JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—This writ petition has been filed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 5.4.2007 passed by the Director of Education (Madhyamik) U.P. Lucknow by which the claim of the petitioners for payment of salary as Assistant Teacher in attached primary section to the Shastri Smarak Inter College Ahmadshahpur, Padra, District Baghpat has been refused. The aforesaid order has been passed pursuant to the order of this Court dated 19.3.2007 passed in Writ Petition No. 40460 of 2005, Kanak Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others. Vide order dated 19.3.2007, this Court has directed the respondent No. 3 i.e. Director of Education (Madhyamik) U.P. Lucknow to re-examine the entire facts relevant for the purposes of the compliance of the direction issued by the Court in its judgment dated 10.11.2003, including the issue as to how many students were actually admitted in the institution at the relevant time, the additional section permitted to be opened in attached primary section of the institution as well as validity of the appointments claimed by the petitioners with specific reference to the original documents in respect of the procedure adopted. 2. In the present writ petition, the impugned order has been challenged on the ground that the respondent No. 3 while passing the impugned order dated 5.4.2007 has ignored the directions given by this Court and rejected the representation totally on irrelevant consideration and misconceived grounds. 3. The facts giving rise to this case are that there is an Institution known as Shastri Smarak Inter College, Ahmadshahpur, Padra, District Baghpat which is duly recognized by the U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education. The services of the teachers and other employees are governed under the provisions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the regulations framed thereunder. The college is on the grant-in-aid list and the salary of the teachers and other employees are payable under the provisions of U.P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salary of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as Act of 1971). 4. Initially up to 1989-90 the college was recognized only up to High School but later on this became an Intermediate College. 4. Initially up to 1989-90 the college was recognized only up to High School but later on this became an Intermediate College. Along with this college there was an attached primary section imparting education from Class I to V. Prior to 6.9.1989, the payment of the salary of the teachers working in the primary section was to be paid from college management. However, vide Circular dated 6.9.1989, the Government has decided to pay the salary to the teachers working in the attached primary section with High School and Intermediate Colleges and it is thereafter the payment of salary of the teachers working in the attached primary section became payable under the Act of 1971. 5. The case of the petitioners is that they were appointed on 3.9.1985 as Assistant teachers in the primary section of the aforesaid college. Their appointments were made in accordance with law and the same were duly approved on 3.10.1985 by the then District Inspector of Schools. Thereafter they have joined the institution and are continuously working. However, after commencement of the Circular dated 6.9.1989 only four teachers out of 16 working in the primary section have been paid salary. The reason for payment of the salary to only 4 teachers was a spot inspection made on 1.10.1989 by the District Inspector of Schools. It appears that after the commencement of the said Circular dated 6.9.1989, the District Inspector of Schools has found that only 4 teachers are actually working and the strength of the students was also not such for which more teachers could be appointed. 6. Aggrieved from the said action, the present petitioners alongwith many others whose payment of salary was refused have filed writ petition No. 18711 of 1990 for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 4.6.1989 passed by the District Inspector of Schools as well as the order dated 5.7.1990. Vide order dated 4.6.1989, the then District Inspector of Schools, Meerut on the basis of spot inspection has directed to pay the salary to only 4 teachers and order dated 5.7.1990 was a consequential order issued by the principal of the college. Prayer was also made for issuing a direction to the respondents to pay the salary to the petitioners for the post of Assistant Teachers working in primary section. Prayer was also made for issuing a direction to the respondents to pay the salary to the petitioners for the post of Assistant Teachers working in primary section. In the said writ petition, this Court on 19.7.1990 has passed an interim order directing the respondents to pay current as well as future salary to the petitioners as and when it falls due. Thereafter the petitioners are continuously working and they have also been paid the salary for some time. 7. However, the said writ petition was dismissed on 10.11.2003 for the reason that the disputed question of facts was involved. But while dismissing the writ petition, a liberty was given to the petitioners to make fresh a representation before the Director of Education (Madhyamik) U.P. Lucknow and the Director was required to pass a reasoned order after providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and other concerned. 