JUDGMENT Hon’ble A.P. Sahi, J.—The petitioner-Smt. Bhuri lodged a complaint under Section 156 (3), Cr.P.C. to the effect that the accused persons cheated her by obtaining documents in the name of getting a lease executed in her favour and instead obtained some loan in her name the recovery whereof was sought to be made from her. Having discovered this fraud practised on her, she lodged the complaint on 21.6.1997. 2. The trial proceeded and during the trial, an Application was moved by the complainant after her examination-in-chief to summon one Sri Ashok Kumar, the village Pradhan, and the Branch Manager Sri N.N. Kapoor of the Punjab National Bank, on the allegation that they had also conspired in getting the fraudulent documents prepared. The said application has been rejected on 1.9.2007 by the learned Magistrate on the ground that the petitioner has only gone through her examination-in-chief and additional evidence is yet to come, therefore, the said application was not liable to be entertained and was, accordingly, rejected. A revision was preferred by the petitioner which was disposed of with the observation that keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafique, 2007 (58) ACC 254, the application can be entertained after the cross-examination of the witness is completed. Accordingly, the order of the trial Court was modified to the extent that such an application could be moved after the cross-examination is completed. 3. The present writ petition has been filed assailing the said orders on the ground that the law referred to by the revisional Court ignores the other decisions of the Supreme Court and the decisions of this Court and, therefore, the matter should be remitted back for a decision afresh. 4. The basic issue is as to whether the Magistrate can proceed to summon a person even before the cross-examination of a witness is undertaken. For a better appreciation, it would be appropriate to quote Section 319, Cr.P.C. herein below : “319. 4. The basic issue is as to whether the Magistrate can proceed to summon a person even before the cross-examination of a witness is undertaken. For a better appreciation, it would be appropriate to quote Section 319, Cr.P.C. herein below : “319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence.—(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. (2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. (3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed. (4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1) then— (a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses re-heard; (b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced.” 5. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions leaves no room for doubt that the Court has wide discretion in the matter and in case the Court is satisfied that the person, sought to be summoned, has committed any offence on the basis of the evidence already led, then the Court may proceed against him as if he was an accused when the Court took cognizance of the offence initially. However, the Section protects the rights of such a person by clearly stating that the proceeding in respect of such a person shall be commenced afresh and the witnesses shall be re-heard. This clearly means that there would be a de novo trial for such a person and all the witnesses will have again to be proceeded with afresh and the entire procedure will have to be adopted. This would ensure the absence of any prejudice to such a person which stands assured by a de novo trial altogether. 6. This clearly means that there would be a de novo trial for such a person and all the witnesses will have again to be proceeded with afresh and the entire procedure will have to be adopted. This would ensure the absence of any prejudice to such a person which stands assured by a de novo trial altogether. 6. The Supreme Court in the case of Michael Machado v. C.B.I., 2000 (40) ACC 1021, after considering the earlier decisions on this issue, came to the conclusion that it is not enough that the Court upon entertaining some doubt from the evidence, may proceed to summon a person. The Court must have reasonable satisfaction on the evidence already collected that an offence has been committed by such person and that he deserves to be tried as an accused. 7. A Division Bench of our Court in the case of Ram Gopal, 1999 (38) ACC 123, was constituted to answer this very specific question as to whether the term evidence as used in Section 319, Cr.P.C. would mean an evidence completed by cross-examination or otherwise. The Division Bench answered the question by clearly stating that the term evidence as used in Section 319, Cr.P.C. did not mean an evidence completed by cross-examination and that the Court can take action under Section 319, Cr.P.C. even only on the statement made in examination-in-chief of one or more than witnesses. This decision was followed by a learned single Judge of our Court in the case of Jagdish and others v. State of U.P. and another, 2001 (43) ACC 635, dated 24.7.2001. It was necessary to refer to this decision as the said decision finds reference in the impugned order of the revisional Court in the present case. 8. The judgment in the case of Surendra Kumar Agrawal v. State of U.P. and