Honble VYAS, J.—In this writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the judgment and certificate dated 26.10.2006 Annex.-3 passed by the Rent Tribunal, Jodhpur as well as order dated 28.03.2008 Annex.-4 passed by the Rent Appellate Tribunal, Jodhpur. 2. The facts of the case set out in the writ petition indicate that an application for eviction under Section 3, 6 and 9(1) B, C, E, G and I, read with Section 10(i)(b) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 was filed by the petitioner in which it was categorically stated that the premises situated at 34, Sardar Club Scheme, Jodhpur was let out by respondent No.3 (applicant before the Tribunal) and the said premises was let out for residential purpose and rent was fixed at the rate of Rs.5,000/-. 3. As per applicant (respondent No.3 herein), the premises was give for residential purpose but, later on, it was utilized for the commercial purpose, therefore, on the basis of change of use, eviction decree was sought for. The other grounds were also taken including the ground of bona fide necessity because applicant was superannuated from the post of Chief Engineer and, later on, from the post of Technical Member with effect from 30.04.1996 when he was residing at Jaipur. As per the grounds taken by the applicant before the Rent Tribunal he was to be shifted from Jaipur to Jodhpur permanently to live with his family. Although the request was made to the tenant (petitioner herein) but he has not evicted the premises while resorting to one or the other reasons, therefore, in the compelling circumstances while taking various ground including the ground of change of use, the application was filed by respondent No.3 against the petitioner tenant. 4. In the ground, a specific plea was agitated by the applicant before the Rent Tribunal that in fact the premises was taken for residential purpose, therefore, Chapter 2 and 3 of the Act of 2001 are not applicable in accordance with Section 3 of the Act. Therefore, the applicant is entitled for eviction decree without proving any ground and he is entitled for the eviction decree because the premises was given for residential purpose. 5. Therefore, the applicant is entitled for eviction decree without proving any ground and he is entitled for the eviction decree because the premises was given for residential purpose. 5. Further, it is specifically prayed in the grounds of the application that if the Court comes to the conclusion that Chapter 2 and 3 are applicable in the present controversy upon the ground that after taking the premises on rent for residential purpose it was used for commercial purpose, then, the petitioner is entitled for eviction decree upon the grounds taken in the application. 6. Notice was issued to the petitioner by the Rent Tribunal and, accordingly, the petitioner filed reply to the application. It was specifically refuted that premises was not taken for residential purpose, in fact, the premises was taken for commercial purpose. In para 5 of the reply, it was stated by the petitioner that the contention of the applicant is totally false that premises din question was taken for residential purpose. 7. The Rent Tribunal finally adjudicated the matter after framing the issues on the ground that contention of the applicant is not acceptable that the premises was let out for residential purpose and while holding that the premises in question was, in fact, let out for commercial purpose, therefore, Chapter 2 and 3 of the Act are applicable as per Section 3 of the Act of 2001 and while considering the grounds taken for eviction, that eviction decree was passed against the respondent. 8. Against the said judgment, appeal was preferred by the petitioner in which various grounds were taken against the adjudication made by the Rent Tribunal and, out of those grounds, one was that the learned Tribunal has committed error while holding that initially premises was let out for commercial purpose. As per the petitioner, the finding of the Rent Tribunal was erroneous on the ground that there was admission in the application filed by respondent No.3 before the Rent Tribunal that the premises in question was let out for residential purpose. When admission with regard to the aforesaid fact was there in the application, then, the Rent Tribunal ought to have considered this aspect of the matter but the Rent Tribunal erroneously adjudicated the matter while holding that Chapter 2 and 3 of the Act of 2001 are applicable in accordance with Section 3 of the Act. When admission with regard to the aforesaid fact was there in the application, then, the Rent Tribunal ought to have considered this aspect of the matter but the Rent Tribunal erroneously adjudicated the matter while holding that Chapter 2 and 3 of the Act of 2001 are applicable in accordance with Section 3 of the Act. The Rent Appellate Tribunal while considering all the grounds advanced by the petitioner, however, upheld the judgment and decree passed by the Rent Tribunal in favour of respondent No.3. The petitioner is challenging both these orders mainly on two grounds. 