JUDGMENT 1. 1. This revision petition is directed against the order dated 12.02.2008 as passed by the Civil Judge (junior Division) Udaipur City-North, Udaipur in Civil Suit No. 13/2008 whereby the learned Trial Court has rejected an application moved by the defendants-petitioners under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure ['Civil Procedure Code'], and, while overruling the objection of the petitioners on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with the matter, had held that the suit in question is triable by the Civil Court. 2. The suit aforesaid has been filed by the plaintiff-non-petitioner No.1 Rock Phosphate Mazdoor Sangh said to be a Trade Union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 ['the Act of 1926'] while arraying the petitioners as defendants Nos. 1 to 3 and the State of Rajasthan as defendant No.4 essentially on the submissions that the defendant No.1 is a registered company and an undertaking of the State Government having several mines including those at Jhamarkotda; that the plaintiff being the representative of the workmen employed at the said Jhamarkotda mines and at the corporate office of the company, was a recognised union since the year 1970 and more than 90% of such workmen were its members; that as per the written consent of the workmen, the defendants had been deducting the monthly contribution payable to the plaintiff union from their wages and were remitting the same to the plaintiff. It has been alleged in the plaint that due to the political differences with the rulling party in the State, the efforts were made to malign the plaintiff union but the plaintiff maintained its hold and succeeded in the elections held on 29.11.2007. According to the plaintiff, on 01.12.2007, certain amendments were made in its constitution in the General Body meeting and such amendments were duly notified to the Registrar of Trade Unions that included increase in monthly contribution of the members from Rs. 10/- per month to Rs. 21/- per month. While reiterating that in accordance with the mutual agreement, the defendants were legally and validly deducting monthly contribution from the wages of such members of the plaintiff union who had voluntarily submitted a written consent therefor, it is maintained that such deducted amount was being paid to the plaintiff and had been remitted until the month of November 2007. The. While reiterating that in accordance with the mutual agreement, the defendants were legally and validly deducting monthly contribution from the wages of such members of the plaintiff union who had voluntarily submitted a written consent therefor, it is maintained that such deducted amount was being paid to the plaintiff and had been remitted until the month of November 2007. The. plaintiff has further averred that the enhancement in the monthly fees was duly notified to the defendants with the written consent of 851 mines workers and 178 corporate office workers; that thereupon, the defendants published general notices at both the places inviting objections; and for no objection having been filed, sanction was issued for such deductions in the wages of the month of December, 2007 as were payable in the month of January 2008; and contribution.of 178 members working in the corporate office was indeed deducted and remitted to the plaintiff union through cheque No. 3738 dated 02.01.2008. 3. The plaintiff has thereafter levelled allegations that the persons who could not otherwise cause harm to the plaintiff union misguided the Mines Minister and got issued a fax message on 26.12.2007 directing stoppage of such contribution and thereupon the defendant No.3 has stopped making such deduction altogether. According to the plaintiff union, immediately upon noticing such facts, a protest petition was submitted to the defendant No.1 and although the defendants also sent a report to the Hon'ble Minister clarifying that the deductions were justified yet, they were refusing to deduct such contribution from the wages payable for the month of January 2008. The plaintiff has stated several grounds to assert that such an-action on the part of defendants was improper and illegal and that the plaintiff was entitled to have the defendants compelled to make such deductions and to remit the amount to it. The plaintiff has also stated that the dispute having arisen because of unnecessary and illegal interference of the State Government, the State was also impleaded as party defendant; and looking to the circumstances, an application under Section 80(2) Civil Procedure Code was also moved. 4. The plaintiff has also stated that the dispute having arisen because of unnecessary and illegal interference of the State Government, the State was also impleaded as party defendant; and looking to the circumstances, an application under Section 80(2) Civil Procedure Code was also moved. 4. The plaintiff has prayed for the reliefs in the nature of perpetual injunction against the defendants that they should not create any obstruction in the working of the plaintiff union, should not deny appropriate deductions from the payment of the workmen, should continue to make such deductions, and should remit the amount of the plaintiff. It has also been prayed that by way of mandatory injunction, the defendants be directed not to discontinue with the deductions at the enhanced rate and the deductions not made in the earlier month be also directed to be made in the ensuing months. It has further been prayed that the defendants be restrained from adopting the pressure tactics or doing anything with political malice and the recognised union i.e. the plaintiff, be permitted to continue with its activities without obstructions. 5. In the suit aforesaid as filed by the plaintiff-non-petitioner No.1, seeking the reliefs of perpetual and mandatory injunction, the petitioners-defendants Nos.1 to 3 moved the application under Order 7 Rule 11 Civil Procedure Code and submitted that the claim as made in the plaint by the plaintiff union, of deduction of enhanced amount of contribution from the wages of the workmen, was covered by Section 7(2)(kkk) of the payment of Wages Act, 1936 [the Act of 1936']; and when the defendants were not agreeing to such demand, it were an industrial dispute that could only be raised under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ['the Act of 1947'1. The defendants-petitioners contended that deduction of monthly contribution from the wages was not a civil right and hence, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of this suit and the same being barred by law, the plaint was required to be rejected. 6. The application so moved by the petitioners came to be rejected by the learned Trial Court by its impugned order dated 12.02.2008. 