JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard learned counsel for the appellants. 2. This is an appeal against the following order of the learned Single Judge dated 17.9.2008 in a writ petition which is pending : “Learned Standing Counsel has accepted notice on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Issue notice to other respondents No. 3 to 7 returnable after six weeks. Steps to be taken within a week. List after six weeks.” 3. The writ petition was filed by the appellants challenging the order dated 18.7.2008 passed by the Prescribed Authority in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter called the “Act, 1860”). There are two reasons due to which this special appeal cannot be entertained. Firstly, the order impugned in the writ petition was an order passed by the Prescribed Authority in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act, 1860 and the Prescribed Authority while exercising jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act, 1860 acts as a Tribunal hence the Special Appeal is barred under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of Rules of the Court. 4. A Division Bench of this Court in Mohd. Tabib Khan v. State of U.P. and others, 2007(10) ADJ 578 (DB), has laid down relying on earlier judgments of this Court that Special Appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court is not maintainable against an order passed by one Judge in a writ petition where the order of the Prescribed Authority is under challenge. 5. In the present case, the writ petition filed by the petitioners-appellants was against an order of the Prescribed Authority. The special appeal arising out of such a writ petition is clearly barred under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court. The judgment of Mohd. Tabib Khan (supra) is fully applicable and the appeal is not maintainable. 6. Secondly, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is an order in which only notices were issued and the case has been directed to be listed after six weeks. By the said order the stay application has neither been allowed nor rejected. 7. The question which is to be considered in the present case is as to whether the order dated 17.9.2008, passed in the writ petition as extracted above is a “judgment” within the meaning of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court. By the said order the stay application has neither been allowed nor rejected. 7. The question which is to be considered in the present case is as to whether the order dated 17.9.2008, passed in the writ petition as extracted above is a “judgment” within the meaning of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court. The special appeal as provided under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court is nothing but continuation of Letters Patent Appeal which was provided for in the charter of the High Court. The word “judgment” against which the Letters Patent Appeal was contemplated came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Shah Babu Lal Khimji v. Jayaben, AIR 1981 SC 1786 . The Apex Court was considering in the said case the scope of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court which contemplated Letters Patent Appeal against judgment of a Single Judge. The Apex Court held in the above judgment that every interIocutory order passed by a learned Single Judge cannot be held to be a judgment, but only those orders would be judgment which decide matters affecting vital and valuable rights of the parties. The Apex Court also held that the orders contemplated under Order 43 Rule 1 which have been expressly made appealable under C.P.C. shall also be appealable under Letters Patent Appeal. The Supreme Court again considered the word “judgment” as used in the Letters Patent Appeal in Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. and others v. Chunilal Nanda and others, (2006) 5 SCC 399. In paragraph 15 of the said judgment, interim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of the case were categorised in 5 categories and one of the category i.e. category (iv) was routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the case till its culmination in the final judgment. The Apex Court laid down in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the said judgment which is quoted below : “15. lnterim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of a case, fall under one or the other of the following categories : (i) Orders which finally decide a question or issue in controversy in the main case. (ii) Orders which finally decide an issue which materially and directly affects the final decision in the main case. lnterim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of a case, fall under one or the other of the following categories : (i) Orders which finally decide a question or issue in controversy in the main case. (ii) Orders which finally decide an issue which materially and directly affects the final decision in the main case. (iii) Orders which finally decide a collateral issue or question which is not the subject-matter of the main case. (iv) Routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the case till its culmination in the final judgment. (v) Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice to a party, but which do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties. 