JUDGMENT Hon’ble Krishna Murari, J.—This appeal filed under Rule 49 of the U.P. Kshettra Panchayats (Election of Pramukhs and Up-Pramukhs and Settlement of Election Disputes) Rules,1994 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’) is directed against the order dated 21.11.2008 passed by Election Tribunal directing recounting of votes. 2. A preliminary objection with respect to maintainability of the appeal has been raised on behalf of the respondent-1. 3. Heard Sri Shesh Kumar appearing for respondent No. 1 and Sri Shashi Nandan, Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Neeraj Tripathi for the appellant on the preliminary objection which is being decided as a preliminary issue. 4. It has been contended by Sri Shesh Kumar that Rule 49 of the Rules provides for appeal to the High Court only against an order made by the Election Tribunal under Rule 44 and an order of recounting not contemplated under the said Rule, appeal is not maintainable. 5. In reply, it has been submitted by Sri Shashi Nandan, Senior Advocate that since the legislature has used the words every order in Rule 44, therefore, any order passed by the Election Tribunal during the proceedings which is in aid to the final order to be passed would be appealable. Laying much emphasis on use of ‘every’ in the Rule by the legislature, it is sought to be urged that unless Rule 49 is interpreted in the manner suggested by him and appeal is held to be maintainable, the use of word ‘every’ becomes redundant. It has further been urged that use of word ‘every’ in place of ‘an’ is indicative of legislative intent providing for appeal even against the orders passed during the proceedings of the election petition. 6. In order to appreciate the rival contention, it would be relevant to quote the provisions. Rule 49 which provides for appeal, reads as under : “49. Appeal against the order of the Judge.—(1) An appeal shall lie from every order made by the Judge under Rule 44 to the High Court within thirty days from the date of the order : Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. (2) Every person who prefers an appeal under sub-rule (1) shall enclose with the memorandum of appeal a Government Treasury Receipt showing that a deposit of five hundred rupees has been made by him either in a Government Treasury or in the State Bank of India in favour of the High Court as security for costs of the appeal.” Rule 44 reads as under : “44. Grounds on which a candidate other than the returned candidate may be declared to have been elected.—(1) If any person who has lodged an election petition has, in addition to calling in question the election of the returned candidate, claimed a declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected and the Judge is of the opinion that in fact the petitioner or such other candidate received a majority of the valid votes, the Judge shall after declaring the election of the returned candidate to be void, declare the petitioner or such other candidate, as the case may be, to have been duly elected : Provided that the petitioner or such other candidate shall not be declared to be duly elected if it is proved that the election of such candidate would have been void if he had been the returned candidate and a petition had been presented calling in question his election.” 7. A bare reading of the aforesaid provisions go to show that an appeal has been provided only against the order passed under Rule 44. 8. The arguments of Mr. Shashi Nandan are based on use of word ‘every’ by the legislature, which according to Webster’s Dictionary means each and all. 9. A word used in statute may have a diversity of meaning. However, the Courts are required to examine and give meaning to any word used in the statute considering the subject of the statute and in context in which the said word has been used. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Deputy Controller of Imports and Exports v. K.T. Kosalram, AIR 1971 SC 1283 , has observed as under : “When the context makes the meaning of a word quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning out of the diverse meanings a word is capable of, according to lexicographers.” 10. Again in the case of Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, AIR 1994 SC 787 , Hob’ble Apex Court has observed that meaning of a word in a given statute depends upon context and subject matter of statute. Same is the view taken in the case of Sahyadri Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Pune, 2003 (3) SCC 506 . 11. There can be no dispute about fact that term of returned candidate in election is for a fixed period. The entire scheme enacted by legislature with regard to challenge of election is obviously based upon consideration that election petition should be decided expeditiously. Delay may defeat very purpose because of the time limit during which effect of election survives. Giving interpretation to Rule 49 as suggested by Sri Shashi Nandan would result into a prolong litigation ad infinitum as every order passed at any stage of the proceedings would be open to appeal by interested party. Even an order adjourning the proceedings or fixing a date being an order in aid of final determination to be made would also become appellable. This can never be the legislative intent as it shall defeat very purpose of providing a specific procedure under the Rules so as to minimize the time in disposal of election petition. Delay in final disposal would render most of the election petition infructuous by efflux of time. It would not be proper to give interpretation to statute or rule so as to render the very purpose of the enactment redundant and infructuous. 12. Thus, word ‘every order’ used in Rule 49 in the context would not mean any order but only such orders which fall within the scope and ambit of Rule 44 i.e. such orders which finally disposes of the election petition itself. 13. The order of re-count cannot be termed to be a final order as it does not by itself results into either failure or success of the election petition nor the election petition stands finally disposed of by the said order. It may be an order in aid of or basis upon which final order may be passed by the Tribunal under Rule 44 but nevertheless it cannot be termed to be an order in the nature of final order contemplated by Rule 44. It may be an order in aid of or basis upon which final order may be passed by the Tribunal under Rule 44 but nevertheless it cannot be termed to be an order in the nature of final order contemplated by Rule 44. Merely because the order of re-count is in aid of or basis upon which a final order deciding election petition may be passed cannot bring it within the ambit and four corners of Rule 44. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mohd. Mustafa v. U.P. Ziladhikari, Phoolpur, Azamgarh and others, 2007 (7) ADJ 1 (DB), has held that an order of recount is an interlocutory order. 14. In view of the above discussions, it is clear that an order directing recount is only an interlocutory order and would not be covered under the provisions of Rule 44 and an appeal against an order of recount would not lie under Rule 49. Thus, the present appeal is not maintainable and accordingly, stands dismissed. 15. The office is directed to return the certified copies of the order and other documents to the learned counsel for the appellant after obtaining photocopies of the same to be retained on the record. ————