6. The application so moved by the petitioners came to be rejected by the learned Trial Court by its impugned order dated 12.02.2008. The learned Trial Court has referred to Section 2 (k) of the Act of 1947 and has also referred to Sections 15 and 22 of the Act of 1936 and has observed that the present suit was only related to the claim of deductions of the basis of the written consent of the members of the Union and such a matter was not barred under the Act of 1936 and was cognizable by the Civil Court under Section 9 Civil Procedure Code. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in . the case of (1) The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke and others AIR 1975 SC 2238 as cited on behalf of the defendants was distinguished by the learned Trial Court with the observations that the said matter related to the payment under an incentive scheme for the labourers and of alteration in service conditions and such was not a matter involved herein. Aggrieved, the petitioners have preferred this revision petition under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code. 7. Assailing the order aforesaid, learned counsel for the defendants-petitioners has referred to the plaint averments, the provisions of the Act of 1947, the Act of 1936, and the Act of 1926 and so also several decided cases and strenuously contended that by way of the present suit, the plaintiff essentially seeks enforcement of such rights that are not ordinarily civil rights but are emanating from and under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and its sister enactments; and, therefore, according to the learned counsel, the suit in question is not cognizable by the Civil Court. Learned counsel contended that the claim as sought to be made by the plaintiff in its capacity as a trade union is essentially the right as recognised by the Payment of Wages Act, 1936; and reading of the said enactment with Section 7-A coupled with item No.1 of the Third Schedule to the Act of 1947 and further with Section 2 (ra) coupled with items Nos. 2 and 13 of the Fifth Schedule to the said Act of 1947 makes it clear that the rights as claimed and the grievances as stated are specifically covered under the said provisions and, therefore, could only be agitated and claimed under the Act of 1947, for being essentially leading to an industrial dispute as defined in Section 2(k) of the Act of 1947. Apart, from the principal reliance on the principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Premier Automobile's case (supra), learned counsel for the petitioners has also referred to and relied upon the decisions in the case of (2) Krishnan & Anr. v. The East India Distilleries and Sugar Factories Ltd. Nellikuppan & Anr. AIR 1964 Madras 81 , (3) The Nippani Electricity Co. Pvt. Ltd. and another v. Bhimarao Laxman Patil and others 1968 LIC 1571 (Mysore) , the (4) The Pigment Lakes & Chemical Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Sitaram Kashiram Konde 1970 LIC 115 (Bombay) , (5) Jitendra Nath Biswas v. M/s. Empire of India & Cyclone Tea Co. & Anr. (1989) 3 SCC 582 , (6) Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. v. Krishna Kant & Ors. (1995) 5 SCC 75 , and (7) Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. v. Zakir Hussain 2005 SCC (L&S) 945 . Learned counsel submitted that it cannot be said that because of alleged refusal to make deductions from the wages, the plaintiff stands denied of any such civil right that could be enforced through a Civil Court by way of injunction. Learned counsel has also referred to the fact that in the State of Rajasthan, by way of amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Chapter II-B has been inserted specifically in regard to trade unions and has contended that such an amendment has a material bearing on the issue that the Civil Court shall have no jurisdiction to deal with the matter in question. Learned counsel submitted with reference to the decision in the case of (8) Chief Engineer, Hydel Project & On. v. Ravinder Nath & Ors. (2008) 2 SCC 350 that the question of bar of jurisdiction could be raised at any stage of proceedings. Learned counsel submitted with reference to the decision in the case of (8) Chief Engineer, Hydel Project & On. v. Ravinder Nath & Ors. (2008) 2 SCC 350 that the question of bar of jurisdiction could be raised at any stage of proceedings. It is submitted that the claim as made by the plaintiff trade union when taken to the extent of the allegations of unfair labour practice, it becomes the subject matter of industrial Disputes Act and even when referable to the sister enactments like the Trade Unions Act, the Payment of Wages Act etc., the suit before the Civil Court would remain barred by necessary implication. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the non-petitioner No.1-plaintiff has again referred to the plaint averments and submitted that the essential cause of action in the present case has arisen because of the unauthorised interference by the State Government in the matter and because of the action as taken by the petitioner company on account of such interference; and, according to the learned counsel for the plaintiff, the suit based on such a cause is only of the jurisdiction of a Civil Court. Learned counsel submitted that the right as claimed by the plaintiff trade union is not a right claimed under the Industrial Disputes Act and not all the aspects mentioned in the Third and Fifth Schedules to the Act of 1947 would ipso facto partake the character of an industrial dispute so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Learned counsel emphasised that merely because the claim made by the plaintiff union incidentally touches the provisions as contained in the Act of 1947, it does not become an industrial dispute for the purpose of the jurisdiction of the Courts. Learned counsel submitted that no such right has been claimed in the suit that falls within the four corners of the Act of 1947 but the right claimed by the plaintiff union is about such deduction for the purpose of contribution as is required to be made by the defendants and is being illegally denied. Learned counsel submitted that no such right has been claimed in the suit that falls within the four corners of the Act of 1947 but the right claimed by the plaintiff union is about such deduction for the purpose of contribution as is required to be made by the defendants and is being illegally denied. Learned counsel yet further submitted that in the plaint, the grievance has specifically been stated of the State Government's unauthorised interference in the matter and the State has also been joined as defendant No.4; and in this matter, only the Civil Court shall have jurisdiction and not the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal under the Act of 1947. Learned counsel has referred to and relied upon the decisions in (9) Borosil Glass Works Ltd. Employees' Union v. D.D. Bamboda & Ors. (2001) 1 SCC 350 , and (10) Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. v. Mohar Singh (2008) 5 SCC 542 . Learned counsel further submitted that the arguments raised with reference to Chapter II-B of the Rajasthan Amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act