9. Firstly, it is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that both the Courts below have committed error while holding that the premises in question was let out for commercial purpose, therefore, Chapter 2 and 3 of the Act of 2001 are applicable in accordance with Section 3 and while doing so, the Courts below completely ignored the admission of respondent No.3 made before the Rent Tribunal in the application filed by him. 10. Secondly, it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the grounds of Section 9 of the Act were not available to respondent No.3 because, admittedly, the premises was let out for residential purpose and rent was more than Rs.4,000/-, therefore, the case does not fall in the category under Section 3((iii)(b) in which it is provided that nothing contained in Chapter 2 and 3 of the Act shall apply to any premises let out for residential purpose before or after commencement of this Act and the monthly rent thereof is Rs.4,000/- or more in the case of premises let out at places situated in the municipal area comprising of the divisional headquarters of Jodhpur, Ajmer, Kota, Udaipur and Bikaner, therefore, the learned Rent Tribunal and the learned Rent Appellate Tribunal passed impugned order without jurisdiction. 11. Although the Rent Tribunal is having jurisdiction to hear the case of eviction of such persons who do not fall under Section 3(iii)(b) but for the said purpose, the Rent Tribunal is required to decide the matter as per the procedure enumerated in Section 15 of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that both the Court below have committed error in exercise of jurisdiction while deciding the matter applying Chapter 2 and 3 of the Act of 2001. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that both the Court below have committed error in exercise of jurisdiction while deciding the matter applying Chapter 2 and 3 of the Act of 2001. In fact, the admission made by respondent No.3 himself is sufficient to prove that Chapter 2 and 3 of the Act of 2001 were not applicable, therefore, the grounds of eviction enumerated in Section 9 were not available to the applicant-respondent. In that view of the matter, both the judgments rendered by the Courts below deserve to be set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that, of course, remedy is available before the Rent Tribunal under Section 18 of the Act, but, for the same, proper application was to be filed by the applicant-respondent which is available other than grounds enumerated in Section 9. However, it has not been done, therefore, both the orders are required to be quashed. 12. As per learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Rent Tribunal has committed serious error while rejecting the plea of the applicant that premises was, in fact, let out for residential purpose and, subsequently, it was used for commercial purpose because there is clear admission in the application itself, therefore, the original order passed by the Rent Tribunal deserves to be set aside. Likewise, although this ground was taken by the petitioner before the Rent Appellate Tribunal but the learned Appellate Tribunal ignored this important aspect of the matter and contrary to law rejected the appeal of the petitioner. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention towards the judgments in the cases of State of A.P. vs. P.V. Hanumantha Rao, through LRs & Another, reported in (2003) 10 SCC 121 ; and, A.K. Gupta & Sons Ltd. vs. Damodar Valley Corporation, reported in AIR 1967 SC 96 . 14. With reference to the first judgment, it is stated by learned counsel for the petitioner that the apex Court has held that the writ petition lies not against the decision but against the decision making process of the Court, Tribunal or Authority. Therefore, in this case, when the petitioner is challenging the jurisdiction of the Court on the ground that Chapter II and III were not applicable upon the admission made by the respondent that the property in question was rented out for residential purpose. Therefore, in this case, when the petitioner is challenging the jurisdiction of the Court on the ground that Chapter II and III were not applicable upon the admission made by the respondent that the property in question was rented out for residential purpose. In this view of the matter, it is submitted that when no other remedy is provided then certainly the remedy available under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by way of approaching this Court can be availed. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that even if it is accepted that Chapter 2 and 3 are applicable in the present case, respondent No.3 failed to prove his case and did not prove any of the grounds in respect of which the eviction decree was sought, therefore, both the orders passed by the Courts below deserve to be set aside. 16. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No.3, Shri R.K. Thanvi vehemently argued that the contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted on the ground that before the Rent Tribunal he has explained each and every thing specifically the ground was taken by him that in fact, at the initial stage, the premises was let out for residential purpose, therefore, Chapter 2 and 3 are not applicable; but, subsequently, the premises was utilized for commercial purpose, therefore, if the Rent Tribunal comes to the conclusion that if the premises was initially rented out for residential purpose, then, he has right to prove other grounds under Section 9 of the Act of 2001. It is further argued by learned counsel for the respondent No.3 that the contention of the petitioner is not understandable because he himself specifically pleaded before the Rent Tribunal that the assertion of the petitioner with regard to letting out the premises for residential purpose is totally false. But, at the same time, he is raising voice before this Court that the premises was let out for residential purpose, therefore, the Rent Tribunal has committed error while not accepting the plea of the petitioner. But, at the same time, he is raising voice before this Court that the premises was let out for residential purpose, therefore, the Rent Tribunal has committed error while not accepting the plea of the petitioner. Therefore, on the one hand, in the reply filed before the Rent Tribunal it is specifically denied by the petitioner that the premises was not let out for residential purpose and, here, before this Court, it is prayed on the basis of claim that the premises was let out for residential purpose, therefore, the petitioner cannot be allowed to take grounds as per his choice and the writ petition deserves to be dismi-ssed. It is contended by learned counsel for the respondent that at different stages the petitioner has taken different grounds, therefore, in such type of litigation, this Court would certainly not interfere in the matter on the grounds which are totally baseless. 17. Learned counsel for the respondent further contended that there is no provision for second appeal, therefore, this writ petition has been filed. However, according to the learned counsel, the scope of writ of certiorari is very limited and, against concurrent finding of fact, this Court would not like to interfere. It is argued on behalf of the respondent that in the writ jurisdiction, this Court cannot enter into the facts of the case so as to re-assess the evidence. Therefore, it is obvious that somehow the petitioner wants this Court to re-appreciate the evidence on facts of the case on the grounds taken by the respondent landlord. In that view of the matter, the plea of the petitioner that Chapter 2 and 3 are not applicable in this case is totally unsustainable before the eye of law. Now, when the eviction decree has been passed on the basis of cogent ground, then the petitioner is raising voice that both the Court below have committed jurisdictional error. In this view of the matter, this writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 18. It is contended by Shri R.K. Thanvi that the plea of the petitioner before the Rent Tribunal was accepted that the premises was let out for commercial purpose. In this view of the matter, this writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 18. It is contended by Shri R.K. Thanvi that the plea of the petitioner before the Rent Tribunal was accepted that the premises was let out for commercial purpose. In whole of the reply, the contention of the petitioner that for the purpose of opening the school, the property in question was taken on rent, therefore, upon the specific plea taken by the petitioner before the Rent Tribunal the plea of the petitioner with regard to letting out the premises initially for residential purpose was not accepted, therefore, now, when the plea of the petitioner accepted by the Rent Tribunal, then, obviously Chapter II and III of the Rent