Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 2289 (RAJ)

RIICO v. B. O. R.

2008-09-29

N.K.JAIN

body2008
Honble JAIN, J.—Though the subject matter of both the writ petitions is different, yet the land in question and parties to the proceedings are similar, therefore, on the request of learned counsel for both the parties, both the writ petitions were heard together and are being disposed of finally by this common order. CW No.2035/2008 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that a Revenue Suit No.252/1985 was filed by the plaintiff-respondents, namely, Kanhaiyalal, Hazarilal and Smt. Meera Devi under Sections 88 and 89 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, in the Court of Assistant Collector & Magistrate, Jaipur (for short, the ACM) for declaration to the effect that the total area of agriculture land, bearing Khasra Nos.203 and 204, situated in Village Jhalana-Chaur, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur, was 22 bigha 8 biswa, as the total area of the land has wrongly been entered as 19 bigha 4 biswa in stead of 22 bigha 8 biswa in the last settlement took place in Samvat Year 2015 (corresponding Year 1958), and, as such, the remaining land measuring 3 bigha 4 biswa could not be recorded in their names, therefore, it be declared that the plaintiffs are khatedartenants of the remaining land measuring 3 bigha 4 biswa of Khasra No.203 and 204. In support of their case, the plaintiffs placed on the record a copy of jamabandi, khasra-girdawari, purcha-settlement,settlement-slip,receiptlagaan and statement-of-Patwari-Halka Durga dated 15th April, 1958. 3. The summons were issued to the defendants and, in response thereto, the defendant State Government filed its written statement through Tehsildar, Sanganer, on 3rd/7th February, 1986, wherein it was admitted that total area of the land of Khasra Nos.203 and 204 was 22 bigha 8 biswa. 4. The issues were framed on 26th February, 1986. The plaintiffs examined PW-1 Hazarilal and PW-2. No evidence was led on behalf of the defendants. 5. The ACM (trainee), Jaipur, vide its judgment dated 21st June, 1986, dismissed the suit. Being aggrieved with the same, an appeal was preferred by the plaintiffs, which was allowed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur, vide its judgment dated 2nd August, 1986 and the order of the ACM was set-aside and it was declared that the plaintiffs are khatedartenants of the land bearing Khasra No.203 and 204 measuring 22 bigha 8 biswa. Being aggrieved with the same, an appeal was preferred by the plaintiffs, which was allowed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur, vide its judgment dated 2nd August, 1986 and the order of the ACM was set-aside and it was declared that the plaintiffs are khatedartenants of the land bearing Khasra No.203 and 204 measuring 22 bigha 8 biswa. It was also declared that the plaintiffs No.1 and 2 are equal share-holders of the land measuring 19 bigha 4 biswa and, in remaining land, the plaintiffs No.1 and 2 will have equal in half share and the plaintiff No.3 Mst. Meera Devi will have half share. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment, the State of Rajasthan preferred second appeal before the Revenue Board but the same was also dismissed vide judgment dated 14th December, 1993. 6. Although, the suit of the plaintiffs for declaration had been decreed by the Revenue Appellate Authority and thereafter by the Revenue Board vide judgment dated 2nd August, 1986 and 14th December, 1993, respectively, as referred above, but there was some error in comparative chart of old and new khasra numbers, therefore, the plaintiff-respondents Kanhaiyalal, Hazarilal and Smt. Meera Devi filed an application in the Court of SDO, II, Jaipur, under Section 136 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act for correction in the revenue record to the extent that in respect of the present Khasra No.291 measuring 0.81 hectare the old Khasra Nos.203 and 204 may be mentioned. The non-applicant No.4 RIICO/petitioner contested the said application by filing written reply dated 6th August, 2001. The non-applicant No.2 State of Rajasthan also filed written-reply dated 30th January, 2002. The learned SDO vide its judgment dated 2nd November, 2004 allowed the application and passed an order that the present Khasra No.291 measuring 0.81 hectare is part of old Khasra No.203 and 204. Being aggrieved with the same, the non-applicant No.4 RIICO filed an appeal before the Divisional Commissioner, Jaipur, which was dismissed vide judgment dated 26th June, 2006. Thereafter the RIICO again preferred second appeal before the Revenue Board, which was also dismissed vide order dated 24th July, 2007. Being aggrieved with the same, the non-applicant No.4 RIICO filed an appeal before the Divisional Commissioner, Jaipur, which was dismissed vide judgment dated 26th June, 2006. Thereafter the RIICO again preferred second appeal before the Revenue Board, which was also dismissed vide order dated 24th July, 2007. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid three orders dated 24.07.2007, 26.06.2006 and 02.11.2004, the petitioner RIICO has preferred Writ Petition No.2035/2008, wherein, in addition to aforesaid orders, the petitioner has also challenged the earlier orders dated 14.12.1993 passed by the Revenue Board and the order dated 02.08.1986 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority. CW No.2036/2008 7. The plaintiffs Kanhaiyalal, Hazarilal and Smt. Meera Devi, filed another suit on 5th June, 1987 for permanent injunction under Section 188 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act against the Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation Limited and the State of Rajasthan, in the Court of ACM, Chaksu, Camp at Sanganer, praying therein that the suit of the plaintiffs be decreed and the defendant No.1 RIICO be restrained by way of permanent injunction not to interfere in the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over the land bearing Khasra No.203 and 204 measuring 3 bigha 4 biswa situated in village Jhalana- Chaur, Tehsil Sanganer, and further the plaintiffs may not be dispossessed from the same. It was pleaded in the plaint that the total area of the land bearing Khasra Nos.203 and 204 was 22 bigha and 8 biswa but, in last settlement, the total area thereof was wrongly reduced/written as 19 bigha 4 biswa instead of 22 bigha 8 biswa, whereas the plaintiffs were in possession of the total land measuring 22 bigha 8 biswa. The plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the State Government, which was initially dismissed by the ACM but the same has now been decreed by the Revenue Appellate Authority vide its judgment dated 2nd August, 1986 and it has been declared that the total area of Khasra No.203 and 204 was 22 bigha 8 biswa and, in pursuance thereof, mutation entry No.2 has been opened on 28th May, 1987 by the Assistant Land Settlement Officer, Jaipur. 8. The defendant No.1 RIICO filed its written statement. 8. The defendant No.1 RIICO filed its written statement. The defendant No.2 the State of Rajasthan also filed its separate written statement wherein again this fact was admitted that the total area of the land bearing Khasra No.203 and 204 was 22 bigha 8 biswa. 9. The said suit was decreed by the ACM, Chaksu vide judgment dated 7th January, 1989. Being aggrieved with the same, an appeal was preferred by the RIICO before the Revenue Appellate Authority but the same was dismissed vide judgment dated 12th June, 1990. Thereafter the RIICO preferred second appeal before the Revenue Board, Rajasthan, Ajmer. During the pendency of that second appeal, the defendant RIICO filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC for amendment in the written statement which was allowed by the Revenue Board at the costs of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only). The amended written statement was placed on the record. The time was sought to file rejoinder which was allowed but the rejoinder could not be filed. However, both the parties agreed before the Revenue Board that since the written statement has been filed the further proceedings will take place in the trial court i.e. the ACM Chaksu in the case, so it was prayed that the case be remanded back to the said court with a direction to grant an opportunity to the plaintiffs to file rejoinder and thereafter to decide the case after framing necessary issues and allowing the parties to lead their evidence in the case. Consequently, the Revenue Board, vide its judgment dated 10th June, 1997, allowed the second appeal of the RIICO, in part. The judgments dated 12th June, 1990 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority and dated 7th January, 1989 passed by the ACM Chaksu, Camp at Sanganer, were set-aside. The case was remanded back to the Court of ACM Chaksu with a direction that the plaintiffs be allowed to file rejoinder up-to 24th July, 1997 and thereafter the issues be framed again and case be decided afresh after taking evidence of both the parties. 10. The case was remanded back to the Court of ACM Chaksu with a direction that the plaintiffs be allowed to file rejoinder up-to 24th July, 1997 and thereafter the issues be framed again and case be decided afresh after taking evidence of both the parties. 10. During the pendency of the suit, the rejoinder could not be filed by the plaintiffs up-to 24th July, 1997 and an application was filed by the plaintiffs to grant permission to file rejoinder explaining the reasons for delay - that copy of amended written statement was not received in time, the plaintiffs brotherin- law expired untimely and the Court of ACM Chaksu was changed for Sanganer Tehsil to Sub Divisional Officer II, Jaipur (for short, the SDO), therefore, the file of the case had not been transferred to the Court of SDO II, Jaipur, therefore, there is delay of 20 days which may be condoned and time may be extended to file rejoinder. The application was contested by the defendants. However, the SDO II, Jaipur, allowed the application of the plaintiffs to place on the record their rejoinder at the costs of Rs.500/- (Rupees five hundred) vide order dated 10th March, 2004. Being aggrieved with the same, a revision petition was preferred by the petitioner RIICO before the Revenue Board contending therein that it was only a Revenue Board who could have extended time to file rejoinder as the time limit to file rejoinder was fixed by the Revenue Board, therefore, the SDO committed an illegality in extending the time to file rejoinder. The Revenue Board, vide its judgment dated 24th July, 2007 dismissed the revision petition observing that the court below has extended the time in the interest of justice while exercising the powers under Section 151 CPC and even if the trial Court was not empowered to extend the time then the Revenue Board is empowered to extend the time and, in the interest of justice, the Revenue Board extended the time to file rejoinder on payment of Costs of Rs.5,000/-, and, in view of this, the objection of the defendant about extension of time to file rejoinder does not exist. The said order of the Revenue Board dated 24th July, 2007 is under challenge in the Writ Petition No.2036/2008, preferred by the defendant No.1 petitioner, RIICO. 