Karpagavalli v. The Secretary to the Government, Food and Consumer Protection Department
2008-07-07
D.MURUGESAN, S.PALANIVELU
body2008
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- D. Murugesan, J. The petitioner is the wife of the detenu - G.Selvaraj. The detenu was branded as Black Marketeer and clamped with the order of detention dated 03.02.2008 passed under Section 3 (1)(a) r/w 3 (1) of the Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (Central Act No.7 of 1980). There were four adverse cases to the credit of the detenu for the offence under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Challenging the above said order of detention, the present Habeas Corpus Petition is filed. 2. Heard Mr.V.Parthiban, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. We have also heard Mr.M.Babu Muthu Meeran, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, representing on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2 and Mr.P.Kumaresan, learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel, representing on behalf of the third respondent. 3. Even though the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner based his arguments on various grounds assailing the order of detention, suffice it to discuss the only contention in regard to the discrepancy in the copy of order of remand furnished to the detenu, for the purpose of disposal of this Habeas Corpus Petition. 4. The detenu was arrested on 01.02.2008 and was remanded to judicial custody till 15.02.2008. There is no dispute that the order of detention was passed on 03.02.2008; that the detaining authority was satisfied that the detenu was produced before the Judicial Magistrate No.IV, Thirupathur on 01.02.2008; that the detenue was ordered to be remanded till 15.02.2008, and that he was lodged in Central Prison, Vellore as under-trial prisoner as could be seen from page-5 of the grounds of detention. A copy of the remand report was furnished to the detenu which is found at page-114 of the booklet. A perusal of the same would go to show that the detenu was produced at the residence of the learned Judicial Magistrate and he was remanded till 15.02.2008. Though the order of remand came to be passed on 01.02.2008, the copy of the same was signed by the Head Clerk of the concerned Court only on 04.02.2008. Therefore, the detaining authority could not have even furnished the copy of the order of remand on 03.02.2008. Further, in order to arrive at the satisfaction that the detenue was in remand, the detaining authority has relied upon the affidavit of the sponsoring authority dated 02.02.2008.
Therefore, the detaining authority could not have even furnished the copy of the order of remand on 03.02.2008. Further, in order to arrive at the satisfaction that the detenue was in remand, the detaining authority has relied upon the affidavit of the sponsoring authority dated 02.02.2008. The said affidavit was not furnished to the detenue and still worse is that a representation was made on 09.04.2008 for furnishing a copy of the affidavit of the sponsoring authority to make an effective representation. If that be so, how the detaining authority came to the conclusion that the detenu was in remand on 03.02.2008. Only after the said representation, a reply was sent which was served on the detenu only on 27.02.2008 including the copy of the affidavit of the sponsoring authority belatedly 12 days after the order of detention. Section 8 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, Slum Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982), contemplates that all the documents which have been relied upon by the detaining authority should be furnished within a period of 5 days, failing which the order of detention is vitiated. There is no dispute that the affidavit of the sponsoring authority dated 02.02.2008 which was relied upon by the detaining authority, has not been furnished within 5 days as contemplated under the Act. In view of the above, the detenu was denied his right to make an effective representation. Therefore, the order of detention is vitiated and the same is liable to be set aside. 5. For the said reason, we are of the considered view that the order of detention is vitiated and the same is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the Habeas Corpus Petition is allowed and the impugned order of detention is set aside. The detenu is directed to be set at liberty forthwith, unless he is required in connection with any other case.