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2008 DIGILAW 230 (UTT)

KISHAN LAL v. THE STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, UTTARAKHAND

2008-05-16

B.S.VERMA

body2008
JUDGMENT This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs :- (a) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the judgment and order dated 16.3.2007 passed by respondent no.1 in Appeal No. 7/2004 as contained in Annexure No. 4 and the order dated 29/30.7.2003 passed by respondent no. 2 so far as it relates to remand of the matter. (b) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent no. 1 and 2 to transfer the permit no. 1053-k in the name of the petitioner. (c) Any other writ, order or direction may also be issued. (d) Costs of the petition may also be awarded to the petitioner. 2. Brief facts giving rise to the writ petition are that one Chandra Bhushan Sharma was holding a regular stage carriage permit no. 1053-k in his name on Haldwani-Kaladhungi-Bazpur-Doraha-Sultanpur Patti-Kashipur route in respect of vehicle No. UMM-44, who could not manage to operation of the vehicle covered by the aforesaid permit due to his old age and he incurred heavy losses. The petitioner was his old friend. Sri Chandra Bhushan Sharma proposed to sell the vehicle to the petitioner and asked him to provide the permit as a gift. The vehicle was purchased by the petitioner on payment of sale consideration and possession thereof was given to the petitioner by the seller. Chandra Bhushan Sharma remained notional holder of permit till the transfer of permit in the name of the petitioner. 3. Sri Chandra Bhushan Sharma and the petitioner moved an application jointly on 20.9.2001 for the transfer of permit no. 1053-k in the name of the petitioner. The said application remained pending before respondent no. 2 for a long time. Thereafter, report from the District Magistrate Udham Singh Nagar was sought, who in turn certified that no sale consideration in respect of the permit had passed on. As per report, the transfer was genuine and there was nothing objectionable. As such, according to the petitioner, there was no impediment in the transfer of permit in the name of the petitioner. 4. During the pendency of the application, Chandra Bhushan Sharma died on 19.5.2003. The said application was placed in the meeting of respondent no. 2 on 29/30.7.2003. As per report, the transfer was genuine and there was nothing objectionable. As such, according to the petitioner, there was no impediment in the transfer of permit in the name of the petitioner. 4. During the pendency of the application, Chandra Bhushan Sharma died on 19.5.2003. The said application was placed in the meeting of respondent no. 2 on 29/30.7.2003. The petitioner was present in the meeting, but the application was rejected by saying that instead of seeking transfer the applicant should have moved an application for grant of fresh permit. Relevant extract of order dated 29/30.7.2003 has been annexed as Annexure no. 1 to the writ petition. 5. Aggrieved by the order aforesaid, the petitioner preferred an Appeal bearing No. 7/2004 Kishan Lal Vs. Regional Transport Authority (for short R.T.A.) and five others before respondent no. 1 on 19.1.2004. 6. Before the appellate authority, it was contended on behalf of the petitioner-appellant that the R.T.A. had committed illegality by not allowing the joint application moved by the deceased Chandra Bhushan Sharma, who sold the vehicle to the petitioner and gifted him the permit of the vehicle and the petitioner for transfer of permit No. 1053-k. 7. From the side of the respondent nos. 3 to 7, who are legal heirs of the deceased Chandra Bhushan Sharma, it was contended that no such application was moved by the deceased Chandra Bhushan and the petitioner for transfer of permit in favour of the petitioner and if such application would have been presented, then after the death of the deceased Chandra Bhushan Sharma, the petitioner would have moved application before the R.T.A. to bring on record the legal heirs of the deceased as provided under Section 82 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short the Act). 8. The appellate Authority has observed that the process of transfer of permit could not have been done by fraud, pressure or ex-parte without hearing the legal heirs of the deceased and the appellant-petitioner did not adopt the proper recourse and has not cared to substitute the names of legal heirs of the deceased. 8. The appellate Authority has observed that the process of transfer of permit could not have been done by fraud, pressure or ex-parte without hearing the legal heirs of the deceased and the appellant-petitioner did not adopt the proper recourse and has not cared to substitute the names of legal heirs of the deceased. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal has also observed that the petitioner-appellant has not adopted the procedure under Section 82(2) of the Act, hence it was ordered that the matter be remanded to the R.T.A. for deciding the application afresh on merits and in accordance with the procedure as laid down under Section 82 of the Act and with this observation, the matter was remanded to R.T.A. by order dated 16.3.2007, which gave rise to the present writ petition. 9. I have perused the averments made in the writ petition, the counter affidavit filed by respondent no. 3 and the rejoinder affidavit of the petitioner. 10. At the outset, it may be mentioned that the R.T.A. by its proceedings of meeting dated 29/30.7.2003, while rejecting the prayer of the petitioner for transfer of permit in his favour has directing that the petitioner may apply afresh for obtaining permit in his name. In the appeal, the appellate authority has partly allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the R.T.A. to follow the procedure as laid down under Section 82(2) of the Act and to decide the matter on merits after hearing both the parties. 11. Undisputed facts of the case are that a joint application was moved before the R.T.A. by the deceased Chandra Bhushan Sharma, the holder of permit and the petitioner for transfer of permit. It is also not disputed that Chandra Bhushan Sharma had died during the pendency of the application and the order had been passed on the application of the petitioner and deceased Chandra Bhushan Sharma subsequently on 29/30.7.2003. 