11. The said order of the Revenue Board dated 24th July, 2007 is under challenge in the Writ Petition No.2036/2008, preferred by the defendant No.1 petitioner, RIICO. 11. So far as the Writ Petition No.2036/2008, wherein the orders dated 24.07.2007 and 10.03.2004 have been challenged, is concerned, the aforesaid facts will reveal that although the Revenue Board, vide its judgment dated 10th June, 1997 allowed the plaintiffs to file their rejoinder up-to 24th July, 1997 but the learned SDO, looking to the facts and circumstances of that case and the reasons assigned in the application, allowed the plaintiffs to file their rejoinder at the later date at the costs of Rs.500/-. The Revenue Board examined the matter and dismissed the revision of the petitioner RIICO vide order dated 24th July, 2007 observing that the SDO has extended the time to file rejoinder while exercising powers under Section 151 CPC but even if it is assumed that the SDO had no authority to extend the time fixed by the Revenue Board then the same is now being extended by it at the costs of Rs.5000/-. The whole grievance of the petitioner is that the time fixed by the Revenue Board for filing the rejoinder could not have been extended by the SDO, but, in view of the fact that the Revenue Board itself has now extended the time to file rejoinder, the objection of the learned counsel for the petitioner does not exist. The plaintiffs moved an application for condonation of delay for extension of time to file rejoinder wherein it was mentioned that copy of amended written-statement was not received by them in time as it was filed at a later stage, their brother-in-law had died untimely and the Court of ACM Chaksu, Tehsil Sanganer had been transferred to the Court of SDO II, Jaipur and the file of the present case had not been transferred from the Court of ACM Chaksu to the Court of SDO-II, therefore, the rejoinder could not be filed in time and there was delay of 20 days. In these circumstances, the learned Revenue Board was fully justified in extending the time to file rejoinder and I do not find any illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order dated 24th July, 2007, so as to interfere with the same. 12. In these circumstances, the learned Revenue Board was fully justified in extending the time to file rejoinder and I do not find any illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order dated 24th July, 2007, so as to interfere with the same. 12. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in the Writ Petition No.2036/2008 and the same is accordingly dismissed. WP NO.2035/2008 13. So far as Writ Petition No.2035/2008 is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner RIICO contended that the land, in dispute, bearing Khasra No.203 and 204 was acquired by the State of Rajasthan for the petitioner RIICO way back in the year 1982. The declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 24th June, 1982; the possession thereof was taken on 18th October, 1982; the award was passed on 14th May, 1984 and the compensation was also accepted, therefore, there was no occasion to file any suit by the plaintiff-respondents. He further contended that although the Revenue Suit No.252/1985 was filed by the plaintiffrespondents way back in the year 1985 for declaration to the effect that the total area of land bearing Khasra Nos.203 and 204 was 22 bigha 8 biswa, which was wrongly reduced/written as 19 bigha 4 biswa in the last settlement took place in Samvat 2015 (Corresponding Year 1958) but in the said suit the petitioner RIICO was not impleaded as a party defendant, therefore, it could not contest the matter and non-impleadment of the RIICO as defendant party to the suit itself is a fraud committed on the Court and on this ground alone the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority dated 2nd August, 1986 and the order dated 14th December, 1993 passed by the Revenue Board, decreeing the suit of the plaintiff-respondents, are liable to be quashed and set aside. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the petitioner RIICO was not a party to the Revenue Suit No.252/1985 which was decreed by the Revenue Appellate Authority and the Revenue Board, therefore, the said judgments are not binding on it. He further contended that there was no record available in favour of the plaintiffs and the suit has wrongly been decreed. He further contended that there was no record available in favour of the plaintiffs and the suit has wrongly been decreed. He also contended that there was no occasion for the Tehsildar Sanganer to file written statement admitting the fact of plaint that the total area of the land bearing Khasra Nos.203 and 204 was 22 bigha 8 biswa. He also contended that the SDO, Divisional Commissioner and the Revenue Board committed an illegality in allowing the application of the plaintiffrespondents filed under Section 136 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act for correction in the revenue record, therefore, their judgments dated 2nd November, 2004, 26th June, 2006 and 24th July 2007 are liable to be set-aside by this court. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon S.P. Chengal Varaya Naidu vs. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1 , and United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Rajendra Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 581 . 