are hardly of any consequence so far the subject matter of the present suit is concerned. Learned counsel also submitted that the petitioners are not entitled to raise such pleas that were not even placed for consideration before the learned Trial Court; and has referred to the decision in (11) Pfizar Ltd. v. Mazdoor Congress and Ors. (1996) 5 SCC 608 . According to the learned counsel for the plaintiff, the dispute of the present nature is essentially referable to the rights and remedies in common law and is exclusively triable by the Civil Court and then, for it being a tripartite dispute, recourse cannot be had to the remedies under the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel submitted that if at all it is stretched to be named as an industrial dispute, the remedies under the Act of 1947 could, at best, be treated to be alternative but not of bar of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 9. Learned counsel submitted that if at all it is stretched to be named as an industrial dispute, the remedies under the Act of 1947 could, at best, be treated to be alternative but not of bar of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners rejoined with the submissions that a reading of the plaint averments makes it clear that impleadment of the State Government in this litigation was only a camouflage and not even a primary proof has been placed on record to support the allegations about the interference of the State Government, and though some oblique reference has been made to the communication by the Mines Minister but the said Minister has not been joined as a party to the suit. Learned counsel has referred to the decision in (12) Chandra Prakash Singh & ors. v. Chairman, Purvanchal Gramin Bank & ors., 2008 AIR SCW 1854 . Learned counsel emphasised on items Nos. 2 and 13 of the first part of the Fifth Schedule to the Act of 1947 and submitted that the substance of the dispute being covered therein, the suit in question is not of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 10. Having given a thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and having examined the plaint averments with reference to the law applicable, this Court is clearly of opinion that this revision petition remains bereft of substance and deserves to be dismissed. 11. The relevant part of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure , providing jurisdiction to the Civil Courts to try all suits of civil nature unless expressly or by implication barred, reads as under: "9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred.-The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred." 12. It remains trite that the provisions excluding jurisdiction of Civil Courts and provisions conferring jurisdiction on other Authorities and Tribunals are strictly construed and the exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court is not readily inferred. The principles in this regard have been noticed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohan Singh's case (supra as under: "21. We may in this behalf profitably notice the following excerpts from Principles of Statutory Interpretation (11th Edn.) by Justice G.P. Singh. The principles in this regard have been noticed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohan Singh's case (supra as under: "21. We may in this behalf profitably notice the following excerpts from Principles of Statutory Interpretation (11th Edn.) by Justice G.P. Singh. "It is a principle by no means to be whittled down' and has been referred to as 'fundamental rule'. As a necessary corollary of this rule provisions excluding jurisdiction of civil Court and provisions conferring jurisdiction on authorities and tribunals other than civil courts are strictly construed. The existence of jurisdiction in civil court to decide questions of civil nature being the general rule and exclusion being an exception, the burden of proof to show that jurisdiction is excluded in any particular case is on the party raising such a contention. The rule that the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court is not to be readily inferred is based on the theory that civil Courts are court of general jurisdiction and the people have a right, unless expressly or implied debarred to insist for free access to the courts of general jurisdiction of the State. Indeed, the principle is not limited to civil Courts alone, but applies to all courts of general jurisdiction including criminal courts. The rule as stated above relating to strict construction of provisions excluding jurisdiction of courts of general jurisdiction was recently expressly approved by the Supreme Court." 13. The case of Nippani Electricity Co. (supra) has otherwise no application to the present case because therein the workman attempted to challenge the notice of retrenchment issued to them as being not bona fide and so also illegal and invalid for having been issued against the provisions of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act of 1947, and the claim being really an industrial dispute, jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with such a dispute was held excluded by implication; however, the principles governing the determination of the question as to how far the jurisdiction of ordinary Civil Court is taken away with respect to the matters entrusted to the special Tribunal have been noticed in the said decision and could be usefully read for the present purpose as under:- "12. Mr. Mr. Mulla in his Code of Civil Procedure, 13th Edition, under the heading "Tribunals and jurisdiction of civil Courts" while observing that the question how far the jurisdiction of ordinary civil Courts is taken away with respect to matters which are entrusted to special tribunals constituted by the Legislature has been subject matter of several decisions in recent times, states the principles governing the determination of the question as follows: 1. Where the statute re-enacts a right existing at common law and provides a special form of remedy therefor, the jurisdiction of the civil Court, to deal with the matter is not excluded unless the statute says so expressly or by necessary implication. 2. So also where the statute creates a new right but provides no special remedy therefor, it can be enforced in the ordinary Civil Courts. 3. But where a statute creates a new right not existing at common law and specified a particular mode in which it is to be enforced, it bars by implication the jurisdiction of civil Courts. 4. Even when the jurisdiction of civil Courts is excluded they would have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the statute have not been complied with or where the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or of natural justice." 14. In the context of the industrial disputes dealt with by the Act of 1947 and so to how far the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is to be treated excluded in relation to such matters, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained the position of law in the case of Premier Automobiles (supra) as under:- "9. It would thus be seen that through the intervention of the appropriate government, of course not directly, a very extensive machinery has been provided for settlement and adjudication of industrial disputes. But since an individual aggrieved cannot approach the Tribunal or the Labour Court directly for the redress of his grievance without the intervention of the government, it is legitimate to take the view that the remedy provided under the Act is not such as to completely outs the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for trial of industrial disputes. But since an individual aggrieved cannot approach the Tribunal or the Labour Court directly for the redress of his grievance without the intervention of the government, it is legitimate to take the view that the remedy provided under the Act is not such as to completely outs the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for trial of industrial disputes. If the dispute is not an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) or within the meaning of Section 2-A of the Act, it is obvious that there is no provision for adjudication of such disputes under the Act. Civil Courts will be the proper forum. But where the industrial dispute is for the purpose of enforcing any right, obligation or liability under the general law or the common law and not a right, obligation or liability created under the Act, then alternative forums are there giving an election to the suitor to choose his remedy of either moving the machinery under the Act or to approach the civil Court. It is plain that he can't have both. He has to choose the one or the other. But we shall presently show that the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to try and adjudicate upon an industrial dispute if it concerned enforcement of certain right or liability created only under the Act. In that event Civil Court will have no jurisdiction even to grant a decree of injunction to prevent the threatened injury or account of the alleged breach of contract if the contract is one which is recognised by and enforceable under the Act alone." 15. In the said case of Premier Automobiles, after an elaborate discussion with an extensive survey of the case law on the subject, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to enunciate the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Court in relation to an industrial dispute as follows : "23. To sum up, the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to an Industrial dispute may be stated thus : (1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the Civil Court. To sum up, the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to an Industrial dispute may be stated thus : (1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the Civil Court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get in an adjudication under the Act. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be. 24. We may, however, in relation to principle No.2 stated above hasten to add that there will hardly be a dispute which will be an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and yet will be one arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law only and not under the Act. Such a contingency, for example, may arise in regard to the dismissal of an un-sponsored workman which in view of the provision of law contained in Section 2-4A of the Act will be an industrial dispute even though it may otherwise be an individual dispute. Civil Courts, therefore, will have hardly an occasion to deal with the type of cases falling under principles No 2 Cases of industrial disputes by and large, almost invariably, are bound to be covered by principle No.3 stated above." 16. The position of law has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the recent decision in Mohar Singh's case (supra) wherein, again after a reference to the substantial number of decisions on the subject, including those in Premier Automobiles, Krishan Kant, and Zakir Hussain (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to point out, "29. The position of law has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the recent decision in Mohar Singh's case (supra) wherein, again after a reference to the substantial number of decisions on the subject, including those in Premier Automobiles, Krishan Kant, and Zakir Hussain (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to point out, "29. The decisions referred to hereinbefore clearly brings about a distinction which cannot be lost sight of. If a right is claimed under the Industrial Disputes Act or the sister laws, the jurisdiction of the civil Court would be barred, but if no such right is claimed, Civil Court will have jurisdiction." 17. It is, thus, beyond doubt that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred by necessary implication in the matter pertaining to any dispute wherein the right is claimed under the Act of 1947 or its sister enactments, but is not so barred if no such right is claimed. In practical application of the principles aforesaid, what is decisive on the question of jurisdiction of Civil Court is the nature of dispute and not merely the name of the statute it is referable to or the name of the particular right whose infringement is the basis of the action. It is, in fact, the entire lot of the cause of action, essentially comprising of the right asserted by the plaintiff, its invasion or infringement as is alleged against the defendant, the right to relief as maintained by the plaintiff, and the relief sought by the plaintiff that would be determinative of the nature of dispute for the purpose of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure . 18. The questions, therefore, are as to what is the nature of dispute in the present case; and the same is referable to which of the provisions and as to whether any remedy has been provided in its regard under the said statutes or any them? To address to these questions, apposite it shall be to notice the relevant plaint averments showing the nature of dispute. To address to these questions, apposite it shall be to notice the relevant plaint averments showing the nature of dispute. In paragraph No.8 of the plaint, the plaintiff has averred,- 8- ( vkB ) ;g fd oknh ,oa izfroknh ds e/; o"kksZa ls ;g r; gS fd mlds la?k ds tks lnL; LosPNk ls la?k dk ekfld pank dVokus gsrq fyf[kr izLrko izfroknhx.k dks nsrs gSa] mudk ekfld pank izfroknhx.k muds osru esa dkV dj ml lexz jkf'k dk psd }kjk oknh dks Hkqxrku fd;k tkrk jgk gSA ;g dVkSrh dkuwuu oS| dVkSrh dh ifjHkk"kk esa vkrh gS rFkk mlls i{kdkj ikcUn gSA bl izdkj dh dVkSrh izfroknhx.k us ekg uoEcj 2007 ( nks gtkj lkr ) ds osru tks fnlEcj 2007 ( nks gtkj lkr ) esa ns; Fkk mlesa ekbZUl ls izfroknh la0 3- ( rhu ) us o dkWjiksjsV dk;kZy; ls izfroknh la0 1 ( ,d ) o 2 ( nks ) us jkf'k dkV dj oknh dks vnk dh gSA " 19. Paragraphs Nos. Paragraphs Nos. 12 to 15 of the plaint, on the cause for filing of the present suit and the right to relief, read as under:- " 12- ( ckjg ) ;g fd oknh la?k dh tkudkjh eas mDr rF; vkrs gh rqjUr fnukad 8-1-2008 ( vkB ,d nks gtkj vkB ) dks mUgksaus izfrokn i= izfroknh la0 1 ( ,d ) dks fn;k ogha izfroknhx.k us Hkh ea=h egksn; dks fu;eksa dk gokyk ns ,slh dVkSrh tk;t gksus ckcr~ viuh fjiksVZ fnukad 18-01-2008 ( vBkjg ,d nks gtkj vkB ) dks Hkst nh ijUrq fQj Hkh ;su&dsu izdkjs.k ea=h egksn; ds uktk;t n[ky o ncko ls izfroknhx.k oknh ds vf/kdkjksa ij dqBkjk?kkr djus o ekg tuojh 2008 ( nks gtkj vkB ) ds osru tks Qjojh esa ns; gS mlesa oknh la?k ds pans dks dkVus ls badkj dj jgs gSa] ftldk mUgsa dksbZ gd ugha gSA izfroknhx.k dk mDr d`R; fuEu vk/kkjksa ij vuqfpr o voS/k gS%& ( v ) fd jkT; ljdkj dks izfroknh la0 1 ( ,d ) tks ,d Lora= fudk; gS mlds vkUrfjd ekeyksa esa n[ky dks dksbZ vf/kdkj ugha gSA ( c ) fd Je la?k dks vius fdz;k dyki ds lapkyu dh iw.kZ vktknh gS ftlesa dksbZ n[ky dk gd jkT; ;k izfroknh dks ugha gS] u os funsZ"k gh ns ldrs gSaA ( l ) fd V~sM ;wfu;u ,DV esa ek= U;wure 'kqYd izkof/kr gS] vf/kdre dh dksbZ lhek ugha gS] ;g Je la?k dk viuk fo"k; gS rFkk tc lk/kkj.k lHkk esa 'kqYd ckcr~ fo/kku esa la'kks/ku dj fy;k gS rks izR;sd lnL; mlls ikcUn gS] tks vlger gks mls la?k NksM+us dh vktknh gS] ij ;gka rks izfroknh la0 1 ( ,d ) o 3 ( rhu ) ds {kS=k/khu dk;Zjr dze"k% 178 ( ,d lkS bfB;ksRrj ) o 851 ( vkB lkS bD;kou ) lnL;ksa us gh ugha cfYd rRi'pkr 11 ( X;kjg ) vkSj deZdkjksa us LoSfPNd lgefr i= vius gLrk{kj dj izLrqr fd;s gSa] ftl ckcr vkifRr;ksa vke=a.k mijkUr Hkh fdlh us fojks/k ugha fd;k] o ftu 178 ( ,d lkS bfB;ksRrj ) deZdkjksa dh dVkSrh xr ekg gks pqdh gS mUgksaus Hkh vkifRr vkt rd ugha dh gSA ( n ) fd u rks ea=h egksn; vkSj u izfroknhx.k dks izpfyr ijEijk o dkuwuh ck/;rk ls ek= dfFkr fufgr LokFkhZ rRoksa ds bruh cM+h rknkr esa Jfedksa ds QthZ gLrk{kj ds dFku ij fcuk tkap fo'okl dj dksbZ dk;Zokgh djus dk gh gd gSA ;g fugk;r oknh la?k dks vkfFkZd :i ls detksj djus] mudh xfrfof/k;ksa jksdus dk jktuSfrd nqeZU'kk ls fd;k d`R; gSA ( ; ) fd u flQZ o`f) dh x;h cfYd iwoZ dh vf/kd`r jkf'k Hkh u dkVuk voS| gSA ( j ) fd mDr dne mBkus ls iwoZ oknh la?k dks lquokbZ dk volj u nsuk] djhc ,d ekg ls dksbZ fyf[kr i= u nsuk izkd`frd U;k; dk mYy?kau gSA ( y ) fd jktuSfrd nqeZU'kk ls fd;k dk;Z dHkh lnHkkoh ugha gks ldrh gSA 13- ( rsjg ) ;g fd mDr vk/kkjksa ij izfroknhx.k dk d`R; voS| o 'kwU; gksus ls oknh muds fo:) o`f) dh x;h nj ls vf/kd`r jkf'k dVkSrh dj oknh dks vnk djus gsrq ikcUn djkus dk vf/kdkjh gS] bl gsrq leqfpr fu"ks/kkKk tkjh djuk U;k;ksfpr gSA 14- ( pkSng ) ;g fd oknh ds ikl vU; dksbZ oSdfYid mipkj ugha gSA ;fn okafNr jkgr ugha nh x;h rks oknh dh xfrfof/k;ka gh cUn gks tk,xh mlds vf/kdkjksa ij foijhr izHkko iM+sxkA 15- ( iUnzg ) ;g fd mDr fookn jkT; ljdkj ds vuko';d o voS| n[ky ls mRiUu gks mUgsa i{kdkj cuk;k x;k gS] ftUgsa dkuwuu uksfVl nsuk vko';d gS ij izdj.k dh ifjfLFkfr ds en~ns utj /kkjk 80 ( 2 ) tk0nh0 ds vkosnu ds lkFk okn izLrqr gSA 20. In this suit, the plaintiff union has prayed for the following reliefs:- " 1 ( ,d ) fd izfroknhx.k dks LFkkbZ fu'ks/kkKk ls ikcUn Qjekosa fd os oknh ds fdz;k dyki esa ck/kk mRiUu ugha djs] oknh o muds lnL;ksa }kjk fyf[kr :i ls nh xbZ lgefr ds vuq:i dkWjsiksjsV vkWfQl o >kejdksVM+k ekbZUl ds Jfedksa ds osru ls Je la?k dk ekfld pank dkVus ls badkj ugha djsa u dVkSrh jksds] yxkrkj iwoZor~ c<+h nj ls pank dkV dj oknh la?k dks izfr ekg vnk djrs jgsA 2 ( nks ) fd vk{kkid fu"ks/kkKk }kjk izfroknhx.k dks ikcUn djkos fd fcuk lquokbZ dk volj fn;s ekbZUl {ks= ds Jfedksa dh iwoZ esa tkjh dVkSrh cUn djus o o`f) nj ls dVkSrh ls badkj dk d`R; u dj ekg tuojh 2008( nks gtkj vkB ds osru ls tks Qjojh ekg esa ns; gS] mlesa ubZ nj ls dVkSrh dj jkf'k oknh dks vnk djsa rFkk xr ekg dh tks dVkSrh ugha dh mls Hkh bl ekg esa dVkSrh djds vnk djsaA 3 ( rhu ) fd izfroknhx.k dks ikcUn Qjeksa fd os dkuwu ds fo:) fdlh Hkh izdkj ds ncko ;k jktuhfrd nqeZU'kk ls dksbZ d`R; ugha djsA ekU;rk izkIr cgqer lefFkZr oknh la?k dks viuh xfrfof/k;ksa lqpk: :i ls pykus ns] ml ckcr~ dksbZ vkifr ;k ck/kk mRiUu ugha djsA 4 ( pkj ) vU; dksbZ jkgr tks U;k;ksfpr gks] e; [kpkZ eqdnek fnyk;k tk;sA " 21. Thus, the right to relief as spelt out in the plaint averments is, in essence, the assertion of the plaintiff union that the defendants-petitioners were bound to remit the amount of contribution payable to it after deducting the same from the monthly wages of its consenting members. The cause for filing of the suit has been stated on the allegations of the infringement of such a right of the plaintiff union when the defendants- petitioners refused to make the requisite deduction and omitted to remit the amount of the plaintiff; and the plaintiff has also stated that the defendants were abstaining from carrying out their obligation because of unnecessary and illegal interference of the State Government. On such a cause of action the plaintiff union has asserted its rights to claim, and has prayed for, perpetual injunction and mandatory injunction to compel the defendants-petitioners to carry out their obligations and not to cause hindrance in the activities of the union. On such a cause of action the plaintiff union has asserted its rights to claim, and has prayed for, perpetual injunction and mandatory injunction to compel the defendants-petitioners to carry out their obligations and not to cause hindrance in the activities of the union. It is difficult to agree that the dispute forming the subject matter of the present suit could be referred to any such right that has been created under the Act of 1947 and/or its sister enactments and where for a remedy has been provided in such enactments. 22. Section 2(k) of the Act of 1947 defines the expression 'industrial dispute' in the following terms : "2(k) 'industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employees and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. 23. The dispute forming the subject matter of the present suit is not a dispute between the employers and employers nor the same is in between the workmen and workmen. The dispute is not even between employers and workmen connected with employment or terms of employment or conditions of labour. The dispute is between the union of the employees and the employers which is connected with and related to the right of the plaintiff union itself, to receive the amount towards contribution to it, after having the same deducted by the defendants-petitioners from the wages of its consenting members. Strictly speaking, the dispute in the present suit cannot be termed to be an 'industrial dispute' for the purpose, and as defined by Section 2(k), of the Act of 1947. 