8. Pursuant to the order of this Court dated 10.11.2003, the petitioners have filed fresh representation before the respondent No. 3 but the Director of Education has rejected petitioners representation on 25.4.2005. The basis for passing the order dated 25.4.2005 was an inspection report of the District Inspector of Schools where he found that only 4 Assistant Teachers were actually working. However, according to the petitioners, the said report was an ex-parte report and the petitioners were never informed about the same. Order dated 25.4.2005 passed by the respondent No. 3 was again challenged by the petitioners through writ petition No. 40460 of 2005 on the following grounds : (1) Because the petitioners appointment were made by the competent authority and their appointments were duly approved by the District Inspector of Schools on 31.10.1985 prior to the Circular dated 6.9.1989. (2) Because it is not a case of the respondent that the petitioners are disqualified or their appointments have been made ignoring the relevant statutes meant for the appointment of assistant teachers. (3) Because the petitioners appointment were made against the sanctioned posts after the permission of the District Inspector of Schools to run 16 more sections in the primary section and the said permission has never been cancelled. (3) Because the petitioners appointment were made against the sanctioned posts after the permission of the District Inspector of Schools to run 16 more sections in the primary section and the said permission has never been cancelled. (4) Because number of sanctioned post was to be considered on the basis of the strength of the students in the year 1985 when the petitioners were appointed and not on the basis of the present strength or for that purpose of the subsequent years. (5) Because on the basis of ex-parte inspection report the payment could not be refused. 9. In the said writ petition, on 13.2.2007 this Court has directed the Director of Education to remain present before the Court alongwith record. However, on the date fixed the Director could not appear and the date was fixed for 19.3.2007. On the date fixed the Director of Education was directed to decide the matter afresh as directed by this Court earlier. The operative portion of the said order is quoted below : “Director is, therefore, required to re-examine the entire facts relevant for the purposes of the compliance of the direction issued by this Court under the judgment dated 10.11.2003, including the issue as to how many students were actually admitted in the institution at the relevant time. The additional section permitted to be opened in primary part of the institution as well as validity of the appointments claimed by the petitioners with specific reference to the original documents in respect of the procedure adopted”. 10. Pursuant to the said order it appears that the Director of Education has passed fresh order dated 5.4.2007 and again the payment of salary of the petitioners have been refused on the following grounds : (i) Because the petitioners do not fall within four corners of the circular dated 6.9.1989 as according to the said circular from class 1 to class V only five teachers i.e. 1 teacher for one class can be paid salary. (ii) Because the petitioners were not appointed in accordance with law and their appointment was also not approved. For coming to this conclusion the reliance has been placed on the letter dated 4.4.2007 sent by the then District Inspector of Schools who had approved the services of the petitioners. (Vide letter dated 4.4.2007, the then District Inspector of Schools has denied his signature over the approval letter dated 30.10.1985. For coming to this conclusion the reliance has been placed on the letter dated 4.4.2007 sent by the then District Inspector of Schools who had approved the services of the petitioners. (Vide letter dated 4.4.2007, the then District Inspector of Schools has denied his signature over the approval letter dated 30.10.1985. It appears that the said letter was sent by the then District Inspector of Schools on the clarification sought by the Director of Education pursuant to the order of the Court for deciding the controversy afresh). (iii) Because the strenght of the students was not such for which permission for opening additional section could be given and salary could be paid. Further the annual grant was not such for which this much number of teachers could be appointed. 11. The aforesaid order has been challenged through the present writ petition on number of grounds : (1) Because while placing reliance on the circular dated 6.9.1989 later circular dated 22.11.1989 was not taken into consideration. According to the later circular the salary of one teacher for each class was clarified to the extent to pay salary to every teacher appointed in new sections as well. (2) Because the strength of the students and opening of new section was relevant to be seen of the year 1985 when the petitioners appointments were made. (3) Because the strength of the subsequent years for opening new section was immaterial because the ceiling of maintenance grant was seized in the year 1976, therefore, the basis for calculating the strength of the students on the basis of grant was not tenable in the eye of law. (4) Because no reliance could be placed on the letter dated 4.4.2007 of Shri Daljit Puri, the then District Inspector of Schools as the said letter contains only his version. Another reason i.e. for ignoring the said letter is that one teacher who was also approved alongwith the petitioners, namely, Meenakshi Devi has been adjusted in another College. It has also been averred that the number of signatures of Shri Daljitpuri was available on the record and many persons mentioned in para 34 of the writ petition are beneficiaries of such kind of signature made by Shri Daljitpuri, the then District Inspector of Schools. 