another, 2003 (47) ACC 362, also finds reference in the revisional Court’s order but the same goes on to hold that a person named in the F.I.R. but not charge-sheeted can also be summoned both by the Court having original jurisdiction and also by the Court to which the case was committed. This decision, therefore, does not directly cover the issue involved in the present case. 9. This decision, therefore, does not directly cover the issue involved in the present case. 9. The Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh and another v. State of Haryana, 2001 (43) ACC 392, decided on 25.7.2001, came to the conclusion wherein the following ratio was laid down in paragraph 9 and 12 of the said decision, which is being quoted below : “9. Hence, once the sessions Court records a statement of the witness it would be part of the evidence. It is true that finally at the time of trial the accused is to be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness to test its truthfulness. But that stage would not arise while exercising Court’s power under Section 319, Cr.P.C. Once the deposition is recorded no doubt there being no cross-examination it would be a prima facie material which would enable the Sessions Court to decide whether powers under Section 319 should be exercised or not. Sub-section (1) of Section 319 itself provides that in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such persons for the offence for which he appears to have committed. Further in case of inquiry there may not be any question of cross-examining the witness. In State of H.P. v. Surinder Mohan and others, this Court dealt with the contention that before granting pardon under Section 306 of the Cr.P.C. accused should be permitted to cross-examine such person whose evidence is recorded by the Magistrate. The Court negatived the said contention by holding that at the time of investigation or inquiry into an offence, the accused cannot claim any right under law to cross-examine the witness. The right to cross-examine would arise only at the time of trial. During the course of investigation by the police, the question of cross-examination by the accused does not arise. Similarly, under Section 200, Cr.P.C. when the Magistrate before taking cognizance of the offence, that is, before issuing process holds the inquiry, the accused has no right to cross-examination does not arise. During the course of investigation by the police, the question of cross-examination by the accused does not arise. Similarly, under Section 200, Cr.P.C. when the Magistrate before taking cognizance of the offence, that is, before issuing process holds the inquiry, the accused has no right to cross-examination does not arise. Further, the person to whom pardon is granted, is examined but is not offered for cross-examination and thereafter during trial if there is no question of any prejudice caused to the accused. In such cases, at the most the accused may lose the chance to cross-examine the approver twice, that is to say, once before committal and the other at the time of trial. Similar would be the position under Section 319, Cr.P.C. 12. Hence, it is difficult to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants that the term ‘evidence’ as used in Section 319 of Criminal Procedure Code would mean evidence which is tested by cross-examination. The question of testing the evidence by cross-examination would arise only after addition of the accused. There is no question of cross-examining the witness prior to adding such person as accused. Section 319 does not contemplate an additional stage of first summoning the person and giving him an opportunity of cross-examining the witness who has deposed against him and thereafter deciding whether such person is to be added as accused or not. Word ‘evidence’ occurring in sub-section is used in comprehensive and broad sense which would also include the material collected by the investigating officer and the material or evidence which comes before the Court and from which the Court can prima facie conclude that person not arraigned before it is involved in the commission of the crime." 10. The Court also considered the other stages of summoning. For Example; the powers of the Magistrate to be exercised under Section 200, Cr.P.C. and the powers for grant of pardon under Section 306, Cr.P.C. The Division Bench judgment of our Court in the case of Ram Gopal (supra) was approved by the said decision. 11. The Court also considered the other stages of summoning. For Example; the powers of the Magistrate to be exercised under Section 200, Cr.P.C. and the powers for grant of pardon under Section 306, Cr.P.C. The Division Bench judgment of our Court in the case of Ram Gopal (supra) was approved by the said decision. 11. Thereafter, another decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shashikant Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh and another, 2002 (45) ACC 164, explained the safeguard provided for under Section 319 of a de novo trial and further went on to explain that the words “could be” cannot under the circumstances therein be held to mean “must be”. However, the said decision was not directly in issue as raised in the present matter. 