Control Act, 2001 are applicable and Section 3 of the Act of 2001 cannot be made applicable. In this view of the matter, the petitioner has taken contrary plea before this Court than the plea taken before the Rent Tribunal, therefore, such type of conduct of the petitioner tenant does not require cognizance of this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. As per the respondents, both the Courts below gave a concurrent finding which does not require any interference in view of the judgment of the apex Court, reported in AIR 2004 SC 3892 . In that judgment, it has been held that certiorari jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction is not permissible to be invoked when concurrent findings are given by the trial Court and appellate Court. Further, it is adjudicated by the apex Court that re-appreciation of evidence and setting aside the judgment of the lower Court is not permissible when the findings are based upon the facts, therefore, this petition is not even maintainable. Hence no interference is required in this case in the judgment given by the learned Tribunal. 19. Learned counsel for the respondent further invited my attention to the judgment reported in Supreme Today 2008 (5) page 136, in the case of Deepchand Juneja vs. Lajwanti Khaturia. In that case, similar type of facts were involved and, on the basis of bona fide necessity, the need of the landlord was taken into consideration and it has been held that bona fide personal need of the landlord is a question of fact and should not normally be interfered with. In that case, similar type of facts were involved and, on the basis of bona fide necessity, the need of the landlord was taken into consideration and it has been held that bona fide personal need of the landlord is a question of fact and should not normally be interfered with. In this case also, the application was filed by the respondent on the basis of the bona fide necessity, therefore, on this ground also, this petition deserves to be dismissed because re-appreciation of evidence and, so also, interference with concurrent findings of fact arrived at both by the trial Court as well as appellate Court are not permissible while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 20. Learned counsel for the respondent landlord vehemently argued that by one or the other reason, the petitioner tenant does not want to vacate the premises and while taking contrary grounds before this Court which were not even agitated, moreover accepted before the Rent Tribunal the petitioner has filed this writ petition and seeking interference which is not tenable. Therefore, this writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 21. I have considered the rival submissions made by both the parties. 22. In this case, admittedly, the Rent Tribunal, Jodhpur and Appellate Rent Tribunal, Jodhpur delivered the judgments on the basis of the concurrent finding of fact. Before the Rent Tribunal, application was filed by the respondent landlord for eviction on the basis of ground of bona fide necessity. According to the facts and evidence adduced by the respondent, he established his case that after retirement, he was to be shifted from Jaipur to Jodhpur. Therefore, the finding of fact arrived at for the purpose of bona fide necessity of the respondent does not require any interference. So also, during the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that Chapter II and III are not applicable because the respondent preferred the application for eviction on the fact that initially the property in question was let out for residential purpose; but, subsequently, it was used by the petitioner for commercial purpose when school was opened by him. 23. I have perused the application filed before the Rent Tribunal. 23. I have perused the application filed before the Rent Tribunal. In para 8 of the application, it is specifrically stated by the respondent landlord that this petition is hereby filed under Sections 3, 6, 9 (1) B, C. E. G. I and Sec. 10 (1)(b) of the Act of 2001. In the grounds although it is stated by the respondent that the property in question was taken on rent for the residential purpose but, later on, school was opened in the said premises and the petitioner started using the said property for commercial purpose. At page 9, in para 10, it is specifically stated by the respondent that : ^^;g gS fd fookfnr ifjlj vizkFkhZ la[;k ,d us vkoklh; mís; ls fdjk;s ij fy;k FkkA ifjlj dk fdjk;k :i;s 6000@& gksus ls bl ij jktLFkku fdjk;k fu;a=.k vf/kfu;e] 2001 dh /kkjk 3 ds vuqlkj bl vf/kfu;e ds v/;k; 2 o 3 ykxw ugha gksrs gS vr% ,slh fLFkfr esa izkFkhZ vizkFkhZx.k ds fo:) csn[kyh ds vk/kkj ij