JUDGMENT G. RAJASURIA, J. 1. Animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated 5.7.1990 made in O.S. No. 9632 of 1986 passed by the learned XII Assistant Judge City Civil Court, Madras as against the second defendant in the suit this appeal is focussed. For convenience sake, the parties are referred to here under according to their litigative status before the trial Court. 2. The quintessence of the case of the plaintiff as stood, exposited from the plaint could be portrayed thus: The plaintiff, viz. , Dunlop India Limited and the first defendant-Devaki entered into a contract whereby the former agreed to supply in favour of the latter, goods on credit. Whereupon D1 agreed to furnish Bank Guarantee by way of securing prompt payment of the dues relating to the goods supplied by the plaintiff D2, the Indian Bank, at the instance of D1 furnished Bank Guarantee vide Exhibit A-5 dated 30.9.1984. Subsequently, D1 committed default in paying the dues to the plaintiff. Whereupon, the plaintiff approached the first defendant for payment of the dues. In response to the same, D1 issued two cheques dated 22.2.1985 drawn on Indian Bank. But those two cheques proved to be rubber cheques. Consequently, the plaintiff issued notice to D1 as well as to D2. Even though, D2 acknowledged its liability, nonetheless, it failed to pay. Hence, the suit. 3. Per contra, the first defendant filed the written statement denying and refuting, challenging and impugning the very cause of action for the suit itself. Pithily, D1 would aver as though by the issuance of the cheques, the dues got discharged, 4. Whereas D2 filed the written statement invoking the limitation plea as under: As per Exhibit A-5, the Bank Guarantee, it was valid for one year with effect from 30.9.1984 and within two months from the expiry of one year, the suit should have been filed so as to enforce the bank guarantee, but, in this case, the plaintiff filed the suit long after the expiry of the period as contemplated in Exhibit A-5. Accordingly, D2 prayed for the dismissal of the suit 5. The trial Court framed the relevant issues. During trial, one K.Gurusamy examined himself as P.W.1 and Exhibits A-1 to 25 were marked. On the side of the defendants, no one was examined and no document was also marked. The trial Court ultimately decreed the suit as against both the defendants. 6. The trial Court framed the relevant issues. During trial, one K.Gurusamy examined himself as P.W.1 and Exhibits A-1 to 25 were marked. On the side of the defendants, no one was examined and no document was also marked. The trial Court ultimately decreed the suit as against both the defendants. 6. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the second defendant filed this appeal on various grounds including the one that the that Court was not justified in ignoring the limitation period as raised by the appellant based on Exhibit A-5. 7. It seems D1 died and no steps were taken to implead the legal heirs of the said party. Consequently, my learned predecessor recorded that the appeal as against the second respondent/D1 stood abated. Be that as it may, de hors such abatement, there is a lis to be decided between the appellant and the first respondent/plaintiff. 8. The point for consideration is as to whether the suit was barred by limitation in view of Exhibit A-5, the Bank Guarantee executed by the appellant/D2? 9. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/ second defendant. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant/second defendant would clinchingly and convincingly cite the following two decisions: “(i) State of Maharashtra v. M.N. Kaul (dead) by his legal representatives and Another AIR 1967 SC 1634 (ii) Kerala Electrical and Allied Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Canara Bank and Others AIR 1980 Ker 151 ” An excerpt from the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. M.N. Kaul (dead) by his legal representatives and Another (supra) would run thus: “................Now, therefore, in pursuance of the said order of the Court dated, the 12.2.1962, and in consideration of the said agreement between Dr. M.N. Kaul of Delhi and the National and Grindlays Bank Limited, Delhi, hereby guarantee to you the payment on demand of a sum not exceeding Rupees 18,240.06 np. (Rupees eighteen thousand two hundred and forty and six naye paise) only in the event of the above mentioned writ petition No.9 of 1962 filed by Dr. M.N. Kaul, Delhi, being dismissed by the Supreme Court of India, and/or the said Court holding that Dr. M.N. Kaul, Delhi, is liable to pay the sales tax Rs. 18,240.06 no. (Rupees eighteen thousand two hundred and forty and six naye paise only) to the said respondent. M.N. Kaul, Delhi, being dismissed by the Supreme Court of India, and/or the said Court holding that Dr. M.N. Kaul, Delhi, is liable to pay the sales tax Rs. 18,240.06 no. (Rupees eighteen thousand two hundred and forty and six naye paise only) to the said respondent. And the National and Grindlays Bank Limited, Delhi, declares that this Guarantee shall remain in force until one calendar month after the date of the pronouncement of the Judgment and/ or a period of twelve months from the date of the execution of the guarantee whichever is later and/ or the drawing and sealing of the order (as the case may be) of the Supreme Court finally disposing of the said petition filed by Dr. M.N. Kaul of Delhi.” 6. The question is whether this guarantee is enforceable. That depends upon the terms under which the guarantor bound himself. Under the law he cannot be made liable for more than he has undertaken. It is often said that a surety is a favoured debtor, for in the expressive phrase of Lord Westbury LC in Blest v. Brown , (1862) 4 De GF &J 367 a tp.376: “you bind him to the letter of his engagement. Beyond the proper interpretation of that engagement you have no hold upon him”. These observations have been recalled in cases of guarantee and suretyship by the Judicial Committee and also this Court. See for example Pratapsing Moholalbhai v Keshavlal Harilal Setalvad , AIR 1935 PC 21 : 62 Ind App 23 and M.S.Anirudhan v.Thomco’s Bank Ltd., AIR 1963 SC 746 : (1963) Supp 1 SCR 63. To this, there are some exceptions. In case of ambiguity when all other rules of construction fails, the Courts interpret the guarantee contra proferentem that is, against the guarantor or use the recitals to control the meaning of the operative part where that is possible. But whatever the mode employed, the cardinal rule is that the guarantor must not be made liable beyond the terms of his engagement. 