( 1 ) CRIMINAL petition No. 179 of 2008 has been filed to quash DVC No. 7 of 2007 on the file of the Court of IX-Metropolitan magistrate, Cyberabad, Kukatpally at miyapur, Ranga Reddy District. ( 2 ) CRIMINAL Petition No. 7311 of 2007 has been filed to quash the tentative order dated 16-8-2007 passed in the said case. ( 3 ) THE factual background is that DVC no. 7 of 2007 was filed by the first respondent herein against the petitioner herein as well as the petitioner's son, who is the husband of the first respondent. The first respondent claimed in the said petition that she was legal wedded to petitioner's son on 6-3-2003 at which time her father gave a dowry of rs. 7,00,000/- apart from gold jewellery etc. The first respondent claimed that she joined the petitioner's son in the matrimonial home after the marriage but she was being harassed by the petitioner, his wife and his other son for additional dowry and she was subjected to cruelty and mental agony. The first respondent also alleges about further incidents at the matrimonial home and she claimed that she was ultimately taken by her husband to her grand parents house near Palakole, west Godavari District, on the christmas day of 2004 and was left there. The first respondent further claimed that on her report, the Court referred to the police and C. C. No. 662 of 2006 was filed under sections 498-A, 406and 506 of Indian Penal code as well as the provisions of Dowry prohibition Act. The first respondent further claimed that she was not being allowed to enter into the house purchased by her husband where they were living till she was dropped at her grand parents house and she claimed a right of residence in the said house and right to get Rs. 5,000/- per month towards maintenance etc. , and filed the petition for directions to provide shelter to her in the said family house, to provide maintenance at Rs. 5,000/- per month to her from December 2005, to restrain the petitioner herein and his son from alienating the said house property, to direct them to return the dowry paid in cash, gold etc. , and to direct them to provide medical facilities to her. 5,000/- per month to her from December 2005, to restrain the petitioner herein and his son from alienating the said house property, to direct them to return the dowry paid in cash, gold etc. , and to direct them to provide medical facilities to her. ( 4 ) ON such petition, orders were passed on 16-8-2007 by the trial Court granting certain reliefs styled as temporary till the disposal of the main petition. The trial Court said in the impugned order that after the case was filed directly by the first respondent herein the matter was referred to the protection Officer who inquired into the same and filed a domestic incident report. The court noted that after going through the contents of the report cognizance was taken and notice were served on the petitioner herein. The mother of the husband was stated to have assured on receiving the notices to inform her son. The husband was noted to have not appeared before the Court, which proceeded to consider the matter by taking recourse to Rule 12 of statutory rules under which it presumed the service on the mother to be sufficient service on the husband. The trial Court referred to the detailed counter filed by the petitioner denying all the allegations of the first respondent and formulated specific points on the entitlement of the first respondent to have a shelter, maintenance, restraint order against alienation of the house property, return of dowry and gold ornaments and claim for medical expenses. The trial Court concluded that as the first respondent was out of possession of shared house since December 2005, she cannot claim any physical shelter in the said house but can be granted alternative relied under Section 19 (f) by getting rents paid by the respondents. The trial Court also took into account that the husband, a Software Engineer working abroad has sufficient income to maintain his wife and also observed that the house property purchased under a registered sale deed dated 5-8-2004 has to be made the subject of the restraint order under Section 19 being the shared house hold. The trial court left the question of the right of the first respondent for return of dowry to be determined after elaborate enquiry in the main petition but not at this stage. Consequently it granted reliefs of payment of Rs. The trial court left the question of the right of the first respondent for return of dowry to be determined after elaborate enquiry in the main petition but not at this stage. Consequently it granted reliefs of payment of Rs. 5,000/- per month as rent by the respondents payment of Rs. 5,000/- per month as maintenance by the respondents and restraint against the respondents from alienating the house property temporarily till the disposal of the main petition. ( 5 ) THE petitioner challenged the said order in Criminal Petition No. 7311 of 2007 on the ground that the acts of domestic violence alleged were allegedly committed much before the commencement of the statute, which came