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2008 DIGILAW 2395 (RAJ)

Gulabi Devi v. Mohan Lal Kulhari

2008-10-24

NARENDRA KUMAR JAIN

body2008
JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsel for the appellants on the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 71 days in filing the appeal as well as on merits of the appeal also. 2. The claimants have preferred this appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act for enhancement of the amount of compensation against impugned award dated 5th October, 2004 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sikar, whereby the learned Tribunal has awarded a total compensation of Rs. 4,01,000/- in favour of the appellants for death of Vinod Kumar. 3. The only argument of learned counsel for the appellants is that appellants placed on record a Salary Certificate (Ex.-9), wherein income of deceased was shown as Rs. 5500/- per month, whereas the Tribunal did not believe the same and assessed the monthly income of the deceased as Rs. 3000/- only. He, therefore, contended that the compensation under the head of "loss of income" of the deceased has not been determined properly. 4. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants and examined the impugned award passed by the Tribunal. Admittedly the deceased Vinod Kumar aged about 23 years was bachelor and claimants in the present case are his mother and brothers. AW-2 Smt. Gulabi in her statement stated that his son was working the wooden work in Jaipur. He was earning Rs. 5500/- per month. Ex.-9, salary certificate, was placed on record which was issued by Rekha Jangid, who was not examined in the case to prove the contents of salary certificate (Ex.-9). No other documentary evidence was placed on record to prove the income or salary of the deceased. The Tribunal, therefore, did not consider this certificate as trustworthy in the facts and circumstances of the present case, however, looking to the age of the deceased, assessed the income of the deceased as Rs. 3000/- per month. He deducted ⅓rd amount out of it and calculated the compensation on the basis of monthly income of the deceased as Rs. 2000/-. The Tribunal applied the multiplier of 17 and awarded Rs. 3,84,000/- under the head of "loss of income". Rs. 15,000/- was further awarded for mental agony; Rs. 2000/- was also awarded for funeral expenses. Thus, the total compensation of Rs. 4,01,000/- was awarded with interest @ 6% per annum. 2000/-. The Tribunal applied the multiplier of 17 and awarded Rs. 3,84,000/- under the head of "loss of income". Rs. 15,000/- was further awarded for mental agony; Rs. 2000/- was also awarded for funeral expenses. Thus, the total compensation of Rs. 4,01,000/- was awarded with interest @ 6% per annum. There is no dispute that Ex.-9 Salary Certificate which was issued by Rekha Jangid has not been proved and in absence of any other evidence, the Tribunal disbelieved the said certificate. The job of deceased was private on the wooden shop. The Tribunal assessed the monthly income of Rs. 3000/- which appears to be just and reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In fact the Tribunal has applied the multiplier of 17 on the basis of age of the deceased, whereas it is settled law that where the claimants are parents then the multiplier is adopted on the basis of age of the claimants. Therefore, the Tribunal has already awarded more compensation by adopting the multiplier of 17 in the present case. The Tribunal has also awarded interest @ 6% p.a. on the amount of compensation. 5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty and Another { (2003) 7 SCC 197 } has held that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall for the victim. Statutory provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be "just" and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit but the same should not be a pittance. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of "just" compensation which is the pivotal consideration. The expression "just" denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness and non-arbitrariness. Para 15 of the judgment is as under: "It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal constituted under the Act as provided in Section 168 is required to make an award determining the amount of compensation which to it appears to be 'just'. It has to be borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales. Bodily injury is nothing but a deprivation which entitles the claimant to damages. The quantum of damages fixed should be in accordance to the injury. An injury may bring about many consequences like loss of earning capacity, loss of mental pleasure and many such consequential losses. Bodily injury is nothing but a deprivation which entitles the claimant to damages. The quantum of damages fixed should be in accordance to the injury. An injury may bring about many consequences like loss of earning capacity, loss of mental pleasure and many such consequential losses. A person becomes entitled to damages for the mental and physical loss, his or her life may have been shortened or that he or she cannot enjoy life which has been curtailed because of physical handicap. The normal expectation of life is impaired. But at the same time it has be to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a wind fall for the victim. Statutory provisions clearly indicate the compensation must be "just" and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit but the same should not be a pittance. The Courts and Tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be "just" compensation is a vexed question. There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of "just" compensation which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression "which appears to it to be just" a wide discretion is vested on the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness. The expression "just" denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness, and nonarbitrary. If it is not so it cannot be just." 6. In view of above discussion, I find that the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal in the present case is just and reasonable and the same does not call for any interference by this Court. 7. I have also examined the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, wherein the appellant has explained the delay as under: "1. That the appellants have filed the above noted appeal before this Hon'ble Court for enhancement of the award amount awarded by learned Tribunal. 2. 7. I have also examined the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, wherein the appellant has explained the delay as under: "1. That the appellants have filed the above noted appeal before this Hon'ble Court for enhancement of the award amount awarded by learned Tribunal. 2. That the appellants are poor and illiterate persons and no body to look after their families. 3. That the appellants could not arrange finance in time for filing the appeal before this Hon'ble Court. After arranging money from their relatives, they approached from their counsel to file an appeal. 4. That the delay caused in filing the appeal is not deliberate but bonafide one and same is liable to be condoned in the interest of justice. 5. That the other grounds would be urged at the time of arguments." 8. The aforesaid paras make it clear that in-fact there is no explanation whatsoever for delay in filing the appeal. In these circumstances, I do not find any sufficient ground to condone the delay also in filing the appeal. The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is, accordingly, dismissed. 9. In view of above, the appeal is dismissed being barred by limitation as well as on merits also.Appeal Dismissed. *******