of the structure standing thereupon. Ordinarily, the concept of ownership may be what is contended by the Counsel for the appellant but in the modern context where it is more or less admitted that all lands belong to the State, the person who hold properties will only be lessees or the persons holding the land on some term from the Government or the authorities constituted by the State and in this view of the matter it could not be thought of that the Legislature when it used the term owner in the provision of Section 14(1)(e) it thought of ownership as absolute ownership. It must be presumed that the concept of ownership only will be as it is understood at present. It could not be doubted that the term owner has to be understood in the context of the background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. This Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at the same time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of such grounds on the basis of which landlords have been permitted to have eviction of a tenant. This Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at the same time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of such grounds on the basis of which landlords have been permitted to have eviction of a tenant. In this context, the phrase owner thereof has to be understood, and it is clear that what is contemplated is that where the person builds up his property and lets out to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use, he should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction, the only thing necessary for him to prove his bona fide requirement and that he is the owner thereof. In this context, what appears to be the meaning of the term owner is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e. the owner should be something more than the tenant. Admittedly in these cases where the plot of land is taken on lease the structure is built by the landlord and admittedly he is the owner of the structure. So far as the land is concerned he holds a long lease and in this view of the matter as against the tenant it could not be doubted that he will fall within the ambit of the meaning of the term owner as is contemplated under this section. This term came up for consideration before the Delhi High Court and it was also in reference to Section 14(1)(e) and it was held by the Delhi High Court in T.C. Rekhi v. Smt. Usha Gujaral, 1971 Ren CJ 322 at p. 326 as under- The word owner as used in this clause has to be construed in the background of the purpose and object of enacting it. The use of the word owner in this clause seems to me to have been inspired by the definition of the word landlord as contained in Section 2(e) of the Act which is wide enough to include a person receiving or entitled to receive the rent of any premises on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person. Construed in the context in which the word owner is used in Clause (e), it seems to me to include all persons in the position of Smt. Usha Gujaral who have taken a long lease of sites from the Government for the purpose of building houses thereon. The concept of ownership seems now to be eclipsed by its social and political significance and the idea of ownership in the case like the present is one of the better rights to be in possession and to obtain it. To accede to the contention raised by Sh. Kapur would virtually nullity the effect of Clause (e) and would render all such landlords remediless against tenants however badly they may need the premises for their own personal residence. I do not think such a result was intended by the Legislature and I repeal the appellants contention. I consider it proper before passing on to the next challenge to point out that, the word owner as used in Clause (e) in Section 14(1) does not postulate absolute ownership in the sense that he has an absolutely unrestricted right to deal with the property as he likes. To describe some one as owner, and perhaps even as an absolute owner of property is to say two things: it is to assert that his title to the property is indisputable and that he has all the rights of ownership allowed by the legal system in question. Rights of ownership may, therefore, be limited by special provisions of law and include in those provisions such as are in force in New Delhi according to which citizens are granted long leases of sites for constructing buildings thereon. Now, the words of a statute, though normally construed in their ordinary meaning, may contain inherent restrictions due to their subject matter and object and the occasion on which and the circumstances with reference to which they are used. They call for construction in the light of their context rather than in what may be either their strict etymological sense or their popular meaning apart from the context (See Halsburys Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 36 para 893, p. 394). the meaning of the word owner in Clause (e) is influenced and controlled by its context and the appellants construction is unacceptable because it seems to be quite clearly contrary to the reasonable operation of the statutory provision. 36 para 893, p. 394). the meaning of the word owner in Clause (e) is influenced and controlled by its context and the appellants construction is unacceptable because it seems to be quite clearly contrary to the reasonable operation of the statutory provision. (Emphasis supplied) 17. Thus on a consideration of the matter, it was observed in M/s. Gay ties Manufacturing Companys case (supra) as under: "A perusal of the aforesaid shows that the word owner is not used by the Legislature in the context of an absolute owner. The Act is a protection for tenants and landlords are entitled to eviction in certain circumstances including for bona fide requirement. The Supreme Court thus observed that the phrase owner appears to be used vis-a-vis a tenant and this vould imply that the owner should be something more than the tenant. Once this test is satisfied a person claiming eviction has to only show his bona fide requirement. The Supreme Court has referred with approval to the observations is of this Court in T.C. Rekhi v. Smt. Usha Gujaral, 1971 Ren CJ 322 where it had been observed that the word owner in the clause seems to have been inspired by the definition of the word landlord as contained in Section 2(e) of the said Act which is wide enough to include a person receiving or entitled to receive the rent of any premises on account or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person. Thus the idea of ownership was held to be one of better right to be in possession than the tenant and to obtain it. The definition of landlord as given in Section 2(e) of the said Act is as under- 2. Definitions In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) landlord means a person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of any premises whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant. 18. 18. In view of the aforesaid legal position, there is no doubt that the respondents have satisfied the test to succeed in the present petition so far as the establishment of the ownership of the property is concerned. Insofar as the aspect of landlord and tenant relationship is concerned, the trial Court has relied upon the letter dated 18.12.1973 which established that not only did Sh. Triveni Prasad, the original tenant, write to Sh. Bhagwan Dass, the original landlord but even submitted arrears of rent as per cheque enclosed. This letter has not been denied by filing any rejoinder." 4. It is well settled and it has taken note of in the aforesaid decision as well, that the ownership that the landlord has to establish to maintain a petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act is not an absolute ownership of the tenanted premises. The idea of ownership is one of the better rights to be in possession and to obtain it. 5. The petitioner himself had filed the proceedings against Shri Shibbo Mal and respondent No.2 Shri Ashok Verma admitted that the petitioner is a tenant under the respondents. 6. Consequently, I find no irregularity in the manner in which the learned Additional Rent Controller has arrived at a finding with regard to the ownership of the respondents. 7. Resultantly the petition and the application are dismissed. Petition and Application dismissed.