into force in October 2006 without any retrospective effect. The petitioner also contended the order to be without giving any opportunity to his son, who is admittedly in U. S. A. and had no notice of this petition, apart from the order being in violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner also contended that the impugned order was also passed against him, which is sought to be enforced under section 31 of the Act, while in fact he is unemployed and is being maintained by his second son. He also claimed to be having no contact with the husband of the first respondent and contended that the tentative order has no legs to stand. ( 6 ) THE petitioner later filed Criminal petition No. 179 of 2008 further contending that the same Court, which is trying C. C. No. 662 of 2006, cannot grant the relied in dvc No. 7 of 2007 and reiterating the grounds raised in the other criminal petition, the petitioner sought for quashing the same. ( 7 ) SMT. C. Jayashree Sarathy, the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the specific provisions of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which came into force from 26-10-2006 only and made specific reference to the definition of domestic Violence apart from the other definitions and relied on the decision of this court in Crl. P. No. 3714 of 2007 and 2-8-2007 to contend that on the very allegations in the main petition by the first respondent about events that happened prior to coming into force of the Act, this petition on any such events cannot be maintained, as the Act has no retrospective effect. P. No. 3714 of 2007 and 2-8-2007 to contend that on the very allegations in the main petition by the first respondent about events that happened prior to coming into force of the Act, this petition on any such events cannot be maintained, as the Act has no retrospective effect. The learned Counsel also referred to the decision in P. Mahendran and others v. State of Karnataka and others (1) AIR 1990 SC 405 , referring to the well settled rule of construction that every statute or statutory rule is prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. The learned counsel further referred to the decision in c. R. P. No. 3354 of 2007 dated 20-12-2007 wherein it was held that sine qua non for an order under Section 19 is an application under Section 12 before the Magistrate and that the Magistrate has to satisfy himself before passing an order under Section 19 that domestic violence has taken place. The learned Counsel contended that in any view no order against the petitioner could have been granted in respect of any relief claimed by the first respondent herein. ( 8 ) SMT. V. Dyumani, the learned Counsel for the first respondent defended the maintainability of DVC No. 7 of 2007 before the trial Court as being one for reliefs of residence, maintenance, medical expenses and restraint from alienating the shared households all of which relate to what is continuing in respect of the first respondent vis-a-vis her matrimonial life with the husband by way of economic abuse, within the meaning of domestic violence as defined in the Act irrespective of the events that happened prior to the commencement of the act. The learned Counsel therefore asserted that the first respondent is entitled to claim such reliefs from the Court and also defended granting of such temporary reliefs pending the main petition by the trial Court. ( 9 ) IT is true that Section 1 (3) of the protection of Women from Domestic Violence act, 2005 made the statute come into force from the appointed date as per gazette notification by the Central Government and that such Gazette Notification was issued by the Central Government on 17-10-2006 bringing the Act into force from 26-10-2006. Neither Section 1 nor any other provisions directly or indirectly indicates any retrospective effect to the provisions of the statute. Neither Section 1 nor any other provisions directly or indirectly indicates any retrospective effect to the provisions of the statute. The decision in Criminal petition no. 3714 of 2007 has therefore decided that the acts of domestic violence that had taken place on or after 26-10-2006 alone can be the subject of the proceedings under the Act. For the purpose of these two petitions, it may not be necessary to go into the question as to whether, in the absence of any retrospective operation of the Act not stated expressly or by necessary implication under any provision of the statute, the provisions of the act can be retroactive in relation to any continuing events amounting to domestic violence as defined under Section 3 of the act, which is a question that deserve consideration and decision in an appropriate case. The same needs no expression of opinion herein, as the first respondent claims herein to be prohibited from having shelter in the shared household before and after coming into force of the Act and even after filing of the petition. She also claims to be deprived of any economic resources to which she is entitled under law or custom payable even other wise under the order of