SHOBHA KANT CHATURVEDI v. IInd ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE, ETAWAH
2008-11-21
TARUN AGARWALA
body2008
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.—Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner is the decree holder and had purchased a plot in the year 1974. In the sale-deed, an easementary right was provided permitting the plaintiff to flow the waste water from the northern portion of the plot. It transpires that the defendant judgment-debtor had no right or title of the land in question but interfered in the possession and obstructed the easementary right of the plaintiff. This resulted in the filing of Suit No. 331 of 1976 for a permanent injunction and, during its pendency, the parties arrived at a compromise and the suit was decreed in terms of the said compromise which became part of the decree which stipulated that the plaintiff would construct a permanent drain towards the northern portion and would have a right to flow the waste water and that the flow of water as well as the right of air would not be obstructed by the defendants over the area shown by the letter ‘Cha’, ‘Jha’, ‘Kha’ and ‘Ja’. It is alleged, that pursuant to the decree, the plaintiff constructed the drain, but the respite was only short lived and, it is alleged that in the year 1992, the defendants again interfered in the easementary right of the plaintiff by not only damaging the drain but also making certain constructions over the disputed area. In this regard, the plaintiff made a complaint to the revenue authorities as well as to the District Magistrate praying that the alleged construction should be removed by the defendants. Pursuant to the directions of the revenue authority, an inquiry was ordered and a Revenue Inspector submitted a report indicating that an illegal construction was raised by the defendant and that the defendant had demolished the drain. These reports and the orders have been filed in the writ petition. It transpires that the revenue authorities directed the defendants to remove the construction but when all efforts failed, the plaintiff filed an execution application No. 32 of 1992 praying that the compensation be paid for the damages done by the defendants and the construction be removed. 3. The defendants filed two objections under Section 47 of the Act.
It transpires that the revenue authorities directed the defendants to remove the construction but when all efforts failed, the plaintiff filed an execution application No. 32 of 1992 praying that the compensation be paid for the damages done by the defendants and the construction be removed. 3. The defendants filed two objections under Section 47 of the Act. The first one was in the year 1994 in which the defendants alleged that no drain was ever constructed by the plaintiff pursuant to the compromise decree and therefore, the question of its demolition by the defendants did not arise. In the second objection, filed in the year 2005, the defendants submitted that the plaintiff had not given the date of the alleged demolition and, on account of this fatal information not being supplied, the decree could not be executed. The record of the writ petition suggests that the execution proceedings dragged on for several years and the executing Court called for an Amin’s report which are numbered as 36-Ga and 44-Ga. In this Amin’s report, the alleged obstruction in the flow of water from the drain has been pointed out as well as certain constructions being raised over the disputed area. The executing Court, after considering the Amin’s report as well as the objections, passed a composite order rejecting the objection of the defendant and allowing the execution application in part to the extent that the defendants having damaged the drain, was liable to compensate the petitioner by payment of Rs. 6000/- along with interest @ 5% p.a. The defendant, being aggrieved by the said order, filed a revision, which was allowed by the impugned order whereby the revisional Court remanded the matter again to the executing Court to decide the matter afresh in the light of the observation made therein. The plaintiff-petitioner being aggrieved by the revisional order has filed the present writ petition. 4. This petition was presented by the petitioner in person and by an earlier order of the Court, Sri Gulrez Khan, Advocate was appointed as an amicus curiae to assist the Court and place the submissions on behalf of the petitioner.
The plaintiff-petitioner being aggrieved by the revisional order has filed the present writ petition. 4. This petition was presented by the petitioner in person and by an earlier order of the Court, Sri Gulrez Khan, Advocate was appointed as an amicus curiae to assist the Court and place the submissions on behalf of the petitioner. The defendants were issued the summons who appeared through their counsel and were granted time to file a counter affidavit which the defendants failed to do and eventually, the learned counsel for the respondents made a statement that he does not wish to file an affidavit and accordingly, the writ petition is being decided on the basis of the material placed in the writ petition. 5. Heard Sri Gulrez Khan, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri R.B.Tripathi, the learned counsel for the opposite parties. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the revisional Court was impressed by the fact that the executing Court should have first disposed of the Amin’s report by passing a separate order and thereafter should have proceeded with the disposal of the execution application. Further, the revisional Court held that the attachment order was not done in accordance with the provisions of Order 21 Rule 54 of the C.P.C. and on these two grounds, remitted the matter back to the executing Court to decide the matter afresh. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted thaI the aforesaid two findings and consequent directions issued by the revisional Court was patently illegal and without jurisdiction and consequently the revisional order was liable to be set aside. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length and having perused the record, one finds that the executing Court had heard the execution application, the objections of the judgment-debtor under Section 47, the Amin’s report 44-Ga and its objection 47-Ga on 8.8.2007 and delivered the order on 9.8.2007. Further, a perusal of the order of the executing Court indicates that both the Amin’s report 36-Ga and 44-Ga as well as the objections of the defendant was considered in detail. Consequently, the revisional Court committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the Amin’s report 44-Ga was not considered or the objections filed by the defendants was not considered.
Consequently, the revisional Court committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the Amin’s report 44-Ga was not considered or the objections filed by the defendants was not considered. Further, no provision has been shown by the opposite party to indicate that separate orders are required to be passed on each application or separate orders are required to be passed for disposal of the Amin’s report. The orders of the executing Court dated 8.8.2007 and 9.8.2007 indicates that a composite order was passed disposing of the execution applications, the objections under Section 47, the Amin’s report and its objections and such disposal by a composite order, is perfectly correct and justified, especially when the Court finds that the execution application filed in the year 1992 took 15 years for its disposal. There is no requirement that the Amin’s report is required to be disposed of first and thereafter the execution application should proceed. The revisional Court consequently committed a manifest error in holding that the objections on the Amin’s report was required to be disposed of first and that only thereafter the executing Court could have proceeded with the execution application. 8. The revisional Court also committed an error in holding that the order of attachment was in violation of the provisions of Order 21 Rule 54 of the C.P.C. In my opinion, this finding was without jurisdiction. The revisional Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in giving a finding on this aspect of the matter and the reason is not far to see. The validity of the attachment proceedings was not raised by the defendants in his objections under Section 47 nor any objection was filed by the defendants under Order 21 Rule 58, C.P.C. It transpires that the defendants raised this ground for the first time in the revision which, in my opinion, could not be allowed to be raised for the first time in a revision. In M/s Gangotri Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd., Allahabad v. Smt. Usha Mukherji and others, 2002(20) LCD 284, the Court held that a point raised in the revision for the first time, which not raised in the objection under Section 47, could not be raised in the revision nor can it be decided by the revisional Court. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the case of Khajan Singh (D) by L.Rs.
Similarly, the Supreme Court in the case of Khajan Singh (D) by L.Rs. v. Gurbhajan Singh and others, AIR 2007 SC 2941 , has held that the revisional Court has a limited jurisdiction and the exercise of the revisional power could be exercised on limited grounds and that the appreciation of evidence on the basis of material brought on record was within the domain of the executing Court and that the revisional Court could not interfere in a finding of fact. 9. In view of the aforesaid, the order of the revisional Court is manifestly erroneous in law and cannot be sustained and is quashed. The writ petition is allowed. The matter is remitted back to the revisional Court to decide the matter afresh with a direction that the revision will be decided within three months from the date of the production of a certified copy of this order in the light of the observations made above. 10. Sri Gulrez Khan, Advocate, who was appointed as an amicus curiae has ably and meticulously argued the petitioner on behalf of the petitioner and the Court appreciates the effort made by him. ————