JUDGMENT By the Court.—Notice on behalf of respondents has been accepted by the learned Chief Standing Counsel. Since affidavits have been exchanged, we proceed to decide the writ petition on merit, after hearing the parties’ counsel. 2. This writ petition questions the validity of the show cause notice dated 26.3.08 issued by the State Government in exercise of its powers conferred under Section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which show cause notice while requiring the petitioner to show cause against the charges levelled therein, also ceases her administrative and financial powers as Adhyaksha of Nagar Panchayat, Dildar Nagar, District Ghazipur. The District Magistrate has been directed to discharge the functions aforesaid either by himself or by an officer nominated by him, not below the rank of Additional District Magistrate. 3. Application for impleadment has been moved by one Mohd. Meraj Khan and Ram Dayal Paswan, who allege that on their complaint the aforesaid show cause notice has been issued resulting into cessation of exercise of administrative and financial powers of the petitioner as Adhyaksha and, therefore, they are necessary parties. 4. On considering the application for impleadment, we do not find the applicants necessary parties to be impleaded in the writ petition, but we allow them an opportunity of hearing as intervener. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of the Court to various amendments made in Section 48. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that Section 48(2), as stood prior to the amendment of 2004, which came into force on 27.2.04, did not contain any provision for cessation of administrative and financial powers of the Adhyaksha. 7. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of the Court to various amendments made in Section 48. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that Section 48(2), as stood prior to the amendment of 2004, which came into force on 27.2.04, did not contain any provision for cessation of administrative and financial powers of the Adhyaksha. 7. A new provision of sub-section (2-A) was added by U.P. Act No. 6 of 2004, which provided as under : “(2-A) Where in an inquiry held by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed, if a President or a Vice-President is prima facie found to be guilty on any of the grounds referred to in sub-section (2), he shall cease to exercise, perform and discharge the financial and administrative powers, functions and duties of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, which shall, until he is exonerated of the charges mentioned in the show-cause notice issued to him under sub-section (2), be exercised and performed by the District Magistrate or by an officer nominated by him not below the rank of the Deputy Collector.” 8. Later on aforesaid sub-section (2-A) was omitted by amendment of U.P. Act No. 2 of 2005, which received the assent of the Governor on March 16, 2005 and was published in the U.P. Gazette, Extraordinary, Part-2 on 17th March, 2005. Later on aforesaid sub-section (2-A) was omitted by amendment of U.P. Act No. 2 of 2005, which received the assent of the Governor on March 16, 2005 and was published in the U.P. Gazette, Extraordinary, Part-2 on 17th March, 2005. A new proviso in sub-section (2) was inserted in place of the then existing provision of Section 2-A, which is the present provision which reads as under : “Provided that where the State Government has reason to believe that the allegations do not appear to be groundless and the President is prima facie guilty on any of the grounds of this sub-section resulting in the issuance of the show cause notice and proceedings under this sub-section he shall, from the date of issuance of the show cause notice containing charges, cease to exercise, perform and discharged (sic discharge) the financial and administrative powers, functions and duties of the President until he is exonerated of the charges mentioned in the show cause notice issued to him under this sub-section and finalization of the proceedings under sub-section (2-A) and the said powers, functions and duties of the President during the period of such ceasing, shall be exercised, performed and discharged by the District Magistrate or an officer nominated by him not below the rank of Deputy Collector.” 9. It may be relevant to mention here that sub-section (2-A) which originally existed in Section 48, and is still on the Statute, provided that after considering any explanation that may be offered by the President and making such enquiry as it may consider necessary, the State Government may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, remove the President from his office etc., but it appears that unmindful of the fact that sub-section (2-A) was already on the statute, the aforesaid new provision was again numbered as sub-section (2-A) which was introduced by U.P. Act No. 6 of 2004 and later on the later provision of sub-section (2-A) which was introduced by the Act of 2004 was omitted by U.P. Act No. 2 of 2005 and thus, the original Section 2-A stands on the statute whereas in place of wrongly numbered sub-section (2-A), the present provision, namely, the proviso to sub-section 2 of Section 48 finds mention in the enactment. 10. 10. The points raised by the parties’ counsel, which require consideration, can be summarised as under : (i) Whether in proceedings initiated under Section 48(2) of the Act, while taking an action under sub-section (2-A), the Adhyaksha (the petitioner) was required to be heard and given an opportunity before issuance of the show cause notice, both in terms of the aforesaid provision of sub-section (2-A) and also in consonance with the principles of natural justice, as such an action results in cessation of his administrative and financial powers and thus, completely denudes the elected office bearer of his statutory functions and the same having not been done in the instant case, the entire enquiry stands vitiated which could not have been made the basis for ceasing the administrative and financial powers. (ii) Whether the charges make out any prima facie case for holding a formal enquiry or for issuance of show cause notice so as to remove the petitioner from the office of Adhyaksha as according to the petitioner, the charges even on their face value, do not make out any case for taking any action under Section 48(2). 11. (ii) Whether the charges make out any prima facie case for holding a formal enquiry or for issuance of show cause notice so as to remove the petitioner from the office of Adhyaksha as according to the petitioner, the charges even on their face value, do not make out any case for taking any action under Section 48(2). 11. On point No. 1, very pertinent arguments have been raised from both the sides, namely, the petitioner and the respondents respectively, urging that in view of power of removal conferred by the State Government, read with the proviso annexed to the said Section 48(2), the State Government, if has a reason to believe that the allegations do not appear to be groundless and the Adhyaksha is, prima facie, guilty of any of the grounds under this sub-section resulting in the issuance of the show cause notice for proceeding under this sub-section, then only he shall be ceased of his administrative and financial function, which means that the State Government must have material before it, on which it has to form a reasonable belief about the allegations not being groundless and then has to record his satisfaction about the Adhyaksha being, prima facie, guilty, which cannot be done without making any enquiry and if such an enquiry is to be made, the Adhyaksha has to be necessarily associated, otherwise the purpose of the whole provision which is not a provision only for ousting the Adhyaksha but also gives protection to the elected President, so that he may not be removed from the office for collateral and motivated reasons, and the power of statutory functionary may not be unnecessarily and illegally interrupted by ceasing the administrative and financial powers on absolutely frivolous grounds, non existing facts and charges, shall stand frustrated, whereas the respondents’ contention is that the order of cessation of powers is only for the transitory period during which the formal enquiry is conducted or so to say after the issuance of show cause notice, the final orders are passed, either exonerating the Adhyaksha or removing the Adhyaksha and no opportunity need be afforded to him while holding the preliminary enquiry. 12. 12. In fact, petitioner’s contention goes to the extent that if the State’s argument is accepted and literal meaning is given to the provision of Section 48(2), then even after the issuance of show cause notice, no enquiry can be said to be contemplated under the said provision and mere giving of show cause notice and a reply to the said notice would be sufficient for taking a decision for either exonerating the Adhyaksha or for removal of the Adhyaksha. 13. Submission is that this cannot be the intention of the rule or the Act to oust the elected Adhyaksha or to cease his powers without holding any proper enquiry and without verifying the facts and charges by material evidence and that too without affording any opportunity to participate in the enquiry, either in the preliminary enquiry or at the time of passing of the final order, but only by affording an opportunity to reply to the show cause notice. 14. The petitioner further urged that if opportunity is not afforded to the Adhyaksha, during preliminary enquiry, he may be subjected to proceedings for removal and his all powers, viz. administrative and financial powers (which are the only powers which he exercises as Adhyaksha), shall be ceased, though, if he is given an opportunity, he may bring forth, the blatant falsehood of the charges, if they are non-existent or baseless, though otherwise, the charges, if at all are made out on the basis of some material, need not be got proved or disproved at this initial stage. 