the Court by way of liability of the husband to maintain her both before and after the Act up-to-date. Such deprivation and prohibition fall within the meaning of clauses (a) and (c)respectively of economic abuse as defined in explanation- I Section 3 (iv) of the Act. Section 3 defining domestic violence for the purposes of this Act includes any act or omission or commission or conduct of the respondent as constituting domestic violence in case of any harm or injury to the aggrieved person including economic abuse. While not going into the truth or otherwise oft the allegations made by the first respondent at different stages, it has to be noted that ex-fade her allegations constituted allegations of economic abuse amounting to domestic violence committed by the petitioner and his son before and after commencement of the act also and continuing upto-date. While not going into the truth or otherwise oft the allegations made by the first respondent at different stages, it has to be noted that ex-fade her allegations constituted allegations of economic abuse amounting to domestic violence committed by the petitioner and his son before and after commencement of the act also and continuing upto-date. Therefore, irrespective of any retrospective or retroactive effect to the provisions of this act, the continuing state of affairs since the date of the Act coming into force concerning the absence of maintenance and prohibition from entering into the shared household in respect of the first respondent ex-facie make her have the required cause of action for pursuing a remedy under Section 12 of the act for obtaining necessary orders or reliefs. As such, the request to quash DVC No. 7 of 2007 on the ground of the same being based solely on acts of domestic violence prior to the Act has not force. ( 10 ) THE reliefs claimed in the petition to provide shelter, maintenance and medical facilities and not alienating the shared household are reliefs sought in-presenti and not reliefs relating to the post only and can be safely considered by the trial Court in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the statute. That these proceedings are available to the first respondent irrespective of the pendency of any criminal case under section 498-A IPC etc. , or any civil proceedings is evident from Section 26 of the act, which Smt. Jayashree Sarathy in her usual fairness brought to the notice of this court. Section 26 makes it clear that any relief available under Section 18 to 22 of the act can be also sought before a civil Court or family Court or Criminal Court, whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of the Act. Sub-Section (2) of Section 26 makes it clear that any relief may be so sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that may be sought for in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or criminal Court. Sub-Section (2) of Section 26 makes it clear that any relief may be so sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that may be sought for in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or criminal Court. That only obligation placed on the aggrieved person is that the information of such other proceedings should be given to the Magistrate concerned, with the proceeding under this act, DVC No. 7 of 2007 a copy of which is available, makes it clear that it informed the magistrate about pendency of C. C. No. 662 of 2006 regarding the same matrimonial disputes. ( 11 ) WHILE so upholding the jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain DVC No. 7 of 2007, it has to be further seen whether the order passed on 16-8-2007 can be sustained. ( 12 ) THE order in question directed the petitioner herein also to pay rent and maintenance of Rs. 5,000/- each per month to the first respondent but the order itself is not explanatory as to on what grounds or under what provisions or principles, the father-in-law was mad liable to pay such amount. The learned Magistrate found on point No. 2 that the husband earning sufficiently as Software engineer abroad has to maintain the wife in view of admitted relationship and made no reference to any liability for the father-in-law to provide such maintenance. While his conclusion that the shared household shall remain unalienated until final disposal of this petition may be exceptionable and while he did not give any finding about the liability of the respondents before him to return any dowry or any other articles the discussion itself shows that the shared household is one purchased and owned by the husband alone under a registered sale deed dated 5-8-2004. While the Magistrate also noted that the first respondent is admittedly out of possession of the shared house since December 2003, he did not whisper a word about how the father-in-law could be responsible for the first respondent being out of possession of the shared household exclusively belonging to the son. As to how the father-in-law was sued for providing sufficient rent to the daughter-in-law is inexplicable and these directions to the father-in-law appear to be unsustainable. As