JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rajiv Sharma, J.—Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and the Counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. In short the facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed in the year 1973 on the post of Junior Assistant in District Office, PCF, Bulandshahar. In July, 1973 he was given posting at PCF Marketing Centre, Gulaoti, Bulandshahar. The petitioner was confirmed on the said post in the year 1978 and was transferred to Regional Office, PCF Meerut on 18.4.1979. 3. On 28.4.1979, a composite order was passed by the Joint Managing Director, PCF Lucknow placing the petitioner under suspension and appointed an Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges levelled against him. After some correspondence, on 13.1.1982, the Enquiry Officer submitted a final enquiry report to the respondent No. 2 and held the petitioner guilty of embezzlement and misappropriation of stock worth Rs. 1,14,144.99. It was aIso stated in the enquiry report that in respect of the charges against the petitioner, an FIR on case crime No. 17/80 under Section 409, IPC was registered against him by the Special Research Wing, Vigilance Department, Meerut. 3. Pursuant to the submission of the enquiry report against the petitioner, on 17.5.1982 a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner as to why punishment should not be awarded to him for committing irregularities. By the letter dated 1.10.1984, the petitioner demanded certain documents and records for submitting effective reply from Manager, Marketing Center, Gulaothi, Bulandshahar, who replied that the relevant record is available with the Special Research Wing, Vigilance Department, Meerut and he should contact the Vigilance Department. On receiving the said reply, the petitioner again wrote a letter to the Special Research Wing for supplying the certain documents but neither any reply was given nor the documents as demanded by the petitioner were made available. However, the petitioner submitted the reply on 17.11.1984 to the show cause notice pleading not guilty of the charges and also requested for furnishing the copies of certain documents. 5. On 21.5.1988, the General Manager (Administration), PCF Lucknow, passed an order revoking the order of suspension pending disposal of criminal case. By the said order the petitioner was posted at PCF Office, Bulandshahar. The petitioner was transferred to Balia on 1.3.2000. 6. On 13.9.2000, an order was passed by the respondent No. 2- Managing Director, U.P. Cooperative Federation directing recovery of Rs. By the said order the petitioner was posted at PCF Office, Bulandshahar. The petitioner was transferred to Balia on 1.3.2000. 6. On 13.9.2000, an order was passed by the respondent No. 2- Managing Director, U.P. Cooperative Federation directing recovery of Rs. 1,14,144.99 from the pay and other benefits payable to the petitioner for causing pecuniary loss to the Federation and dismissing the petitioner from service. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the impugned order dated 13.9.2000 is an order passed in arbitrary exercise of power and is in utter disregard of the provisions of Article 19 of the Constitution apart from being without jurisdiction for the reason that neither the relevant Act or Regulation/Bye-laws confer power upon the Managing Director to pass order of dismissal. The power of the Committee of Management, which is empowered to inflict punishment has not been delegated to the respondent No. 2 or to any other authority at the relevant time. Further, the punishment can be awarded as provided in Regulation 84 of the Regulation. 8. Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the impugned order dated 13.9.2000 inflicts two penalties for the same set of charges and, therefore, it is contrary to the provisions of Regulation 84. He also informed that the Managing Director while passing the impugned order did not assign any reason or ground on which the reply dated 17.11.1984, was found to be unsatisfactory whereas under Regulation 84 a duty has been cast upon the punishing authority to impose penalty upon an employee only when such authority finds the reply of the petitioner unsatisfactory. 9. Lastly, Counsel for the petitioner contended that on 13.1.1982 enquiry was initialed against the petitioner and the impugned order of dismissal has been passed on 13.9.2000 and as such there is inordinate long delay and the petitioner is unnecessarily being harassed and victimized for the last 20 years without there being any cogent reason. The entire enquiry proceedings and the impugned order is vitiated for the reason neither the documents as demanded by the petitioner through various written letters were supplied nor the due procedure of affording reasonable opportunity and making effective reply was afforded to the petitioner. 10. A preliminary objection has been raised by the Counsel for the opposite parties that the petitioner has an equally efficacious alternative remedy of preferring an application/representation under Section 128 of the Cooperative Societies Act. 10. A preliminary objection has been raised by the Counsel for the opposite parties that the petitioner has an equally efficacious alternative remedy of preferring an application/representation under Section 128 of the Cooperative Societies Act. In reply, Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order has been passed in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice and the order is without jurisdiction. Further, the writ petition was filed in the year 2000 and now after lapse of 8 years, relegating the petitioner to avail alternative remedy would be of no useful purpose and it would defeat the justice as the petitioner is out of job since last 8 years. 