7. Judging of the letters of guarantee from this standpoint it is clear that the Bank bound itself to pay on demand the sum of Rs. 18.240.06 np only in the event of the writ petition being dismissed and/ or this Court holding Dr. M.N. Kaul liable. The guarantor, however, put a time limit on the guarantee. 7. Judging of the letters of guarantee from this standpoint it is clear that the Bank bound itself to pay on demand the sum of Rs. 18.240.06 np only in the event of the writ petition being dismissed and/ or this Court holding Dr. M.N. Kaul liable. The guarantor, however, put a time limit on the guarantee. According to the last paragraph, the contract was to remain in force: “(i) for one calendar month after the pronouncement of the judgment and/or (ii) (a) a period of 12 months from the date of the execution of the guarantee whichever be later and /or (b) the drawing and sealing of the order (as the case may be) of the Supreme Court finally disposing of the petition of Dr. Kaul. The Sales Tax authorities can take advantage of any of the above conditions. It will be recalled that the order of this Court was passed on 15.3.1965. Under (i) time for enforcement was available till 15.4.1965. Under (ii)(a) as the guarantee was executed on 23.3.1962 one year expired on 23.3.1963. Condition (ii)(b) does not apply because no order was drawn up or sealed. Thus the last date for enforcement of the guarantee was 15.4.1965. No attempt was made so to enforce it and the guarantee was not available thereafter.” 8. Mr. Dhebar sought to increase the liability by reading the recitals and also by making the first paragraph of the operative part of the guarantee to speak This is not possible. The guarantee in this form was accepted by the party concerned as well as by this Court and it is impossible to ignore the time limit which is an integral part of the guarantee. The contention of the Bank that the guarantee is no longer enforceable is, therefore, right. Of course, if the Bank can be made to part with the money belonging to Dr. M.N. Kaul under any other procedure open to the Sales tax authorities the Bank would be bound legally to pay it over but the guarantee cannot be enforced. Following the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the Kerala High Court also rendered its judgment vide its judgment dated 25.1.1980 in Kerala Electrical and Allied Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Canara Bank and Others (supra). 11. Following the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the Kerala High Court also rendered its judgment vide its judgment dated 25.1.1980 in Kerala Electrical and Allied Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Canara Bank and Others (supra). 11. It is therefore crystal clear that insofar as the Bank Guarantee is concerned, the time limit for filing suit or enforcing it, is governed by the terms and conditions of the Bank Guarantee itself and that there could be no second thought over it, in view of the clear verdicts as found set out in the aforesaid two precedents. The trial Court misdirected itself in simply applying the general law of limitation and in holding that the suit was not barred by limitation. An excerpt from page No. 2 of Exhibit A-5, the Bank Guarantee is extracted here under for ready reference: “This Guarantee is valid for one year from the date hereof, i.e. from 30.9.1984 to 29.9.1985. If no claim is made within one year from the last day of the aforesaid period the guarantee shall cease to exist and we shall be relieved from all liabilities thereunder. Not withstanding anything contained herein, our liability under this guarantee is restricted to Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) only. Out guarantee shall remain in force until 29.9.1985 until a suit or action to enforce a claim under the guarantee is filed against us within 2 months from that date, all your rights under the said guarantee shall forfeited and we shall be released and discharged from all liabilities thereunder.” The above excerpt would unambiguously and unequivocally highlight and spotlight the fact that the Bank Guarantee was intended to be valid only for the period from 30.9.1984 to 29.9.1985. The very clause extracted supra would also highlight that within two months from the last date, i.e., 29.9.1985 of the Bank Guarantee, the suit should have been filed. 12. Indubitably and incontrovertibly, the fact remains that the suit was filed only on 25.10.1986 so to say, long after the expiry of the two months period from 29.9,1985. Hence, it is obvious that the trial Court ignoring these facts and without au fait with law and au courant with facts adjudged the lis , which warrants interference. 13. 12. Indubitably and incontrovertibly, the fact remains that the suit was filed only on 25.10.1986 so to say, long after the expiry of the two months period from 29.9,1985. Hence, it is obvious that the trial Court ignoring these facts and without au fait with law and au courant with facts adjudged the lis , which warrants interference. 13. Accordingly, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court as against D2 alone is set aside and in respect of the judgment and decree as against D1, there is no order of quashment and accordingly, that would stand and the point is decided in favour of D2. 14. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 15. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the appellant/D2 would make an extempory submission to the effect that the Bank had deposited a sum of Rs.57,814.58 in the trial Court in compliance with the order passed by this Court in CM P. No. 6825 of 1991 dated 14.5.1991 and that D2 may be permitted to withdraw the same. 16. In view of the judgment of this Court in setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court as against D2, the appellant/D2 is permitted to withdraw the amount deposited with accrued interest, if any. Appeal allowed.