15. The learned counsel for the plaintiffrespondents contended that there is ample evidence available on the record to show that total area of the land bearing Khasra No.203 and 204 was 22 bigha 8 biswa which was wrongly reduced/written as 19 bigha 4 biswa in the last settlement took place in Samvat Year 2015 (Corresponding Year 1958). He contended that from the Notification of acquisition it is clear that only 19 bigha 4 biswa land out of the land bearing Khasra Nos.203 and 204 was acquired and remaining land measuring 3 bigha 4 biswa remained in the possession of the plaintiff-respondents, where their residential houses are situated and they have been residing even today since then. He contended that it was a mistake committed by the Revenue Officers while preparing settlement record. Section 6 declaration and award, all were passed only in respect of the land measuring 19 bigha 4 biswa out of the land bearing Khasra No.203 nd 204 and not for the land measuring 22 bigha 8 biswa. The necessary correction was made in subsequent settlement of 1971 but it could not come into effect and in the meantime the Notification was issued and as per the revenue record the Notification was issued in respect of the land measuring 19 bigha 4 biswa of Khasra No.203 and 204. The necessary correction was made in subsequent settlement of 1971 but it could not come into effect and in the meantime the Notification was issued and as per the revenue record the Notification was issued in respect of the land measuring 19 bigha 4 biswa of Khasra No.203 and 204. In these circumstances, it was necessary for the plaintiffs to file a suit for declaration under Sections 88 and 89 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, which was filed way back in the year 1985 itself. He further contended that the necessary party to the suit for declaration regarding total area of land is the State Government through Tehsildar; and, as per the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, the suit was filed against the State of Rajasthan through Tehsildar, which was the only necessary party; the present petitioner RIICO was not a necessary party in the said proceedings; the dispute relates only in respect of the land measuring 3 bigha 4 biswa of Khasra Nos.203 and 204, which was never acquired and no declaration or award was passed in respect thereto; the said land i.e. 3 bigha 4 biswa was never taken in possession by the petitioner RIICO. The defendant State of Rajasthan filed its written statement dated 3rd/7th February, 1986 wherein this fact was admitted that total area of the land bearing Khasra No.203 and 204 was 22 bigha 8 biswa and as per the provisions of the Evidence Act the admission is the best evidence and the suit could have been decreed only on the basis of the admission of the defendant but still the suit of the plaintiffs based on documentary evidence was dismissed. The learned ACM, who was only a trainee, committed an illegality in dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs vide its judgment dated 21st June, 1986, which was rightly set-aside by the Revenue Appellate Authority vide judgment dated 2nd August, 1986 which has further been affirmed by the Revenue Board vide judgment dated 14th December, 1993. 16. So far as subsequent orders passed by the SDO, Divisional Commissioner and the Revenue board on the application of the plaintiffs under Section 136 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act for correction in the revenue record, are concerned, the same are only the consequential orders. There was wrong entry in the comparative list of old and new Khasra numbers. 16. So far as subsequent orders passed by the SDO, Divisional Commissioner and the Revenue board on the application of the plaintiffs under Section 136 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act for correction in the revenue record, are concerned, the same are only the consequential orders. There was wrong entry in the comparative list of old and new Khasra numbers. The present Khasra No.291 measuring 0.81 hectare had arisen out of the old Khasra Nos.203 and 204. The learned SDO rightly allowed the application and the said order has been upheld by the Divisional Commissioner and the Revenue Board. He contended that under the garb of the orders dated 02.11.2004, 26.06.2006 and 24.07.2007, as referred above, the petitioner RIICO cannot be allowed to challenge the order of the Revenue Board dated 14.12.1993 and the judgment dated 02.08.1986 passed by the Revenue appellate Authority. 17. The learned counsel for the plaintiff respondents further contended that in fact the impugned orders are of the Revenue Appellate Authority and the Revenue Board, which were passed in 1986 and 1993, and the same are binding on the petitioner RIICO also and the petitioner had knowledge about these judgments since 1987, as a reference of the judgment of the Revenue Appellate Authority dated 2nd August, 1986 was given in another suit for permanent injunction filed on 5th June, 1987, wherein the RIICO was defendant No.1 but the said judgment was not challenged by the petitioner RIICO since 1987 and the present writ petition, wherein the said judgment has been challenged, is liable to be dismissed only on the ground of delay and laches. He also contended that the judgments have been passed on the basis of the record and admission of the defendant State of Rajasthan in the written statement, therefore, no fraud has been committed by the plaintiffs in any manner and there is no basis of submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner RIICO in this regard. He next contended that if any party takes a plea of fraud then it is required that fraud should be pleaded and proved. He next contended that if any party takes a plea of fraud then it is required that fraud should be pleaded and proved. There is nothing on the record to show that the plea of fraud has been pleaded and proved by the defendant-petitioner RIICO at any stage and there is no finding of any court in this regard, therefore, the judgments referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner RIICO are of no consequence in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 18. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the following judgments:- 1. Gayatri Devi vs. Shashi Pal Singh (2005) 5 SCC 527 2. Ishwardas vs. State of M.P. - AIR 1979 SC 551 3. P. Girdharan Prasad Missir vs. State of Bihar - AIR 1968 Patna 77 4. Hari Singh vs. State of U.P. - AIR 1984 SC 1020 5. State of Haryana vs. Ajay Walia - (1997) 6 SCC 255 and 6. Poosa Ram vs. The Board of Revenue - RLW 1995 (2) (Raj.) 561 19. I have carefully considered and examined the impugned judgments in the light of submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. 20. In S.P. Chengal Varaya Naidu vs. Jagannath (Supra) the Honble Apex Court held that the judgment or decree obtained by fraud is to be treated as nullity and can be questioned even in collateral proceedings, and such judgment or decree is liable to be set aside. The Honble Apex Court in Para 6 of the judgment held as under:- “6. .....A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by anothers loss. ............ A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party.” 21. In United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Rajendra Singh (Supra) the Honble Apex Court considered its earlier decision in S.P. Chengal Varaya Naidus case (Supra), and in Para 3 of the judgment held as under:- “3. In United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Rajendra Singh (Supra) the Honble Apex Court considered its earlier decision in S.P. Chengal Varaya Naidus case (Supra), and in Para 3 of the judgment held as under:- “3. “Fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over all these centuries. Lord Denning observed in a language without equivocation that “no judgment of a court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for, fraud unravlels everything” (Lazarus Estates Ltd. vs. Beasley (1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 2 WLR 502 (CA).” 22. In Gayatri Devi vs. Shashi Pal Singh (Supra) the Honble Apex Court considered the above referred two judgments in United India Insurance Company Limiteds case and in S.P. Chengal Varaya Naidus case (Supra) and held that fraud must necessarily be pleaded and proved. Para 13 to 16 of the judgment reads as under:- “13. The history of this litigation shows nothing but cussedness and lack of bona fides on the part of the respondent. Apart from his tenacity and determination to prevent the appellants from enjoying the fruits of the decree, there appears to be nothing commendable in the case. Even before us the same arguments of fraud, and that the appellants were not legally owners of the suit property, were pleaded. 14. In the first place, it appears to us that the revision petition before the High Court was wholly incompetent in view of the amended provision of section 115 CPC. The Revision Petition was entertained at the stage of interlocutory proceedings. As laid down by this Court in Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society vs. Swaraj Developers, an order interim in nature or which does not finally decide the lis, cannot be challenged by way of a revision under section 115 of the CPC. 15. In Ravinder Kaur vs. Ashok Kumar a two Judge Bench of this Court observed: "Courts of law should be careful enough to see through such diabolical plans of the judgmentdebtors to deny the decreeholders the fruits of the decree obtained by them. These type of errors on the part of the judicial forums only encourage frivolous and cantankerous litigations causing laws delay and bringing bad name to the judicial system." 16. These type of errors on the part of the judicial forums only encourage frivolous and cantankerous litigations causing laws delay and bringing bad name to the judicial system." 16. In our view these observations aptly apply to the case before us. The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgment of this Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v Jagannath and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Rajendra Singh to contend that there was a fraud played upon the court and the fraud unravels everything. As a general proposition, the proposition is right. But fraud must necessarily be pleaded and proved. In the entire history of litigation nothing was pleaded, much less proved, as fraud. We cannot countenance the plea of fraud without any basis.” 23. In Ishwardas vs. State of M.P. (Supra) the Honble Apex Court considered the provisions of Section 11 of the CPC and held as under:- “In order to sustain the plea of res judicata it is not necessary that all the parties to the two litigations must be common. All that is necessary is that the issue should be between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim.” 24. In P. Girdharan Prasad Missir vs. State of Bihar (Supra) the Division Bench of Patna High Court held that the writ petition filed after 17 months from the date of award in land acquisition proceedings, is liable to be dismissed only on the ground of delay alone. Para No.8 of the judgment is reproduced as under:- “8. Taking first the question of undue delay, I find that though the petitioners were fully aware of the termination of the land acquisition proceeding by the end of July, 1962, and had actually filed an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act as early as 31st July, 1962, for reference