11. A Division Bench of this Court presided over by the Chief Justice held in Pradeep Kumar Singh v. U.P. State Sugar Corporation, Lucknow and another, 2002(20) LCD 46 held that alternative remedy is not a bar where a writ petition has been filed for enforcement of any fundamental rights; or where there is violation of principles of natural justice, or where the order or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. 12. The Apex Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Mark, 1998 SCC 1 , has held that if an order is violative of principles of natural justice in that case even if there is statutory alternative remedy available to the petitioner the High Court can interfere without relegating the petitioner pursue the alternative remedy. 13. Moreover, it is a settled law that question of maintainability of the writ petition is to be raised at the first instance and once the writ petition has been admitted the question of maintainability of the writ petition cannot be raised. Here, the writ petition was admitted on 24.1.2000 and at that time no question regarding maintainability of the writ petition was raised. Now, the parties have exchanged the affidavits. For the reasons aforesaid, the objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition is overruled. 14. Counsel for the respondent resisted the motion and submitted that the petitioner was initially appointed on consolidated pay on temporary basis and by the order dated 27.11.1976 he had been given regular pay scale on adhoc and temporary basis. For the reasons aforesaid, the objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition is overruled. 14. Counsel for the respondent resisted the motion and submitted that the petitioner was initially appointed on consolidated pay on temporary basis and by the order dated 27.11.1976 he had been given regular pay scale on adhoc and temporary basis. On 18.3.1981, the petitioner was given charge-sheet for committing certain irregularities to which the petitioner did not give any explanation within the time prescribed despite the time period was extended twice. Thereafter the petitioner sent a letter dated 6.7.1981 stating therein that he will submit explanation on 15.7.1981 but on this date, neither the petitioner appeared nor furnished the reply. As the petitioner had not given explanation to the charge-sheet as such on the basis of evidence mentioned in the charge-sheet and all the relevant record, the enquiry officer had submitted his report on 13.1.1982. It is incorrect to say that no opportunity was given to the petitioner to reply the charge-sheet. As a matter of fact reasonable opportunity was afforded to the petitioner but he did not avail the same. 15. As regard the competence of the Managing Director for passing the impugned order, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the Managing Director is the Chief Executive Officer of the Federation and was fully competent to pass the orders exercising the powers under the Act, Rules, Regulation and Bye-laws. Furthermore, the power of appointment authority had been delegated to the Managing Director vide order dated 14.5.1999. He also added that the impugned order is speaking order and has been passed after recording reasons and after obtaining prior concurrence from the Board. The petitioner has failed to produce any satisfactory evidence at the time of personal hearing given to him 18.6.1998. 16. As regard the passing of dismissal order and recovery of the amount, Counsel for the respondent submitted that the Rule 83 of the U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd. Karmchaari Sewa Niyamawali, 1980 provides for imposing more than one penalties. 17. The petitioner has failed to produce any satisfactory evidence at the time of personal hearing given to him 18.6.1998. 16. As regard the passing of dismissal order and recovery of the amount, Counsel for the respondent submitted that the Rule 83 of the U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd. Karmchaari Sewa Niyamawali, 1980 provides for imposing more than one penalties. 17. The Apex Court in Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India and others, (1986) 3 SCC 229 ; Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others v. B. Karunakar and others, (1993)4 SCC 727 ; State of U.P. v. Shatrughan Lal and another, (1998) 6 SCC 651 ; Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Limited v. Girja Shanker Pant and others, (2001) 1 SCC 182 ; Bhupinder Pal Singh v. Director General of Civil Aviation and others, (2003)3 SCC 633 , propounded that the petitioner has a right to be given copy of the relevant documents and shall also be allowed to inspect the relevant documents which were demanded by the petitioner, in the event their copies could not be supplied. 