15. It has also been urged, that it does not require any debate, that many a times, such actions against the Adhyaksha are politically motivated. 16. In support of the plea that while holding enquiry for the purpose of show cause notice, no opportunity need be given to the Adhyaksha, reliance is being placed upon the case of Rekha (Kinner) v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (3) ADJ 315 (DB) and also on the case of Zaheer Ahmad Ansari v. State of U.P. and others, (2005) 1 UPLBEC 40 . 17. 17. Argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, in response, is that judgements in the aforesaid cases are per incurium and sub silentio, which require consideration in the light of the provision aforesaid, which is not only for deciding as to whether a formal enquiry should be conducted or not after issuance of the show cause notice but also gives power to the State Government to denude the Adhyaksha of all his powers, both administrative and financial on the issuance of show cause notice and thus, it has an adverse civil consequence upon the statutory rights of the Adhyaksha. 18. In our opinion the aforesaid issue of affording opportunity prior to the issuance of show cause notice under Section 48(2) is not required to be considered by us in the present writ petition as the writ petition deserves to be allowed on the second point, namely, the charges do not make out even a prima facie case for holding formal enquiry or for issuance of show cause notice so as to remove the petitioner from the office of Adhyaksha. 19. Though the plea of non-affording of opportunity was taken by the petitioner by moving an amendment application, which has been allowed, but in view of our findings, we need not consider the plea raised in the amended paragraphs with respect to non-affording of opportunity to the petitioner by holding a preliminary enquiry. 20. We, therefore, leave the point No. 1 open and refrain ourselves from delving upon the said issue. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner has emphatically pressed a plea that the charges levelled against the petitioner do not make out any case, even prima facie, for taking action against the petitioner under Section 48(2) on their face value. 22. The aforesaid plea has to be considered by looking into the charges but without making any detailed enquiry and without making any assessment of the material and evidence on record by the Court. In case the charges are absolutely frivolous on the face of it, or do not make out any case or the enquiry held suffer from some gross procedural irregularity resulting into miscarriage of justice, or they have been found to be prima facie proved on extraneous considerations or without there being any material in support of the charges, the Court would be justified in considering the aforesaid issues. 23. 23. In all eight charges have been levelled. We summarize the charges and also the stand taken by the petitioner in the writ petition, namely, the explanation submitted by her and the findings given by the enquiry officer, as under : Charges Reply of the petitioner Finding of the enquiry Officer 1. A total sum of Rs. 30 lacs was Charge denied. The same has Proved for want sanctioned, out of which, Rs. 8.00 been alleged without perusing of documents. lacs was left and the last date for the records. Also stated that the its utilization was 31.3.2007. time had been extended vide Charge was alleged that tenders order dated 20.10.2007, and in were invited for the utilization of view of the aforesaid extension the left/unspent amount after the of time, pursuant to the recom- said period lapsed without taking mended proposal of board permission for extension of time. meeting dated 9.4.2007, tenders were invited and the work was completed and the left-over/ unspent amount was utilized. 2. Appointment of Class-IV em- Denied. No employee has been No definite finding ployees had been made by the regularised, as alleged. The given; rather petitioner in lieu of financial employees appointed on con- stated that the favour, daily wagers have been tractual basis are still working on involvement of regularized after taking handsum contractual basis. They have petitioner appears amount as well as two contrac- neither been regularized nor given to be suspicious. tual workers have been regula- permanent status and also no rized without adopting due pro- appointment has been made cedure. on contractual basis. 