Judgment :- 1. Petitioner, the President of the elected committee of the third respondent society, challenges Ext.P7 issued by the first respondent on 24-10-2007 appointing the second respondent administrator under Section 33(1) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, the "Act", for short, on the ground that the committee has lost the quorum prescribed by Clause 15.6 of its bye-laws, following the arrest of a committee member Sri. Babychan in connection with a murder case and the committee had not met after 7-4-2007 which was the last valid meeting of the committee. 2. Thebye-laws of the society provide for a committee with nine members. Following the election on 15-12-2003, five persons were elected to the committee and they took charge on that day. A copy of the bye-laws is placed before me during arguments and put to the parties. Clause 15.6 of the byelaws reads as follows: "15.6 The Board of Directors shall meet, once in every month as often as necessary to conduct the affairs of the Society. The quorum for such meeting shall be 5." 3. According to the petitioner, a meeting was held on 1-5-2007 and thereafter, on 31-10-2007, after the admittedly valid meeting on 7-4-2007 and the meetings on 1-5-2007 and 31-10-2007 were attended by all the members of the committee, including Sri. Babychan and therefore, the impugned action are unsustainable. 4. In opposition, Ext.R1(a) is produced along with the counter affidavit of the first respondent whereby the Circle Inspector of Police, Kuthiyathodu has addressed the first respondent on 14-8-2007 stating that Sri. Babychan was arrested at 5.30 a.m. on 1-5-2007. On the strength of that document, the first respondent contends that though the records of the society would show that Resolution No.12 was drawn up on 1-5-2007 requesting the State Co-operative Election Commission to appoint an electoral officer and a returning officer for the purpose of bye-election to the existing four vacancies, such resolution is a fraudulent one since Sri. Babychan could not have participated after his arrest, recorded to be at 5.30 a.m. Regarding the meeting on 31-10-2007, the plea of the first respondent is that the said meeting was held at Vaikom, away from the area of operation of the society. 5. Babychan could not have participated after his arrest, recorded to be at 5.30 a.m. Regarding the meeting on 31-10-2007, the plea of the first respondent is that the said meeting was held at Vaikom, away from the area of operation of the society. 5. Themeeting of 31-10-2007, according to the version of the petitioner, was held in Vaikom because of the directions contained in the bail order of Babychan interdicting him from entering the area of Alappuzha District. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the last meeting having been held on 7-4-2007, going by the prescription in the bye-laws that the Board of Directors shall meet once in every month, the situation that could lead to any action under Section 33(1) of the Act on the ground that committee failed to hold its regular meeting consecutively for six months can occur only if no meeting was held in October, 2007 and because, a meeting was held on 31-10-2007, that provision is not violated. He cited the decision of the Delhi High Court in Daryodh Singh v. Union of India (AIR 1973 Delhi 58) and that of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Kali v. Sia Ram (AIR 1978 Allahabad 546) dilating on the term "month", with reference to the provisions of the General Clauses Act. Abdul Latif v. Commissioner Gorakhpur (AIR 1968 Allahabad 44) was referred, to emphasize that an opportunity of explanation ought to have been granted on the facts and circumstances of the case in hand and also that the concept of the term "month" has to be construed by treating it as the calender month. 7. Thelearned Government Pleader, on the other hand, argued that the alleged meeting on 1-5-2007 cannot be believed on the face of Ext.R1(a) and counting from 8-4-2007, no other meeting was, indisputably, held before 7-4-2007 and hence, Ext.P7 decision is in order. 8. In paragraph 2 of the counter affidavit on behalf of the first respondent, the provision in Clause 15.6 of the bye-laws, as quoted above, is reiterated to state that "as per bye-law clause 15.6, the Board of Directors shall meet once in every month or as often as necessary to conduct the affairs of the society." 9. The meeting of 7-4-2007 having been held in the month of April, the statutory prescription contained in Section 33(1) requires to be examined. The meeting of 7-4-2007 having been held in the month of April, the statutory prescription contained in Section 33(1) requires to be examined. The said provision enjoins that where, among other things, the committee fails to hold its regular meeting "consecutively" for "six months", the Registrar may act in terms of that provision. The word "month" is not defined in the Act. Reference has, therefore, to be made to the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125 (Act 7/25), Section 2 (22) of which reads as follows: "The month shall mean a month reckoned according to the British Calender." 10. With or without the support of the decisions referred to on behalf of the petitioner, it can be safely concluded that the term "month" and the words "six months" in Section 33(1) mean "month" or "six months" as per the British Calender. The word "consecutively" is different from the term "continuously". "Consecution" is a train of consequences; a series of things that follow one another; succession of similar intervals in harmony. "Consecutive" is the adjective form of consecution and it means, "following in regular order or one after another; expressing consequence. Therefore, a regular period of a month understood as defined in the General Clauses Act has to consecutively occur for six times to attain the status "consecutively for six months" enjoined by Section 33(1) of the Act. Hence, if a meeting is held in a month reckoned according to the British Calender, the meeting for the next consecutive month can be held on any day in the next month reckoned as per the British Calender and in so calculating, if a meeting has been held in a particular month, the vice of Section 33(1) of the Act would be attracted only on failure to hold a meeting on any of the days of its 6th consecutive month. Hence, a meeting having been, indisputably held on 7-4-2007, i.e. in April, 2007, Section 33(1) can be invoked on the case in hand only if no meeting was held till the end of October, 2007, i.e. 31-10-2007. Therefore, the issuance of the impugned Ext.P7 order on 24-10-2007, i.e., before the expiry of six months, is without jurisdiction and is, hence, void. 11. Therefore, the issuance of the impugned Ext.P7 order on 24-10-2007, i.e., before the expiry of six months, is without jurisdiction and is, hence, void. 11. The question whether a meeting was actually held on 31-10-2007 or not, is of no consequence to decide the sustainability of Ext.P7, though there is nothing on record in the counter affidavits whereby the meeting of 31-10-2007 is not disputed, but is criticized only as having been held away from the area of operation of the society. 12. For the conclusions arrived at as above, this writ petition is entitled to succeed. In the result, this writ petition is allowed quashing Ext.P7. All necessary consequences shall follow. The Administrator shall forthwith hand over charge to the committee which was in office as on 24-10-2007. No costs.