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2008 DIGILAW 2358 (MAD)

Adhimoolam & Others v. Indian Bank & Others

2008-07-10

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, V.DHANAPALAN

body2008
Judgment V. Dhanapalan, J. Petitioners have filed these two Writ Petitions, praying for issuance of a writ of certiorari, to call for the records of the fourth respondent pertaining to the order, dated 312. 2007, passed in M.A.No.124 of 2007 in D.R.C.No.187 of 2001 in O.A.No.375 of 1997 and quash the same. 2. The facts, which led to the filing of these Writ Petitions, are as follows: 2. 1. Petitioners are the owners of an extent of 12.03 acres of land in Okkiyam Thoraipakkam Village. On 12.05.1992, the petitioners executed a Power of Attorney in favour of Palaniappa Estates, represented by its Proprietor PL.Sundaram, by which they gave the power to the agent to develop the land to sell the same, to raise finance by deposit of title deeds and other encumbrances and to construct houses, flats, apartments and do all other things, which the Power Agent, in his absolute discretion, may think fit. The Power Agent is doing real estate business and has intended to develop the land by making lay out and undertaking construction on the said property. He has also taken possession of the entire property. 2. 2. For the purpose of developing the land, the petitioner approached the second respondent for raising finances and a Memorandum of Understanding was entered into on 17.02.1992 between the Power of Attorney and the second respondent by which the second respondent agreed to provide financial assistance to the maximum limit of Rs.50.00 lakhs on depositing the documents of title with the second respondent. Initially, the second respondent paid a sum of Rs.20.00 lakhs to the Power of Attorney. However, the second respondent failed in keeping its commitments on the balance of Rs.30.00 lakhs, which was agreed to be paid on or before 31.03.1992 and 30.06.1992. In view of the breach committed by the second respondent in making the payment as agreed upon, the petitioner could not successfully complete the business venture as planned by them. The amount of Rs.20.00 lakhs, which was paid, was used for the purpose of construction and sales promotion, but since the second respondent defaulted in payment of the balance amount, the entire project could not be completed. In the meanwhile, the petitioner completed part of the project and effected sale of the land and building to approximately over 60 persons. The petitioner also undertook construction of the residential house on work contract basis. In the meanwhile, the petitioner completed part of the project and effected sale of the land and building to approximately over 60 persons. The petitioner also undertook construction of the residential house on work contract basis. Hence, out of the entire extent of 12.03 acres, during the course of development, about 4 acres has gone for road and other common areas such as parks and the balance extent has been sold to various parties who have also put up the building on the said extent owned by them. The petitioner had entered into an agreement with the land owners only for the purpose of development of the property and even though the second respondent did not fulfil the promise of payment of the balance amount of Rs.30.00 lakhs, they orally gave permission to the petitioner to continue development process and make the sale in spite of the fact that the property had been mortgaged to them by deposit of title deeds as per the Memorandum of Understanding, dated 17.02.1992. Subsequently, the second respondent informed the petitioner that they were taking some facilities from the Indian Bank and, therefore, the petitioner would be required to sign certain documents with the Indian Bank for the deposit of the title deeds. Accordingly, the petitioner signed in the deposit register of the Indian Bank as if he has deposited the documents of title with the Indian Bank even though there was absolutely no pecuniary relationship between the petitioner and the Indian Bank. The petitioner signed the deposit register only on an assurance given by the second respondent that he was obtaining a loan from the Indian Bank and that immediately on obtaining the loan on the strength of the title deeds of the petitioner, the balance amount of Rs.30.00 lakhs would be given to the petitioner, but, the petitioner did not get the amount of Rs.30.00 lakhs. 2. 3. In such circumstances, the petitioner filed C.S.No.376 of 2000 before the High Court for a declaration that the Memorandum of Understanding, dated 17.02.1992, is unenforceable in law and for a consequential relief of permanent injunction, restraining the second respondent from initiating any action on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding, dated 17.02.1992. 2. 3. In such circumstances, the petitioner filed C.S.No.376 of 2000 before the High Court for a declaration that the Memorandum of Understanding, dated 17.02.1992, is unenforceable in law and for a consequential relief of permanent injunction, restraining the second respondent from initiating any action on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding, dated 17.02.1992. During the course of the said proceedings, a compromise was arrived at between the petitioner and the second respondent by which the second respondent agreed to receive a sum of Rs.43.00 lakhs in full and final settlement of his claim against the petitioner and a schedule of payment was also agreed upon. However, Memorandum of Compromise was not filed in the Court, eventhough it was signed by the parties. 2. 4. The second respondent and a number of firms/companies and individuals connected with the second respondent had borrowed huge sums of money from the Indian Bank. Therefore, the Indian Bank filed O.A.No.375 of 1997 against the second respondent before the Debts Recovery Tribunal on 14.06.1997. In the application, there were 47 respondents and the petitioners herein were impleaded as respondents 14 to 29 and the second respondent herein was the 42nd respondent. The land of the extent of 12.03 acres in Okkiyam Thurapakkam Village was shown in the schedule to the application as the land which had been mortgaged to the Indian Bank by the second respondent herein. The total claim in respect of the said application was approximately Rs.59.35 crores. 5. During the course of hearing of this application, the second respondent indicated to the petitioner that the entire issue was getting settled and, therefore, requested the petitioner to come to the Bank and sign a Memorandum of Compromise to be filed before the DRT. Accordingly, the petitioner signed the memorandum but a copy of the same was given to him only in February 2006, though it was signed on 211. 2000. The petitioner was not aware of filing of O.A.No.375 of 1997 before the DRT though the petitioners had been impleaded as represented by their Power of Attorney P.L. Sundaram. No notice was served on the petitioner, as he was no longer at the address mentioned in the notice. 2000. The petitioner was not aware of filing of O.A.No.375 of 1997 before the DRT though the petitioners had been impleaded as represented by their Power of Attorney P.L. Sundaram. No notice was served on the petitioner, as he was no longer at the address mentioned in the notice. The petitioner was not aware of the fact that an application had been filed for recovery of money and that one of the properties shown in the schedule of application was the property of the petitioner. 