18. In the instant case, the petitioner was required to be present on 18.7.1981 for participation in the enquiry. When pursuant to the letter dated 7.7.1981, the petitioner went to the District Office, PCF, the Enquiry Officer was not present for conducting the enquiry. The petitioner has also indicated that again on 18.12.1981 a communication was issued by the Enquiry Officer fixing 28.12.1981 for holding enquiry. On 28.12.1981 when the petitioner reached the District Office, PCF Bulandshahar, the Enquiry Officer was not present. On 1.10.1984 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition), the petitioner demanded Copies of Stock Register pertaining to year 1978-79, 1979-80, Dead Stock Register for the year 1978-79 and 1977-78, Fertilizer Stock Register and other documents mentioned in the said letter. The respondents in the counter affidavit nowhere have stated that the copies of the documents as sought by the petitioner were supplied or he was allowed to inspect the same. It may also be mentioned that the disciplinary proceedings took almost 19 years to reach to its logical conclusions, which reflects the lackadaisical attitude of the authorities, who perhaps were not seriously interested in disciplinary proceedings and allowed them to go on according to their whims. 19. Before proceeding further, it is also relevant to mention that on 21.5.1988 the order of suspension passed against the petitioner was revoked pending trial. 19. Before proceeding further, it is also relevant to mention that on 21.5.1988 the order of suspension passed against the petitioner was revoked pending trial. In this order, it was also mentioned that decision regarding payment of salary during the period of suspension shall be taken after the judgment of the Trial Court. Nowhere in the counter affidavit it has been informed that as to what had happened in the Trial. 20. In Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India and others, (1986)3 SCC 229 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that no one facing a departmental enquiry can effectively meet the charges unless the copies of the relevant statements and documents to be used against him are made available to him. In the absence of such copies the concerned employee cannot prepare his defence, cross-examine the witnesses and point out the inconsistencies with a view to show that the allegations are incredible. Observance of natural justice and due opportunity has been held to be an essential ingredient in disciplinary proceedings and following this principle, the Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the order of removal of the petitioner. Bhupinder Pal Singh reported in (2003)3 SCC 633 . 21. In Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Limited v. Girja Shankar Pant and others, (2001)1 SCC 182 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that fundamental requirement of law is that the doctrine of natural justice should be complied with and has, as a matter of fact, turned out to be an integral part of administrative jurisprudence. It was also held in this case that at an enquiry facts have to be proved and the person proceeded against must have an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to give his own version or explanation about the evidence on which he is charged and to lead his defence. 22. I have given our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and have also examined the material on record including the enquiry report. Counsel for the respondent has also failed to show that the documents, which were demanded by the petitioner, were supplied to him during the course of enquiry. Such lapse would vitiate the departmental proceedings unless it was shown and established as a fact that non-supply of copies of those documents had not caused any prejudice to the delinquent in his defence. Such lapse would vitiate the departmental proceedings unless it was shown and established as a fact that non-supply of copies of those documents had not caused any prejudice to the delinquent in his defence. Furthermore, this Court in the case of Om Pal Singh v. District Development Officer, Ghaziabad and others, 2000(18) LCD 1239, has held that even if, the delinquent employee has not appeared, the charges could be held proved only after examination of witnesses and production of record to support the allegations. In the instant case, the report submitted by the enquiry officer does not reveal that any witness or the Departmental Presenting Officer was examined by the Enquiry Officer. In his report he has mentioned that after going through the records, the charge of Rs. 1,14,144.99 is proved against the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer for arriving on such a conclusion has disclosed no other reasons. 23. After having carefully examined the material on record and the decisions, referred to above, I am fully satisfied that enquiry proceedings were conducted in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice as such the impugned punishment order dated 13.9.2000 suffers from serious infirmities and is liable to be quashed. 24. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 13.9.2000 (Annexure-13) to the writ petition is hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be reinstated in service, if he has not attained the age of retirement and shall be entitled for all consequential benefits. In case the petitioner has attained the age of superannuation, he shall be entitled for the post retiral benefits like gratuity, pension, encashment etc. which shall be paid to the petitioner within a maximum period of four months. ————