JUDGMENT : A.K. Ganguly, C.J. - This Public Interest Litigation has been filed by Dr. Gyan Guru Das, who claims to be a journalist by profession and the Printer and Publisher of News Paper, namely, "TOP TEN NEWS & VIEWS". He also claims to be the Editor of various other monthly News Papers and claims to be associated with various literary, socio-economic and cultural organizations. 2. In this petition, the main grievance which has been raised is that various banks and financial institutions unduly waived the dues of Opposite Party No. 3 to the extent of about Rs. 2300 crores. Therefore the complaint is that the said amount of Rs. 2,300 crores, which is public money has vanished from the system. It has also been alleged that such waiver has taken place for benefiting one Business House and the main grievance of the Writ Petitioner is that the massive chunk of public money amounting to Rs. 2300 crores which is roughly 50% of the Annual Budget of the State of Orissa will never be recovered again. In support of the said claims various News items have been referred to, which appeared in one 'Economic Weekly', It appears that some of the news items which have been referred to are of the year 2003. 3. In this matter, after notices were issued, some of the Opposite Parties appeared and Learned Counsel appearing for Opposite Party No. 3 i.e. IMFA took preliminary objections about the maintainability of this petition mainly on two grounds. Firstly, identical questions have been urged in a previous Public Interest Litigation fled by one Ajit Nain and the same has been dismissed. The second question is that the petition is barred by delay. It has also been urged that OTS settlements have been done pursuant to proceedings before competent Court. A scheme of amalgamation has been sanctioned by the Company Court. Company Court proceedings were challenged before the Division Bench and were dismissed by the Division Bench of this Caurt and against such Judgment matter is pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, but no stay has been granted by the Hon'ble Court in those proceedings. 4. The Learned Counsel appearing for Opposite Party Nos. Company Court proceedings were challenged before the Division Bench and were dismissed by the Division Bench of this Caurt and against such Judgment matter is pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, but no stay has been granted by the Hon'ble Court in those proceedings. 4. The Learned Counsel appearing for Opposite Party Nos. 6 and 15 i.e. IDBI and Union Bank of India respectively also supported the contention of Opposite Party No. 3 and also prayed for dismissal of this Public Interest Litigation on the preliminary grounds raised by Opposite Party No. 3. As such the matter was heard on the ground of preliminary objections. 5. In the counter affidavit, which has been filed by Opposite Party No. 3, it has been urged that the previous Writ Petition which was filed in the nature of Public Interest Litigation being W.P. (C) No. 6889 of 2004 was filed by one Ajit Nain. The prayers of the present petition were compared with the prayers in the previous PIL petition and it was argued that in the present petition the prayer is for a writ of certiorari for setting aside the OTS settlements made and a further prayer is for a writ of mandamus for referring the matter to CBI for investigation or to appoint a Judicial Commission, and the prayers in the previous Writ Petition filed by Ajit Nain was not to allow waiver of the amount of loan as proposed in the scheme application and also for a writ or order for prohibiting the banks and their servants and agents from granting waiver of loan of nearly Rs. 2,300 crores to the ICCL, Opposite. Party No. 10 therein (after merger it is Opposite Party No. 3 here). 6. It was urged that prayer for referring the matter to C.B.I. for investigation is misconceived in as much no F.I.R. has been disclosed and equally misconceived in the prayer for appointing a Judicial Commission. Such commission is always appointed by the Government under the Commission of Enquiry Act. This Court finds that there is a lot of substance in those contentions raised by the Learned Counsel for the Opposite Party No. 3. 7. Such commission is always appointed by the Government under the Commission of Enquiry Act. This Court finds that there is a lot of substance in those contentions raised by the Learned Counsel for the Opposite Party No. 3. 7. Comparing the prayers in both the Writ Petitions, the Learned Counsel for Opposite Party No. 3 argued that the only valid prayer is the same in both the petitions, namely, restraining the parties from granting waiver of loan to this Opposite Party No. 3, who was Opposite Party No. 10 in the previous Writ Petition. The Learned Counsel has referred to paragraph-8 of the present petition and pointed out that the same allegation on waiver of loan of Rs. 2,300 crores is also the subject matter of this petition. The Learned Counsel for Opposite Party No. 3 has also filed an additional affidavit in this matter. 