ORDER N. PAUL VASANTHAKUMAR, J. - By consent of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as the learned Additional Government Pleader (Tax) appearing for the respondents, the writ petitions are taken up for final disposal even at the admission stage. Prayer in the writ petitions is to quash the order of the second respondent dated February 29, 2008 and direct the respondents to pass fresh orders of assessment by following circulars dated August 25, 1999 and April 20, 2001 by affording opportunity of personal hearing. The petitioner, a private limited company, is doing heavy civil contract works like infrastructure road construction for National Highways Authority of India, and is a registered dealer under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The petitioner is also doing quarry works. The second respondent called for accounts for the purpose of final assessment for the year 2003-04. The petitioner produced the accounts and on January 31, 2007 pre-assessment notice granting exemption towards the second sales of petrol and diesel and labour charges incurred in the execution of works contract. The second respondent in his notice proposed to assess the taxable turnover of Rs. 7,55,39,983. The petitioner filed objection on March 29, 2007. After considering the said objection final assessment order was passed on April 23, 2007 assessing the petitioner's total and taxable turnover of Rs. 59,68,38,597 and Rs. 7,47,64,812. The second respondent further issued a notice of revision of assessment for the year 2003-04 on May 25, 2007 based on the inspection of the enforcement wing officials on March 3, 2004 for suppression of Rs. 19,90,11,084. The petitioner filed an objection on June 18, 2007 and prayed for personal hearing. Again the revision of assessment notice was issued on June 18, 2007 proposing to levy tax on the deemed sale value of machineries, etc., for which the petitioner submitted objections on July 5, 2007. Again another revision of assessment notice dated October 26, 2007 was issued for which also the petitioner submitted objections on November 28, 2007. The objections having been rejected, final order was passed on May 14, 2008 raising a total demand of tax and penalty of Rs. 2,76,38,786. The said order is challenged in this writ petition on the ground of violation of natural justice. In W.P. No. 13185 of 2008, the very same petitioner is challenging the order of assessment and demand of Rs. 2,76,38,786. The said order is challenged in this writ petition on the ground of violation of natural justice. In W.P. No. 13185 of 2008, the very same petitioner is challenging the order of assessment and demand of Rs. 15,67,276, towards tax, surcharge and penalty. The second respondent called for accounts for the purpose of final assessment for the assessment year 2003-04. According to the petitioner, he produced the accounts and on January 31, 2007 the second respondent issued pre-assessment notice and proposed to assess the taxable turnover of Rs. 7,55,39,983. The petitioner filed objections on March 29, 2007 and stated that the proposed turnover of Rs. 7,75,171 cannot be brought to tax as no transfer of right is involved. The second respondent passed final assessment order on April 23, 2007 assessing the petitioner for a total taxable turnover of Rs. 59,68,38,597 and Rs. 7,47,64,812. A revision of assessment notice dated October 26, 2007 was issued proposing to levy tax on purchase value of the machinery and converting the entire purchase value as sales of machineries. The petitioner submitted objection on November 28, 2007. However, revised assessment order dated February 29, 2008 was received by the petitioner on May 14, 2008 demanding a sum of Rs. 42,40,740 towards tax, surcharge, additional tax and penalty. The said order is challenged in this writ petition without resorting to file appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under section 31 of the TNGST Act, 1959. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner - company as well as the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner - company submitted that even though appeal remedy before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, is provided under the Act, the impugned orders of assessment having been passed in violation of principles of natural justice, the petitioner is entitled to challenge the assessment orders in these writ petitions. The learned Additional Government Pleader submitted that adequate opportunity was given to the petitioner and if the petitioner has got any document to prove its case the same can be produced before the appellate authority, who will be in a position to render a factual finding. There is no controversy with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition though alternative remedy is available, and it depends upon the facts of each case and it is a rule of discretion/convenience. There is no controversy with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition though alternative remedy is available, and it depends upon the facts of each case and it is a rule of discretion/convenience. In this case, the facts are disputed by the respondent and the records are to be perused to find out the true facts. The learned Additional Government Pleader for the respondents contended that effective and adequate opportunity was given to the petitioner before passing the final assessment orders and principles of natural justice is not violated and therefore the petitioner can very well challenge the assessment orders of the respondent before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under section 31 of the TNGST Act, 1959. Section 31(3) mandates the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to dispose of the appeal in the following manner : "31(3) In disposing of an appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, after giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and for the sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing - (a) in the case of an order of assessment - (i) confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or the penalty or both; (ii) set aside the assessment and direct the assessing authority to make a fresh assessment after such further inquiry as may be directed; or (iii) pass such other orders as he may think fit; or (b) in the case of any other order, confirm, cancel or vary such order : Provided that at the hearing of any appeal against an order of the assessing authority, the assessing authority shall have the right to be heard either in person or by a representative." From the perusal of the above provision it is evident that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is empowered to confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or the penalty or both; set aside the assessment and direct the assessing authority to make a fresh assessment after such further inquiry as may be directed; or pass any order as he may think fit. It is also stated that the appellant is entitled to be heard either by person or by a representative. In view of the said power available to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the petitioner can re-argue the matter including raising of factual aspects, which can be verified by the appellate authority. It is also stated that the appellant is entitled to be heard either by person or by a representative. In view of the said power available to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the petitioner can re-argue the matter including raising of factual aspects, which can be verified by the appellate authority. It is well-settled in law that the disputed facts cannot be decided in a writ petition as held in the decision in Himmat Singh v. State of Haryana reported in [2006] 9 SCC 256. In yet another decision in Food Corporation of India v. Harmesh Chand reported in [2007] 7 MLJ 687 the Supreme Court held as follows : "Since the facts were seriously disputed by the appellant and no factual finding could be recorded without consideration of evidence adduced by the parties, it was not an appropriate case in which the High Court ought to have exercised its writ jurisdiction. The parties could have approached a civil court of competent jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter." When appealable order is passed, particularly when the facts are in dispute, writ petition filed under article 226 of the Constitution of India without availing of the alternate remedy is not maintainable is the consistent view taken by the Supreme Court and by this court. (a) In the decision C.C.T., Orissa v. Indian Explosives Ltd. reported in [2008] 14 VST 1; AIR 2008 SCW 1815 the Supreme Court set aside the order passed in a tax matter and in paragraph 7 held thus : "7. The High Court seems to have completely lost sight of the parameters highlighted by this court in a large number of cases relating to exhaustion of alternative remedy. Additionally the High Court did not even refer to the judgment of another Division Bench for the assessment year 1997-98 and assessment year 1998-99 in respect of ICI India Ltd. In any event the High Court ought to have referred to the ratio of the decision in the said case. That judicial discipline has not been adhered to. Looked at from any angle, the High Court's judgment is indefensible and is set aside." (b) A Division Bench of this court in the decision in Nivaram Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. CEGAT, Madras reported in [2006] 205 ELT 9 considered similar issue of by-passing alternate remedy in tax matters. In paragraphs 5 to 14 the Division Bench held as follows : "5. In paragraphs 5 to 14 the Division Bench held as follows : "5. It is well-settled by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court that particularly in tax matters there should be no short circuiting of the statutory remedies, vide Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1983] 53 STC 315; AIR 1983 SC 603 , Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar v. Dunlop India Limited [1985] 19 ELT 22 (SC); AIR 1985 SC 330 , etc. 6. It is well-settled that, when there is an alternative remedy ordinarily writ jurisdiction of this court, under article 226 of the Constitution should not be invoked. This principle applies with greater force regarding tax proceedings. As observed by the Supreme Court in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1983] 53 STC 315; AIR 1983 SC 603 : 'Where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of.' 7. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. AIR 1952 SC 192 held that as the Motor Vehicles Act is a self-contained code and itself provides for a forum for appeal/revision, the writ jurisdiction should not be invoked in matters relating to its provisions. A similar view was taken in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar v. Dunlop India Ltd. [1985] 19 ELT 22 (SC); AIR 1985 SC 330 . 8. In Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar v. Dunlop India Limited [1985] 19 ELT 22 (SC); AIR 1985 SC 330 the Supreme Court observed : 'In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1983] 53 STC 315 (SC); AIR 1983 SC 603 , A. P. Sen, E. S. Venkataramiah and R. B. Misra, JJ. held that where the statute itself provided the petitioners with an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the prescribed authority, a second appeal to the Tribunal and thereafter to have the case stated to the High Court, it was not for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution ignoring as it were, the complete statutory machinery. That it has become necessary, even now, for us to repeat this admonition is indeed a matter of tragic concern to us. That it has become necessary, even now, for us to repeat this admonition is indeed a matter of tragic concern to us. Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute are in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to article 226 of the Constitution. But, then the court must have good and sufficient reason to by-pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely, matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged.' 9. In C. A. Abraham v. Income-tax Officer [1961] 41 ITR 425 (SC); AIR 1961 SC 609 , H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-Cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopinath & Sons [1990] 77 STC 1; [1992] Suppl 2 SCC 312 and in Karnataka Chemical Industries v. Union of India [1999] 113 ELT 17; [2000] 10 SCC 13 the Supreme Court held that where there is a hierarchy of appeals provided by the statute the party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction. All these decisions are related to taxing statutes, and are hence apposite to the present context. 10. In Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh AIR 1999 SC 2859 and Punjab National Bank v. O. C. Krishnan [2001] 6 SCC 569 the Supreme Court held that if the statute provides for remedy of revision or appeal, writ jurisdiction should not be invoked. 11. In Union of India v. T. R. Verma AIR 1957 SC 882 the Supreme Court held that it is well-settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. 11. In Union of India v. T. R. Verma AIR 1957 SC 882 the Supreme Court held that it is well-settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under article 226 of the Constitution unless there are good grounds to do otherwise. 12. In A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan [2000] 7 SCC 695 the Supreme Court deprecated the practice of exercising the writ jurisdiction when an efficacious alternative remedy is available. 13. In W.P. No. 981 of 2003 (Tax) Khandelwal Soya Industries Ltd. v. State of U.P. decided on August 27, 2003 a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissed a writ petition challenging the provisional assessment orders under the U.P. Trade Tax Act on the ground of alternative remedy under section 9 of that Act. Against the aforesaid judgment, special leave petition was filed before the Supreme Court which has been dismissed. We respectfully agree with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in the aforesaid decision. 14. We are therefore surprised that the writ petition was entertained at all by this court." (c) Same is the view taken by different Division Benches of this court in (Sharda Industries v. Commercial Tax Officer, Chennai) W.A. No. 1555 to 1557 of 2007, dated December 10, 2007; (Srinivasa Trading Co. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer) W.A. Nos. 749 and 750 of 2006, dated June 22, 2006 and W.A. Nos. 590 and 591 of 2008 dated June 11, 2008 (Chopard Builders Ltd. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Coimbatore [2009] 22 VST 134 (Mad)). In W.A. Nos. 590 and 591 of 2008 the First Bench of this court by order dated June 11, 2008 (Chopard Builders Ltd. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer [2009] 22 VST 134 (Mad)) held as follows : "2. These writ appeals have been filed challenging an order passed by the learned single judge, dated September 17, 2007 (Chopard Builders (P.) Ltd. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer [2009] 22 VST 126 (Mad)). Subject-matter of the challenge was an order passed by the assessing authority under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. These writ appeals have been filed challenging an order passed by the learned single judge, dated September 17, 2007 (Chopard Builders (P.) Ltd. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer [2009] 22 VST 126 (Mad)). Subject-matter of the challenge was an order passed by the assessing authority under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. We need to consider the merits of the case, as in view of the admitted position against the order of the assessment officer, statutory appeal is provided. We just remind ourselves of the repeated directions given by the apex court that in the Revenue matters, the taxing statute itself is a complete code and the writ court should not ordinarily interfere unless the assessee had exhausted all his statutory remedies. In view of this well-settled principle, we direct the appellant to file an appeal within a period of three weeks from today before the appellate authority. ..." (d) In the decision of Sharda Industries v. Commercial Tax Officer, Chennai reported in [2008] 14 VST 276 (Mad) similar view was taken by a learned single judge (M. Jaichandren, J). The learned Additional Government Pleader submitted that the said view of the learned single judge was confirmed by a Division Bench. In view of the settled legal position, i.e., disputed facts cannot be gone into in a writ petition and in tax matters wherever alternate remedy is provided, writ petition shall not be entertained, I am of the view that these writ petitions challenging the orders of assessment made by the respondent, are not maintainable and the petitioner is bound to file appeals against the said orders of assessment as per section 31 of the Act. The petitioner is given two weeks' time to file appeals against the orders of the assessment and if such appeals are filed within two weeks, the appellate authority is directed to consider the same on merits and in accordance with law, without referring to the period of limitation. Since I am dismissing the writ petitions solely on the ground of availability of alternate remedy, merits of the cases canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner - company and by the learned Additional Government Pleader are not considered and decided in this order, in any manner. Both the writ petitions are dismissed with the above observations. No costs. Connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed.