JUDGMENT By the Court.—The petitioner was posted as Additional District Judge, Rampur. A charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner in which it was alleged that the petitioner granted bail in a case under Sections 307 and 302 Indian Penal Code against all judicial norms and propriety and for extraneous consideration, knowing that the accused Chotey Mian alias Zaki Mian was named in the prompt first information report of a broad day light double murder case and he was also named as assailant in the dying declaration of Achhan Khan, one of the deceased of this incident and thus the petitioner failed to maintain absolute integrity and complete devotion to duty. The petitioner submitted a reply dated 29.1.2002 denying the charges. In the enquiry proceedings that followed the statement of Faisular Rahman, the complainant was recorded in support of the case of the department. The charged officer also examined three defence witnesses, namely, DW-1 Satish Chandra A.D.G.C. (Criminal), DW-2 Dr. D.K. Dubey, DW-3 Sudhir Sharan Kapoor, D.G.C. (Criminal). The inquiry judge submitted a report dated 1.12.2001 in which he found the charge to be partly proved. The conclusion recorded by the learned inquiry judge may be quoted in his own words : “The charge is partly proved. This was not a case for grant of bail. There is no direct evidence of exercise of extraneous consideration for grant of bail but possibility of exercising discretion to grant bail on extraneous consideration cannot be ruled out”. 2. The enquiry report was accepted by the Full Court and a resolution dated 16.11.2002 was passed accepting the inquiry report and directing that two increments of the charged officer with cumulative effect be withheld—a major punishment. The decision of the Full Court was communicated by a letter of the Registrar dated 27.11.2002. It appears that in the order of punishment, which was communicated to the petitioner by the letter of the Joint Registrar the date from which the punishment was intended to be effective had not been disclosed. Sri Amit Sthalkar learned Standing Counsel for the High Court states that thereafter the matter was again placed before the Full Court and a resolution was passed by the Full Court on 6.9.2003 that the punishment would be effective from the date the order was passed. This fact was communicated to the petitioner by a letter of the Joint Registrar dated 23.10.2003. This fact was communicated to the petitioner by a letter of the Joint Registrar dated 23.10.2003. The petitioner has challenged the order of punishment. 3. We have heard Sri Ashok Khare, senior Advocate and Sri V.K. Goel, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Amit Sthalkar, learned Standing Counsel for the High Court. 4. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even on the findings recorded by the learned inquiry judge the charge could not be found to have been proved even partly and no order of punishment could be passed against the petitioner. The learned inquiry Judge has found that it was not a case for grant of bail and that there was no direct evidence of exercise of extraneous consideration for grant of bail but possibility of exercising discretion to grant bail on extraneous consideration cannot be ruled out. Before arriving at the conclusion above quoted the learned enquiry judge has outlined the circumstances in support of the conclusion arrived at in para 9 of the report which is quoted below : “The department has examined the complainant. He has stated that after grant of bail, he came to know that the District Judge had taken Rs. Five lakhs for getting bail application allowed by junior Judge. There is no inquiry against the District Judge. Sri Sathish Chandra ADGC (Criminal) and Sri Sudhir Sharan Kapoor, DGC (Criminal) who were examined by the charged officer as DW1 and DW2 have made statements that they had not heard any such rumours. There is no direct evidence in the. case that any amount of money was taken for getting favourable order on the bail application. However, in the circumstances of the case possibility of exercise of extraneous consideration while granting bail cannot be ruled out. These circumstances are as follows : (1) This was not a fit case for grant of bail. (2) It was a broad day light double murder case with prompt FIR. (3) There was a dying declaration and its veracity was neither doubted nor any reference to its veracity has been made in the bail order. (4) There is no contradiction in the FIR and the dying declaration. (5) Both the deceased had fire arm injuries that were cause of death. (3) There was a dying declaration and its veracity was neither doubted nor any reference to its veracity has been made in the bail order. (4) There is no contradiction in the FIR and the dying declaration. (5) Both the deceased had fire arm injuries that were cause of death. (6) The first bail was got dismissed as not pressed and on the next day second bail application was filed on the same grounds. (7) On one occasion the in-charge Session Judge had refused to consider this bail application on that ground that this is part heard by the District Judge. It is probable that bail application was allowed on considerations other than merit." 5. A judicial order is based on an assessment of circumstances and facts, which emerge from the evidence and unless there are circumstances to indicate that the order was passed on extraneous consideration the charge cannot be found to be proved even partly only on the basis that the order is erroneous. On a particular set of facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence two views may be possible and even though the facts and circumstances may point heavily in favour of one view the fact that the officer has taken the other view would not by itself be sufficient for holding that the officer has failed to maintain integrity or to show complete devotion to duty. Decided cases have held that the very fact that there is provision for successive appeals or revision against a judicial order indicates that possibility of erroneous order does exist. To punish an officer for passing an erroneous order would result in dampening of the spirit of fearlessness so essential for an independent exercise of judicial functions. In support of the contention the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions in P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P. and others, 2001 (6) SCC 491 ; Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana, 1988 (3) SCC 370 ; Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India and others, 1999 (7) SCC 409 ; Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court Allahabad and others, 2007 (4) SCC 247 and Desh Bhushan Jain v. State of U.P. and others, 2007 (4) AWC 3209 . In view of the aforesaid decisions we are of the opinion that the mere fact that an order is erroneous is not sufficient for coming to the conclusion that the officer has committed misconduct. 6. We have gone through the evidence of the witnesses recorded in the enquiry and have also perused the bail order and the dying declaration, which was produced before us by the learned Standing Counsel at the time of the hearing of the case to see what were the other circumstances to prove misconduct. We also proceed to examine whether the contention of the petitioner’s counsel that on the circumstances of the case enumerated in para 9 of the enquiry report the conclusion that the charge was partly proved is totally unwarranted. Only one witness was examined on behalf of the department, namely, the complainant Faisulur Rahman. He has stated that he had heard about three or four days before the bail was heard by the charged officer that a sum of Rs. 5 lacs had been paid to the District Judge and that the District Judge had promised to get the bail granted by some junior officer. In the cross-examination he admitted that he had not seen money being passed on to the District Judge and that his statement was based on rumours, floating in the kutchery. The charged officer has also examined the D.W. 1 Satish Chandra Additional District Government Counsel (Criminal). He has stated that there was no such rumour floating in the kutchery. The District Government Counsel (Criminal) Sri Sudhir Sharan Kapoor who had conducted the case on behalf of the department was examined as D.W. 3 and he also stated that there was no such rumour afloat. He has also stated that he was satisfied with the bail order which was passed on merits. Thus we find that apart from the rumour which is mere hearsay, referred to in the statement of the complainant that bribe was given to the District Judge and that he had promised to get the bail granted by a junior officer there is no other oral evidence against the petitioner. The ADGC, DW-1 and DGC, DW-3 who was conducting the case have denied that any such rumour was afloat. The learned enquiry Judge has also not given any such finding believing the version of the complainant that there was any such rumour afloat. The ADGC, DW-1 and DGC, DW-3 who was conducting the case have denied that any such rumour was afloat. The learned enquiry Judge has also not given any such finding believing the version of the complainant that there was any such rumour afloat. All that we are left with then are the inferences which can he drawn from the bail order or the material on the record of the bail proceedings. 7. It also appears from the enquiry report that a material fact, which has been noticed by the learned inquiry judge was that a vigilance enquiry was held against the District Judge and it was found that there was no material against him. In the circumstances the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in case the allegation of bribe levelled against the District Judge is ruled out there would have been no occasion for the District Judge to have instructed the charged officer to grant bail. We are of the view that this contention has merit. Moreover the bail application was granted on the same day on which it was transferred to the Court of the charged officer and the order appears to have been passed in open Court. The motive suggested by the complainant that the District Judge had accepted bribe and had promised to get the bail granted by a junior officer having been found, unfounded in the vigilance enquiry and the currency of the rumour having been denied by the ADGC and DGC who were produced as defence witnesses it is difficult to conclude that the District Judge had influenced the charged officer to grant bail. The inference that the order was passed on extraneous consideration would then have to be drawn from the order itself. 8. The learned inquiry judge has found that “it is probable that bail application was allowed on considerations other than merit” but the circumstances enumerated in para 9 of the report have been relied upon by him in support of the conclusion that possibility of exercise of extraneous consideration while granting bail cannot be ruled out. The learned inquiry judge has observed that the charged officer has only noticed the arguments of the counsel for the accused but has not recorded any findings. The learned inquiry judge has observed that the charged officer has only noticed the arguments of the counsel for the accused but has not recorded any findings. On this point the petitioner’s counsel drew our attention to the concluding portion of the bail order itself in which the charged officer has observed that no findings were being recorded on merits. It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was a practice in those days in the Courts in matters of grant of bail not to record any finding on merits as that could influence the trial. There appears to be some merit in this contention and while we are not holding that a prima facie finding need not be recorded in an order granting bail but we find that the charged officer has noted the arguments on behalf of the accused and though he has not expressed any opinion on merits as he has himself observed in the bail order but some of the arguments noted in the order do indicate the weakness of the prosecution case and also suggest that the FIR was ante timed. There are at least two such glaring circumstances referred to in the arguments noticed in the order. The first circumstance is that in the Parcha lash in the Form 13 the time at which