Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. , Hyderabad v. Government of Andhra Pradesh
2008-03-28
L.NARASIMHA REDDY
body2008
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER The petitioner is a Government owned company. It assails an order passed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, in G.O.Rt.No.2150, dated 28-10-2005, making a reference of the dispute, raised by the H.M.T Contract Labours' Union, he 3rd respondent, to the Labour Court-I, at Hyderabad. It also challenges the order dated 30-06-2005, passed by the Labour Court, in I.A.No.3 of 2006 in I.D.No.201 of 2005, directing reinstatement of the members of the 3rd respondent-Union. 2. The 3rd respondent initiated proceedings before the Conciliation Officer, stating that the petitioner did not regularize the services of the Contract Labourers, though they worked for several years. On the report submitted by the Conciliation Officer, indicating failure of his efforts, the 1st respondent referred the dispute to the Labour Court, under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act'), and the same was taken up as I.D.No.201 of 2005. The 3rd respondent filed an application under Section 33(1)(a) of the Act, with a prayer to direct the petitioner to reinstate 26 workmen, who were said to have been retrenched, during the pendency of the conciliation proceedings. The petitioner resisted the same. The Labour Court passed a detailed order dated 30-06-2006, allowing the I.A. 3. The petitioner contends that the very reference made by the 1st respondent is illegal, inasmuch as there did not exist any relationship of employer and employee, between itself and the members of the 3rd respondent-Union. An objection is also raised about the Labour Contractor, not being made as party. It is urged that the reference made by the 1st respondent is contrary to law, and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. So far as the order passed by the Labour Court in I.A.No.3 of 2006 is concerned, it is stated that the application itself was not maintainable, since it was not in relation to any alteration of conditions, during the pendency of the I.D. 4. The 3rd respondent filed a counter-affidavit. It is stated that the reference made by the 1st respondent does not suffer from any factual or legal irregularity, and that the application filed under Section 33 (1) (a) of the Act is very much in order. It is urged that the retrenchment of 26 members of the 3rd respondent-Union, attracts Section 33 of the Act. 5.
It is stated that the reference made by the 1st respondent does not suffer from any factual or legal irregularity, and that the application filed under Section 33 (1) (a) of the Act is very much in order. It is urged that the retrenchment of 26 members of the 3rd respondent-Union, attracts Section 33 of the Act. 5. Sri P.B. Vijay Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner-company is under serious financial hardship, so much so, it has been referred to BIFR. He contends that the members of the 3rd respondent-Union were never employed by the petitioner, either on temporary, or on casual basis, and the mere fact that they worked under a Contractor, by itself, cannot lead to a claim for regularizing the services, much less, making reference under Section 10 of the Act. He submits that the I.A. filed by the 3rd respondent was untenable on the face of it, inasmuch as it was not even alleged that any conditions of service were altered during the pendency of the I.D. 6. Sri A.K. Jaya Prakash Rao, learned counsel for the 3rd respondent, submits that the employees have rendered several years of unblemished service, and they were entitled to be regularized, notwithstanding the fact that they have been engaged by a Labour Contractor. He contends that the question as to whether the reference was valid, can also be agitated in the I.D., and the interim application filed by his clients, is within the scope and ambit of Section 33 of the Act. 7. The challenge made by the petitioner, to the proceedings initiated against it, is twofold: The first is about the very validity of the reference made by the 1st respondent-Labour Court, and the second is about the validity of the order passed by the Labour Court in I.A.No.3 of 2006. 8. So far as the first aspect is concerned, it is not in dispute that the proceedings took place before the Conciliation Officer, between the petitioner, on the one hand, and the 3rd respondent, on the other hand. The conciliation failed, and the Government thought it fit to refer the dispute to the Labour Court. The question as to whether there existed any basic relationship between the petitioner, and the members of the 3rd respondent-Union, to attract the provisions of the Act, is a matter that can certainly be raised before the Labour Court.
The conciliation failed, and the Government thought it fit to refer the dispute to the Labour Court. The question as to whether there existed any basic relationship between the petitioner, and the members of the 3rd respondent-Union, to attract the provisions of the Act, is a matter that can certainly be raised before the Labour Court. Once the procedure prescribed under the Act was followed, before making reference, and once it is not disputed that the 1st respondent has the jurisdiction to refer the dispute, it is difficult to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner, as regards the validity of the reference. 9. It needs to be observed that the purport of Section 33 (1)(a) is very limited, and cannot constitute the basis of an independent adjudication. It mandates that whenever the proceedings between an employer and employee are pending, before a Conciliation Officer, or the Labour Court, the employer shall not alter the conditions of service, prejudicial to the interests of the employees. An occasion for an employee, or their union, to invoke Section 33 (1)(a) would arise, if only any change was brought about, to the conditions of service, during the pendency of the proceedings. 10.The grievance made by the 3rd respondent is that, 26 employees were retrenched, when the proceedings are pending before the Conciliation Officer. If that were to be so, they ought to have moved the Conciliation Officer, and if not successful there, further authorities, including the High Court. Admittedly, no such development has taken place, during the pendency of the I.D. On the other hand, the alleged retrenchment has taken place, by the time the reference came to be made. The application under Section 33 (1)(a) filed by the 3rd respondent was totally untenable. The jurisdiction of a Labour Court to pass an order under Section 33 (1) (a) is limited to the cases where the alteration or change of conditions of service takes place, when the I.D is pending before it. Therefore, the order in I.A.No.3 of 2006 cannot be sustained in law. 11.For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed in part, upholding the reference made by the 1st respondent through G.O.Rt.No.2150 dated 28-10-2005, but setting aside the order dated 30-06-2005, passed by the Labour Court- I, in I.A.No.3 of 2006 in I.D.No.201 of 2005.
Therefore, the order in I.A.No.3 of 2006 cannot be sustained in law. 11.For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed in part, upholding the reference made by the 1st respondent through G.O.Rt.No.2150 dated 28-10-2005, but setting aside the order dated 30-06-2005, passed by the Labour Court- I, in I.A.No.3 of 2006 in I.D.No.201 of 2005. Since the dispute between the parties is pending for a longtime, the Labour Court, shall endeavour to dispose of the I.D. itself, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 12. There shall be no order as to costs.