izekf.kr fd;s fcuk eqruktk edku ds ckcr~ csn[kyh dh fMØh izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS vkSj blh rjg fdjk;k Hkh cktkj nj ls c<+okus dk vf/kdkjh gSA exj fdUgha dkj.kksa ls ;fn U;k;ky; bl fu"d"kZ ij igqaps fd ekStwnk ekeys esa mä vf/kfu;e ds v/;k; 2 o 3 ykxw gksrs gS rks Hkh izkFkhZ vizkFkhZx.k ds fo:) Åij fy[ks vk/kkjksa ij okafNr fMØh izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gSA izkFkhZ us vizkFkhZ dks fnukad 7-10-2003 dks vius vf/koäk ls uksfVl fnykdj mldh fdjk;snkjh lekIr dj nh gS vkSj eqruktk edku dk dCtk lqiqnZ djus dk fy[kkA vizkFkhZ us mä uksfVl esa fy[ks rF;ksa dh ikyuk ugha dh cfYd vius vf/koäk ls izkFkhZ dks xyr tokc fnyok;k vr% ,slh fLFkfr esa ;g ;kfpdk isk gSA** 24. Although it is stated in the application that the premises was taken on rent for residential purpose but it is specifically stated in the application that if this Court comes to the conclusion after taking evidence that the premises was taken on rent for commercial purpose, then, Chapter II and III will be made applicable and the respondent landlord will be entitled for eviction decree on the basis of the grounds taken in the application. In the application both of the grounds were taken by the respondent that although the premises were let out for residential purpose; but, further it is stated that after taking evidence if this Court finds that the premises was let out for commercial purpose, then, Chapter II and III will apply and the respondent will be entitled for eviction decree upon the ground of bona fide necessity. Upon this assertion, after taking evidence the learned Rent Tribunal gave its finding on the basis of the reply filed by the petitioner that the premises was let out for commercial purpose. In the reply filed by the petitioner before the Rent Tribgunal, she herself has specifically stated in para 5 as follows : ^^fd in la[;k 9 ;kfpdk bl gn rd lgh gksus ls Lohdkj gS fd ,d tk;nkn IykWV la[;k 34 ljnkj Dyc Ldhe] jkrkukMk] tks/kiqj esa vkbZ gqbZ gSA izkFkhZ dk ;g dFku iw.kZ :i ls xyr o fujk/kkj gS fd ;g tk;nkn ,d vkoklh; tk;nkn gS vfkok bl edku dks vizkFkhZ la[;k 1 us vius fuokl gsrq izkFkhZ ls ekg vizsy 1995 esa 5000@& :i;s ekgokj ls fdjk;s ij fy;k gksA izFke rks tSlk fd izkFkhZ dh vksj ls mlds vf/koäk Jh vkj-ds- Fkkuoh ds ekQZr fnukad 7-10-2003 dks tks uksfVl mÙkjnkrk vizkFkhZ dks fn;k Fkk ds tokc uksfVl ls Li"V gS fd izkFkhZ o vizkFkhZ ds e/; Hkw Lokeh o fdjk;snkj dk lEcU/k ugha gSA tc rd izkFkhZ i{kdkjku~ ds e/; Hkw Lokeh o fdjk;snkj dk lEcU/k LFkkfir ugha dj ns rc rd izkFkhZ dh ;kfpdk bl vk/kkj ij gh dkfcy [kkfjt gSA** 25. The above assertion clearly speaks that the petitioner took the plea before the Rent Tribunal that the property in question was taken on rent for commercial purpose and not for residential purpose and she has produced evidence also. Therefore, the Rent Tribunal after considering the entire material on record gave finding that the property was let out for commercial purpose and not for residential purpose. This is a finding of fact recorded on the basis of the evidence adduced by the petitioner herself. It is, therefore, strange that before this Court the petitioner is challenging the finding of the Rent Tribunal which is based upon her stand and plea taken before the Rent Tribunal. This is not permissible under the law. This is a finding of fact recorded on the basis of the evidence adduced by the petitioner herself. It is, therefore, strange that before this Court the petitioner is challenging the finding of the Rent Tribunal which is based upon her stand and plea taken before the Rent Tribunal. This is not permissible under the law. The petitioner is estopped from saying that on the basis of the plea of the respondent the finding was to be given by the Rent Tribunal that the property in question was let out for the residential purpose. The petitioner has tried to mislead this Court while raising such plea that Chapter II and III are not applicable, therefore, on the basis of the grounds taken by the respondent no eviction decree can be passed by the learned Rent Tribunal. In my opinion, in view of the conduct of the petitioner, no case is made out for invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Upon the concurrent finding recorded by the Rent Tribunal and Appellate Rent Tribunal no interference is required while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. I am in full agreement with the proposition of law laid down by the apex Court in the judgment of P.V. Hanumantha Rao (supra). In that view of the matter, this writ petition has no substance. 26. The writ petition is, therefore, accordingly dismissed. There shall however be no order as to costs.