the dead body was received in the police station was later to the time at• which the postmortem was held and the time of lodging of the FIR is not disclosed in the form. The submission was that the first information report was ante timed. The time of the dead body being brought to the police station has been given as 4.25 p.m. whereas the post-mortem of the deceased is shown to have been conducted at 2.45 p.m. The other glaring circumstance is that the incised wound, which was found upon the dead body of the deceased was not explained in the First Information Report. This was also one of the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the accused noticed in the bail order. The learned inquiry judge has found that it was not a fit case for bail as it was a broad day light double murder case with prompt FIR and there was a dying declaration and both the deceased had firearm injuries that were the cause of death. The learned inquiry judge has found that it was not a fit case for bail as it was a broad day light double murder case with prompt FIR and there was a dying declaration and both the deceased had firearm injuries that were the cause of death. As regards the prompt FIR the circumstances pointed out by the counsel for the accused suggested that the FIR was ante timed. Reliance has been placed by the inquiry judge upon the dying declaration, copy of which was produced by the learned Standing Counsel at the time of hearing. The learned enquiry judge has found that veracity of the dying declaration was neither doubtful nor any reference to its veracity has been made on the bail order. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to page 18 of the paper book of the petition which is a copy of one of the pages of the bail order and drew our attention to the contention of the accused regarding challenge to the veracity of the dying declaration noticed in the bail order. We also find that the dying declaration also does not disclose or explain the incised wound upon the body of the deceased. The dying declaration is a cryptic one of only two or three sentences. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the statement of D.W. 2 Dr. D.K. Dubey who had examined the deceased. In his statement D.W. 2 Dr. D.K. Dubey has stated in the enquiry that the bed head ticket contains an entry at 12.20 p.m. that the deceased was in a drowsy condition and his general condition was very low and pulse not palpable. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that these are intrinsic circumstances, which cast doubt upon the reliability of the dying declaration. We are not for a moment holding that the view taken by the Inquiry Judge that it was not a case for grant of bail is erroneous. That may be correct. All that we are holding is that even though the view taken by the charged officer may have been erroneous but in view of the circumstances pointed out in the bail order, it cannot be said that the order was perverse or so ridiculous that an inference of extraneous consideration in passing the order could be inferred. All that we are holding is that even though the view taken by the charged officer may have been erroneous but in view of the circumstances pointed out in the bail order, it cannot be said that the order was perverse or so ridiculous that an inference of extraneous consideration in passing the order could be inferred. Learned counsel for the petitioner also pointed out that subsequently the accused had been acquitted by another judge and the copy of the order has been filed along with a supplementary affidavit of the petitioner. Learned Standing Counsel submitted that the fact that the accused was subsequently acquitted, however, would not be determinative of the issue whether the officer had misconducted himself in granting bail. Learned Standing Counsel has relied upon V.R. Katarki v. State of Karnataka and others, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 267, in support of this contention. 9. The learned enquiry judge found that the first bail application was got dismissed as not pressed and on the next day second bail application was filed on the same grounds. It is sufficient to say that as that order of rejection was not on merits the charged officer was required to hear the second bail application on merits and it was not necessary for him to examine whether there were any fresh grounds. 10. The learned enquiry judge has also found that on one occasion the incharge District Judge had refused to consider the bail application on the ground that it was part heard of the District Judge. On this point the DGC D.W. 3 in answer to the question whether the case was part heard according to the order sheet and if this was pointed out to the charged officer, answered in the negative and also said that he had raised no such objection. Nothing has been brought to our notice to indicate that the application was marked part heard. Moreover it appears the application was transferred by the District Judge himself to the charged officer. In the circumstances we do not find any thing improper in the conduct of the charged officer in hearing the application. From these facts it appears that there were no intrinsic or other circumstances, which may indicate that the bail order passed by the charged officer was perverse or that no reasonable man could have passed such an order. In the circumstances we do not find any thing improper in the conduct of the charged officer in hearing the application. From these facts it appears that there were no intrinsic or other circumstances, which may indicate that the bail order passed by the charged officer was perverse or that no reasonable man could have passed such an order. Taking it that it was not a case for grant of bail that alone could not be the basis on which the charge could have been found to be even partly proved for which the officer could be punished. 