12. It has also been averred that the number of signatures of Shri Daljitpuri was available on the record and many persons mentioned in para 34 of the writ petition are beneficiaries of such kind of signature made by Shri Daljitpuri, the then District Inspector of Schools. 12. Refuting the submission of Shri V.K. Goel, assisted by Shri V.K. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri K.K. Chand learned Standing Counsel has made the following submissions : (1) It is the petitioners who have filed the writ petition before this Court claiming the payment of salary under the Act of 1971, therefore, it is the duty of the petitioners to establish before this Court that they are fully qualified and duly appointed as Assistant teachers in Junior Basic School. Further, their appointments have been made against the sanctioned posts after following the procedure as contained in U.P. Recognised Basic School (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers and other Conditions) Rules, 1975 and in consonance with the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972 read with U.P. Basic Education Teachers Service Rules, 1981 or in conformity with the provisions as contained in U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and Regulation framed thereunder. In his submissions, the petitioners have nowhere stated in the entire writ petition that what is their qualification, when posts were sanctioned, when the vacancies were advertised and what procedure has been adopted for appointment of the petitioners. In his submissions in absence of above requirement payment of salary by the State exchequer under the Act of 1971 cannot be made. (2) The sanction of the post and the permission for running the new sections are altogether two different things and it is settled law that sanction of the post has nothing to do with the permission to open new section. In his submissions, the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Gopal Dubey v. D.I.O.S. Maharajganj and others, 1999 UPLBEC 1 has held that no order for payment of salary can be passed on the assumption that permission has been granted for running the new section. In his submissions, the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Gopal Dubey v. D.I.O.S. Maharajganj and others, 1999 UPLBEC 1 has held that no order for payment of salary can be passed on the assumption that permission has been granted for running the new section. (3) Even if it is assumed that Director of Education has erred in making the basis of the strenght of the students of the year 2000 and 2001 and not 1985 even then on benefit shall accrue so far it relates to the payment of salary to the petitioners unless it is proved that after grant of permission for running new sections the posts were also sanctioned and the appointment of the petitioners were also made in accordance with law. (4) Learned Standing Counsel has also submitted that even if the letter of Shri Daljit Puri the then District Inspector of Schools dated 4.4.2007 is taken to be incorrect as no reliance can be placed on the said letter drawing adverse inference against the petitioners and refusing the payment of salary to the petitioners as other similarly situated persons are getting salary and are beneficiary of such kind of signatures as appears on the approval letter dated 30.11.1985 even then it will make no difference as it is settled that concept of Article 14 of the Constitution of India is positive one and it cannot be enforced in negative manner. In his submissions it is settled that if some wrong orders have been passed no mandamus can be issued by this Court on the basis of said order unless it is proved before the Court that the persons who are claiming benefit of that kind of order are entitled to get the benefit in accordance with law. (5) In reply to the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners are working for the last 23 years in the said institution and for sometime they have been paid salary also from State Exchequer, therefore, if at the fag end of their career their case are ignored and salary is refused, not only their life but entire family will be ruined, learned Standing Counsel has submitted that equity follows the law and justice must be done in accordance with law how so hard consequence one may suffer. 13. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners Shri V.K. Goel assisted by Shri Vivek Kumar Singh, Shri K.N. Shukla and Shri K.K. Chand, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 14. For deciding the aforesaid writ petition, following points are necessary to be considered : (1) Whether the permission/sanction for opening new section will amount sanction of the post? (2) Whether the petitioners appointment was made against the sanctioned posts after following the procedure as contained under the relevant Acts, Rules and Regulations? (3) Whether the Director of Education has erred in law in not considering the circular dated 22.11.1989 for payment of salary of one teacher for each class and for each teacher in new section also? (4) Whether Director of Education has erred in placing reliance on letter dated 4.4.2007 sent by Director of Education (Vaikalpik Shiksha) the then District Inspector of Schools without giving an opportunity to rebut the same to the petitioners, ignoring the claim of the petitioners for payment of salary? (5) Whether on equitable ground impugned order passed by the Director of Education can be quashed considering the long working of the petitioners of about 23 years? Point No. 1 15. So far as the permission for opening new section and sanction of the post is concerned, the law is settled in this regard and permission to run new section has nothing to do with the sanction of the post. Both are separate things and are governed under separate statute. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Gopal Dube (supra) has observed : “Section 9 of the Payment of Salaries Act expressly mandates that no institution shall create a new post of teacher or other employee except with the previous approval of the Director or such other office as may be empowered in that behalf by the Director. Since the statute requires the thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner or not at all. It follows, therefore, that prior approval of the Director in writing must be obtained before the management creates a new post of teacher in the recognised institution. The requirement of the statute cannot be presumed because the Director happens to be the authority or one of the authorities concerned in the matter of accord of recognition for opening a new subject in a college. The requirement of the statute cannot be presumed because the Director happens to be the authority or one of the authorities concerned in the matter of accord of recognition for opening a new subject in a college. It is relevant to note here that recognition for opening a subject in a College is accorded by the Director under the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act, which is a statute to establish a Board to regulate and supervise the system of the High School and Intermediate Education in Uttar Pradesh, prescribe courses therefore and oversee related activities, whereas the payment of Salaries Act is enacted to regulate the payment of salaries to teachers and other employees of the High Schools and Intermediate Colleges and to provide for matter connected therewith. The two statutes, in our considered view, operate in different fields. While dealing with matters like recognition and payment of salary of teachers and other employees relevant matters to be taken into consideration are different. Regarding recognition, the authority has to satisfy itself about necessary infrastructure, the facilities available in the educational Institution, the benefit to the students of the locality in opening the new subject in the Institution, the potentiality of the institution to cater to the needs of the students of the locality etc. while dealing with the question of granting approval for creation of post of a teacher or other employee in an institution, the primary consideration is the preparedness of the State Government to bear the financial liability of the new post proposed to be created. It follows therefore, that the contention that since the Director is associated with the matter regarding grant of permission/recognition for opening new subject in the Institution, it is presumed that he has given his consent for creating new posts of teachers and other employees for that subject is not correct. This contention, if accepted, may lead to situation that the management creates posts of teachers and other employees in connection with the new subject and the State Government is compelled to bear the financial liability without any further involvement in the matter. Such a situation, as we read the provision of the two enactments, it not contemplated. It also does not appeal to common logic. Such a situation, as we read the provision of the two enactments, it not contemplated. It also does not appeal to common logic. The result is that for the purpose of creating a new post of teacher or other employee for/in connecting with a new subject, which it has been permitted to open, the management has to obtain prior approval of the Director as required under Section 9 of the Payment of Salaries Act. This statutory mandate cannot be said to have been satisfied by raising a presumption on the basis of recognition grated for that subject. Point No. 2 16. In respect of point No. 2 it is for the petitioners to prove that their appointment have been made against the sanctioned post. So far as procedure adopted for appointment is concerned, it has to be looked into what is the qualification and procedure prescribed under the relevant statute for the purposes of an appointment of Assistant teacher in Junior Basic School. It is noticeable that after commencement of U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972 two kinds of Junior Basic School are running throughout the State. The services of one set of school are governed under the rules known as U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981. Rule 2 of which talks about the Junior Basic School. Junior Basic School means, basic school which impart education from class 1 to V. Rule 8 of the aforesaid rule talks about qualification of the Assistant Master and Assistant Mistress in the Junior Basic School, according to which the