3. Rs. 82,500/- has been paid to Denied. The procedure of re- Charge partially a private person for false boring boring of the defective hand- proved. of five hand-pumps. pumps was under process as per the recommendation of the Board Meeting dated 9.4.2007. However, when it came to the knowledge that the work was to be done by U.P. Jal Nigam, the same was not done and no amount in this regard was paid. 4. Executive Officer resides at Denied. The Executive Officer Proved. the President’s house instead does not reside at the Presi- of the allotted house, as well as dent’s house, but resides in a the documents/records of the rented accommodation and Panchayat are kept there. Thus, Executive Officer performs entire work is conducted from his work from the Office as the President’s house. The Executive Officer Proved. the President’s house instead does not reside at the Presi- of the allotted house, as well as dent’s house, but resides in a the documents/records of the rented accommodation and Panchayat are kept there. Thus, Executive Officer performs entire work is conducted from his work from the Office as the President’s house. well as all the documents/ records are kept by the concer- ned officials in the office. 5. Fogging Machine had been Denied. The Fogging Machine No definite finding purchased without inviting ten- had been purchased by adopting given by the Enquiry ders for the same, without the decision taken in the Board Officer. He states getting the quotations pub- Meeting held on 17.2.2007 after that the records- lished in the National News- inviting tenders. Necessary cheque book were papers. Even two sets of High entries for the purchase of the not shown. H.M. Lights were purchased aforesaid Fogging Machine on the basis of quotation only, were made in the Stock Register and the amount was also not and the bills for the same were certified by the Executive Officer. also certified by the Executive Officer. 6. No tractor trollies were pur- Denied. No previous purchase of No definite finding chased till 27.7.2007, out of tractor trolley, whatsoever, had given. the money sanctioned for the been made by the petitioner in year 2006-07, but the money the year 2006-07, nor the same for the same has been with- has been purchased till the date drawn by the petitioner and the of filing of the reply. procedure for its purchase was not followed. 7. Petitioner did not conduct any Denied. The Board Meeting had Charge proved on Board Meeting of Nagar Palika been called as per the Nagar the basis of the after 17.2.2007. Palika Act on convenient dates, statements given and on the dates 9.4.2007 & by the Corporators. 6.7.2007, the Board Meetings were held, whereas on 3.1.2008, the Board Meeting was under process and some pande- monium took place in the meeting. The agenda of the Board Meeting was also annexed with the reply. 8. The attendance register of The concerned four contractual Recorded that the the contractual employees of employees were working on enquiry could not be the Nagar Palika for the month Muster-roll on stop-gap-arrange- conducted for want of January, 2007, contain 22 ment and temporary basis. of record. The agenda of the Board Meeting was also annexed with the reply. 8. The attendance register of The concerned four contractual Recorded that the the contractual employees of employees were working on enquiry could not be the Nagar Palika for the month Muster-roll on stop-gap-arrange- conducted for want of January, 2007, contain 22 ment and temporary basis. of record. No definite names, but in the month of But since they, themselves, finding given. July, 2007, four names were absented from duties and did deleted. not perform duties, their names were deleted. 24. On going through the charges and also the enquiry report, it is clear that charge number 1 has been found to be proved for want of documents. It could not be explained by the respondents that how a charge can be said to be proved for want of documents, particularly when it is the specific case of the petitioner that time for utilization of funds was duly extended and, therefore, in the aforesaid extended time, in accordance with recommendations of the Board given in its meeting held on 20.3.07, tenders were invited and the unspent amount was utilized. 25. Charge number 2 has been specifically denied by the petitioner on oath saying that no employee has been regularised and that all such employees are working on contractual basis and they have neither been regularised nor given permanent status. The enquiry officer has observed that no definite finding can be given and that involvement of the petitioner appears to be suspicious. This also cannot be said to be even prima facie proof of the charge. 26. So is the case with charge number 3, where reply of the petitioner shows that as soon as it came to the knowledge that the work was to be done by U.P. Jal Nigam, the same was not done and no amount in this regard was paid. There is nothing on record to show that how the charge is partially proved, as observed by the enquiry officer. 27. Charge number 4 also has been specifically denied saying that the Executive Officer does not reside at the President’s house but resides in a rented accommodation and Executive Officer performs his work from the office as well as all the documents/records are kept by the concerned officials in the office. 