24. Significant it is to notice that in this suit, the plaintiff union is not espousing the cause of any individual workman or even a group of workmen; but the cause relates to the right claimed by the plaintiff union itself that the defendants ought not to deny deductions from the wages as per the consent stated by the workmen towards contribution to the plaintiff; and that the defendants ought to remit the amount after deduction to the plaintiff. Such a right could of course be claimed by the plaintiff with reference to the Act of 1926 read with Section 7(2)(kkk) of the Act of 1936 for itself being a registered and recognised Trade Union but then, whether under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 or under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 whereunder and whereby such a right is claimed, there is no machinery as such provided for enforcement of such a right of the Trade Union to have the contribution deducted from the wages of its members and to have.the same remitted to it; and there appears no remedy available under the enactments referred by the petitioners whereunder the plaintiff could claim the injunction as prayed for in this suit. 25. Section 2(ra) and certain clauses in the Third and Fifth Schedules to the Act of 1947 have been referred. Section 2(ra) merely defines the expression 'unfair labour practice' to recd, 2(ra) "unfair labour practice" means any of the practices specified in the Fifth Schedule." 26. The Third Schedule of the Act of 1947 provides for the matters within the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunals and the relevant part in its item No.1 reads as under:- "1. Wages, including the period and mode of payment." 27. In the fist part of Fifth Schedule to the Act of 1947 are adumbrated such aspects that would amount to unfair labour practices on the part of the employers and the trade unions of the employers. The referred items Nos. 2 and 13 therein read as under:- 2. To dominate, interfere with or contribute support, financial or otherwise, to any trade union, that is to say- (a) An employer taking an active interest in organising a trade union of his workmen; and (b) An employer showing partiality or granting favour to one of several trade unions attempting to organise his workmen or to its members, where such a trade union is not a recognised trade union. "13. Failure to implement award, settlement or agreement." 28. Apparently, it is not a grievance stated by any workman about the period and mode of payment of his wages, and the matter cannot be co-related with item No.1 of the Third Schedule to the Act of 1947. "13. Failure to implement award, settlement or agreement." 28. Apparently, it is not a grievance stated by any workman about the period and mode of payment of his wages, and the matter cannot be co-related with item No.1 of the Third Schedule to the Act of 1947. Merely because the expression 'wages' occurs therein, it cannot be said that anything and everything related with wages directly becomes the subject of a matter to be considered only by the Industrial Tribunal. As noticed, the claim herein is about deduction from the wages and is remittance, as the same is asserted to be a legal right of the plaintiff union. Then, item No.2 in the Fifth Schedule to the Act of 1947 has not even a remote connection with the dispute at hands. It is not the essential part of the cause of action in this suit that the employer is taking interest in organising a trade union of its workmen or is showing partiality towards any non-recognised trade union. At the most, and by some stretch of arguments, the matter could be referred to item No.13 of the Fifth Schedule to argue that the cause stated by the plaintiff is about employer's failure to implement the agreement for deduction from the wages. But then, the question about jurisdiction cannot be answered with abstract reference merely to the expression 'agreement' without noticing the cause stated and the relief claimed. According to the plaintiff, the requisite deductions were being regularly made, enhanced amount of contribution was also deducted in relation to some of its members and remitted to the plaintiff, and then, such deductions were denied because of the unauthorized and illegal interference of the State Government. It is difficult to hold that such a grievance by the trade union itself, of infringement of its own rights, could also be raised as an industrial dispute and would be exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court established under the Act of 1947 so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. It is difficult to hold that such a grievance by the trade union itself, of infringement of its own rights, could also be raised as an industrial dispute and would be exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court established under the Act of 1947 so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Though Chapter V-C of the Act of 1947, in its Sections 25-T and 25-U, provides for prohibition of unfair labour practice and so also for penalty for committing unfair labour practices but then, relief, of injunction against threatened injury or against continuing wrong is difficult to be found therein so as to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court stands barred by necessary implication. 29. Taking the relevant provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, it is noticed that bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts has been spelt out in Section 22 thereof on the specified matters thus : "22. Bar of suits.-No Court shall entertain any suit for the recovery of the wages or of any deduction from wages insofar as the sum so claimed. (a) Forms the subject of an application under Section 15 which has been presented by the plaintiff and which is pending before the authority appointed under that Section or of an appeal under Section 17; or (b) Has formed the subject of a direction under Section 15 in favour of the plaintiff; or (c) Has been adjudged, in any proceeding under Section 15, not to be owed to the plaintiff; or (d) Could have been recovered by an application under Section 15." 30. Thus, the bar of the jurisdiction of Civil Court in the matters dealt with by Act of 1936 is confined to the claim for recovery of the wages or of any deduction from wages insofar the sum claimed is or has been or could be the subject of an application under its Section 15. The said Section 15 essentially deals with the claims arising out of deduction from wages or delay in payment of wages and the matters incidental thereto. The said Section 15 essentially deals with the claims arising out of deduction from wages or delay in payment of wages and the matters incidental thereto. For the purpose of the present case, noticeable it is that under sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act of 1936, the deduction from wages, if made contrary to the provisions of the said Act, could also be a subject of the application to the prescribed authority who can direct its refund together with compensation as provided under sub-section (3). Then, the deduction as claimed by the plaintiff union is referable to Clause (kkk) of sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act of 1936 that reads as under: (2) Deductions from the wages of an employed person shall be made only in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and may be of the following kinds only, namely:- .... .... .... .... (kkk) deductions made, with the written authorisation of the employed person, for payment of the fees payable by him for the membership of any trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 (16 of 1926)." 