12. First of all, it has to be examined whether the procedure as laid down under Section 82 of the Act for transfer of permit had been properly adhered to by the petitioner. 13. Section 82 of the Act reads as under :- “82. Transfer of permit. 12. First of all, it has to be examined whether the procedure as laid down under Section 82 of the Act for transfer of permit had been properly adhered to by the petitioner. 13. Section 82 of the Act reads as under :- “82. Transfer of permit. (1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), a permit shall not be transferable from one person to another except with the permission of the transport authority which granted the permit and shall not without such permission, operate to confer on any person to whom a vehicle covered by the permit is transferred any right to use that vehicle in the manner authorized by the permit. (2) Where the holder of a permit dies, the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicle covered by the permit may, for a period of three months, use the permit as if it had been granted to himself. : Provided that such person has, within thirty days of the death of the holder, informed the transport authority which granted the permit of the death of the holder and of his own intention to use the permit : Provided further that no permit shall be so used after the date on which it would have ceased to be effective without renewal in the hands of the deceased holder. (3) The transport authority may, on application made to it within three months of the date of the holder of a permit, transfer the permit to the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicles covered by the permit : Provided that the Transport Authority may entertain an application made after the expiry of the said period of three months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by good and sufficient cause from making an application within the time specified.” 14. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the possession of the vehicle was given to the petitioner by the deceased Chandra Bhushan Sharma and permit of the vehicle had been gifted to the petitioner and both the parties have moved an application under sub-rule (1) of Rule 87 of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 hence the R.T.A. was under obligation of statute to make order of transfer of permit in favour of the petitioner ignoring the fact that the seller of the vehicle Chandra Bhushan Sharma had died during the pendency of the application. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the case of Mst. Dhani Devi v. Sant Bihari Sharma and others [AIR 1970 Supreme Court 759]. 15. In the case of Mst. Dhani Devi (supra) the Apex Court has dealt with the matter of application for grant of permit of vehicles on the death of the applicant. In paragraph no. 3 the Apex Court inter alia has observed that “a person in possession of a transport vehicle is not entitled to a permit as a matter of right, see Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Ram Ltd., 1952 SCR 583 at pp. 591, 595 = (AIR 1952 SC 192 at pp. 194, 196). His only right is to make an application for the grant of a permit under Section 45 and to a consideration of the application in accordance with the provisions of the Act. If he dies after obtaining the permit, the Regional Transport Authority has power under Section 61(2) to transfer the permit to the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicles covered by the permit. We are inclined to think that in the case of death of the applicant before the final disposal of his application for the grant of a permit in respect of his vehicles the Regional Transport Authority has power to substitute the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicles in place of the deceased applicant and to allow the successor to prosecute the application. As the relief sought for in the application is dependent upon and related to the possession of the vehicles, the application is capable of being revived at the instance of the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicles.” 16. The ratio of the judgment cannot be disputed. As the relief sought for in the application is dependent upon and related to the possession of the vehicles, the application is capable of being revived at the instance of the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicles.” 16. The ratio of the judgment cannot be disputed. Provisions of Order XXII of the C.P.C. are not applicable to the Act, but there is provision for making application in case of death of the permit holder under sub-section (3) of Section 82 of the Act, which shall be dealt with at appropriate place hereinafter. Moreover, in the case before the Apex Court the provisions of Sections 57, 57(8), 58, 64 and 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short Old Act) were dealt with and there is a reference of Section 61(2) of the Old Act regarding power of R.T.A. to transfer the permit to the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicles covered by the permit. Section 57 of the Old Act deals with procedure in applying for and granting permits. Section 58 deals with duration and renewal of permits. 17. Section 59 of the Old Act deals with general condition attaching to all permits and sub-section (1) thereof is almost identical to sub-section (1) of Section 82 of the Act, which deals with transfer of permit. Thus Section 59(1) deals with transfer of permit during the lifetime of the permit holder. Section 61 of the Old Act deals with transfer of permit on death of holder and it corresponds to the provision of Section 82(2) and 82(3) of the Act except proviso appended to sub-section (3) of Section 82 of the Act. 18. From a perusal of entire record, it is obvious that in the case at hand, the petition has not so far applied to the transport authority as provided under sub-section (3) of Section 82 the Act. There is relaxation of time period under the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of Section 82 of the Act. To my mind, the petitioner has not properly adhered to the provision of sub-section (3) of Section 82 of the Act, because the permit holder Chandra Bhushan Sharma had died during the pendency of application for transfer of permit. 