27. Charge number 4 also has been specifically denied saying that the Executive Officer does not reside at the President’s house but resides in a rented accommodation and Executive Officer performs his work from the office as well as all the documents/records are kept by the concerned officials in the office. This charge has been found to be proved but the material on the basis of which it has been proved, has not been shown. Even otherwise, such a charge prima facie cannot make out a case either for removal of the Adhyaksha or for ceasing his powers. 28. In charge number 5 also, enquiry officer says that no definite finding can be made as the record/cheque book or cash book were not shown. 29. In regard to charge number 6, again it has been mentioned that no definite finding can be given. 30. Charge number 7 has been said to be proved on the basis of the statements given by the Corporators but it appears that Board Meeting Register has not been seen and even otherwise not holding Board meetings on regular intervals cannot be a charge for removal of the Adhyaksha as has been held in the case of Lakhan Lal v. State of U.P., (1994) 12 LCD 433. In the said case, it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court, that holding of meetings every month is a provision which is directory and that violation thereof cannot be a ground for removal of the Adhyaksha. 31. Charge number 8 again says that enquiry could not be conducted for want of record and, therefore, no definite finding has been given. 32. On a perusal of the enquiry report and the charges levelled against the petitioner, it is thus, apparent that either the charges have not been found to be proved for want of documents or they could not be proved for want of record of that role of the petitioner has been found suspicious but no material has been brought on record by the respondents so as to infer that there was material before the enquiry officer to prove the charges even prima facie. On mere suspicion or for want of record, for which the petitioner cannot be held guilty as he was not the person concerned who was required to furnish the record, no such action of cessation of administrative and financial power could have been taken against the petitioner. 33. It is always to be kept in mind that denuding the Adhyaksha from exercise of his administrative and financial powers virtually means taking away all the functions of Adhyaksha, till the enquiry is concluded and, therefore, unless any charge is made out, which is not purely of technical nature or a mere irregularity and is neither violation of a specific rule or procedure resulting in gross misconduct nor attributes any financial loss to the institution, action should not be taken lightly or casually. 34. In the case of Lakhan Lal v. State of U.P. and others, (1994) 12 LCD 433, reiterating the observations made in Surendra Prakash Goel v. State of U.P. and others, HVD (All.) 1992(1), held that if the President has committed some technical irregularity but he has not been benefited from the same financially or otherwise, Government should not remove him from the office and instead a warning under Proviso to sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Act is sufficient. 35. However, since the provision of giving a ‘warning’ is no more on the Statute, therefore, either the Adhyaksha can be removed on the charges levelled against him or he is to be exonerated, if the charges are found not proved. 36. Section 48 read with sub-section (2) and the proviso attached thereto, is a provision which curtails the term of the elected Adhyaksha by removing him from office on proved charges of misconduct, abuse of powers, persistent violation of rules, resulting into gross misconduct and of committing financial irregularities or any such act, which is not becoming of an elected Adhyaksha. The removal from office of the Adhyaksha is punitive in nature and has its own evil effects in future elections. The removal from office of the Adhyaksha is punitive in nature and has its own evil effects in future elections. Action under the aforesaid provision, therefore, has to be taken only in case the elected Adhyaksha has conducted himself in a manner which is grossly prejudicial to the interest of the institution or that such a conduct constitutes a misconduct or financial irregularity and is not merely a technical or procedural irregularity, which does not result into any fiscal gain to the Adhyaksha, nor results into financial loss to the Panchayat, nor can be said to be a gross misconduct so as to deprive of his tenure of office, even before his term has expired. 37. Panchayats having attained constitutional status on the commencement of the seventy-third amendment of the Constitution with the prescribed tenure of Panchayats and consequently that of the Adhyaksha, the said tenure cannot be curtailed lightly or casually or mere ipse dixit on a complaint or on the whims and fancy of the enquiring authority nor it is the discretion of the State Government to take any action for removal unless there is material, prima facie, to satisfy that such a case exists, for taking such a drastic action. 