JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. Determination of the scope and ambit of the powers of an industrial tribunal, while acting on an application under the proviso to Section 33(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short, 'the said Act'), forms the subject of controversy in this appeal. 2. Before we enter into the merit of the appeal, the material facts, giving rise to this appeal, are, in a nutshell, set out as under: (i) While the appellants herein were working as workmen under the respondent No. 1, namely, Gauhati Stock Exchange, as employer, a domestic enquiry was held by the management against the appellants on a charge of misconduct and, on the basis of the report of the domestic enquiry, so held, both the workmen were dismissed from service. Since, however, an industrial dispute, covered by Ref. No. 1/1997, arising out of a charter of demands of the employees of Gauhati Stock Exchange, was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, Guwahati, the management filed an application, under Section33(2) (b) of the said Act, seeking the Tribunal's approval of the orders of dismissal passed by them. Before the learned Tribunal, the management took the plea that the domestic enquiry was held in accordance with law and that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were based on a correct appraisal of the materials, which were produced in the domestic enquiry, and, hence, the findings of the domestic enquiry as well as the action of the management in dismissing the said workmen be sustained. The management also took the plea that in the event the learned Tribunal found that the proceedings of the domestic enquiry were not legal, valid and/or fair, the management may be allowed to adduce further evidence to justify the dismissal of the workmen. The learned Tribunal did not record any finding with regard to the validity of the domestic enquiry, but it did grant leave to the management to adduce further evidence. The management accordingly adduced evidence. On completion of the enquiry, the learned Tribunal passed an order, on 14.02.2001, declining to approve the order of dismissal, which had been passed by the management against the workmen. (ii) Aggrieved by the order, dated 14.02.2001, aforementioned, the management impugned the same by filing two writ petitions, which gave rise to WP(C) No. 1472/2001 and WP(C) No. 1473/2001. On completion of the enquiry, the learned Tribunal passed an order, on 14.02.2001, declining to approve the order of dismissal, which had been passed by the management against the workmen. (ii) Aggrieved by the order, dated 14.02.2001, aforementioned, the management impugned the same by filing two writ petitions, which gave rise to WP(C) No. 1472/2001 and WP(C) No. 1473/2001. Having found that the learned Tribunal had, without determining the question as to whether the domestic enquiry, in question, was legally sustainable or not, decided the question of correctness of the dismissal of the workmen, the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petitions by a common judgment and order, dated 22.08.2006, setting aside the order, dated 14.02.2001, aforementioned and remitting the matter to the learned Tribunal for a decision, to be rendered within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the order and the connected case records, on the question as to whether the domestic enquiry, held by the management, was sustainable in law or not. It is this direction, which stands challenged by the workmen in the present appeal. 3. We have heard Mr. D. Dasgupta, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the workmen-appellants. 4. While considering the present appeal, it needs to be noted that as a proposition of law, it is not in dispute before us that when an industrial tribunal is required to decide as to whether, in terms of the powers vested in it under the proviso to Clause (b) of Section 33(2), should it or should it not accord approval to the order of dismissal, where a domestic enquiry has been held, the tribunal is required to determine if the enquiry held is in accordance with law in the sense that the principles of natural justice had been observed, while conducting such domestic enquiry, or not and, if the domestic enquiry is found to have adhered to the principles of natural justice, the tribunal has the onus to determine if the evidence, adduced in the domestic enquiry, justified the management's action of dismissal of the workmen. If the finding reached by the management is one, which a prudent person would treat as reasonable, or if the finding is a possible one, the action taken by the management shall be approved by the tribunal unless the punishment imposed by the employer is disproportionate to the nature of misconduct. If the finding reached by the management is one, which a prudent person would treat as reasonable, or if the finding is a possible one, the action taken by the management shall be approved by the tribunal unless the punishment imposed by the employer is disproportionate to the nature of misconduct. If, however, the domestic enquiry is found to be invalid for any reason and/or if the finding of guilt is found to be perverse, the tribunal has to decide the matter on merit and it is at this stage that the tribunal has to consider the evidence, which the management may have already adduced and also the evidence, which the management may seek to adduce. 5. Thus, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, while acting under Section 33(2)(b), remains limited to a prima facie consideration of the question as to whether a case for according approval has been made out by the employer or not. In order to enable the tribunal to reach this prima facie decision, the tribunal is required to decide if an appropriate domestic enquiry has been held prior to the impugned dismissal/discharge of the workman. Without giving a finding as to whether the domestic enquiry, held by the management, was proper or not and whether the evidence, adduced in the domestic enquiry, was adequate to sustain the finding or not, the tribunal cannot straightaway enter into the merit of the case. A reference, in this regard, may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in D.C. & G. Mills v. L.B. Singh (1972) I LLJ 180 SC. The relevant portion of the observations, made by the Apex Court, reads as under: (4) When a domestic enquiry has been held by the management and the management relies on the same, it is open to the latter to request the Tribunal to try the validity of the domestic enquiry as a preliminary issue and also ask for an opportunity to adduce evidence before the Tribunal, if the finding on the preliminary issue is against the management. However elaborate and cumbersome the procedure may be, under such circumstances, it is open to the Tribunal to deal, in the first instance, as a preliminary issue the validity of the domestic enquiry. If its finding on the preliminary issue is in favour of the management, then no additional evidence need be cited by the management. However elaborate and cumbersome the procedure may be, under such circumstances, it is open to the Tribunal to deal, in the first instance, as a preliminary issue the validity of the domestic enquiry. If its finding on the preliminary issue is in favour of the management, then no additional evidence need be cited by the management. But, if the finding on the preliminary issue is against the management, the Tribunal will have to give the employer an opportunity to cite additional evidence and also give a similar opportunity to the employee to lead evidence had been made by the management to the Tribunal during the course of the proceedings and before the trial has come to an end. When the preliminary issue is decided against the management and the latter leads evidence before the Tribunal, the position, under such circumstances, will be, that the management is deprived of the benefit of having the finding of the domestic enquiry being accepted as prima facie proof of the alleged misconduct. On the other hand, the management will have to prove, by adducing proper evidence, that the workman is guilty of misconduct and that the action taken by it is proper. It will not be just and fair either to the management or to the workman that the Tribunal should refuse to take evidence and thereby ask the management to make a further application, after holding a proper enquiry, and deprive the workman of the benefit of the Tribunal itself being satisfied. On evidence adduced before it, that he was or was not guilty of the alleged misconduct. (5) *** *** *** (6) If the employer relies only on the domestic enquiry and does not simultaneously lead additional evidence or ask for an opportunity during the pendency of the proceedings to adduce such evidence, the duty of the Tribunal is only to consider the validity of the domestic enquiry as well as the finding recorded therein and decide the matter. If the Tribunal decides that the domestic enquiry has not been held properly it is not its function to invite suo motu the employer to adduce evidence before it to justify the action taken by it. 6. If the Tribunal decides that the domestic enquiry has not been held properly it is not its function to invite suo motu the employer to adduce evidence before it to justify the action taken by it. 6. In the light of the position law discussed above, it is clear that in the present case, the management had already submitted an application, in the learned Tribunal, making it clear to the learned Tribunal that the management sought to rely on the proceedings of the domestic enquiry to sustain the order of dismissal, but in case the Tribunal found the domestic enquiry to be invalid, the management be allowed to lead further evidence in justification of the order of dismissal. When the learned Tribunal had not decided the question as to whether the domestic enquiry, conducted by the management, was or was not in accordance with law and whether the order of dismissal was or was not sustainable on the basis of the evidence adduced in the domestic enquiry, the learned Single Judge was, to our mind, fully justified in interfering with the order passed by the learned Tribunal and in remitting the matter back to the learned Tribunal for a decision to be rendered in accordance with law within the specified period. 7. It has been pointed out by Mr. Dasgupta, at the time of hearing of the present appeal, that in the present case, it was the General Manager of Gauhati Stock Exchange, who was alleged to have been threatened by the present appellants as workmen, it was the General Manager, who had issued the charge-sheet, the General Manager was one of the witnesses of the management in the domestic enquiry and it was the General Manager, who had passed the order(s) of dismissal against the workmen. In such circumstances, contends Mr. Dasgupta, the order of dismissal is completely illegal. In this context, we may hasten to point out that the General Manager, being the appropriate disciplinary authority, was the person competent to issue the charge-sheet and to convene the domestic enquiry. The domestic enquiry was, however, conducted by a person other than the General Manager. As the General Manager was a witness to the alleged incident, it was but natural that he had to be examined, in the domestic enquiry, as a witness to sustain the charge. The domestic enquiry was, however, conducted by a person other than the General Manager. As the General Manager was a witness to the alleged incident, it was but natural that he had to be examined, in the domestic enquiry, as a witness to sustain the charge. The finding of the domestic enquiry was, in fact, placed before the Committee of Management, Gauhati Stock Exchange, and it is the said Committee, which agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and dismissed the workmen. As a functionary of the management, it is just a coincidence that the General Manager had to issue the order of dismissal. In such circumstances, the contention of Mr. Dasgupta that unfairness, in conducting the domestic enquiry, is writ at large cannot be sustained. 8. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we find absolutely no merit in this appeal. This appeal, therefore, is not admitted and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. No order as to costs. Send back the LCR. Appeal dismissed