8. In the previous PIL filed by Shri Nain (hereinafter referred to as 'previous PIL'), in paragraphs 21 and 22 the same allegation about waiver of Rs. 2,300 crores by IDBI and other banks has been allegedly averred. The same allegation of alleged favoritism for a particular group of companies was the subject matter of challenge in the previous PIL. In the previous PIL also reliance was placed on the News Paper reports appearing in the 'Asian Age' dated 17.11.2003 and 18.11.2003 and in the 'Sambad' dated 19.3.2002. It has been stated that in the present Writ Petition also news item of the 'Sambad' dated 21.11.2003 has been relied upon. 9. After hearing the facts and circumstances of the case it appears that various settlements were arrived at between the Opposite Party No. 3 and several, financial institutions. On the basis of such settlements, various petitions of compromise were filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal where the banks' applications for realizing their dues against Opposite Party No. 3 were pending. Those DRT proceedings were compromised between the banks and Opposite Party No. 3 and some of those which are disclosed in the counter of Opposite Party No. 3. They are: 1. Order Dated 02.8.2006 in O.A. No. 52 of 2003 before the D.R.T., Cuttack. 2. Order Dated 02.8.2006 in O.A. No. 116 of 2002 before the D.R.T., Cuttack. 3. Order Dated 02.8.2006 in O.A. No. 23 of 2001 before the D.R.T. Cuttack. 4. They are: 1. Order Dated 02.8.2006 in O.A. No. 52 of 2003 before the D.R.T., Cuttack. 2. Order Dated 02.8.2006 in O.A. No. 116 of 2002 before the D.R.T., Cuttack. 3. Order Dated 02.8.2006 in O.A. No. 23 of 2001 before the D.R.T. Cuttack. 4. Order Dated 02.8.2006 in O.A. No. 117 of 2002 before the D.R.T. Cuttack. 5. Order Dated 02.8.2006 in O.A. No. 226 of 2001 before the D.R.T. Cuttack. 6. Order Dated 03.12.2003 in O.A. No. 1950 of 1999 before the D.R.T. No. 1, Mumbai. 10. It was also stated that an application under Sections 391 and 394 of the Companies Act for sanction of a scheme of Restructuring and Amalgamation of ICCL with IMFA was filed before this Court on 7.2.2006. In the said application, notices were issued in news papers on 24.2.2006. The Second Motion was filed before this Court on 15.5.2006 and the notices of the same were published in the news papers on 6.6.2006. Thereafter the said scheme was approved by this Hon'ble Court. 11. Challenging the said scheme the present Petitioner did not come before this Court, but one Ajit Nain, claiming to be the shareholder of IDBI, Indian Overseas Bank, Punjab National Bank, Andhra Bank and Canara Bank, holding 500, 300, 100, 100 and 100 shares respectively, filed the previous PIL before this Court. Ajit Nain also filed objections before the Company Court when the Scheme of Amalgamation and Restructuring was being heard before the Learned Company Judge. The Hon'ble Company Court dismissed the said objection and approved the scheme as aforesaid on 13.10.2006. Thereafter, Shri Nain filed an appeal before the Division Bench of this Court being L.P.A. No. 13 of 2007. The said Ajit Nain also filed a complaint before the BIFR on 9.8.2004 for prosecution of erstwhile ICCL and its directors and an Order Dated 2.4.2007 the BIFR rejected the petition filed by Shri Ajit Nain. Thereafter, Shri Nain filed an appeal before the Division Bench of this Court being L.P.A. No. 13 of 2007. The said Ajit Nain also filed a complaint before the BIFR on 9.8.2004 for prosecution of erstwhile ICCL and its directors and an Order Dated 2.4.2007 the BIFR rejected the petition filed by Shri Ajit Nain. In doing so, the BIFR held that Shri Ajit Nain has no locus standi to file this petition and the BIFR further observed that the Hon'ble Orissa High Court vide an Order Dated 13.10.2006 had sanctioned the Composite Scheme of Arrangement and Amalgamation filed by M/s. ICCL and M/s IMFA and as such the company being M/s ICCL was dissolved without being wound up u/s 394 of the Companies Act and the BIFR held that there was no malafide intention on the part of the company, namely, M/s. ICCL in not making a reference to BIFR and as such reference made by Shri Nain was held to be not maintainable. 12. The Division Bench of this High Court by an Order Dated 22.8.2007 dismissed the appeal of Shri Ajit Nain against the order of amalgamation passed by the Learned Company Judge and also dismissed the SLP, as both the applications were heard together. It has been urged that after the same order passed by the Division Bench on 22.8.2007, this PIL has been filed within a month thereafter by the present Petitioner on 18.09.2007. These facts could not be rebutted by the Petitioner. 