38. Merely because some complaint has been made, which may be genuine, politically designed or a motivated complaint, the State Government would not be obliged to either ask for an enquiry by some nominated officer or to issue a show cause notice, unless, of course, the State Government feels satisfied about the gravity of the charges, which on the face of it, make out a case of gross misconduct or financial irregularity. It is only thereafter that a preliminary enquiry can be ordered and in the preliminary enquiry also, the enquiring authority has to see that whether, prima facie, the charges are proved on the basis of material on record or not. If the charges are not found to be proved, there would be no occasion for the State Government to issue a show cause notice under Section 48(2). If the charges are not found to be proved, there would be no occasion for the State Government to issue a show cause notice under Section 48(2). Of course, the State Government still has the authority to get the enquiry reconducted, in case it finds that some material documents or evidence has not been considered by the enquiry officer but it will not be open even for the State Government to get the same charges enquired into again and again, unless it gets a desired enquiry report. 39. The scheme of the aforesaid Section 48 leaves no scope of doubt that it is a consciously placed provision for keeping a check upon the misdeeds of the elected Adhyaksha and for that matter to save the institution from being misused by the person in power and for that matter stringiest punishment of removal has been prescribed therein. Removal of an elected Adhyaksha can only be ordered, if he is functioning against the interest of the institution and is abusing his powers as Adhyaksha. The instances given in the Section itself do constitute misconduct, if found proved. 40. A bare reading of Section 48 read with sub-section (2) and the proviso lays down a scheme of removal of the Adhyaksha, therefore, while taking action under Section 48(2), the scheme under the proviso cannot be given a complete go-bye. The proviso itself speaks about the satisfaction of the State Government before issuance of show cause notice and for that matter the first and essential ingredient is that the State Government must have reason to believe or to say, in other words, must reasonably believe that the allegations do not appear to be groundless and the Adhyaksha is prima facie, guilty of any of the grounds mentioned in the sub-section. How this provision shall be put into execution is also provided in the said proviso and in sub-section (2) of Section 48. The proviso can be read to mean that first the State Government on receipt of a complaint is to make a reasonable belief that the allegations are not groundless and then an enquiry is to be conducted by the nominated officer or by the State Government for seeing that the charges levelled prima facie stand proved, that is, to say, the Adhyaksha is found prima facie guilty on the charges levelled against him. It is only thereafter that a show cause notice under Section 48 sub-clause (2) is to be issued. 41. Thus, the scheme of the Section, coupled with the proviso, gives adequate protection to the Adhyaksha, from being ousted from office on mere politically designed complaint or for ulterior reasons. Adhyaksha can only be removed if he is found guilty of any of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 48. 42. In case even after an enquiry conducted under the directives of the State Government, the charges are not found to be prima facie proved, namely, Adhyaksha is not found to be prima facie guilty of any of the grounds mentioned in the Section, the State Government would neither have any authority to cease the administrative or financial powers of the Adhyaksha nor it would have any power or discretion to proceed further and to remove him on such charges, which could not be established even prima facie. 43. The phrase ‘reason to believe’ has been the subject matter of interpretation in various cases. 44. In the case of N. Nagendra Ram & Co. v. State of A.P., (1994) 6 SCC 205 , the apex Court held that ‘the expression “reason to believe” means that even though formation of opinion may be subjective but it must be based on material on the record. It cannot be arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is, thus, a check on exercise of power to seize the goods’. 45. In Dr. Partap Singh and another v. Director of Enforcement, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and others, AIR 1985 SC 989 , the Supreme Court taking note of the case of S. Narayanappa v. Commr. of Income-tax, Bangalore, AIR 1967 SC 523 , observed as under : “The expression ‘reason to believe” is not synonymous with subjective satisfaction of the Officer. The belief must be held in good faith; it cannot be merely a pretence. In the same case, it was held that it is open to the court to examine the question whether the reasons for the belief have a rational connection or a relevant bearing to the formation of the belief and are not extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of the section.” 