JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dilip Gupta, J.—The petitioner, a Constable in the Central Industrial Security Force, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CISF’) was dismissed from service by the order dated 1st June, 1999 passed by the Group Commandant. The Appeal filed by the petitioner before the Deputy Inspector General for setting aside the aforesaid order was dismissed by the order dated 30th November, 1999. These two orders have been challenged in this writ petition. 2. The records indicate that a charge-sheet dated 23rd January, 1999 was served upon the petitioner containing two charges. Earlier the petitioner had been suspended on 15th December, 1998. The first charge was that the petitioner was deployed to drive CISF Truck No. UP-14-1387 on 11th December, 1998 from 5.00 AM to 1.00 PM. The petitioner got 95 liters of diesel filled on 11th December, 1998 and so the truck was full to its maximum capacity of 160 liters of diesel. The log book showed that the truck covered 266 Kms. in 141 liters whereas according to the running average of the said truck which is 3.77 Kms. per liter, it should have covered about 531 Kms. in 141 liters. This indicated that the petitioner has misappropriated the diesel. The second charge mentioned in the charge-sheet was that the petitioner had wrongly mentioned in the log book dated 13th December, 1998 that the truck was on shift duty upto 12.40 PM and again on Adam duty from 2.00 PM to 2.40 PM whereas on 13th December, 1998 Contractor Geep No.UP-81-D 9185 performed the said shift duty and Adam duty and Truck No.UP-14-1387 was not used at all. The petitioner was, therefore, charged for making an attempt to suppress the misappropriation of diesel. 3. The petitioner denied both the charges and a departmental enquiry was ordered. The Enquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty of both the charges in his report dated 12th April, 1999. 4. A show cause notice dated 26th April, 1999 was issued to the petitioner to submit his representation against the enquiry report. The petitioner submitted a reply dated 13th May, 1999 and after considering the said reply the order dated 1st June, 1999 was passed by the Group Commandant, CISF by which the petitioner was dismissed from service. The petitioner was found guilty of charge No. 1 only and charge No. 2 was found not proved on the basis of benefit of doubt. The petitioner was found guilty of charge No. 1 only and charge No. 2 was found not proved on the basis of benefit of doubt. The Appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed. 5. Sri B.N. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of dismissal cannot be sustained as the evidence on record did not establish the petitioner’s guilt and even otherwise the punishment imposed upon the petitioner was disproportionate to the offence. He also submitted that two other drivers were deputed to drive the said truck between 11th December, 1998 to 14th December, 1998 but only the petitioner has been punished and no action has been taken against the other respondents. In support of his contention he has relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sher Bahadur v. Union of India and others, JT 2002 (6) SC 152; S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 and Bhagwati Prasad Dubey v. Food Corporation of India, AIR 1988 SC 434 . 6. Sri Ashok Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, however, contended that proper opportunity had been given to the petitioner during the enquiry and on the basis of cogent evidence, the petitioner was found guilty. He, therefore, submitted that there is no infirmity in the impugned orders. He has also placed reliance upon the decision of a Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered on 2nd September, 2008 in Special Appeal No. 80 of 1997 (Lal Bahadur Yadava v. Union of India and others) wherein in respect of a driver in the Central Reserve Police Force who had misappropriated some quantity of diesel, this Court dismissed the writ petition holding that in departmental proceedings, the procedure prescribed under the Evidence Act was not strictly applicable and that the adequacy or reliability of evidence is not a matter which can be canvased under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. 8. The report of the Enquiry Officer indicates that it is on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence that the petitioner has been found guilty of misappropriating diesel for personal gains. The average was calculated by a Board which included the petitioner and it was found to be 3.77 Kms. per liter. 8. The report of the Enquiry Officer indicates that it is on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence that the petitioner has been found guilty of misappropriating diesel for personal gains. The average was calculated by a Board which included the petitioner and it was found to be 3.77 Kms. per liter. The Enquiry Officer also noticed from the evidence of the PW-1 and PW-4 that the petitioner had admitted before them that he had misappropriated diesel. The order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is a detailed order and takes into consideration the evidence on record. The defence raised by the petitioner that the diesel pipe of the truck was leaking and he had taken the truck for repair was not found acceptable as the story was found to have been made up for the purposes of defence. The Appellate Authority has not also accepted the contention advanced by the petitioner that no action was taken against the other two drivers since from the records it was clear that it was the petitioner who had misappropriated the diesel. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the average had not been correctly recorded and, therefore, the petitioner could not have been held guilty merely on the basis of average of 3.77 Kms per liter recorded by the Board. This contention cannot be accepted as the petitioner was also a member of the Board that calculated the average and had also signed the proceedings. The evidence of PW -1 and PW-4 also shows that they have made a statement that the petitioner had informed them that he had in fact misappropriated diesel and something should be done to settle the matter. In such circumstances it cannot be said that there is no evidence on the record, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner to hold the petitioner guilty of the charge. 10. The Supreme Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Shri Udaysingh s/o Ganpatrao Naik Nimbalkar and others, JT 1997 (5) SC 298, held that disciplinary proceedings are not a criminal trial and, therefore, the scope of enquiry is entirely different from that of a criminal trial in which the charge is required to be proved beyond doubt. In the case of disciplinary enquiry, the technical rules of evidence have no application and preponderance of probabilities and some material on record would be necessary to reach a conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct. The test laid down is to see whether there is evidence on record to reach the conclusion that the delinquent has committed misconduct and whether as a reasonable man, in the circumstances, would be justified in reaching that conclusion. The same view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, 1997 (77) F.L.R. and in the case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank and others, (2003) 3 SCC 583 . It was held that strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded and the standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is not the same as of the criminal trial. In the disciplinary proceedings the preliminary question is whether the employee is guilty of such conduct as would merit action against him, whereas in criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him are established and if established what sentence should be imposed upon him. 11. In Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G. Thirugnanasambandam, 2005 AIR SCW 84, the Supreme Court also held that it is a well settled principle that the principles of Evidence Act have no application in a domestic enquiry. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner also wanted the Court to appreciate the evidence so as to find out whether the petitioner was guilty of the first charge. Regarding re-appreciation of evidence by the High Court, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that the High Court has a very limited jurisdiction and when the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority is based on some evidence, the High Court will not reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion regarding proof of charges. It has been emphasised that the High Court has to act within the limits of the powers of judicial review. 13. In High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar (supra) the Supreme Court observed : “In judicial review, it is settled law that the Court or the Tribunal has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. 13. In High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar (supra) the Supreme Court observed : “In judicial review, it is settled law that the Court or the Tribunal has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the delinquent receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the view of the Court or Tribunal. When the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence, Tribunal is devoid of power to reappreciate the evidence and would (sic) come to its own conclusion on the proof of the charge. The only consideration the Court/Tribunal has in its judicial review is to consider whether the conclusion is based on evidence on record and supports the finding or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence. This is the consistent view of this Court vide B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 , State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V. Venugopalan, JT 1994 (5) SC 337 : (1994) 6 SCC 302 (SCC para 7); Union of India v. Upendra Singh, JT 1994 (1) SC 658 : (1994) 3 SCC 357 (SCC para 6); Government of Tamil Nadu v. A. Rajapandian, JT 1994 (7) SC 492 : (1995) 1 SCC 216 (para 4) and B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 (at pp. 759-60)” (emphasis supplied) 14. The Supreme Court in the case of Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Bhola Nath Singh and others, (1997) 3 SCC 657 , also observed : “Under these circumstances, the question arises whether the High Court would be correct in law to appreciate the evidence and the manner in which the evidence was examined and to record a finding in that behalf. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. The High Court, in the proceedings under Article 226 does not act as an appellate authority but exercises within the limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. The High Court, in the proceedings under Article 226 does not act as an appellate authority but exercises within the limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. In this case, no such errors were pointed out nor any finding in that behalf was recorded by the High Court. On the other hand, the High Court examined the evidence as if it is a Court of first appeal and reversed the finding of fact recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted by disciplinary authority. Under these circumstances, the question of examining the evidence, as was done by the High Court, as a first appellate Court, is wholly illegal and cannot be sustained." 15. In the case of R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab, (1999) 8 SCC 90 , the Supreme Court made the following observations : “Before adverting to the first contention of the appellant regarding want of material to establish the charge, and of non-application of mind, we will have to bear in mind the rule that the court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the function of the Court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The inquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the Court in writ proceedings." (emphasis supplied) 16. In the case of Lalit Popli (supra) the Supreme Court observed as follows : “While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority." 17. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority." 17. The last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the punishment is disproportionate to the charges. This contention cannot also be accepted. The petitioner was an employee in the CISF and had misappropriated the diesel. 18. The scope of interference by Courts with the quantum of punishment has been the subject matter of a number of decisions and it has been repeatedly emphasised that interference cannot be done in a routine manner and that the principles relating to judicial review of administrative action have necessarily to be examined. The decisions of the Supreme Court clearly emphasise that where the punishment in disciplinary cases is challenged as being arbitrary, the question that would arise for consideration would be whether the administrative order is “rational” or “reasonable” and the test then to be applied is the “Wednesbury” test. The Courts will then be confined only to a secondary role to find out if the action satisfies the test. The disciplinary authority and the appellate authority, being fact finding authorities, have the exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline and they are vested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the gravity of the misconduct. It has also been emphasised that the High Court while exercising the power of judicial review cannot normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other penalty unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the Court in the sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards. 19. In the present case, the petitioner, a Constable in the Industrial Security Force, was found to have misappropriated diesel. Such a person is not fit to be retained in service. It cannot, therefore, be said that the punishment is such which will shock the conscience of the Court in the sense that it is in defiance of the logical or moral standards. It is, therefore, not possible for this Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment. 20. Such a person is not fit to be retained in service. It cannot, therefore, be said that the punishment is such which will shock the conscience of the Court in the sense that it is in defiance of the logical or moral standards. It is, therefore, not possible for this Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment. 20. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, it is not possible for this Court to set aside the impugned orders. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. ————