12. The difficulty has arisen on account of the decision now rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafique and another, JT 2007 (5) SC 562 : 2007 (2) JIC 490, wherein the following observations were made in paragraph 12 and 13 of the decision which are quoted herein below : “12. The Trial Judge, as noticed by us, in terms of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was required to arrive at his satisfaction. If he thought that the matter should receive his due consideration only after the cross-examination of the witnesses is over, no exception thereto could be taken far less at the instance of a witness and when the State was not aggrieved by the same. 13. From the decisions of this Court, as noticed above, it is evident that before a Court exercises its discretionary jurisdiction in terms of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it must arrive at the satisfaction that there exists a possibility that the accused so summoned is in all likelihood would be convicted. Such satisfaction can be arrived at inter alia upon completion of the cross-examination of the said witness. For the said purpose, the Court concerned may also like to consider other evidence. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court has committed an error in passing the impugned judgment, it is, accordingly, set aside. The appeal is allowed.” 13. It is, however, to be noted that in the said case, an application had been moved by the complainant under Section 319, Cr.P.C. for summoning Mohd. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court has committed an error in passing the impugned judgment, it is, accordingly, set aside. The appeal is allowed.” 13. It is, however, to be noted that in the said case, an application had been moved by the complainant under Section 319, Cr.P.C. for summoning Mohd. Shafi which was turned down by the learned Sessions Judge on the ground that the application was not acceptable at that stage against which a 482 Application was moved before this Court and the 482 Application was allowed by the High Court. The ground taken before the Apex Court was that the High Court could not have exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to substitute the discretion exercised by the learned Sessions Judge under Section 319, Cr.P.C. The Apex Court, after considering the observations in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and others, (1983) 1 SCC 1 , and in the case of Yuvraj Amber, reported in 2006 (7) SLT 638, held that in case the Sessions Court thought that the matter should have received due consideration only after cross-examination of the witness was over, no exception could have been taken to the power exercised by the Sessions Court and the High Court ought not to have interfered with the same. However, in paragraph 13 of the said decision, the observations, that were made, are stated to be running counter to the decision in the case of Rakesh and another v. State of Haryana (supra). It is urged that both the decisions of the Apex Court are of coequal strength and the later decision in the case of Mohd. Shafi, notice has not been taken of the case of Rakesh and another v. State of Haryana (supra). 14. Learned Counsel for the applicant contends that paragraph 13 of the judgment in Mohd. Shafi’s case lays down a very wide proposition which indicates that the trial Court cannot arrive at a satisfaction unless and until the cross-examination of the witnesses is completed and a finding is further recorded to the effect that there are compelling reasons to do so and there is a possibility that the accused, so summoned in all likelihood, would be convicted. Learned Counsel for the applicant contends that in the instant case the discretion exercised by the trial Court was, therefore, mechanical and there was no justification for waiting for another evidence to be adduced referred to in the order on the basis whereof it could be said that further evidence was required. 15. The question of the powers of the trial Court to exercise its discretion cannot be doubted in view of the wordings of Section 319, Cr.P.C. The proposition as to whether cross-examination should be completed compulsorily before invoking Section 319, Cr.P.C. has been squarely answered by the Apex Court in Rakesh and another v. State of Haryana (supra). However, without noticing the said decision, the observations made in para 13 of Mohd. Shafi’s case (supra) clearly recites that before a Court exercises its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 319, Cr.P.C., it has to arrive at the satisfaction that there exists a possibility that the accused so summoned is likely to be convicted. The Court further goes on to hold that such satisfaction can be arrived at inter alia upon completion of the cross-examination of the said witnesses. The Court can also wait for further evidence. 