academic qualification for the purpose of Assistant Teacher in junior basic school happens to Bachelor degree from an University established by law in India or a degree recognised by government as equivalent thereto together with training qualification, consisting of B.T.C., H.T.C., J.T.C., certificate of teaching or any other training courses recognised by the Government as equivalent thereto. It is clarified that prior to 1998 the academic qualification was Intermediate alongwith training qualification as prescribed herein above. In the year 1998 only Bachelor degree has been mentioned and other qualification remain the same. Rule 14 talks about determination of vacancies and preparation of list. Rule 15 talks about notification of the vacancies and preparation of list of eligible candidates. Rule 16 talks about constitution of selection committee. 17. In the year 1998 only Bachelor degree has been mentioned and other qualification remain the same. Rule 14 talks about determination of vacancies and preparation of list. Rule 15 talks about notification of the vacancies and preparation of list of eligible candidates. Rule 16 talks about constitution of selection committee. 17. The second set of school are being run by the societies and the services of Assistant teachers in Junior Basic School are governed under the rules known U.P. Recognised Basic School (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teacher and Other Conditions) Rules, 1975. Rule 3 of the aforesaid rule talks about applicability of the said rule according to which every recognised school shall be bound by the conditions and restrictions as contained in the said rules. Apart from other rules, Rule 9 of the aforesaid rules talks about appointment of teacher which runs as under : “No person shall be appointed as teacher or other employee in any recognised school unless he possesses such qualification as are specified in this behalf by the Board and for whose appointment the previous approval of the Basic Shiksha Adhikaari has been obtained in writing. In case of vacancy the applications for appointment shall be invited by the concerned management through advertisement in at least two newspapers (one of them will be daily newspaper), giving at least thirty days time for submitting application. The date of interview may be given in the advertisement or the candidates be informed of the date fixed for interview by registered post, giving them at least 15 days time from the date of issue of the letter. The management shall not select any untrained teacher and if the selected candidates is trained one, he will be approved by the Basic Shiksha Adhikari.” 18. Here it is also noticeable that the petitioners are teachers in the primary section attached with an Intermediate College. Neither in the Act, nor in the regulations framed under U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 procedure is prescribed for appointment of teacher in attach primary section and only qualification has been prescribed in the Appendix vide Notification No. 8238/15 Fit-7-76-2 (18) 75 dated 8.12.1976. 19. However, Regulation 10 of Chapter 2 of U.P. Intermediate Education Act talks about procedure for filling of the vacancies of the head of the institution and teachers by direct recruitment in recognised institution. 19. However, Regulation 10 of Chapter 2 of U.P. Intermediate Education Act talks about procedure for filling of the vacancies of the head of the institution and teachers by direct recruitment in recognised institution. If the said regulation is presumed to be applicable in the case of the petitioners then petitioners have to establish that before their appointment the procedure contained in the said regulation have been followed. It is noticeable that since this primary section is being run by a committee of management of society, therefore, Rule 3 of Rules of 1975 is also applicable. Rule 9 of this rule requires that prior to appointment of a teacher, prior approval of the District Basic Education Officer is essential. The vacancies have to be advertised atleast in two newspapers. It is also one of the condition that no untrained teacher shall be appointed and if any untrained teacher is appointed that has to be approved by the District Basic Education Officer. 20. From the perusal of three sets of rules one thing is common that the posts have to be sanctioned, appointments have to be made after due advertisement and persons have to be eligible to be appointed as Assistant teacher. I have gone through the record and in the entire writ petition no such averment has been made with regard to the qualification, manner and mode followed in the appointment of the petitioners. The Director of Education ought to have dealt with this aspect of the matter before passing the impugned order. Point No. 3 21. So far as the Circular dated 22.11.1989 for payment of salary of one teacher for each class and for each teacher in new section is concerned the recital of circular dated 22.11.1989 issued by Joint Director of Education (Arth) Directorate of U.P. is necessary to be looked into. The said recital is quoted below : bu mPprj ek/;fed fo|ky;ksa ls lEc/k izkbejh d{kkvksa esa v/;kidksa dks ,d d{kk esa ,d rFkk izR;sd ekU; vfrfjä vuqHkkx ds fy, ,d&,d v/;kid ekU; ekudj osru dk Hkqxrku lqfufpr fd;k tk;sA 22. The said recital is quoted below : bu mPprj ek/;fed fo|ky;ksa ls lEc/k izkbejh d{kkvksa esa v/;kidksa dks ,d d{kk esa ,d rFkk izR;sd ekU; vfrfjä vuqHkkx ds