11. In P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P. and others, 2001 (6) SCC 491 para 7, the Apex Court has held : "In the present case, though elaborate enquiry has been conducted by the enquiry officer, there is hardly any material worth the name forthcoming except to scrutinize each one of the orders made by the appellant on the judicial side to arrive at a different conclusion. That there was possibility on a given set of facts to arrive at a different conclusion is no ground to indict a judicial officer for taking one view and that too for alleged misconduct for that reason alone. The enquiry officer has not found any other material, which would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or devotion to duty or that he has been actuated by any corrupt motive. At best, he may say that the view taken by the appellant is not proper or correct and not attribute any motive to him which is for extraneous consideration that he had acted in that manner. If in every case where an order of a subordinate Court is found to be faulty a disciplinary action were to be initiated, the confidence of the subordinate judiciary will be shaken and the officers will be in constant fear of writing a judgment so as not to face a disciplinary enquiry and thus judicial officers cannot act independently or fearlessly. Indeed the words of caution are given in K.K. Dhawan case and A.N. Saxena case that merely because the order is wrong or the action taken could have been different does not warrant initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the judicial officer. In spite of such caution, it is unfortunate that the High Court has chosen to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant in this case." 12. In spite of such caution, it is unfortunate that the High Court has chosen to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant in this case." 12. In Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad and another, (2007) 4 SCC 247 , the Apex Court had occasion to consider its previous decision in Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of P & H, 1988 (3) SCC 370 ; K.P. Tiwari v. State of M.P., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 540; Kashi Nath Roy v. State of Bihar, 1996 (4) SCC 539 ; Alok Kumar Roy v. Dr. S.N. Sarma, AIR 1968 SC 453 and Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India, AIR 1999 SC 2881 . In paragraph 12 of Ramesh Chander Singh’s case it was held that : “This Court on several occasions has disapproved the practice of initiation of disciplinary proceedings against officers of the subordinate judiciary merely because the judgments/orders passed by them are wrong. The appellate and revisional Courts have been established and given powers to set aside such orders. The higher Courts after hearing the appeal may modify or set aside erroneous judgments of the lower Courts. While taking disciplinary action based on judicial orders, the High Court must take extra care and caution." 13. In paragraph 18 of Ramesh Chander Singh’s case the Apex Court observed in reference to bail order granted in that case as follows : "The fact that it was a case of daylight murder wherein two persons died, is not adequate to hold that the accused were not entitled to bail at all. Passing order on a bail application is a matter of discretion, which is exercised by a judicial officer with utmost responsibility." 14. We may now refer to the cases cited by Sri Amit Sthalkar. In State v. Eslian alias Jothi Basu, (2006) 9 SCC 785 , it was held that the High Court in that case had erred in granting bail without assigning reasons. In Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. and another, (2004) 7 SCC 525 , the apex Court held that it is necessary to give reasons for prima facie concluding why bail is being granted. The Apex Court in that case held that the High Court’s order showed complete non-application of mind. In Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. and another, (2004) 7 SCC 525 , the apex Court held that it is necessary to give reasons for prima facie concluding why bail is being granted. The Apex Court in that case held that the High Court’s order showed complete non-application of mind. In Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh and others, (2002) 3 SCC 598 , it was held that bail could not be granted as a matter of course and an order for bail be left of cogent reason cannot be sustained. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. N.C.T. Delhi and another, AIR 2001 SC 1444 , it was held that the jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. It was a case of anticipatory; bail. In Puran v. Rambilas and another, (2001) 6 SCC 338 , it was held that at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case was not required to be done but that did not mean that while granting bail some reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted were not to be indicated. In Gurucharan Singh v. State Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC 179 , it was held that the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed amongst other factors would have to be considered. The cases cited by the learned Standing Counsel for the High Court lay down the principles for grant of bail. An emphasis is made on the fact that reasons are required to be given and the order must indicate application of mind. If bail is granted without observing those principles it may be said that the order granting bail passed by the judicial officer is erroneous. None of the cases cited by the learned Standing Counsel are upon the point as to when misconduct on the part of the judicial officer can be inferred from an erroneous order. The cases cited are therefore distinguishable. 15. In the present case all that can be said against the charged officer in regard to the bail order passed by him is that the said order was erroneous. From this fact alone the charge cannot be even partly proved. 16. The cases cited are therefore distinguishable. 15. In the present case all that can be said against the charged officer in regard to the bail order passed by him is that the said order was erroneous. From this fact alone the charge cannot be even partly proved. 16. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The punishment resolved by the Full Court dated 16.11.2002 and as clarified on 6.9.2003 communicated to the petitioner by letters dated 27.11.2002 and 23.10.2003 of the Joint Registrar is quashed. ————