to the District Judge against the award. They did not care to challenge the legality of the award either by way of writ petition or by way of another suit till seventeen months later. The petitioners have clearly admitted in paragraphs 30 and 32 of their petition that they were fully aware as early as July-August, 1962 not only about the giving of the award in the land acquisition proceeding but also of the delivery of possession by the Collector to the respondent Company on the 27th August, 1962. The petitioners have clearly admitted in paragraphs 30 and 32 of their petition that they were fully aware as early as July-August, 1962 not only about the giving of the award in the land acquisition proceeding but also of the delivery of possession by the Collector to the respondent Company on the 27th August, 1962. They should, therefore, have immediately challenged the validity of the award by an appropriate proceeding. No explanation has been given for this delay of more than seventeen months. 25. On the other hand, while challenging the quantum of the compensation awarded to them by applying for a reference to the District Judge under Section 18 of the Act, the petitioners challenged the legality of the land acquisition proceeding only in the execution proceeding, first before the Munsif of Bettiah and then on appeal before the Additional Subordinate Judge and then by way of second appeal before the High Court. This unexplained delay is itself a good ground for dismissing this writ petition. Secondly, the principle of res judicata is an insurmountable hurdle to the petitioners getting any relief here now. I have briefly described the main points in controversy between the petitioners and respondent no.2 in the three courts where the executability of the decree obtained by the plaintiffs was under challenge in an application under S.47, Code of Civil Procedure. The main ground on which the decree was alleged to be non-executable was that by virtue of the land acquisition proceeding and its due termination the petitioners right to execute the decree for delivery of possession was completely extinguished. The bona fides of the acquisition proceeding was challenged on grounds almost identical with those taken here. But these were all rejected both by the executing court (Munsif, Bettiah) on the 10th September, 1962, and by the 2nd Additional Subordinate Judge in appeal on the 26th July, 1963. It is true that in second appeal, No.250 of 1963, the petitioner did not again press the question about the invalidity of the acquisition proceedings, but as that second appeal was dismissed and the lower courts orders were confirmed, the decision of this vital issue by the lower courts will operate as res judicata.” 26. It is true that in second appeal, No.250 of 1963, the petitioner did not again press the question about the invalidity of the acquisition proceedings, but as that second appeal was dismissed and the lower courts orders were confirmed, the decision of this vital issue by the lower courts will operate as res judicata.” 26. In Hari Singh vs. State of U.P. (Supra) the Honble Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground of laches, which was filed challenging the validity of the Notification, after 2½ years. Para No.4 of the judgment is reproduced as under: “4. At the out set we are of the view that the writ petition filed in July, 1982 questioning the notification issued in January, 1980 after a delay of nearly two and a half years is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches only. It is no doubt true that the appellants have pleaded that they did not know anything about the notifications which had been published in the Gazette till they came to know of the notices issued under Section 9 (3) of the Act but they have not pleaded that there was no publication in the locality of the public notice of the substance of the notification as required by Section 4(1) of the Act. It should be presumed that official acts would have been performed duly as required by law. It is significant that a large number of persons who own the remaining plots have not challenged the acquisition proceedings. The only other petition in which these proceedings are challenged in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.11476 of 1982 on the file of the High Court filed subsequently by Amar Singh and four others. Moreover in a small place like Kheragarh where these plots are situate, the acquisition of these lands would be the talk of the town in a shortwhile and it is difficult to believe that the appellants who are residents of that place would not have known till July, 1982 that the impugned notification had been published in 1980. Any interference in this case filed after two and a half years with the acquisition proceedings is likely to cause serious public prejudice. This appeal should, therefore, fail on the ground of delay alone.” 27. Any interference in this case filed after two and a half years with the acquisition proceedings is likely to cause serious public prejudice. This appeal should, therefore, fail on the ground of delay alone.” 27. In State of Haryana vs. Ajay Walia (Supra) the writ petition, filed after a delay of 13 years, was dismissed and it was observed that the representations filed repeatedly do not furnish the cause of action. Para No.6 of the Judgment is reproduced as under:- “6. The facts reveal that requisition was made for recruitment of only four candidates. The Service Selection Board had no power and jurisdiction to select as many as 28 candidates and to recommend their names to various departments for appointment. In the circumstances, when the Superintending Engineer, Hathnikund, Circle had not requisitioned appointment of 8 candidates including the respondent, he rightly did not accede to and returned the list to the Board stating that he could not make any appointment as the ad hoc Sub- Divisional Clerks already working had obtained stay from the High Court against their termination. In these circumstances, the direction asking the Superintending Engineer to appoint the respondent, issued by the High Court is obviously illegal. Moreover the selection was made in 1982 and writ petition came to be filed in 1995, i.e., after an inordinate delay. Representations repeatedly given to various authorities do not furnish her fresh cause of action to file writ petition. The High Court is wholly unjustified to have entertained and allowed the writ petition.” 28. In Poosa Ram vs. The Board of Revenue and Others (Supra), the Division Bench of this Court held that the Land Revenue Officer is competent and has power, even after the settlement operations are over, to correct their own entries in the revenue registers, which are the parts of the record of the rights. The Division Bench, in Para No.7 of the Judgment, held as under:- “7. The view taken by the Revenue Appellate Authority as well as by the Board of Revenue, is not correct. The order ,passed by the Land Record Officer, was not without jurisdiction. He has powers, under Section 136 of the Act, to decide the dispute relating to the correction of the entry, i.e., to correct the errors which crept in the Record during the settlement/survey operation. He acted within his jurisdiction and passed the order. The order ,passed by the Land Record Officer, was not without jurisdiction. He has powers, under Section 136 of the Act, to decide the dispute relating to the correction of the entry, i.e., to correct the errors which crept in the Record during the settlement/survey operation. He acted within his jurisdiction and passed the order. The Revenue Appellate Authority as well as the Board of Revenue have not decided the appeals on merits and dismissed the same merely on the technical ground relating to maintainability of the case. The orders passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Bikaner (Camp Sri Ganganagar) as well as by the Board of Revenue, therefore, deserve to be quashed and set-aside ” 29. The above facts and orders passed by the various authorities i.e. the ACM, SDO, Revenue Appellate Authority, Divisional Commissioner and the Revenue Board, show that the plaintiffrespondents were Khatedar-tenants of the land bearing Khasra Nos.203 and 204 situated in village Jhalana-Chaur, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur, and its total area was 22 bigha 8 biswa. During the settlement took place in Samvat Year 2015 (Corresponding Year 1958) the total area of the said land was wrongly reduced/written in the revenue record as 19 bigha 4 biswa. The Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued in respect of the land measuring 19 bigha 4 biswa bearing Khasra No.203 and 204 and the same was taken in possession by the State of Rajasthan for the petitioner RIICO. The remaining land of these Khasra numbers measuring 3 bigha 4 biswa remained in the possession of the plaintiffs, however, the same had not been entered in khatedari of the plaintiffs due to erroneous entries made by the revenue officer. The plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration under Sections 88 and 89 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act in the year 1985 itself to the effect that they may be declared as khatedar-tenants of the land bearing Khasra No.203 and 204 measuring 22 bigha 8 biswa in place of 19 bigha 4 biswa, wherein the defendants State of Rajasthan through Tehsildar Sanganer, in its writtenstatement, admitted this fact that total area of the land of Khasra No.203 and 204 is 22 bigha 8 biswa. The suit could have been decreed only on the basis of admission as admitted facts need not to be proved but the plaintiffs also produced other documentary evidence in support of their contentions but the learned ACM, who was a trainee, dismissed the suit vide judgment dated 21st June, 1986. However, the Revenue Appellate Authority allowed the appeal of the plaintiffs and set-aside the judgment dated 21st June, 1986. The Revenue Board affirmed the finding of the Revenue Appellate Authority vide judgment dated 14.12.1993. The necessary party to the said suit was only the State of Rajasthan and there was no need to implead the petitioner RIICO as a party thereto. The petitioner RIICO took possession of the land measuring 19 bigha 4 biswa. The remaining land, which is in dispute in this writ petition, was 3 bigha 4 biswa where, according to the petitioner, their houses are situated. The petitioner RIICO was in knowledge of the judgment passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority dated 02.08.1986 since 1987, which is clear from the fact that in another suit filed by the plaintiffs for permanent injunction on 05.06.1987, a reference of this judgment was made in the plaint filed against the RIICO defendant. The another suit for permanent injunction was decreed on 07.01.1989, which was affirmed by the Revenue Appellate Authority vide order dated 12.06.1990. However, the Revenue Board remanded the matter vide judgment dated 10.06.1997, and the suit is still pending in the court of SDO, as mentioned above while considering the writ petition No.2036/2008. 