16. The term “judgment” occurring in clause 15 of the Letters Patent will take into its fold not only the judgments as defined in Section 2 (9), CPC, and orders enumerated in Order 43 Rule 1, CPC, but also other orders which, though may not finally and conclusively determine the rights of parties with regard to all or any matters in controversy, may have finality in regard to some collateral matter, which will affect the vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties. Interlocutory orders which fall under categories (i) to (iii) above, are, therefore, “judgments” for the purpose of filing appeals under the Letters Patent. On the other hand, orders falling under categories (iv) and (v) are not “judgments” for the purpose of filing appeals provided under the Letters Patent.” 8. In view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the above case, the routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the case are not “judgment” which are appealable under the Letters Patent. The impugned order dated 17.9.2008 as extracted above clearly indicates that the said order is not an order deciding the interim application of the appellants nor any issue has been decided by the said order which may adversely affect the valuable right of the parties. The order impugned dated 17.9.2008 clearly falls in category (iv) as indicated in paragraph 15 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. (supra) thus the special appeal against the order impugned dated 17.9.2008 is not maintainable under Chapter VIII Rules 5 of the Rule of the Court. The order impugned dated 17.9.2008 clearly falls in category (iv) as indicated in paragraph 15 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. (supra) thus the special appeal against the order impugned dated 17.9.2008 is not maintainable under Chapter VIII Rules 5 of the Rule of the Court. A Division Bench of this Court in which one of us (Hon’ble Ashok Bhushan, J.) was a member has considered the word “judgment” under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court in 2008 (7) ADJ 617 , M.K. Bajpai v. State of U.P. and others, decided on 29.7.2008. The Division Bench after referring to the above mentioned judgments of the Apex Court in Shah Babu Lal Khimji and Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. held that an order passed by a learned Single Judge in a writ petition which does not fall under any of the categories under Order 43 Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure nor falls in any other interlocutory order affecting the valuable rights of the parties are not appealable. Following was laid down in paragraph 14 : “The judgment of the apex Court in the case of Shah Babu Lal Khimji (supra) has thus elaborately laid down the nature of the orders passed by one judge of the High Court against which Letters Patent Appeal are maintainable. There cannot be any dispute that appeal will be fully maintainable against a final judgment or a preliminary judgment. The maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal was also accepted against the intermediary or interlocutory judgment. From paragraph 113 (3) of the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Shah Babu Lal Khimji (supra), it is clear that interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are specified in clause (a) to (w) of Order 43 Rule 1. Thus, with regard to interlocutory orders passed by one Judge, appeals to which have been held to be maintainable, can be grouped in following categories : (a) The interlocutory orders against which appeal is provided under any of the clause of Order 43 Rule 1, C.P.C. are appealable under Letters Patent. Thus, with regard to interlocutory orders passed by one Judge, appeals to which have been held to be maintainable, can be grouped in following categories : (a) The interlocutory orders against which appeal is provided under any of the clause of Order 43 Rule 1, C.P.C. are appealable under Letters Patent. (b) There may be other interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order 43 Rule 1, C.P.C. but which possess the characteristics and trappings of finality in that, the orders may adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding, against such orders appeal is also maintainable.” 9. The submission which has been pressed by the learned counsel for the appellants is that since the interim relief has not been granted the stay application of the appellants shall be deemed to have been rejected. He has relied on Section 11 Explanation V, C.P.C. which deals with res judicata. Explanation V to Section 11, C.P.C. is as follows: “Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused.” 10. Explanation V to Section 11 is in context when the principles of res judicata can be pressed into service. Explanation V says that the relief claimed in the plaint which is not expressly granted by the decree shall for the purposes of this Section be deemed to have been refused. No question of principles of res judicata are attracted in the present case nor there is any question of application of Section 11 Explanation V the stay application in the writ petition filed by the appellants having not yet been. The stay application filed by the appellants being still pending and having not yet been rejected, there is no question of assuming it to be deemed to be rejected. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in M/s Plasto Pack, Mumbai and another v. Ratnakar Bank Ltd., JT 2001 (6) SC 598. Paragraph 12 of the said judgment is as follows : “By order dated 3.3.1995 relief (a) set out in the plaint was granted ‘as it was’, without specifying the exact decretal amount and the rate of interest allowed by the Court. Paragraph 12 of the said judgment is as follows : “By order dated 3.3.1995 relief (a) set out in the plaint was granted ‘as it was’, without specifying the exact decretal amount and the rate of interest allowed by the Court. Such of the prayers as were not granted by decree dated 3.3.1995 would be deemed to have been refused and to that extent the suit shall be deemed to have been dismissed. More than two years and eight months later the Court could not have, on a mere notice of motion, substituted almost a new decree in place of the old one by granting such reliefs as were not granted earlier and that too without noticing the defendant-appellants. As held in K. Rajamouli v. AVKN Swamy, (2001) 5 SCC 37 power to amend a decree cannot be exercised so as to add to or subtract from any relief granted earlier. A case for setting aside the decree was earlier made out. In the facts and circumstances of the case the Division Bench ought to have taken a liberal view of the events and entertained the appeal for consideration on merits by condoning the delay in filing the same. However, that was not done. We are satisfied that grave injustice has been done to the appellants by denying them an opportunity of hearing and contesting the suit on its merits. We are also of the opinion that the respondent-bank ought to have taken a reasonable stand and should have sympathetically considered the proposal of the appellants which was not lacking in bona fides and in the interest of avoiding litigation and early recovery of outstanding debts the respondent should have compromised the suit. Even if the appellants’ proposal was not acceptable to the respondent, at least a counter-proposal should have been made in which case across the table discussion between the parties with the assistance of their learned counsel would have brought out a mutually accepted resolution and an end to the litigation. We are constrained to observe that this litigation is being perpetuated because of the unreasonable and rigid attitude of the respondentbank.” 12. In the above case, before the Apex Court a decree was passed by the learned Single Judge under Order 8 Rule 10, C.P.C. against the appellants “in terms of prayer (a), ( c ), (ii), d(i) and (i) with costs. In the above case, before the Apex Court a decree was passed by the learned Single Judge under Order 8 Rule 10, C.P.C. against the appellants “in terms of prayer (a), ( c ), (ii), d(i) and (i) with costs. Subsequently, the said decree was modified by the learned Single Judge and other reliefs were granted as noticed in paragraph 4. The defendants moved an application for recall of the decree which was rejected by the High Court. The defendants filed petition for special leave which was granted subject to the appellants depositing certain amount. The Apex Court took the view that the High Court was not justified in refusing to set-aside the ex-parte decree dated 3.3.1995 as modified on 24.11.1997. In paragraph 12 of the judgment on which reliance has been placed, the Apex Court observed that such prayers which were not granted by decree would be deemed to have been refused. There cannot be any dispute to the proposition as laid down in the above judgment. The principle is well settled that such reliefs which are not expressly granted shall be treated to be deemed to have been refused. The case before the Apex Court was where the suit was finally decided by passing a decree. Earlier, the learned Single Judge granted decree in different terms, subsequently, on ex-parte motion the decree was modified. It was held by the Apex Court that the reliefs which were not expressly granted shall be deemed to be refused and modification of decree was not justified. Present case is not a case where the writ petition or even the stay application has not been finally decided by granting relief or a part of relief. The stay application in the present case is still pending for consideration before the learned Single Judge. The principles laid down by the Apex Court in M/s. Plasto Pack (supra) are not attracted in the facts of the present case. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the special appeal is maintainable against the order impugned since the stay having not been granted shall be deemed to have been refused cannot be accepted. The order impugned being a normal routine order passed during the progress of the case is being not appealable under Order 43 Rule 1, CPC and does not affects any valuable right of any party is clearly not appealable. The order impugned being a normal routine order passed during the progress of the case is being not appealable under Order 43 Rule 1, CPC and does not affects any valuable right of any party is clearly not appealable. None of the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants are acceptable. The special appeal is held to be not maintainable on the above mentioned both the grounds. 13. The Special Appeal is accordingly dismissed. ————