6. Petitioner signed the Memorandum of Compromise for settlement of the claim between the Indian Bank and the second respondent and their group, but he was not aware of the contents of the memorandum since he was given to understand by the second respondent that they would take care of the entire settlement and return the title deeds to the petitioner. A perusal of the memorandum of compromise would show that the borrowers/guarantors/mortgagors had agreed to pay a sum of Rs.48.47 crores as against the total dues of Rs.124.47 crores as on 30.06.2000. They also paid a sum of Rs.5.00 crores and undertook to pay a sum of Rs.5.00 crores on or the date of filing the compromise memo. The Memorandum of Compromise was filed before DRT on 012. 2000 and eventually taken up for consideration only on 08.08.2001 and, after hearing the parties, the DRT passed an order recording the compromise on certain terms and conditions. The applicant had no knowledge of the pending proceedings and was set ex parte. On 27.01.2006, a sale notice was issued and only at that stage the petitioner came to know about the pending proceedings and the fact that his property was going to be sold. Immediately, the petitioner filed I.A.Nos.30 and 32 of 2006 for condoning the delay of 2890 days in filing a petition for setting aside the ex parte order, dated 16.03.1998, and for stay of the sale. The said petitions were dismissed by the DRT and aggrieved over the said order, the petitioner filed an appeal before the DRAT. On 211. 2006, the DRAT passed an order to the effect that the auction would be stayed if the petitioner was prepared to pay Rs.3.25 crores, however, the auction sale was fixed on 211. 2006 at 02.00 p.m. 7. On 211. 2006, the DRAT passed an order to the effect that the auction would be stayed if the petitioner was prepared to pay Rs.3.25 crores, however, the auction sale was fixed on 211. 2006 at 02.00 p.m. 7. Under the circumstances, the petitioner filed a Writ Petition No.46531 of 2006 before this Court and the same was admitted on 211. 2006 and an interim order passed to the effect that the auction might be held in respect of the property but conformation of the sale should not be done without the prior permission of the Court. Subsequently, on 012. 2006, the said Writ Petition was disposed of with a direction that the interim order would continue till the final decision is taken by DRAT and DRAT was directed to dispose of M.A.No.204 of 2006 before 312. 2006. Thereafter, M.A.Nos.204 and 207 of 2006 were dismissed by DRAT on 212. 2006. Hence, the petitioner filed W.P.No.556 of 2007. In the meantime, the sale certificate was issued. The said Writ Petition was eventually dismissed by the Division Bench on 17.04.2007. However, on 03.01.2007 itself, the third respondent had paid the entire consideration of Rs.23.05 crores. In view of certain negotiations that took place between the bank and the borrower, the borrower decided to bring in the entire OTS amount of Rs.157.00 crores, which included the original OTS amount of Rs.123.00 crores as on 312. 2000. A full satisfaction memo was also filed by the bank and on 09.04.2007, the DRT passed an order recording the full satisfaction memo and dismissing all the original applications, as settled out of court. Therefore, the entire amount has been paid by the borrower and there is no reason to proceed with the sale. The amount of Rs.23.05 crores deposited by the third respondent has been kept in No Lein Account and the Recovery Officer has not allowed the Bank to adjust the same towards the dues. Since a sum of Rs.157.00 crores has been paid towards full and final settlement and to that effect a full satisfaction memo was filed by the bank and the same was recorded by the Tribunal, no amount is due under the Original Applications and the amount of Rs.23.05 crores kept in No Lien Account has to be returned by the Recovery Officer. The entire action of the Recovery Officer in bringing the property of the third party for sale to help the second respondent is totally collusive and arbitrary and the first respondent bank is playing to the tune of the second respondent company and their action is not transparent in law. The Recovery Officer did not wait till the disposal of Writ Petition on merits and proceeded to confirm the sale and return the original sale deeds on the same day when a memo was filed that an appeal was filed as against the orders of the DRAT. The appeal preferred before DRAT in Appeal No.7 of 2007 was dismissed by an order dated 19.07.2007 without considering the above aspects. As against the same, the petitioner preferred an appeal in M.A.No.124 of 2007 before the DRAT and the DRAT, by an order dated 312. 2007, dismissed the appeal with costs. 2. 8. Hence, these Writ Petitions. 3. First respondent has filed a counter affidavit, denying the averments contained in the petition and stating that the Writ Petition is not maintainable in law or in facts. According to them, the bank has no role to play in the agreement. The petitioner, Power Agent of the land owners, created equitable mortgage with the bank by depositing the title deeds in respect of his properties on 02.04.1992 and executed a letter confirming the creation of the mortgage on 03.04.1992. The bank is not concerned with the inter se agreement between the petitioner and the second respondent or any litigation in respect of the same. The petitioner remained ex parte in the original application proceedings in 16.03.1998. Thereafter, he has entered into a memo of compromise on 211. 2000 as one of the respondents consulted for settlement of the banks due under a compromise entered into between the bank and the second respondent group concerns. The petitioners signed the memo of compromise through their Power of Attorney as original owner of the property. As the parties to the compromise memo did not pay the amount in time, by invoking default clause, an interim recovery certificate vide DRC No.187/2001 was issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Further, attachment of all the properties was made by the Recovery Officer of DRT by 012. 2002. The petitioner has waited till the property is put in public auction and suddenly filed an application to stay the auction proceedings. Further, attachment of all the properties was made by the Recovery Officer of DRT by 012. 2002. The petitioner has waited till the property is put in public auction and suddenly filed an application to stay the auction proceedings. The averment that the petitioner came to know that the second respondent and the group concerns did not fulfil the terms of compromise and he was not given the memorandum of compromise is only an afterthought. The petitioner watched the proceeding and when the property was put in public auction, the interim recovery certificate was challenged, seeking for setting aside the ex parte order, which cannot, in any event, be challenged by the parties to it. The petitioner is a party to the memo of compromise in O.A.Nos.375 of 1997 and 385 of 1997 and he cannot say that he is not aware of the original proceedings. The address was given in the original applications as per the documents available with the bank and the address mentioned in O.As. is the last known address available with the bank. The notices sent to the petitioner were retained unserved and publication has been effected on 12.02.1998 in News Today. The bank has taken every care to serve summons on the petitioner. It is an admitted fact that the amount of Rs.23.05 crores deposited by the third party purchaser is kept in Non-interest bearing Sundry Deposit, as directed by the Recovery Officer. It is not true that the present One Time Settlement is the same as the one reached in the year 2000. The petitioner, after signing the memorandum of compromise, is not disputing the same and thus cannot contend differently. The DRT passed an order on 08.08.2001 in terms of the memo of compromise signed by the parties on 211. 2000. The borrower company namely Gemini group of company/mortgagor/guarantor, who had signed the memo of compromise, defaulted in payment of amount due to the bank. Thus, the bank had to take further steps in bringing the property for sale in terms of the interim recovery certificate of the DRT. It is not true that the bank had filed the recovery certificate and the petitioner was not aware of the same till October, 2006. Thus, the bank had to take further steps in bringing the property for sale in terms of the interim recovery certificate of the DRT. It is not true that the bank had filed the recovery certificate and the petitioner was not aware of the same till October, 2006. The petitioner has already agitated the rejection of the certificate for condonation of delay in the earlier round of litigation in W.P.No.567 of 2007 and the said writ petition came to be dismissed on 17.04.2007. As the bank wanted to recover the long pending dues, it initiated action for bringing the mortgaged assets for sale and one of the properties is of the petitioner. The sale of the petitioners property fetched Rs.23.05 crores in the auction held by the Recovery Officer of DRT. The entire amount of the auction sale proceedings was received by the Recovery Officer on 112. 2006 and the bank received the amount from the Recovery Officer on 05.01.2007 and the said amount was kept in interest bearing Sundry Deposit account pending the Writ Petition No.567 of 2007. 4. It is also stated in the counter that the Gemini group of companies negotiated the One Time Settlement and agreed to pay Rs.157.00 crores inclusive of the sale consideration of few properties and the payment was received on 28.03.2007 and the bank filed full satisfaction memo before DRT on 09.04.2007. M/s.J.D.A.Consultancy Services Pvt.Ltd. brought in additional Rs.23.05 crores so as to enable the bank to file full satisfaction memo as the bank could not utilise the amount deposited by the auction purchaser, namely, J.D.A.Consultancy. The One Time Settlement was not on the basis of the earlier One Time Settlement. The amount of Rs.23.05 crores deposited by the auction purchaser could not be utilized by the bank as the Recovery Officer restrained the bank from doing so and the same was during the pendency of the writ petition. The petitioner ought to have sought for redemption, which he had agreed as per the terms of the compromise signed by him before the sale of the property. There was no silent arrangement for entering into the memo of compromise. The bank has the right to recover its dues in terms of law and as per its policy decisions. The petitioner ought to have sought for redemption, which he had agreed as per the terms of the compromise signed by him before the sale of the property. There was no silent arrangement for entering into the memo of compromise. The bank has the right to recover its dues in terms of law and as per its policy decisions. The borrower requested the bank for OTS and it was found viable and thus the bank accepted the offer and agreed for accepting Rs.157.00 crores. The right to invoke the interim recovery certificate vests with the respondent bank and the sale of the property of the petitioner has helped the bank to recover substantial amount. The petitioner cannot claim that he is liable to pay only Rs.1.46 crores out of Rs.157.00 crores. Accordingly, he prayed for dismissal of the Writ Petitions. .5. Second respondent has also filed a counter, by putting the petitioner to strict proof of the averments contained in the petition. It is stated in the counter that the second respondent and the petitioner, at the cost of the second respondent, had decided to develop the petition subject property and an initial payment towards the development work was also released to the petitioner by this respondent. The said initial payment was made by mortgaging the petition subject property to the first respondent bank. The initial money was paid with a fond hope that the petitioner will develop the property and the petitioner and this respondent will have a huge income out of the same. But, the petitioner has started swindling the moneys given by this respondent without developing the petition subject property. A criminal complaint was also made against the petitioner by this respondent and the same was investigated. The first respondent initiated recovery proceedings against this respondent as guarantor, wherein the petitioner was also made a party and as mortgagor/guarantor. After due service to the petitioner, the petitioner, in those proceedings, did not appear and therefore was set ex parte before the Tribunal. Since the recovery proceedings were pending, as per the legal advice, this respondent was directed to file a memorandum of compromise with all the parties, including the petitioner. On explaining all these things, the petitioner readily joined in the compromise and a memorandum of compromise was also filed before the DRT. Since the recovery proceedings were pending, as per the legal advice, this respondent was directed to file a memorandum of compromise with all the parties, including the petitioner. On explaining all these things, the petitioner readily joined in the compromise and a memorandum of compromise was also filed before the DRT. Due to various calamities and unforeseen circumstances, the said compromise was not able to be fulfilled. Subsequently, since that failure has happened at borrowers end, as per the terms of compromise, an interim recovery certificate was issued by the Tribunal and the properties were brought into auction. All the properties mortgaged were brought into auction by the Recovery Officer of the Tribunal. Several publications were given and some of the properties were sold and some were not sold. Under the circumstances, after deducting the money which was realized by the bank from auctions, the bank has given opportunity to the borrowers and the balance was paid by the borrower in full quit and the bank has filed a full satisfaction memo before the Tribunal. As a matter of fact, when the petitioner has misappropriated funds by utilizing the same for his own use, that was questioned by this respondent by filing a criminal complaint with the police department. The petitioner has come in person and executed the documents relating to the mortgage and now claims as if he has blindly believed this respondent and signed those documents, which is concocted for the purpose of this Writ Petition. It is also not correct to state that the petitioner was not aware of the pending O.A. in Debt Recovery Tribunal against this respondent and the petitioner, as the petitioner had discussed about the pending O.A.on several occasions. .6. The counter further goes to the effect that the compromise was worked out by the borrowers with the respondent bank and at that time it was finalized that the properties which were sold cannot be redeemed and hence the borrowers were forced to accept the compromise and agree to pay the balance amount. Even for that payment, they obtained financial assistance from some other financial company by mortgaging the properties which were available with them. The present petition is nothing but a sheer abuse of process of law. Even for that payment, they obtained financial assistance from some other financial company by mortgaging the properties which were available with them. The present petition is nothing but a sheer abuse of process of law. The person, who mortgaged the property, illegally alienated the same to various third parties and now claims protection under law in the guise of filing this writ petition, which is against the settled principles of law. 7. It is also stated in the counter that this respondent has no connection whatsoever with the auction purchaser and all the allegations made in the petition are created for the purpose of the case and the transaction between the auction purchaser and the bank are not with this respondents knowledge. The borrowers have made One Time Settlement with the bank with regard to the balance claimed by the bank after due appropriation of the amounts realized from the auction of several properties. The petitioner has unnecessarily made this respondent as a party to this Writ Petition and deliberately pleaded the distorted statements before this Court. Accordingly, he prayed for dismissal of the Writ Petition with exemplary costs to this respondent. .8. Third respondent has also filed a counter, stating that most of the allegations in the writ petition are not within the knowledge of this respondent, as this respondent is an auction purchaser in an auction conducted by the Debts Recovery Tribunal on 211. 2006 except those facts which have come to the knowledge of this respondent after 211. 2006. The present Writ Petition is not maintainable on the principles of res judicata. The writ petitioner had instituted a writ petition in W.P.No.556 of 2007 before this Court for a writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the order dated 212. 2006 in M.A.Nos.204 and 207 of 2006 and for a consequential relief forbearing the Debts Recovery Tribunal from proceeding with confirmation of sale in respect of the properties sold in public auction by the Recovery Officer on 211. 2006. The said writ petition having been dismissed on 17.04.2007, the present writ petition is hit by the principles of res judicata and is not maintainable before this Court. 2006. The said writ petition having been dismissed on 17.04.2007, the present writ petition is hit by the principles of res judicata and is not maintainable before this Court. Most of the averments and allegations contained in the affidavit filed in support of this writ petition have been raised before this Court in W.P.No.556 of 2007 and as such the petitioner is in law not entitled to raise the very same issue before this Court by way of this writ. The order passed in W.P.No.556 of 2007 having attained finality, the instant Writ Petition is not maintainable in law. The sale certificate was issued prior to the passing of the interim order in the above writ petition and the Recovery Officer did not hand over possession of the property. After dismissal of the writ petition, the petitioner filed an appeal in S.R.No.6 of 2007 on 19.04.2007 under Section 30 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act in DRC No.187 of 2007 praying to set aside the sale of the property and the sale certificate and return the title deeds of the subject property and for a direction to the first respondent and for an interim injunction restraining the bank from appropriating the amount of Rs.23.05 crores. The said appeal SR.No.6 of 2007 was disposed of giving liberty to the appellants to raise those points before the Recovery Officer by filing appropriate objections/averments provided the same are entertainable in accordance with law and the Recovery Officer was directed to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. During April 2007, the petitioners preferred a petition in M.A.No.1 of 2007 under Rule 61 of the II Schedule to the Income Tax Act, seeking to set aside the sale held on 211. 2006 and the consequential sale certificate issued in favour of the third respondent, for return of the documents of title and Rs.25.00 lakhs deposited by the petitioner. During the pendency of the said M.A., the petitioner filed a Writ Petition No.17613 of 2007 before this Court for a mandamus forbearing the Recovery Officer from permitting the bank to appropriate Rs.23.05 crores. The said M.A.was dismissed on 29.05.2007, directing the first respondent not to appropriate the amount lying in No Lien Account till the disposal of the Writ Petition No.17613 of 2007. Ultimately, on 26.07.2007, the Writ Petition was dismissed. The said M.A.was dismissed on 29.05.2007, directing the first respondent not to appropriate the amount lying in No Lien Account till the disposal of the Writ Petition No.17613 of 2007. Ultimately, on 26.07.2007, the Writ Petition was dismissed. Aggrieved over the order of dismissal of M.A.No.1 of 2007, the petitioner preferred an appeal in M.A.No.7 of 2007 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the said M.A.was dismissed on 19.07.2007. Further aggrieved over the said order of dismissal, the petitoiner has filed an appeal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal in M.A.No.124 of 2007 and the said appeal was also dismissed. Hence, the petitioner has filed these Writ Petitions. The factual issues pleaded in these writ petitions have previously been considered in various writ petitions and once again by the Recovery Officer in M.A.No.1 of 2007, by the DRT in Appeal No.7 of 2007 and by the DRAT in M.A.No.124 of 2007. Therefore, the petitioners are precluded from raising the factual issues before this Court. .9. It is also stated in the counter that Rule 61 of the II Schedule to the Income Tax Act provides for an application to set aside the sale on grounds of non-service of notice or irregularity. Only on these two grounds, an application is maintainable in and more further such an application ought to be filed within 30 days from the date of sale; in the .instant case, the said application ought to have been filed on or before 212. 2006 and as per the proviso to Rule 61, such an application shall be disallowed unless the applicant deposits the amount recoverable from him in execution of the certificate. In this case, no application whatsoever was preferred within 30 days from the date of sale. However, the application was filed only on 19.04.2007 and as such the said application was not maintainable and the Courts below have rightly dismissed the said application. 10. The counter further goes to the effect that this respondent has paid an additional sum of Rs.23.05 crores towards the sale consideration and the amount has not been paid by the borrower as contended by the petitioners. 10. The counter further goes to the effect that this respondent has paid an additional sum of Rs.23.05 crores towards the sale consideration and the amount has not been paid by the borrower as contended by the petitioners. The amount of Rs.157.00 crores as evident from the various pleadings by the bank represents the sum of Rs.23.05 crores paid by this respondent, a sum of about Rs.39.00 crores realised from sale of another property and a sum of Rs.20.00 lakhs realised from sale of another property and it is false for the petitioners to contend that the borrower brought in the sum of Rs.157.00 crores. The petitioner has lost his right of redemption by 212. 2006, as the sale certificate has been issued in favour of this respondent. The sale was conducted on 211. 2006 and not a week before the Memorandum of Full Satisfaction was filed, as alleged by the petitioner. The Recovery Officer has confirmed the sale before passing of any orders by this Court in W.P.No.556 of 2007. The Courts below have considered all the issues raised by the parties and it is false for the petitioner to contend that the orders have been passed without considering the issues raised. Therefore, these Writ Petitions are liable to be dismissed. .11. Mr. AR. L. Sundaresan, learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the order dated 312. 2007 of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal in M.A.No.124 of 2007 is against law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case and the Appellate Tribunal ought to have set aside the sale conducted on 211. .11. Mr. AR. L. Sundaresan, learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the order dated 312. 2007 of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal in M.A.No.124 of 2007 is against law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case and the Appellate Tribunal ought to have set aside the sale conducted on 211. 2006, since no amount was due under the Recovery Certificate through which the property situated at Okkiam Thorapakkam Village, measuring an extent of 12.03 acres was brought for sale in the auction; the first respondent has filed a Full Satisfaction Memo dated 28.03.2007 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal on 09.04.2007 and to that effect an order was also passed by DRT, accepting a sum of Rs.157.00 crores towards full and final settlement; the DRAT failed to appreciate the arguments placed by the petitioner that the sale consideration of Rs.23.05 crores deposited by the third respondent was kept in No Lien Account; the first respondent bank has not appropriated the amount deposited by the third party auction purchaser since the Writ Petition No.556 of 2007 was pending before this Court and also in view of an interim order directing that the possession should not be handed over to the third party auction purchaser even if the sale certificate was issued; the DRAT erred in coming to a conclusion that the petitioner had not approached the DRT by filing an application under Rule 60 or 61 within 30 days from the date of sale with the deposit of the DRC amount; even before the sale proclamation was done, the application filed by the petitioner to set aside the ex parte order was pending and the petitioner challenged the recovery proceedings before the date of sale was fixed and hence the question of invoking Rule 60 or 61 does not arise; when the DRAT held that the sale was conducted on 211. 2006 and confirmed in favour of the third respondent on 03.01.2007, it failed to see that the application to set aside the ex parte decree was filed and pending the same, the sale was conducted; the conclusion of the DRAT that the claim of the first respondent is only a sum of Rs.59,35,67,968.42 is not correct, as the first respondent had filed Original Applications and this petitioner was a party to O.A.Nos.375 and 385 of 1997 only; the total settlement amount between the borrower and the first respondent was a sum of Rs.157.00 crores for entire group accounts; the Recovery Officer issued the Sale Certificate in a hurried manner and that the sale consideration of Rs.23.05 crores was kept in No Lien Account and the same was not adjusted towards the loan account, hence, on the date of filing the memo of full satisfaction, the amount deposited by the auction purchaser was available with the Recovery Officer and, therefore, the sale has to be set aside and the amount lying with the Recovery Officer should be returned to the auction purchaser. 12. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, no amount was due in DRC and Original Applications were allowed to be withdrawn as settled out of Court; the action of the bank in permitting the property of the third party to be sold in auction to adjust the dues of the borrower and utilise the sale proceeds for One Time Settlement is totally arbitrary and capricious and that the owner of the property is also entitled to the right of redemption as per law once the due to the bank is settled. It is also his contention that the auction purchaser participated in the proceedings knowing the litigation and, before the auction sale reached finality, the loan has been discharged in full and hence the sale deserves to be set aside. Accordingly, he prayed for allowing the Writ Petition. 13. In support of his contentions, the learned Senior Counsel relied upon the following decisions: (i) Chinnammal and others v. P. Arumugham and another, (AIR 1990 SUPREME COURT 1823): "The person, who purchases property in court auction with the knowledge of the pending appeal against the decree cannot resist restitution after the decree is set aside in appeal. His knowledge about the pending litigation would make all the difference in the case. His knowledge about the pending litigation would make all the difference in the case. He may be a stranger to the suit, but he must be held to have taken calculated risk in purchasing the property. Indeed, he is evidently a speculative purchaser and in that respect he is in no better position than the decree holder purchaser. The need to protect him against restitution, therefore, seems to be unjustified. Similarly, the auction purchaser who was a name lender to the decree holder to purchase the property could not also be protected to retain the property if the decree is subsequently reversed." .(ii) U. Nilan v. Kannayyan, (AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 3750): "Sale does not become absolute on mere passing of order of confirmation – Sale attains finality only after disposal of appeal against the order refusing to set aside the sale – There is no difference between an appeal against order refusing to set aside sale and an appeal against order refusing to restore application to set aside sale. As such, even after passing of order confirming sale, a mortgagor can apply for deposit of mortgage money during pendency of appeal against order refusing to restore his application for setting aside sale – Furthermore, his application to make deposit does not become not maintainable on subsequent rejection of his application to set aside sale on merits." (iii) Maganlal v. Jaiswal Industries, (1989 (4) SUPREME COURT CASES 344): "Notwithstanding confirmation of sale, Rule 35 CPC would still be attracted where appeal against the order of confirmation is pending, as till the appeal is finally decided, the sale does not become absolute." (iv) Philomina Jose v. Federal Bank Ltd. and Others, (2006 (2) SUPREME COURT CASES 608); "Right of redemption subsists until there is a final determination on whether or not to set aside the sale under Order 34 CPC, either by way of appeal or revision." .(v) Sri Mohan Wahi v. Commissioner of Income-Tax and Others, (2001 INCOME TAX REPORTS 799), "It is true that sanctity of sale of property by public auction has to be protected; at the same time, a citizen faced with proceedings for recovery of assumed arrears should not be deprived of his property in spite of judicial or quasi-judicial pronouncements holding, before the sale was confirmed, that there were no arrears of tax. A sensitive and not a technical approach is required to be adopted by the court in the process of dispensing justice, when it is found that valuable property of a person is sought to be sold away for recovery of arrears of tax that did not exist at all." 14. In reply, Mr. Jeyash B.Dolia, learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent, has contended that the property of the petitioner which fetched Rs.23.05 crores in the auction sale could not be utilized by the bank for filing the memo of satisfaction; the third respondent brought in additional Rs.23.05 crores so as to enable filing of the full satisfaction memo before the DRT; the amount of Rs.23.05 crores lying in the Sundry Deposit account cannot now be utilised by the bank towards its due and that the bank has received the entire amount and closed the account. He would also argue that the grounds raised by the petitioner regarding auction sale or the right of redemption have all been considered by DRT and DRAT and the matter has become final; the sale certificate is issued in favour of the auction purchaser; the bank is entitled to bring any of the mortgaged property for sale and that after the full satisfaction memo is filed, the One Time Settlement has been settled out of court. Accordingly, he prayed for dismissal of the Writ Petition. 15. In addition, Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram, learned Senior Counsel for the third respondent, would submit that the order passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal is in accordance with law after appreciation of evidence and probabilities of the case; the present writ petition arises out of a petition filed under Rule 61 of the II Schedule to the Income Tax Act, however, the petitioner contends that the question of invoking Rule 60 or 61 does not arise and, hence, the writ petition fails and is liable to be dismissed. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the auction proceedings are governed by the II Schedule to the Income Tax Act and only an application under Rule 61 is maintainable to set aside the auction and, as such, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that he need not invoke Rule 60 or 61 cannot be sustained. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the auction proceedings are governed by the II Schedule to the Income Tax Act and only an application under Rule 61 is maintainable to set aside the auction and, as such, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that he need not invoke Rule 60 or 61 cannot be sustained. Further, the findings of the Recovery Officer have been considered in first appeal by the Debts Recovery Tribunal and in second appeal by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and, hence, it is erroneous for the petitioners to place distorted facts or challenge the finding on facts contested in two appellate forums. The learned Senior Counsel has also argued that the settlement has been done only after taking into consideration the amounts realised from the sale of the properties and the amount paid by the third respondent towards the purchase of the property in auction viz., Rs.23.05 crores; the third respondent has nothing to do with the principal borrowers and hence the allegation that the principal borrower and the auction purchaser are one and the same is false; the amount paid by the third respondent is duly reflected in the memo filed by the bank before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the third respondent has paid an additional sum of Rs.23.05 crores towards sale consideration and the repeated allegation of the petitioner that the same was paid by the principal borrower is ex-facie false. In her last limb of submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has submitted that irreparable loss and hardship is being caused to the third respondent due to the vexatious litigations filed one after another, solely with an intent to defeat the rights of the third respondent and that the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal has rightly come to the conclusion that the proceedings instituted by the petitioner is only to protract the proceedings and hence these Writ Petitions are liable to be dismissed with costs. 16. To substantiate her contentions, the learned Senior Counsel for the third respondent would cite the following authorities: (i) Abdul Subhan Sahib v. Ramana, (AIR (32) 1945 MADRAS 161): "It is not open to a judgment-debtor or any one standing in his shoes to plead an uncertified adjustment of the decree by way of defence to a suit filed by the auction purchaser for possession. Once the sale has been confirmed by the Court, it confers an absolute title on the auction-purchaser, whether he be the decree-holder or a stranger, provided there was title in the judgment-debtor. It is immaterial whether the decree-holder has deliberately deceived the judgment-debtor and by false statement prevented him from taking steps himself to have an adjustment certified." (ii) Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1967 SUPREME COURT 608 (V 54 C 608): "4....The result is that the purchasers title relates back to the date of sale and not the confirmation of sale. There is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908 either under O.XXI or elsewhere which provides that the sale is not to be confirmed if it be found that the decree under which the sale was ordered has been reversed before the confirmation of sale. It does not seem ever to have been doubted that once the sale is confirmed the judgment-debtor is not entitled to get back the property even if he succeeds thereafter in having the decree against him reversed...." "For the reasons already given and the decisions noticed, it must be held that the appellant-auction purchaser was entitled to a confirmation of the sale notwithstanding the fact that after the holding of the sale the decree had been set aside. The policy of the Legislature seems to be that unless a stranger auction purchaser is protected against the vicissitudes of the fortunes of the suit, sales in execution would not attract customers and it would be to the detriment of the interest of the borrower and the creditor alike if sales were allowed to be impugned merely because the decree was ultimately set aside or modified...." (iii) Boddapati Ramachandra Rao v. Special Deputy Tahsildar, Income-Tax, Vijayawada, 1968 ITR (A.P.) 277: "Under Rule 63 of Schedule II to the Income-tax Act,1961, the Tax Recovery Officer has no option but to confirm the sale, if there is no application to set aside either under Rule 60 or 61. The mere fact that sale is subject to confirmation by the Tax Recovery Officer does not mean that he has the discretion to refuse to confirm the sale, even if there is no application to set aside." (iv) Anshiram v. Tax Recovery Commissioner, M.P.-II, (1982) 142 ITR (M.P.) 6): "Even a ground which makes the sale wholly invalid has to be raised for avoiding the sale by making an application under the rule. Rule 61 specifically says that if the defaulter wants to challenge the sale on the ground that notice was not served on him to pay the arrears, that ground has also to be taken in the application to be made under Rule 61. Having regard to the wider scope of Rule 61 of Schedule II, even a ground that no notice was issued to the defaulter before drawing up the proclamation of sale under Rule 53 ought to be taken only by an application under Rule 61. If no application is made under Rule 61 on this ground, the confirmation of sale will automatically follow under Rule 63." .(v) K. Chidambara Manickam v. Shakeena, (2007) 6 MLJ 448 (DB): "In our considered view, the borrowers should have approached the secured creditor or the authorized officer before the date fixed for sale and not after the sale...." "Sale has become absolute and complete by issuance of sale certificate – Such sale certificate need not be registered – Auction purchaser has become absolute owner on issuance of sale certificate – Borrowers approached secured creditor only after property was sold in public auction and sale was confirmed in favour of auction purchaser – As such, secured creditor could proceed with taking of possession of secured assets." 17. In the light of the above pleadings, let us now examine all the proceedings, which went against the petitioners right from the beginning, to find out whether any injustice is caused to the petitioners. .18. The second respondent bank initiated recovery proceedings in O.A.No.375 of 1997 for recovery of a sum of Rs.59,35,67,968.42 ps. against the writ petitioners, represented by their Power of Attorney Holder M/s. Palaniappa Estates by its Proprietor Mr. P.L. Sundaram and several others under Section 19 (1) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks And Financial Institutions Act,1993. .18. The second respondent bank initiated recovery proceedings in O.A.No.375 of 1997 for recovery of a sum of Rs.59,35,67,968.42 ps. against the writ petitioners, represented by their Power of Attorney Holder M/s. Palaniappa Estates by its Proprietor Mr. P.L. Sundaram and several others under Section 19 (1) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks And Financial Institutions Act,1993. The petitioners, being the owners of 12.03 acres in Okkiyam Thuraipakkam Village, had executed a Power of Attorney in favour of .the said P.L.Sundaram, who, in turn, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, dated 17.02.1992, with the second respondent, as per which the financial accommodation by the second respondent to the petitioners to the tune of Rs.50.00 lakhs was agreed to be provided by depositing the documents of title with the second respondent. Therefore, the second respondent executed an agreement of guarantee in respect of the said immovable property belonging to the petitioners in favour of the first respondent bank for the loan availed by the second respondent. It is not disputed by the petitioners that their Power of Attorney Holder has deposited the documents of title with reference to the said immovable property belonging to them on behalf of the second respondent and created an equitable mortgage in favour of the bank. The petitioners remained ex parte in the Original Application proceedings on 16.03.1998. Thereafter, they signed a memo of compromise on 211. 2000 as one of the respondents consulting for the settlement of the dues under a compromise entered into between the bank and the second respondent group concerns. As the parties to the compromise memo did not pay the amount in time, by invoking default clause, a recovery certificate vide DRC No.187/2001 was issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, pursuant to which, attachment of almost all the properties was made by the Recovery Officer of DRT by 012. 2002. 19. It also transpires that the petitioners, having waited till the property was put in public auction, filed applications viz., I.A.No.30 of 2006 to set aside the order, dated 16.03.1998, after a delay of 2890 days, and another I.A.No.32 of 2006 to stay the auction proceedings and the said applications were dismissed by the Tribunal on 010. 2006. Against the said order of dismissal, the petitioners filed appeals in M.A.Nos.204 and 207 of 2006 before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. On 211. 2006. Against the said order of dismissal, the petitioners filed appeals in M.A.Nos.204 and 207 of 2006 before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. On 211. 2006, the DRAT passed an order that auction would be stayed if the petitioners paid Rs.3.25 crores, but the petitioners did not pay the said amount. Therefore, on 211. 2006, the auction was held and the third respondent participated in the said auction conducted by the Recovery Officer and he was declared as the highest bidder in respect of the property belonging to the petitioners, measuring an extent of 12.03 acres in Okkiyam Thurappakkam village, Chennai, for a sum of Rs.23.05 crores. On 112. 2006, the entire sale consideration of Rs.23.05 crores, being the bid amount, was remitted by the third respondent within 15 days of the auction as per the rule and, on 212. 2006, the DRAT dismissed the appeals viz., M.A.Nos.204 and 207 of 2006. 20. It is very significant to note that since no application was filed before the Recovery Officer under Rule 61 or any other Rules of the II Schedule to the Income Tax Act for setting side the sale of the subject property within 30 days as prescribed in the said Rule, the Recovery Officer duly confirmed the sale on 212. 2006 and issued Sale Certificate to the third respondent on 03.01.2007. 21. Thereafter, the petitioners filed W.P.No.556 of 2007 to quash the order, dated 212. 2006, passed by DRAT in M.A.Nos.204 and 207 of 2006 and to forbear the Recovery Officer from confirming the sale of the subject property. In this context, it is pertinent to note that before the Writ Petition came up for admission, the Sale Certificate was already issued by the Recovery Officer in favour of the auction purchaser, namely, third respondent. However, this Court, as an interim measure, made it clear that if the sale had been confirmed and the Sale Certificate, if any, issued by that time, the respondents should not give possession of the property in favour of the auction purchaser without prior permission of the Court. Therefore, the amount of Rs.23.05 crores deposited by the auction purchaser was kept in non-interest bearing sundry deposit account to await the outcome of W.P.No.556 of 2007. Therefore, the amount of Rs.23.05 crores deposited by the auction purchaser was kept in non-interest bearing sundry deposit account to await the outcome of W.P.No.556 of 2007. It also appears, since the Recovery Officer directed the bank not to appropriate the said amount, the auction purchaser paid an additional amount of Rs.23.05 crores to the bank on 05.04.2007 and, on the same day, the bank filed a full satisfaction memo before the Debts Recovery Tribunal to the effect that the bank had received the amount in full and final settlement by receiving a consolidated amount of Rs.157.00 crores. Pertinent it is to state here that the said sum of Rs.157.00 crores includes the amount of Rs.23.05 crores, deposited by the auction purchaser. Hence, on 09.04.2007, all the O.As. were dismissed, as settled out of Court. Thereafter, on 17.04.2007, W.P.No.556 of 2007 was dismissed. 22. When the Writ Petition, challenging the auction and confirmation of sale, was dismissed, there ends the matter and the petitioners have lost their right over the subject property, more particularly, when they have not chosen to file any appeal against the dismissal of the said Writ Petition. .23. However, on 19.04.2007, the petitioners filed an application under Rule 61 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act in M.A.No.1 of 2007 against DRC No.187 of .2007, praying to set aside the sale of the subject property held on 211. 2006 and also the Sale Certificate. During the pendency of the said M.A., the petitioners also filed another W.P.No.17613 of 2007, praying to forbear the bank from appropriating the sum of Rs.23.05 crores and the same was later dismissed as withdrawn, from which an adverse inference can be drawn against the petitioners. Consequently, on 29.05.2007, M.A.No.1 of 2007 was dismissed by the Recovery Officer, holding that the conditions in Rule 61 were not satisfied. Even assuming that a remedy lies to the petitioner under Rule 61, the Rule is very clear that the application should be filed within thirty days from the date of sale i.e., in this case, since the sale was held on 211. 2006, the application should have been filed on or before 212. 2006. However, the petitioners filed the said application only on 19.04.2007, i.e., nearly after four months beyond the time limit. 2006, the application should have been filed on or before 212. 2006. However, the petitioners filed the said application only on 19.04.2007, i.e., nearly after four months beyond the time limit. Against the said order of dismissal in M.A.No.1 of 2007, the petitioners filed Appeal No.7 of 2007 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the same met with similar fate on 19.07.2007, on the grounds that the application was not filed within time; the applicants have not sustained substantial injury by reason of non-service or irregularity and that the sale was confirmed on 03.01.2007 well before the filing of the petition on 19.04.2007. Even against the said order of dismissal in Appeal No.7 of 2007 by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the petitioners filed M.A.No.124 of 2007 before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, which was also dismissed on 312. 2007, and the said order is challenged in these Writ Petitions. 24. Coming to the impugned order, it is not disputed that the mortgaged property had been sold by the Recovery Officer on 211. 2006 in DRC No.187/2007. It is also not controverted that the appellants, represented by the Power of Attorney, have not preferred any application to the Recovery Officer to set aside the sale within 30 days from the said date of sale i.e., 211. 2006 by tendering the amount specified in the proclamation of sale, but they filed such an application only on 19.04.2007 in M.A.No.1 of 2007 before the Recovery Officer. Failure on the part of the petitioners to file the application within time to set aside the sale is fatal to their case. Besides, when the very same question was raised before this Court in W.P.No.556 of 2007 and the same was dismissed by a Division Bench and in the absence of filing of any appeal against the said order, the principle res judicata comes into operation. .25. In this case, the sale was held as early as 211. 2006 and confirmed in favour of the .third respondent on 03.01.2007, whereas satisfaction memos were filed by the bank on 28.03.2007 and 05.04.2007 i.e., after the sale was confirmed and based on the satisfaction memos, all the O.As. were dismissed, as settled out of Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that since the satisfaction memos were filed, the petitioners are relieved of all the dues and they are entitled for redemption of the mortgaged property belonging to them. were dismissed, as settled out of Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that since the satisfaction memos were filed, the petitioners are relieved of all the dues and they are entitled for redemption of the mortgaged property belonging to them. It is true, right to redeem the mortgage, as provided under Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, is a very valuable right possessed by the mortgagor, but, such a right can be exercised only before it is foreclosed or the estate is sold. As seen above, the petitioners have sought for such a right only after the estate is sold in public auction. The general principle is that only if the borrowers approach the secured creditor or the authorized officer before the date fixed for sale or transfer, as provided under Section 13 (8) of the SARFAESI Act, and pay all the dues to the secured creditor, the Section creates a bar on the secured creditor or authorized officer to proceed further with the proposed sale or transfer. In this case, admittedly, the date fixed for sale was 211. 2006. But, even according to the petitioners, they approached the authorized officer only on 19.04.2007. Therefore, the right accrued in favour of the third respondent-auction purchaser cannot be challenged by the petitioners on the basis of a belated application filed by them, after confirmation of sale and issuance of the Sale Certificate in favour of the auction purchaser. It is also significant to mention that out of the total claim of Rs.59,35,67,968.42 ps., the first respondent bank has realized only a sum of Rs.23.05 crores by way of the sale of the properties belonging to the petitioners and, therefore, in respect of the balance amount, the first respondent bank entered into a negotiation with the principal borrower, namely, the first respondent in the O.A., to arrive at the settlement. It follows necessarily that such settlement would, by no stretch of imagination, enure to the benefit of the petitioners. .26. It follows necessarily that such settlement would, by no stretch of imagination, enure to the benefit of the petitioners. .26. Moreover, subsequent to the order of dismissal passed by this High Court in W.P.No.556 of 2007 on 17.04.2007, the petitioners filed another Writ Petition vide No.17613 of 2007, wherein, by an order, dated 09.05.2007, the Recovery Officer was forborne from delivering possession of the property to the auction purchaser and, accordingly, in his order, dated 29.05.2007, the Recovery Officer passed the order, restraining the first respondent bank also from appropriating the amount deposited by the third respondent without the approval of the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Subsequently, since the said Writ Petition was dismissed on 27.06.2007 as withdrawn, possession of the property purchased by the third respondent was directed to be delivered by the Recovery Officer and the first respondent bank was also at liberty to appropriate the auction amount deposited by the third respondent. 27. The Recovery Officer, in his order, dated 29.05.2007, in M.A.No.1 of 2007, has clearly held that the Sale Certificate, dated 03.01.2007, was issued before the receipt of the order passed by the High Court in W.P.No.556 of 2007, dated 03.01.2007, and that after receipt of the order, further action to hand over possession to the auction purchaser in pursuance of the Sale Certificate was not taken. In his order, the Recovery Officer further observed that the Writ Petition No.566 of 2007 was dismissed by the High Court on 17.04.2007 and that on the basis of the satisfaction memo filed by the first respondent bank in O.A.No.375 of 1997, the Presiding Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal passed the order, dated 09.04.2007, recording the Full Satisfaction Memo and approving the settlement. As such, the third respondent being a stranger and auction purchaser, having purchased the property in the recovery proceedings by paying a sum of Rs.23.05 crores, is entitled to the confirmation of sale in his favour. The petitioners, knowing fully well that they are fighting a loosing battle, instituted all the above proceedings only to drag on the recovery proceedings and to frustrate the authorities and also the auction purchaser. 28. The petitioners, knowing fully well that they are fighting a loosing battle, instituted all the above proceedings only to drag on the recovery proceedings and to frustrate the authorities and also the auction purchaser. 28. After considering all the above points at length, the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal has come to the definite conclusion and dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioners, imposing costs of Rs.5,000/-each in respect of the contesting respondents, with which we do not find any illegality or irregularity. 29. This Court, in the decisions relied upon by the learned Senior counsel for the third respondent, in Abdul Subhan Sahibs case, held that once the sale has been confirmed by the Court, it confers an absolute title on the auction purchaser and in Chindambara Manickams case, that sale has become absolute and complete by issuance of sale certificate and the auction purchaser has become absolute owner on issuance of sale certificate. Further, in Boddapati Ramchandra Raos case, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that the Tax Recovery Officer has no option but to confirm the sale, if there is no application to set aside the sale. 30. Though the petitioners cited the decision of the Supreme Court in U.Nilans case, to say that sale does not become absolute on mere passing of order of confirmation, it is of no avail to them, the reason being, even according to the said judgment, in this case, the sale attained finality after disposal of the appeal against the order refusing to set aside the sale. 31. Following the ratio laid down in the above decisions and in view of our detailed discussion in the foregoing paragraphs, these Writ Petitions, in our considered opinion, do not deserve any consideration. As such, they are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected M.P.No.1 of 2008 in W.P.No.570 of 2008 and M.P.Nos.1 and 2 of 2008 in W.P.No.2656 of 2008 are also dismissed.