JUDGMENT 1. - Heard the learned counsels for the parties. 2. By this petition, the petitioner has challenged the charge-sheet issued to the petitioner under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules under Annex.P/13 dated 2.3.1996. During the pendency of writ petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner informs the Court that the Court exercising criminal jurisdiction has already acquitted the petitioner of the charges levelled against him for incident dated 10.9.1995 as well as 21.10.1995 covered by charges No.1 and 3 in the said charge-sheet. The learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and ors reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446 and in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and another reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 and the judgment of this Court in the case of Khawaju Khan v. State of Rajasthan and ors. reported in 2008(2) RLW 998 (Raj.) and submits that since for the same charges relating to the same incidents, the Court of competent jurisdiction has already acquitted the petitioner vide judgment dated 20.6.1980 in Criminal Case No.366/1997 - State v. Mool Chand for offences under Sections 452 and 354 Indian Penal Code. and judgment dated 5.8.1999 in Criminal Case No.401/1995 - State v. Mool Chand for offences under Sections 451, 323 and 504 Indian Penal Code., therefore, the departmental enquiry cannot be proceeded with on the same set of facts against the petitioner. 3. On the side opposite Mr. B.L.Tiwari, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager, Indian Oil Corporation Limited and ors reported in AIR 2005 (SC) 4217 submits that since the criminal trial and departmental proceedings operate in different field and have different objective, therefore, the charge-sheet cannot be quashed on the ground that the petitioner has been acquitted by the criminal Court. He further submits that since charge No.2 and 4 were not subject matter of criminal trial which have terminated in favour of the petitioner under the aforesaid judgments of criminal Courts, therefore, there is no ground to quash the enquiry on at least these two charges against he petitioner and the Department should be allowed to proceed with the Departmental enquiry against the petitioner as charges No.2 and 4 are also of serious nature and the petitioner cannot be allowed to go scot free without holding enquiry in the matter. 4. Having heard the learned counsel, this Court is of the opinion that as far as charges No.1 and 3 are concerned since in regular criminal trial held by the Court of competent jurisdiction, the Courts have already acquitted the petitioner, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments and by this Court in the two judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is not considered appropriate to allow the respondents to proceed in the enquiry as far as charges No.1 and 3 are concerned against the petitioner as it may amount to unnecessary harassment of the petitioner for the charges based on the same allegations and same set of facts, on which regular criminal trial has already been held. Though it is true that departmental enquiry and criminal trial operate in different field and consideration which weigh with the criminal Court and disciplinary authority are also different. Even though a person may be acquitted on technical grounds or even on account of the fact that prosecution failed to establish the charges before the criminal Court beyond reasonable doubt, yet the departmental authority may find a person guilty of misconduct, still in the present case, since charges No.1 and 3 pertain to specific instances alleged to have been committed by the petitioner and the criminal Court upon a regular trial has held that charges are not proved and thus has acquitted the petitioner, this Court does not consider it expedient to permit the respondents to proceed against the petitioner as far as charges No.1 and3 are concerned. However, as far as charges No.2 and 4 are concerned, since apparently there has been no regular trial of the petitioner by any criminal Court, initiation of departmental enquiry with the issuance of charge-sheet Annex.9 cannot be faulted or stayed or quashed on the basis of judgments of criminal Court referred to above. It is also true that the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner involve the facts in which the disciplinary proceedings had already been concluded against the delinquent and later on they were found to be acquitted by the criminal Courts on the same set of facts and therefore, the punishment orders were quashed and set aside by the Courts, whereas in the present case, the petitioner has approached this Court only against initiation of disciplinary proceedings with the issuance of impugned charge-sheet Annex.9. The learned counsel also informs that this Court while admitting the writ petition on 5.7.1996 had stayed the departmental proceedings against the petitioner and the same are still pending, but in pursuance of order dated 2.5.2005, the learned counsel for the respondents has taken instructions from the respondents and upon instruction he submits that the respondents are still inclined to proceed with the enquiry in pursuance of charge-sheet annex.9 against the petitioner. 5. In view of this, the present writ petition is partly allowed and as far as charges No.1 and 3 are concerned in the impugned charge sheet (Annex.9), the same are quashed in view of acquittal of the petitioner by the criminal Court of competent jurisdiction, however, with the liberty to the respondents to proceed with the departmental enquiry as far as other two charges are concerned. In view of the present writ petition being pending in this Court for long number of years since 1996 till 2008, it is directed that the enquiry against the petitioner may be concluded within a period of three months from today. No order as to costs.Writ petition Allowed in Part *******