46. In the case of Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel and others v. State of Gujarat and another, in Para 30 of the report, the apex Court observed as under : “30. In the case of Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel and others v. State of Gujarat and another, in Para 30 of the report, the apex Court observed as under : “30. This Court while expressly referring to the expressions such as “reason to believe”, “in the opinion of” observed : “63......Therefore, the words, ‘reason to believe’ or ‘in the opinion of’ do not always lead to the construction that the process of entertaining ‘reason to believe’ or ‘the opinion’ is an altogether subjective process not lending itself even to a limited scrutiny by the Court that such ‘a reason to believe’ or ‘opinion’ was not formed on relevant facts or within the limits or as Lord Radcliffe and Lord Reid called the restraints of the statute as an alternative safeguard to rules of natural justice where the function is administrative.” 47. Also on consideration of the case of ITO v. Lakhmani Mewal Das, (1976) 3 SCC 757 , the Court observed as under : “In ITO v. Lakhmani Mewal Das this Court construed ‘the expressions “reason to believe” employed in Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and observed that the reasons for the formation of the belief must have a rational connection with or relevant bearing on the formation of the belief. Rational connection postulates that there must be a direct nexus or live link between the material coming to the notice of the Income Tax Officer and the formation of his belief that there has been escapement of the income of the assessee from assessment in the particular year because of his failure to disclose fully or truly all material facts. It is not any or every material, howsoever vague and indefinite or distant which would warrant the formation of the belief relating to escapement of the income of the assessee from assessment. The reason for the formation of the belief must be held in good faith and should not be a mere pretence.” 48. The State Government has to apply its mind on the material on record to form a reasonable belief and then has to take into account the findings recorded by the enquiry officer for reaching to a conclusion as to whether the Adhyaksha is prima facie guilty of the charges levelled or not. The State Government has to apply its mind on the material on record to form a reasonable belief and then has to take into account the findings recorded by the enquiry officer for reaching to a conclusion as to whether the Adhyaksha is prima facie guilty of the charges levelled or not. The enquiry report of the enquiry conducted by the nominated officer by the State Government being the only material on the basis of which powers of the Adhyaksha have been ceased or are ceased or he is issued a notice for showing cause as to why he should not be removed from the office of Adhyaksha, the said evidence, namely, the enquiry report has to be carefully looked into by the State Government and if the enquiry report itself does not make the Adhyaksha prima facie guilty of the charges, there would hardly be any occasion for the State Government to proceed further on the basis of such an enquiry. 49. In the case in hand, the enquiry report, as has been summarized above, clearly shows that none of the charges can be said to have been proved even prima facie nor the Adhyaksha can be held prima facie guilty of any of the charges. That being so, the impugned order of cessation of administrative and financial powers of the Adhyaksha is per se illegal, without authority and absolutely arbitrary. An arbitrary exercise of power by the State Government cannot be protected under law. The notice thus, issued is wholly without jurisdiction and without authority. 50. The plea of the respondents that the petitioner still would have opportunity to defend the notice by giving a detailed reply is of no assistance to the State as the present notice is not a simple notice of show cause but it has its adverse civil consequences, taking away the statutory rights and functions of the petitioner as Adhyaksha by ceasing his administrative and financial powers and also because for want of any material in support of the charges levelled against him, coupled with the findings in the enquiry report, which do not make out any case for exercise of power under Section 48(2), the petitioner cannot be dragged into mischief of Section 48(2) by passing the order of removal from his elected office of Adhyaksha. 51. 51. For the aforesaid reasons, the order dated 26.3.08 passed by the State Government is liable to be quashed, which is hereby quashed. 52. The writ petition is allowed, with no order as to costs. ————