13. In this matter an affidavit has also been filed by Opposite Party No. 6 i.e. IDBI. In the said affidavit it has been stated that the present PIL filed by the Petitioner is not maintainable in view of wild allegations which have been made against One Time Settlement between the ICCL and Opposite Party No. 6. It has also stated that the previous PIL which was filed by Shri Ajit Nain was also moved on the similar allegation and the same was dismissed by. the Division Bench of this Court by an Order Dated 22.8.2007. Initially IGCL was going through a period of recession and losses and therefore the individual institutions, banks including Opposite Party No. 6 recalled their respective assistance and filed recovery proceeding In D.R.T., Mumbai. the Division Bench of this Court by an Order Dated 22.8.2007. Initially IGCL was going through a period of recession and losses and therefore the individual institutions, banks including Opposite Party No. 6 recalled their respective assistance and filed recovery proceeding In D.R.T., Mumbai. But thereafter, since December, 1999 the position of ICCL improved and it started making monthly payment to the financial institutions including IDBI from March, 2000 and their payments were increased from February, 2002. Then ICCL submitted a revival proposal which was discussed at a joint meeting of the secured lenders on 9.11.2000. Thereafter, M/s. S.R. Batliboi Consultants was appointed to carry out business valuation and asset valuation of both ICCL and IMFA. Based on its valuation report, ICCL submitted a settlement proposal. That proposal was placed before the Board of Directors of Opposite Party No. 6 at its meeting held on 31st May, 2002 and then the said proposal was approved in May, 2003 envisaging payment of the entire principal to the extent of Rs. 493.28 crores and the waiver of entire deferred interest. It has been stated in the affidavit that however, the ICCL has been regular in payment of its dues, as per the revised repayment schedule. One of the shareholders challenged the settlement proposal before the BIFR and the BIFR heard the matter on 2nd April, 2007 and ultimately the BIFR dismissed the said objection of the shareholders by its Order Dated 2.4.2007. In the said affidavit it was prayed that the Writ Petition has no locus standi and a previous PIL filed by Ajit Nain with similar prayer has been dismissed and the subsequent petition on the same allegation should not be entertained. 14. A counter affidavit has also been filed by Union Bank of India opposing the present PIL. In paragraph 11 of the said affidavit it has been stated that as the ICCL failed to pay its loan its account become NPA in March, 1993. The Opposite Party No. 15 recalled its credit facilities in 1999 and invoked the guarantee of IMFA. Then pending submission of concrete proposal, ICCL started making payments to financial institutions and banks and it has paid Rs. 275.69 lakhs to the Bank, out of which Rs. 166.64 lakhs were appropriated towards principal and Rs. 109.05 lakhs were appropriated towards interest dues. Then pending submission of concrete proposal, ICCL started making payments to financial institutions and banks and it has paid Rs. 275.69 lakhs to the Bank, out of which Rs. 166.64 lakhs were appropriated towards principal and Rs. 109.05 lakhs were appropriated towards interest dues. In October, 2001 ICCL submitted a proposal offering to pay 50% of the aggregate outstanding of all Banks as on NPA dated 31.3.1993. The proposal was not accepted by the consortium Banks and the company was advised to improve the same. Then in February/March 2003, the company offered to pay 100% of the outstanding as on the date of NPA i.e. 31.3.1993 over a period of seven years and a compromise proposal to pay Rs. 6,20,99,338.57 was recommended by the concerned branch of Opposite Party No. 15 and the same was placed at the Central Office level before the committee of executives which analyzed the proposal in detail and recommended the same for acceptance. The proposal was thereafter placed before the management committee of the Board of Directors and the same was approved on 28.03.2003. The ICCL then lodged with the Opposite Party No. 15 post dated cheques for the entire OTS amount payable every quarter, which are being realized on their respective dates. After approval of OTS, the consent terms were filed in DRT in OA No. 52 of 2003 and the consent decree was passed on 16.04.2003. Thereafter in October 2006, this Hon'ble Court in Company Petition No. 9 of 2006 approved the scheme of amalgamation between ICCL and IMFA. It also appears that the bank has received a total amount of Rs. 6,20,99,338.57 towards full & final settlement on various dates in back and the account sands fully adjusted. It was denied that any favour was accorded to the company. It was stated that the Opposite Party No. 15 has waived Rs. 44.77 crores which constitutes accrued interest held in dummy ledger at quarterly compounding contractual rates from 01.01.1991 to 31.12.2002. It has been denied that the bank has indulged in any so called illegal sacrifice of public money and, submitted that, therefore the petition should be dismissed. 15. Broadly on those facts the aforesaid two questions have been raised namely, whether the present PIL is barred by principles of res-judicata and delay. It has been denied that the bank has indulged in any so called illegal sacrifice of public money and, submitted that, therefore the petition should be dismissed. 