30. In these circumstances, it is clear beyond doubt that the petitioner RIICO had full knowledge since 1987 about the judgment dated 02.08.1986 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority. However, the Revenue Board remanded the matter vide judgment dated 10.06.1997, and the suit is still pending in the court of SDO, as mentioned above while considering the writ petition No.2036/2008. 30. In these circumstances, it is clear beyond doubt that the petitioner RIICO had full knowledge since 1987 about the judgment dated 02.08.1986 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority. The judgment of the Revenue Appellate Authority dated 02.08.1986 has been affirmed by the Revenue Appellate Authority vide judgment dated 14.12.1993 but neither the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority nor the judgment of the Revenue Board was ever challenged by the petitioner RIICO, and the same have now been challenged in Writ Petition No.2035/2008, which has been filed in this Court on 20.02.2008 i.e. after about 15 years and that too under the garb of consequential orders relating to correction of entries passed on an application under Section 136 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, i.e., the order dated 2nd November, 2004, of SDO, which has further been affirmed by the Divisional Commissioner and the Revenue Board vide their judgments dated 26.06.2006 and 24.07.2007, respectively. 31. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner RIICO with regard to playing fraud on the part of the plaintiffs upon the Court is not based on any pleading and evidence. The Honble Supreme Court in Gayatri Devi & Others vs. Shashi Pal Singh (Supra) held that fraud must necessarily be pleaded and proved. Therefore, I do not find any merit in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 32. The land holder is the State of Rajasthan and the suit in respect of the land for declaration is required to be filed against the State through Tehsildar which was rightly filed in the present case and the petitioner RIICO was not necessary party to the suit filed by the plaintiffs in the year 1985 for declaration under Sections 88 and 89 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The said judgment is binding on the petitioner RIICO as it is a privy of the State of Rajasthan. The said judgment is binding on the petitioner RIICO as it is a privy of the State of Rajasthan. The question relating to total area of land bearing Khasra No.203 and 204 had finally been decided by the Revenue Appellate Authority vide its judgment dated 02.08.1986, and the Revenue Board, vide its judgment dated 14.12.1993; the Honble Supreme Court in Ishwardas vs. State of M.P. (Supra) has held that in order to sustain the plea of res judicata it is not necessary that all the parties to the two litigations must be common. All that is necessary is that the issue should be between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim. 33. The petitioner RIICO is only privy of the State of Rajasthan and as such the petitioner cannot question the validity of the judgments dated 02.08.1986 and 14.12.1993, which are binding on it. 34. So far as the application under Section 136 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, filed for correction in the comparative chart/list of old and new khasra numbers of the land, in dispute, is concerned, the SDO, the Divisional Commissioner and the Revenue Board all have recorded a concurrent finding of fact which cannot be allowed to be questioned in writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The question as regards to total area of land of a particular khasra number is also a pure question of fact. There is a concurrent finding of fact by the Revenue Appellate Authority as well as the Revenue Board in this regard that the total area of land bearing Khasra No.203 and 204 was 22 bigha 8 biswa and, out of which, the land measuring 19 bigha 4 biswa has been acquired by the State Government for petitioner RIICO and the remaining land measuring 3 bigha 4 biswa is in the khatedari-right and possession of the plaintiff-respondents. The said finding of fact cannot be interfered with by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 35. The Honble Supreme Court in Babhutmal Raichan d Oswa l vs. Laxmiba i R. Tart e – AIR 197 5 SC 1297, held that the High Court cannot, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227, interfere with finding of fact recorded by the subordinate court or tribunal. Its function is limited to seeing that the subordinate court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. Its function is limited to seeing that the subordinate court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. It cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence and reappreciating it. 36. The Honble Supreme Court in Mohd . Yunus vs. Mohd. Mustaqim – AIR 1984 SC 38 , held that in exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. 37. In view of the above, it is clear that there is concurrent finding of fact by the Revenue Appellate Authority and the Revenue Board with regard to the total area of the land of Khasra No.203 and 204 and old and new numbers thereof, and I do not find any illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in the said finding so as to interfere with the same. 38. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in the Writ Petition No.2035/2008 also and it is hereby dismissed on the ground of delay as well as merits also. 39. Both the writ petitions accordingly stands disposed of in the manner indicated above. No order as to costs. 40. Since both the writ petitions have been decided by this common order, the office is directed to place a copy of this order in other connected writ petition for ready reference.