31. The aspect relevant for the purpose of this present case is that it is not the claim of any employed person that there had been or would be any such deduction that had or would contravene the provisions of Section 7(2), particularly its clause (kkk), of the Act of 1936. On the contrary and other way round, the claim is of the trade union that the employer should not refuse to make such deduction when authorised in writing by its members. Such a claim is not referable to Section 15 of the Act of 1936; and in regard to such a claim, the said Act of 1936 does not appear creating any bar on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, more particularly when the bar is otherwise spelt out in Section 22 of the Act of 1936 in relation to the specific class and kind of cases. 32. Even with reference to the provisions of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 this Court is unable to find express or implied bar on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court thereunder in relation to the matter of the present nature. 32. Even with reference to the provisions of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 this Court is unable to find express or implied bar on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court thereunder in relation to the matter of the present nature. The said Act of 192& provides, in its Section 18, the immunity from civil suit or other legal proceedings in any Civil Court to a registered Trade Union and its office-bearer/member in respect of certain acts, essentially related to the trade disputes. Then, the Act provides, in its Section 19, for enforceability of an agreement between the Trade Union and its members and proviso thereto, of course, bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, but only in relation to the claim for enforcement of, or damages on breach of, any agreement concerning the conditions on which the members of the Trade Union shall or shall not sell their goods, transact business, work, employ, or be employed. Section 18 of the Act of 1926 reads as under: "18. Enforceability of agreements.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, an agreement between the members of a registered Trade Union shall not be void or voidable merely by reason of the fact that any of the objects of the agreement are in restraint of trade : Provided that nothing in this section shall enable any Civil Court to entertain any legal proceeding instituted for the express purpose of enforcing or recovering damages for the breach of any agreement concerning the conditions on which any members of a Trade Union shall or shall not sell their goods, transact business, work, employ or be employed." 33. If at all the provisions of the Act of 1926 and the Act of 1936 are of any indication, bar of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has specifically been delineated in the relevant provisions on the limited aspects only. The necessary implication could only be that except for the matters so provided, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred. The suit of the present nature is not covered by any of the barring provisions; and obviously remains very much within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 34. The necessary implication could only be that except for the matters so provided, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred. The suit of the present nature is not covered by any of the barring provisions; and obviously remains very much within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 34. Reference has also been made on behalf of the petitioners to the Industrial Disputes (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1958 and Chapter II-B as inserted thereby; and it is submitted that the Act of 1926 is undoubtedly a sister enactment of the Act of 1947. Though learned counsel for the plaintiff would raise objection that such submissions were not placed for consideration before the Trial Court, however, as the matter concerns the jurisdiction of the Court, ignoring such objection, the provisions as contained in the said Chapter II-B have also been examined; and this Court is of opinion that the reference to the said Chapter II-B is not only misplaced but, in a way, the provisions contained in the said Chapter II-B rather operate against the propositions sought to be suggested by the petitioners. 35. The said provisions of Chapter II-B essentially deal with registration of a representative union with the Registrar concerned who is to maintain a register for the purpose; to whom application for registration could be made; and who would carry out necessary enquiry and on being satisfied with the fulfilment of the conditions requisite for registration, may register a representative union and issue certificate in that regard. Provisions have also been made for cancellation of registration of certain eventulaties including the one if the registration of the union under the Act of 1926 is cancelled. Provisions have also been made for the registration of another union in place of existing registered union and for re-registration too. Section 9-I therein provides for appeal to the Industrial Tribunal from the order passed by the Registrar under the said Chapter. Obviously, an appeal lies to the Industrial Tribunal in relation to the matters concerning registration, cancellation, or re- registration etc. of a union as a representative union. The said provisions have otherwise no application or relevance for the present purpose; but the features noticeable are that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal has been provided as an appellate jurisdiction and only in respect of the matters concerning registration of a representative union and the ancillary issues but not otherwise. of a union as a representative union. The said provisions have otherwise no application or relevance for the present purpose; but the features noticeable are that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal has been provided as an appellate jurisdiction and only in respect of the matters concerning registration of a representative union and the ancillary issues but not otherwise. The indication, if any to be gathered therefrom; and the inference, if any to be drawn thereby, is that jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal in relation to the matters concerning the Trade Union itself is the limited one only as provided by the Section 9-I contained in the said Chapter II-B. 36. The said provisions of Chapter II-B make it clear that the right of a Trade Union referable to Section 7(2)(kkk) of the Payment of Wages Act is not taken away or in any manner dealt with; and there is no machinery as such provided for enforcement of such a right of the Trade Union to have the contribution deducted from the wages of its members and to have the same remitted to it. The said provisions in Chapter II-B rather fortify the conclusion that the right to relief as claimed in the present suit is not at all available under the Scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; and the matter is clearly of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 37. Having regard to the nature of right asserted, the nature of injury alleged, and the nature of relief claimed, this Court is clearly of opinion that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in this matter is not barred. There is no express bar spelt out in any of the statutes referred; and no such bar appears arising by necessary implication. 