15. Broadly on those facts the aforesaid two questions have been raised namely, whether the present PIL is barred by principles of res-judicata and delay. In support of this contention some Judgments have been cited by the Learned Counsel for Opposite Party No. 3 and also by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner. 16. On the bar of Res Judicata reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka and Another Vs. All India Manufacturers Organization and Others. In that case the Learned Judges of the Supreme Court held that the principles of Res Judicata are applicable to public interest litigation. In paragraph 32 at page 698 of the report the Learned Judges explained the concept of Res Judicata and held that it is based on the principles of larger public interest and founded on two grounds namely that no one ought to be vexed twice for one and the same cause and secondly that public policy requires that there should an end to the same litigation. The Learned Judges also held that Section 11 of the CPC is not the foundation of the principle of Res Judicata but it is merely a statutory recognition thereof and the Section, therefore, is not exhaustive of the general principles of law of res judicata. The main object of the doctrine is that once a matter has been determined in a former proceeding, it should not be open to the parties to re-agitate the matter again and again. 17. On the application of Res Judicata in Public Interest Litigation, the Learned Judges referred to Explanation VI of Section 11 of the CPC which relates to bona fide proceedings "in respect of a public right" or of private rights claimed by persons in common for themselves and others. It was held that the said Explanation that all persons interested in such right shall for the purpose of this Section, be deemed to claim "under the persons so litigating". The Court further held by referring to its previous Judgment in the case of Forward Construction Co. and Others Vs. It was held that the said Explanation that all persons interested in such right shall for the purpose of this Section, be deemed to claim "under the persons so litigating". The Court further held by referring to its previous Judgment in the case of Forward Construction Co. and Others Vs. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.), Andheri and Others, that it cannot be disputed that Section 11 also applies to public interest litigation as long as it is shown that the previous litigation was in public interest and not by way of private grievance and further the previous litigation was a bona fide one and in respect of a right which is common and is agitated in common with others. It was also held that a "Judgment in a previous public interest litigation" if the said "litigation was filed bona fide" is "a Judgment in rem" and "it binds the public at large and bars any member of the public from coming forward before the Court and raising any connected issue or an issue, which had been raised/should have been raised on an earlier occasion by way of a public interest litigation". 18. While coming to the aforesaid finding which was virtually based on principles of Constructive Res Judicata the Hon'ble Supreme Court also considered the Explanation IV to Section 11, CPC. The rationale behind the said Explanation IV was also explained by referring to the observations of Wigram, V.C. in Henderson v. Henderson reported in (1843) 60 All ER 378. The observations of Wigram, V.C. are very instructive and quoted hereunder: The plea of res judicata applies, except in special case (sic), not only to points upon which the Court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a Judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. 19. The same principles were subsequently reiterated by Lord Justice Somervell in Greenhalgh v. Mallard reported in (1947) 2 All ER 255 and were considered considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court. 19. The same principles were subsequently reiterated by Lord Justice Somervell in Greenhalgh v. Mallard reported in (1947) 2 All ER 255 and were considered considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Those are extracted below: I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the Court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the Court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. The said ratio in Greenhalgh was approved by the Apex Court in State of U.P. Vs. Nawab Hussain, . 20. The Learned Judges in the case of State of Karnataka (supra) also noticed further development of the law on Res Judicata in The Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers' Association and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, . 21. This Court has to hold that in the facts of the case as discussed above, the main subject matter of challenge in both the public interest litigations, namely the one filed by Ajit Nain and the present one is the same. The complain is over the waiver of Rs. 2,300/-crores of debts of the erstwhile ICCL which subsequently merged with Opposite Party No. 3. It is nobody's case that the previous public interest litigation which was filed by Ajit Nain was not filed bona fide or Ajit Nain has been set up by Opposite Party No. 3. 