fy, ,d&,d v/;kid ekU; ekudj osru dk Hkqxrku lqfufpr fd;k tk;sA 22. From the perusal of the language used in the Circular it is clear that for the recognised section in addition to one teacher in each class, the teachers appointed in new sections are also entitled to get the salary but question remains whether the said circular issued by the Joint Director of Education will have an over riding effect on the Circular dated 6.9.1989 issued by the Director of Education himself. Whether the said Circular can be read in isolation, or it will be read in consonance with the provisions of relevant statutes governing field of an appointment in junior basic school as assistant teacher? Whether the said circular issued by the Joint Director of Education is in conformity with the provisions contained in U.P. High School and Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and Payment of Salaries Act, 1971. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the then District Inspector of Schools has given permission to open new section on the basis of norms prescribed for the purposes of opening new section and it is against that the petitioners appointments have been made. In his submission, the Director of Education has erred in law in ignoring the circular dated 22.11.1989 and norms prescribed by the State Government for opening new section while passing the impugned order. 24. So far as the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioners to the extent that while passing the impugned order the circular dated 22.11.1989 has not been considered appears to be true but it will make no difference as admittedly this circular has been issued by the Joint Director of Education. I am of the view that this circular will have no over riding effect over the circular dated 6.8.1989 but for the sake of argument even if it is assumed that circular dated 22.11.1989 has to be read in consonance with the circular dated 6.9.1989 issued by the Director of Education even then it will make no difference so far it relates to the payment of salary to the petitioners. I am of the view that for payment of the salary, the petitioners have to prove either before the Director of Education or before this Court that after permission to open new sections, the posts were also sanctioned and petitioners were appointed against those sanctioned posts, after following due procedure as contained in the relevant statute. Point No. 4 25. So far as the letter dated 4.4.2007 sent by the Director of Education Vaikalpik Shiksha the then District Inspector of Schools is concerned, prima facie it appears that no decision could be arrived at by the Director of Education, Madhyamik against the petitioners on the ex-parte version of the then District Inspector of Schools contained in letter dated 4.4.2007. But it is settled law that if any wrong order has been passed no mandamus can be issued by the Courts on the basis of said order unless it is established before the Court that the persons who are claiming benefit of that kind of order are entitled to get the desired benefit in accordance with law under the relevant statutes. 26. The Apex Court after considering so many other cases, in the case of State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh and others, JT 2000 (5) SC 389 has observed : "The concept of equality as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution is a positive concept which cannot be enforced in a negative manner. When any authority is shown to have committed any illegality or irregularity in favour of any individual or group of individuals other cannot claim the same illegality or irregularity on ground of denial thereof to them. Similarly wrong judgment passed in favour of one individual does not entitle others to claim similar benefits. In this regard this Court in Gurusharan Singh and others v. NDMC and others, JT 1996 (1) SC 647 : 1996 (2) SCC 459 , held that citizens have assumed wrong notions regarding the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law to all citizens. Benefits extended to some persons in an irregular or illegal manner cannot be claimed by a citizen on the plea of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution by way of writ petition filed in the High Court. Benefits extended to some persons in an irregular or illegal manner cannot be claimed by a citizen on the plea of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution by way of writ petition filed in the High Court. The Court observed : “Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been a discrimination.” 27. Again in Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain and others, JT 1996 (8) SC 387 : 1997 (1) SCC 35 , this Court considered the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution and reiterated its earlier position regarding the concept of equality holding : “Suffice it to hold that the illegal allotment founded upon ultra vires and illegal policy of allotment made to some other persons wrongly, would not form a legal premise to ensure it to the respondent or to repeat or perpetuate such illegal order, nor could it be legalised. In other words, judicial process cannot be abused to perpetuate the illegalities. Thus considered, we hold that the High Court was clearly in error in directing the appellants to allot the land to the respondents.” 