to how the father-in-law was sued for providing sufficient rent to the daughter-in-law is inexplicable and these directions to the father-in-law appear to be unsustainable. While the petitioner herein has no alienable interest in the shared household, the alienation of which is restrained by the orders in question, if he is not subjected to any of the interim directions for the foregoing reasons, his grievance should stand sufficiently redressed. Insofar as the directions that may continue to be in force against the husband, the first respondent in DVC No. 7 of 2007 are concerned, probably, the petitioner herein cannot make any grievance of the same as he specifically pleaded herein that he has nothing to do with the husband of the first respondent with whom he is not in contact and that he is being maintained by his second son, as he is now unemployed. It is open to the first respondent in the main DVC to take care of himself and pursue appropriate remedies against the directions impugned in the criminal Petition No. 7311 of 2007 and it is suffice for protecting the interest of the petitioner herein to have the directions against him set aside. ( 13 ) FOR the same reasons, there is no need to further probe into the question whether the special statute provides or not the scope for any temporary directions pending disposal of the main petition and any expression of opinion on such uncalled for issues may be prejudicial to the rights of the first respondent's husband vis-a-vis the first respondent. ( 14 ) THEREFORE, the challenge to the maintainability of the main DVC should fall but the interim directions insofar as the petitioner is concerned should be set aside and the matter be decided herein without any expression of any opinion about the disputes between wife and husband. One more aspect, which of course has to be tackled before the matter is disposed of is that the trial Court dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner herein on the ground of ill-health and treated that there was no evidence for the petitioner herein and posted the main matter for arguments. The matter probably would have been disposed of, there been no interim direction given by this Court pending this criminal petition, without any opportunity to the petitioner herein to place his version before the Court. The matter probably would have been disposed of, there been no interim direction given by this Court pending this criminal petition, without any opportunity to the petitioner herein to place his version before the Court. The petitioner having been impleaded as the second respondent in the petition undoubtedly has the right to have himself heard and oral and documentary evidence produced by him before the trial Court which is all the more necessary as the husband-first respondent in DVC was admittedly not served with the notice of DVC and as it is not known whether the mother served with the notice or the father who claims to be not in contact, were able to communicate to their son regarding the reliefs sought for by the daughter-in-law. It is all the more necessary for the petitioner to have an opportunity of placing his evidence before the Court in view of the positive allegations made against him, his wife and the second son concerning the domestic violence to which the first respondent was subjected to, which alone will provide cause of action and the right to have recourse to the special statute. Therefore, while disposing of the criminal petitions in the manner indicated above, the trial Court should be directed to provide reasonable opportunity to the petitioner herein to place his evidence before the Court closing any such evidence and hearing the arguments for disposal of the petition on merits. ( 15 ) IN the result, the Criminal Petition 179 of 2008 is dismissed and Criminal Petition no. 7311 of 2007 is allowed in respect of the petitioner alone quashing the orders of 9th metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad, kukatpally at Miyapur in DVC No. 7 of 2007 dated 16-8-2007 to the extent of directing the petitioner herein to pay the rent of rs. 5,000/- per month or the maintenance of rs. 5,000/- per month from 23-4-2007. 7311 of 2007 is allowed in respect of the petitioner alone quashing the orders of 9th metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad, kukatpally at Miyapur in DVC No. 7 of 2007 dated 16-8-2007 to the extent of directing the petitioner herein to pay the rent of rs. 5,000/- per month or the maintenance of rs. 5,000/- per month from 23-4-2007. The trial Court shall give every opportunity to the petitioner herein to produce any oral and documentary evidence, which he desires to produce before the trial Court, during further enquiry into DVC No. 7 of 2007 on its file and then alone proceed to determine the case on merits in accordance with law and it is also made clear that any observations made in this order are purely confined to the determination of these petitions and they shall not have any effect on the determination of DVC No. 7 of 2007 on merits. Criminal Petition is dismissed