Judgment ( 1. ) THIS Second Appeal filed by the appellant under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the order dated 16-7-98 passed by Additional District judge, Sardarpur, District Dhar in Regular Civil Appeal No. 13-A/97, whereby dismissed the application filed by the State under Section 5 of the Limitation act for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, which was barred by 12 days, saying therein that no sufficient ground is made out for condonation of delay. This Second Appeal was admitted on 16-4-1999 on the following substantial questions of law :-" (a) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the appellate Court below erred in law in rejecting the appellants application for condonation of delay and dismissing their appeal as time barred?" ( 2. ) I have heard Shri Lokesh Bhatnagar, learned Government advocate for the appellants, and perused the order passed by the Lower Appellate court. In the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of 12 days delay it was submitted that the certified copy of the judgment was forwarded to the office of Collector which was not received in time and in the meantime, the Officer-in-charge/tehsildar was transferred and he was also busy in some Government work. It was also submitted that in the meantime, the real brother of the Officer-in-charge became seriously ill and subsequently, he died on 9-5-1997, therefore, the Officer-in-charge could not contact to Government Advocate to file appeal in time. In support of application, the affidavit of Advocate was filed but the application was dismissed on the ground that the affidavit of Officer-in-charge was not filed and delay was not explained satisfactorily. ( 3. ) IN case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. Mst. Katiji and others, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 , Honble Supreme Court has held as under :-"3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of the justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of the justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that :- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the state which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the state is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the state is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal)and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing- on- the- buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grata status. The Courts therefore have to informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. " ( 4. ) THUS, considering the law laid down by the Apex Court, it is not in dispute that the State is impersonnel machinery and for the reason mentioned above the Officer-in-charge could not file appeal and there was only 12 days delay. As explained by the Officer-in-charge, in my opinion, there was sufficient ground for condonation of delay in this case. Lower Appellate Court should have taken pragmatic approach in considering the application and should have considered the law laid down by the Apex Court in objective manner. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. The impugned order passed by the Lower Appellate Court is set aside and I. A. No. 1/97, an application for condonation of delay is allowed and delay in filing appeal is condoned. The case is remanded back to the Lower appellate Court to hear and decide the appeal on merits. The appellant/state shall appear before the Lower Appellate Court on 10th of April, 2008. The Court will summon the respondents and after hearing the parties shall decide the appeal preferably within a period of six months. The case is remanded back to the Lower appellate Court to hear and decide the appeal on merits. The appellant/state shall appear before the Lower Appellate Court on 10th of April, 2008. The Court will summon the respondents and after hearing the parties shall decide the appeal preferably within a period of six months. Office is directed to remit the record of the Trial Court as well as Lower Appellate Court, so that it may reach on or before 10th of April, 2008. Parties to bear their own costs.