28. In State of Haryana and others v. Ram Kumar Mann, JT 1997 (3) SC 450 : 1997 (3) SCC 321 , this Court observed : “The doctrine of discrimination is founded upon existence of an enforceable right. He was discriminated and denied equality as some similarly situated persons had been given the same relief, Article 14 would apply only when invidious discrimination is meted out to equals and similarly circumstanced without any rational basis or relationship in that behalf. The respondent has no right, whatsoever and cannot be given the relief wrongly given to them, i.e. benefit of withdrawal of resignation. The High Court was wholly wrong in reaching the conclusion that there was invidious discrimination. The respondent has no right, whatsoever and cannot be given the relief wrongly given to them, i.e. benefit of withdrawal of resignation. The High Court was wholly wrong in reaching the conclusion that there was invidious discrimination. If we cannot allow a wrong to perpetrate, an employee, after committing mis-appropriation of money, is dismissed from service and subsequently that order is withdrawn and he is reinstated into the service. Can a similarly circumstanced person claim equality under Section 14 for reinstatement? The answer is obviously “No”. In a converse case, in the first instance, one may be wrong but the wrong order cannot be the foundation for claiming equality for enforcement of the same order. As stated earlier, his right must be founded upon enforceable right to entitle him to the equality treatment for enforcement thereof. A wrong decision by the Government does not give a right to enforce the wrong order and claim parity or equality. Two wrongs can never make a right.” 29. Although the law is settled in this regard but after receipt of the letter dated 4.4.2007 of the then District Inspector of Schools, the Director of Education ought to have sought the version of the petitioners before taking the final decision in the matter. Point No. 5 30. So far as the equity is concerned, it is well settled that equity follows the law and justice has to be done in accordance with law howsoever, hard consequences it may follow. The Apex Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ram Chandra Ambedkar (Mrs) and another, (1994) 2 SCC 718 , has held : “Justice according to law is a principal as old as the hills. The Courts are to administer the law as they find it, however, inconvenient it may be..................” The Courts should endeavour to find out whether a particular case which sympathetic considerations are to be weighed falls within the scope of law. Disregardful of law, however, hard the case may be, it should never be done. In the case of Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank, 2007 (1) AWC 507, the Apex Court has observed.................... Disregardful of law, however, hard the case may be, it should never be done. In the case of Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank, 2007 (1) AWC 507, the Apex Court has observed.................... It is well settled that when there is a conflict between the law and equity, it is the law who is to prevail in accordance with latin maxim dura lex sed which means the law is hard but it is the law, equity can only supplement the law but it cannot supplant or override it.”.............What is administered in the Court of justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity, however, or they may be most err to clear and express provision of law." 31. In view of the above settled position of law there is no scope for me to hold that on the basis of long working of the petitioners the petition will succeed unless it is proved that the appointments were made against the sanctioned posts in accordance with law. 32. After giving thoughtful consideration to the entire aspect of the matter, I am of the view that the Director of Education has neither given proper opportunity of hearing nor considered each and every aspect of the matter as indicated and directed by this Court earlier. 33. In view of that the impugned order dated 5.4.2007 passed by the Director of Education Madhyamik, U.P. Lucknow is hereby quashed. The writ petition is allowed. The matter is again sent back to the Director of Education to decide the matter afresh. The petitioner is also directed to bring all relevant materials i.e. (i) order for sanction of the posts by the competent authority against which petitioners have been appointed (ii) the date, place and manner of advertisement of the vacancies (iii) constitution of selection committee for the purpose of appointment (iv) qualification of each petitioners on the date of appointment. 34. Apart from this petitioners may also furnish other details like government order removing ceiling of maintenance grant, etc. 34. Apart from this petitioners may also furnish other details like government order removing ceiling of maintenance grant, etc. The petitioners may appear before the Director of Education within six weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order and Director of Education Madhyamik, U.P. is directed to decide the matter afresh within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment of this Court and the petitioners representation alongwith supporting materials after hearing all concerned i.e. educational authorities, concerned committee of management and the petitioners or their representative etc. However, it is made clear that no payment of salary be made pursuant to this judgment and the payment of salary will depend on the fate of the decision of the Director of Education, Madhyamik, U.P. Lucknow. ————