38. Apart from the aforesaid, and even if it be assumed for the sake of arguments that the nature of dispute has some traces referable to the labour and industrial enactments, the fact remains that the grievance stated by the plaintiff is essentially in regard to the interference by the State Government in its relationship with the management. In the frame of the suit, this Court is unable to countenance the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that the allegation in respect of the State Government are something of a cloak or camouflage. In the frame of the suit, this Court is unable to countenance the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that the allegation in respect of the State Government are something of a cloak or camouflage. The plaint read as a whole makes it clear that the basic and root grievance of the plaintiff union is about unauthorized interference of the State Government in the matter of deduction by the employers, of contribution from the wages of the members of plaintiff union. The submission that the Hon'ble Minister has not been joined as party is also entirely irrelevant; and rather baseless. In the frame of the suit and the pleading taken, prima facie, there does not appear any necessity that the plaintiff ought to have joined the Hon'ble Minister a party to the suit. However, for the matter being considered on the question of jurisdiction, this aspect is not required to be dilated upon any further; and whether the grievance as stated is ultimately found to be valid or not; and whether the plaintiff is able to establish its right to relief are the matters entirely different and are to be decided only when the suit goes into the trial. For the present purpose, suffice is to say that for the grievance as stated and reliefs as prayed with reference to a tripartite dispute arising because of interference of the State Government, the suit in question cannot be held beyond the jurisdiction of the Civil Court; nor could be said to be barred by any law. 39. Though a number of decisions have been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, however, the fundamental principles applicable to and relevant for the present case remain those as directly found in the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Premier Automobile's case (supra) and as recently explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohar Singh case (supra); and, applying such principles to the facts of the present case, this Court has found that the suit in question is not beyond the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Hence, there appears no necessity to discuss at length all the cited decisions. 40. Hence, there appears no necessity to discuss at length all the cited decisions. 40. However, it may be pointed out that largely and generally all the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners had been of such dispute where the right itself was claimed only under the Act of 1947 or its sister enactment and not otherwise. In Krishna Kant (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the group of cases where the services of the employees concerned were terminated after disciplinary enquiries held against them on the charges of misconduct; and, essentially, the employees questioned such termination on the ground of violation of the certified Standing Orders in force in the establishment. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while explaining Premier Automobile's case and expounding further principles, held that where a dispute involves recognition, observance and enforcement of rights and obligations created under the Act of 1947 or its sister enactments like the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 'the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction. In Zakir Hussain (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that it were a case of the termination simpliciter not containing any stigma and held that the management was entitled to terminate the services of the probationary officer during the period of probation if his services were not found to be satisfactory. In the case of Jitendra Nath Biswas (supra), the suit was filed questioning the dismissal of the employee and relief was claimed of reinstatement and back wages. The Hon'ble Supreme Court found that such a relief would only be available to a workman under the Act of 1947. In the case of Krishnan (supra), the dispute was raised by some of the workmen to declare that an agreement entered into between the management and the labourer union was invalid and not binding of them. Such a dispute was held to be an industrial dispute. In the case of Pigment Lakes (supra), the suit was filed by the workman claiming a declaration that the defendant company has terminated him illegally and without reason and omitted to reemploy him on re-starting of the factory. The reliefs as claimed were found to be available under Sections 25- FFF and 25-H of the Act of 1947 and it was found that such reliefs could not be granted under the Specific Relief Act by the Civil Court. 41. The reliefs as claimed were found to be available under Sections 25- FFF and 25-H of the Act of 1947 and it was found that such reliefs could not be granted under the Specific Relief Act by the Civil Court. 41. None of the decisions cited on behalf of the petitioners deals with any dispute of the present nature or even on the periphery thereof; and hence, the cited decision have no direct application to the question at hands nor are of any support to the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners. 42. For all the reasons aforesaid, this Court is clearly of opinion that the suit in question is triable by the Civil Court; and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred. The learned Trial Court has rightly rejected the baseless applications moved by the petitioners. 43. The impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or irregularity and does not call for any interference.The revision petition fails and is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Record be returned to the Trial Court immediately. Petition dismissed with costs. *******