19. There is relaxation of time period under the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of Section 82 of the Act. To my mind, the petitioner has not properly adhered to the provision of sub-section (3) of Section 82 of the Act, because the permit holder Chandra Bhushan Sharma had died during the pendency of application for transfer of permit. 19. It was vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had already proceeded under Rule 87 of Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 for transfer of permit during the life time of permit holder and by making a joint application under Rule 87 of the Rules, the permit existing in the name of deceased Chandra Bhushan Sharma ought to have been transferred in the name of the petitioner by the R.T.A., hence nothing more was required to be done by the petitioner. I am not inclined to accept this contention for the simple reason that the procedure of transfer of permit under Rule 87 is applicable only during the lifetime of the permit holder. Since the permit holder had already died, therefore, the petitioner can take recourse to sub-section (3) of Section 82 of the Act read with Rule 87. Rules cannot be allowed to sit over the specific provisions of the Act. 20. In the memo of appeal in paragraph no. 8, the petitioner had stated “that a perusal of the certified copy indicates that the R.T.A has nullified the statutory provisions contained in section 82 of the M.V. Act, 1988 which exclusively deals with the transfer of permits under different situations. The R.T.A. has negated the very existence of Section 82 of M.V. Act, 1988 in an illegal and unauthorized manner.” Thus, it is clear that the appellant-petitioner himself takes aid of Section 82 of the Act in the disposal of the application. 21. Since the permit holder Sri Chandra Bhushan Sharma had already died during the pendency of the application for transfer of permit, i.e. on 19-5-2003 and, subsequently, the impugned order dated 29/30.7.2003 was passed by the R.T.A. It is evident from a bare perusal of the order passed by the R.T.A. that factum of death of Chandra Bhushan Sharma was not brought to the notice of the R.T.A. either by the petitioner or by the legal heirs of the deceased. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal after hearing both the parties on merits has set aside the order dated 29/30-7-2003, passed by the R.T.A., and remanded the matter for proceeding in accordance with Section 82(2) of the Act. But I am of the considered view that the petitioner may take recourse to sub-section (3) of Section 82 instead of sub-section (2) of Section 82 of the Act. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the S.T.A.T. has misinterpreted the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Dhani Devi (supra). I do not find any force in this contention, because I have already observed above that the petitioner may prosecute his application for transfer of permit under Section 82(3) of the Act. 23. It is disputed question of fact whether the petitioner is in possession of the vehicle or not and this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot decide the disputed question of fact. Since the legal heirs of deceased permit holder were impleaded as respondents before the appellate authority and they had contested the appeal, therefore, the ends of justice would be subserved if the matter is decided by the R.T.A. afresh in accordance with law after hearing both the parties. The order of remand passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal does not suffer from any perversity or illegality or jurisdictional error on merits. 24. While parting with the judgment, it may be mentioned that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in the remand order had directed the R.T.A. to proceed with the matter in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 82 of the Act. Sub-section (2) provides that where the holder of a permit dies, the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicle covered by the permit may, for a period of three months, use the permit as it had been granted to himself provided such person had informed the transport authority of the death of the holder of permit and of his own intention to use the permit, within a period of thirty days of the death of permit holder. In the case at hand, the record does not show that compliance of sub-section (2) had been done by either party to the appeal, hence provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 82 of the Act are not attracted. In the case at hand, the record does not show that compliance of sub-section (2) had been done by either party to the appeal, hence provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 82 of the Act are not attracted. The only recourse open to the petitioner now is to make an application to the transport authority as provided under sub-section (3) of Section 82 of the Act. Therefore, the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal is liable to be modified to that extent alone. The petitioner may take recourse to sub-section (3) of Section 82 of the Act before the R.T.A. The writ petition, therefore, deserves to be partly allowed and the order passed by the S.T.A.T. is liable to be partially modified. 25. The writ petition is partly allowed and the order passed by State Transport Appellate Tribunal is modified to the extent that the R.T.A. shall proceed further in the matter after an application is made by the petitioner under sub-section (3) of Section 82 of the Act for transfer of permit. Costs easy. 26. If the petitioner applies for transfer of permit as observed above, the R.T.A. shall decide the application of the petitioner on merits in accordance with law after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the parties, expeditiously as far as possible, without being influenced by any observations made in the body of this judgment. 27. All pending applications stand disposed of.