16. The difficulty is, as has arisen in the present case, that the trial Court does not appear to have gone to the extent of examining the matter in the light of Mohd. Shafi’s case but at the same time the trial Court was not required to go to that extent of waiting for cross-examination or waiting for further evidence, as held in the case of Rakesh and another v. State of Haryana (supra). The question, therefore, is as to in what manner is the Court required to exercise its discretion under Section 319, Cr.P.C. 17. This aspect of consideration of compelling reasons to exist and the powers to be exercised sparingly means that such exercise has to be undertaken for arriving at the satisfaction in order to summon an accused. If the power under Section 319, Cr.P.C. is akin to the powers of summoning on an application under Section 156 (3) or a complaint under Section 200, Cr.P.C., then in that view of the matter, it is the allegations which have to be seen coming forth in the statement of the witnesses and it is not compulsory for a Court to wait for any further evidence. In this view of the matter, the discretion can be exercised by the Court on the strength of the statement made by a witness as approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh and another v. State of Haryana (supra). 18. However, this discretion can also be exercised only after further satisfying itself upon the cross-examination of a witness. In order to arrive at this satisfaction as to whether a person deserves to be summoned or not, the Court can exercise its discretion to wait for cross-examination or adducing of further evidence. 19. The following paragraph (Pr 12) extracted from Michael Machado’s case is instructive : “12. But even then, what is conferred on the Court is only a discretion as could be discerned from the words t"he Court may proceed against such person”. The discretionary power so conferred should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice. It is not that the Court should turn against another person whenever it comes across evidence connecting that other person also with the offence. A judicial exercise is called for, keeping a conspectus of the case, including the stage at which the trial has proceeded already and the quantum of evidence collected till then, and also the amount of time which the Court had spent for collecting such evidence. It must be remembered that there is no compelling duty on the Court to proceed against other persons.” 20. This is what has been further emphasised in Mohd. Shafi’s case. 21. How should the discretionary power be exercised can be better understood by reverting to the following decisions of the Apex Court where the rules of discretion have been discussed in detail, namely— 1. 2006 (10) SCC 1 (paras 26 to 35) Reliance Airport v. Airport Authority of India. 2. 2004 (2) SCC 370 ( paras 9 to 12) National Insurance Company v. Keshav Bahadur. 3. 2004 (2) SCC 590 (paras 19 to 24) Union of India v. Kuldeep Singh. 22. The question, therefore, is that in the event the trial Court either chooses to exercise its discretion in such a manner or rejects an application under Section 319, Cr.P.C., can it be said that the Court has committed an illegality? It is this issue which requires a determination keeping in view the observations made by the Apex Court in the later decision of Mohd. Shafi’s case (supra). It is this issue which requires a determination keeping in view the observations made by the Apex Court in the later decision of Mohd. Shafi’s case (supra). In Rakesh’s case (supra), the Apex Court clearly went on to hold that the term evidence as used in Section 319, Cr.P.C. would not mean evidence which is tested by cross-examination. It further holds that there is no question of cross-examining the witnesses prior to adding such person as an accused. 23. There is yet another decision which goes on to hold that a de novo trial protects an accused summoned under Section 319, Cr.P.C. inasmuch as a de novo trial has to be held. The said case is of Rajendra Singh v. State of U.P. and another, 2007 (7) SCC 378 . The Court in paras 16 to 21 further went on to observe that while recording satisfaction under Section 319, the Court need not be satisfied that the person has committed the offence. It need only appear to the Court that an offence has been committed. This observation in Rajendra Singh’s case also deserves to be clarified in the context of the language employed in para 11 and 12 in the case of Michael Machado v. C.B.I., (supra); where the Court observed as follows : “11. The basic requirements for invoking the above section is that it should appear to the Court from the evidence collected during trial or in the inquiry that some other person, who is not arraigned as an accused in that case, has committed an offence for which that person could be tried together with the accused already arraigned. It is not enough that the Court entertained some doubt, from the evidence, about the involvement of another person in the offence. In other words, the Court must have reasonable satisfaction from the evidence already collected regarding two aspects. First is that the other person has committed an offence. Second is that for such offence that other person could as well be tried alongwith the already arraigned accused.” 12. But even then, what is conferred on the count is only a discretion as could be discerned from the words "the Court may proceed against such person”. The discretionary power so conferred should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice. Second is that for such offence that other person could as well be tried alongwith the already arraigned accused.” 12. But even then, what is conferred on the count is only a discretion as could be discerned from the words "the Court may proceed against such person”. The discretionary power so conferred should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice. It is not that the Court should turn against another person whenever it comes across evidence connecting that other person also with the offence. A judicial exercise is called for, keeping a conspectus of the case, including the stage at which the trial has proceeded already and the quantum of evidence collected till then, and also the amount of time which the Court had spent for collecting such evidence. It must be remembered that there is no compelling duty on the Court to proceed against other persons." 24. Not only the above ratio, but also the view expressed in Mohd.Shafi‘s case (supra) in para 13, the emphasis laid is, that the Court before exercising, discretion must arrive at a satisfaction in the terms expressed therein, and therefore, there appears to be a clear difference of opinion expressed by a coequal strength judgment of the apex Court in Rajendra Singh’s case (supra) 25. A learned Single Judge of this Court of the Lucknow Bench in the case of Dinesh Kumar Tewari v. State of U.P. in Crl Misc. Case No. 301 of 2008 decided on 29.1.2008, has held that in view of the decision in Mohd.Shafi’s case (supra), without the cross-examination of the witnesses, the accused could not have been summoned for trial in exercise of the power under Section 319, Cr.P.C., as such the procedure adopted by the trial Court was unsustainable. In that case six witnesses including one injured had turned hostile. The informant of the case who appeared as P.W.7 in his examination-in-chief, named the accused. It was on the strength of that solitary statement that the accused had been summoned which order was set aside giving liberty to move an application after the cross-examination of the said witness. It is to be noted that the case of Mohd. Shafi was decided on 9.4.2007 by the apex Court. It was on the strength of that solitary statement that the accused had been summoned which order was set aside giving liberty to move an application after the cross-examination of the said witness. It is to be noted that the case of Mohd. Shafi was decided on 9.4.2007 by the apex Court. Another learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Shiv Ganesh Gautam v. State of U.P., 2007 (59) ACC 1, went on to hold that a single line statement made by the witnesses would not be sufficient without any further evidence to collect that a person deserves to be summoned. In that case the informant had made a statement naming the person who was sought to be summoned. The application was rejected by the trial Court but later on two other witnesses appeared and they made the same single line statement of the involvement of the person in a conspiracy whereafter the application was moved under Section 319, Cr.P.C. was allowed. The order was set aside on the ground of unreasonable satisfaction. The said decision which was rendered after the decision of Mohd. Shafis case had not taken notice of the same. There is yet another decision by a learned Single Judge of the Lucknow Bench in the case of Prem Das v. State of U.P., in Crl. Misc. Case No. 3002 of 2007 decided on 28.9.2007 where applying the same principle, the order was set aside on the ground that the Court should have arrived at the satisfaction that there exists a possibility that the accused so summoned in all likelihood would be convicted. Such satisfaction could be arrived inter alia at the strength of the cross-examination of the said witnesses. The learned Single Judge had accordingly set aside the order and issued necessary directions. 26. On the other hand a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Anoop Singh v. State of U.P., 2007 (3) JIC 507 after noticing Mohd. Shafi’s case, has come to the conclusion that there are no fetters on the powers of the Courts in summoning the persons only on the basis of the examination-in-chief. For this, the learned single Judge has relied on earlier decision of the apex Court in the case of Rakesh v. State of Haryana (supra). Shafi’s case, has come to the conclusion that there are no fetters on the powers of the Courts in summoning the persons only on the basis of the examination-in-chief. For this, the learned single Judge has relied on earlier decision of the apex Court in the case of Rakesh v. State of Haryana (supra). Similarly another learned single Judge of the Lucknow Bench in the case of Manoj Kumar Pandey v. State of U.P., in Crl. Misc. Case No. 3018 of 2007 decided on 2.11.2007, has arrived at the conclusion that the evidence by way of cross examination is compulsory, is untenable, keeping in view the decision in the case of Rakesh v. State of Haryana (supra). However, the learned single Judge further went on to hold that in view of the other decisions of the apex Court particularly the decision in Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka, 2004 (7) SCC 792 , the satisfaction is to be recorded by the Court that there is a likelihood of conviction on the basis of material received. The learned single Judge has laid emphasis on the observations made in Mohd. Shafi’s case in that regard to the effect that the Court has to see that there exists a possibility that the accused so summoned in all likelihood would be convicted. 27. A perusal of the aforesaid decisions demonstrates that there are conflicting views about the ratio of the case of Mohd. Shafi’s (supra), on the one hand as applied in the cases of Dinesh Kumar Tewari (supra) and Premdas (supra), where the Courts have relying on Mohd. Shafi’s case, held that the application under Section 319 could not have been allowed without the cross-examination of the witnesses, and on the other hand relying on the decision of the apex Court in the case of Rakesh (supra), the two learned single Judges in the case of Manoj Kumar Pandey and Anoop Singh (supra), have held that the cross-examination is not at all necessary and that witnesses can be summoned on the basis of only examination-in-chief. 28. The aforesaid conflict in my opinion, appears to be resolved by a Larger Bench inasmuch as in my opinion the decision in the case of Mohd. Shafi goes on to hold that the satisfaction can be arrived at inter alia after cross-examination. 28. The aforesaid conflict in my opinion, appears to be resolved by a Larger Bench inasmuch as in my opinion the decision in the case of Mohd. Shafi goes on to hold that the satisfaction can be arrived at inter alia after cross-examination. The said decision nowhere says that the satisfaction can be arrived only after cross-examination and not before that. The said decision gives a wide discretion to the Court concerned to arrive at a satisfaction either at the stage of the examination-in-chief or after cross-examination. In the said case the High Court had interfered with the discretion of the trial Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. which judgment was set aside with the observation that the said discretion cannot be interfered with that to even on the asking of a witness. 29. In the instant case, Smt. Bhuri is the complainant and also the witness and her application has been rejected in view of ratio of the decision in the case of Mohd. Shafi (supra). The Court below has not taken into consideration the ratio of the decision in the case of Rakesh v. State of Haryana (supra) and as such in view of this conflicting position of law as referred to herein above, I find it necessary to request the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for referring the matter to a Larger Bench in order to resolve the conflicts with regard to correct interpretation in the case of Mohd. Shafi (supra) keeping in view the earlier decision of the apex Court of the same strength in the case of Rakesh Kumar (supra). 30. Thus, in view of the conflicting observations as referred to herein above and the fact that this has given rise to conflicting decisions by learned single Judges of this Court, and keeping in view the Division Bench in Ram Gopal’s case, the matter requires to be gone into and an authoritative pronouncement be made for the proper guidance of this Court as well as by the subordinate Courts which are facing this issue continuously, and this Court is being called upon to answer the aforesaid issues time and again. 31. 31. Accordingly, since the questions raised are of wide public importance and arising out of the conflicting views of the learned Single Judges in the cases of (i) Dinesh Kumar Tewari v. State (supra) and (ii) Prem Das v. State (supra) on the one hand, and in the cases of (iii) Anoop Singh v. State (supra) and (iv) Manoj Kumar Pandey v. State on the other hand, both set of decisions relying on two separate decisions of equal strength of the Apex Court, let the papers be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Larger Bench to answer the following proposition : (i) Whether the ratio as referred to in paragraph 12 and 13 of the decision in the case of Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafique, 2007 (58) ACC 254, and referred to herein above run counter to and in conflict with the decision of an equal strength of the Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh and another v. State of Haryana, 2001 (43) ACC 392, which has not been noticed in Mohd. Shafi’s case, and, as such, whether this Court and subordinate Courts are bound to follow the ratio of the Division Bench decision in the case of Ram Gopal, 1999 (38) ACC 123. (ii) Whether the discretion to be exercised by a competent Court under Section 319, Cr.P.C. can be held to be limited or fettered in any way by the ratio the Apex Court decision in the case of Rakesh and another v. State of Haryana, 2001 (43) ACC 392, as against the ratio in the case of Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafique, 2007 (58) ACC 254 (paras 12 and 13) and Michael Machado’s case 2000(3) SCC 262 (paras 11 and 12). (iii) Whether the supplementing observations of one of the Hon’ble Judges in paras 16 to 21 of Rajendra Singh’s case (supra) which is a later decision without noticing the ratio laid down in para 11 and 12 of Michael Machado’s case (supra) and paras 12 and 13 of Mohd. Shafi’s case (supra), has the impact of limiting the discretion of the Courts while exercising powers under Section 319, Cr.P.C. by expressing a contrary opinion. ————