22. Therefore, following the ratio in State of Karnataka (supra) this Court holds that the previous Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 22.8.2007 dismissing the Writ Petition of Ajit Nain (W.P. (C) No. 6889 of 2004 ) is a Judgment in rem and binds every one including the Petitioner in this case and bars the present petition on principles of Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata. 23. On this point Learned Counsel for the Petitioner argued that the previous Judgment in W.P. (C) No. 6889 of 2004 was obtained by suppression of material facts inasmuch as RBI guidelines regarding corporate restructuring of one time settlement was suppressed. 23. On this point Learned Counsel for the Petitioner argued that the previous Judgment in W.P. (C) No. 6889 of 2004 was obtained by suppression of material facts inasmuch as RBI guidelines regarding corporate restructuring of one time settlement was suppressed. The other point which was stated is that in the previous petition the Opposite Parties are different in as much as in the present petition the Reserve Bank of India, Central Vigilance Commissioner and the Central Bureau of Investigation have been made parties, but they were not parties in the previous proceeding. Learned Counsel has also relied on some Judgment. This Court is not impressed by the aforesaid argument. 24. In a Public Interest Litigation the parties can be different. Even though the parties are different it cannot be said that same question can be agitated again and again. If this principle is upheld, in that case after a PIL is decided, another PIL can be filed on the same at the instance of any other person. That will totally contrary to Section 11 of CPC read with explanation and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka (supra) and Ors. Judgments discussed above. 25. It is not in dispute that the parties to the aforesaid loan settlement and the OTS proceeding are the same. Therefore, in the same transaction which was subject matter of challenge in the previous PIL (W.P. (C) No. 6889 of 2004 ) is also the subject matter of challenge in the present PIL. That being the position, on the strength of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka (supra) the principle of Constructive Res Judicata is attracted. A point which was open to be canvassed but has not been canvassed will be deemed to have been a matter of primarily and substantially in issue in the previous proceeding. This is precisely the sweep of Explanation IV to Section 11, CPC and it is now well settled that the principle of Constructive Res Judicata is applicable to PIL. 26. This is the consistent view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court both in Forward Construction Co. and also in State of Karnataka (supra). This is precisely the sweep of Explanation IV to Section 11, CPC and it is now well settled that the principle of Constructive Res Judicata is applicable to PIL. 26. This is the consistent view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court both in Forward Construction Co. and also in State of Karnataka (supra). In Forward Construction Co., the Hon'ble Supreme Court has said that if it is alleged in the second PIL that the first petition was lacking any bona fide the onus of proving the same is on the party which is seeking to avoid the previous decision. See Forward Construction Co. and Others Vs. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.), Andheri and Others, in para. 21 at page 398 of the report. 27. In the instant case, no attempt has been made by the Petitioner either in his pleadings or in his argument to even allege that the previous petition filed by Ajit Nain was not a bona fide litigation or was not a PIL. In the previous Writ Petition which was filed by Ajit Nain it has been averred in paragraph 1 as follows: The Petitioner is filing the instant writ application to protect the interest of the other shareholders of the Banks and Financial Institutions and also members of the public. 28. In paragraph 35 of the said petition also it has been stated that the waiver of Rs. 2300 crores of public money will be at the cost of common tax payers and public at large. Paragraphs 46 and 47 thereof also show that that Writ Petition was filed as a PIL. 29. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has relied on the decision in the case of Haryana Financial Corporation and Another Vs. Jagdamba Oil Mills and Another. This Court fails to appreciate the relevance of the points decided in the said case to the facts of the present case. In the said decision it was pointed out that if an administrative action is taken by the authorities fairly, the Court should not act as an Appellate authority over the decision taken by the administrative authority. Various other questions came up for consideration, namely, how a precedent has to be followed and Some other questions. The question of Res Judicata or its application to PIL never fell for consideration in the said decision. Therefore, the said decision has no application to the facts of the present case. 30. Various other questions came up for consideration, namely, how a precedent has to be followed and Some other questions. The question of Res Judicata or its application to PIL never fell for consideration in the said decision. Therefore, the said decision has no application to the facts of the present case. 30. The other two decisions which were cited by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, namely, the decisions in Forward Construction Co. and Slate of Karnataka (supra) lay down the propositions which directly go against the contention of the Petitioner, Those two decisions have been discussed above. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the present PIL filed by Dr. Gyan Guru Das is barred by the principles of Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata. 31. Now coming to the question of delay, it appears that the Petitioner came to know of the alleged waiver in the news-item carried in the Asian Age and published in the Sambad dated 21.11.2003 (para. 14 of the Writ Petition). The news item in Asian Age was also referred to Ajit Nain in his previous Writ Petition (W.P. (C) No. 6889 of 2004 ). But the present Writ-Petition was filed on 18.9.2007. Therefore, there was a delay of about four years. Thus, it appears that after getting the knowledge of the alleged waiver, which the Petitioner alleges to be against public interest, the Petitioner did nothing for more than 3 and 1/2 years and filed this Writ Petition on 18.9.2007 only after dismissal of the petition of Ajit Nain by a Division Bench of this Court on 22.8.2007. The Petitioner in the present Writ Petition claims to be a reputed journalist. As such there is no reason for him not to be aware of the matter relating to waiver of loan by the financial institutions as it hit the headlines in various news papers in 2003. He averred that he came to know of the same in November, 2003. But even in the Writ Petition there is no explanation for the delay why he was silent for more than three years. 32. On the question of delay in filing PIL the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in the case of The Printers (Mysore) Ltd. Vs. He averred that he came to know of the same in November, 2003. But even in the Writ Petition there is no explanation for the delay why he was silent for more than three years. 32. On the question of delay in filing PIL the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in the case of The Printers (Mysore) Ltd. Vs. M.A. Rasheed and Others, that if a Writ Petition was filed three years after making of allotment and execution of deed of sale, the High Court should have dismissed the Writ Petition on the ground of laches on the part of the Respondent. That Judgment was also given in a PIL. Same principles have been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R and M Trust Vs. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group and Others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the sacrosanct jurisdiction of public interest litigation should be invoked very sparingly and in favour of a vigilant litigant and not for those who invoke this jurisdiction for publicity. In paragraph 27 at page 111 of the report, the Learned Judges pointed out that delay in the context of PIL is very material. In paragraph 28 at the same page, the Learned Judges of the Supreme Court followed its previous decision in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bhailal Bhai and Others, that the provisions of Limitation Act do not apply to the granting of relief under Article 226. But the maximum period fixed by the legislature within which a suit has to be filed in a Civil Court should be taken to be a reasonable time. It has been held that the Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action. But where the delay is more than the maximum period, it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable. 33. In the instant case the delay on the part of the Petitioner in approaching the Court is more than three years which is more than the maximum period under the Limitation Act for bringing a civil action. So the delay is gross and wholly unexplained. 34. The Hon'ble Supreme Court quoting the decision in Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. 33. In the instant case the delay on the part of the Petitioner in approaching the Court is more than three years which is more than the maximum period under the Limitation Act for bringing a civil action. So the delay is gross and wholly unexplained. 34. The Hon'ble Supreme Court quoting the decision in Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India and Others, said that the Supreme Court considered that even five months' delay was fatal. 35. Considering the aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court finds that apart from the question of Res Judicata, unexplained delay of more than three years from the date of knowledge of the Petitioner of the alleged waiver and filing of the present Writ Petition is a vitiating factor and on this ground also this petition deserves to be dismissed. 36. For the reasons aforesaid, the preliminary objections taken by the Opposite Party No. 3 succeed. The PIL is dismissed as barred by the principles of Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata or principles of analogous thereto and on the ground of delay and laches. There will be no order as to costs. B.N. Mahapatra, J. 37. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed