JUDGMENT T. Nanda Kumar Singh, J. 1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 11.8.1999 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nagaon in Title Appeal No. 8 of 1998 dismissing the appeal and affirming the judgment and decree dated 28.1.1998 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Nagaon in Title Suit No. 78 of 1989/231 of 1993. Both the 1st appellate Court and the trial Court made concurrent findings of fact that the appellant plaintiff has no right and title over the suit land described in Schedule A to the plaint and the suit houses described in Schedule B to the plaint. 2. The present second appeal is admitted on the substantial question of law formulated at the time of the admission, of the appeal which reads as follows : 1. Whether the Courts below erred in law in interpreting the decision in Title Suit No. 4/46 and decide the suit in question 3. Heard Mr. B. K. Goswami, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. T. Goswami, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Mr. K. Pathak, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents-defendants. 4. The appellant-plaintiff filed the Title Suit No. 78 of 89 & 231 of 1993 against the respondents-defendants for declaration that the plaintiff is the absolute and exclusive owner of the suit land described in Schedule A to the plaint and the suit houses described in Schedule-B to the plaint and also for khas possession of the suit land and suit houses by evicting the principal-defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and their men/agents. The pleaded case of the appellant-plaintiff in the plaint of the Title Suit No. 78/89 & 231/93 of the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 1, Nagaon are that the suit land comprising of 41/4 Lecha covered by Dag No. 1562 (old 1185) of the periodic patta No. 676 (old 116) of the Town Nagar Kissan under the Town Mouza of Nagaon District and the suit houses mentioned in Schedule-'B' constructed on the suit land described in Schedule-A were originally belonged to the proforma-defendant No. 4, Md. Anowar Rahman and proforma defendant No. 5, Md. Hamidur Rahman and they had been in possession of the suit properties. The houses described in Schedule-B to the plaint were let out to the proforma defendant No. 6, 7 and 8 (Md. Abdul Rasid, Md. Abdul Harnid and Md. Anowar Rahman and proforma defendant No. 5, Md. Hamidur Rahman and they had been in possession of the suit properties. The houses described in Schedule-B to the plaint were let out to the proforma defendant No. 6, 7 and 8 (Md. Abdul Rasid, Md. Abdul Harnid and Md. Samsuddin) and they were running the shoe shop in the name and style "O.K. Shoe Store". On 28.8.77, the proforma defendant Nos. 6, 7 and 8 closed the shop and left the houses and the proforma defendant Nos. 4 and 5 brought the houses under their occupation. 5. The appellant-plaintiff is also dealing with shoes at a shop known as "Janata Shoe House" adjacent to the said shop i.e. 0. K. Shoe Store. The proforma respondent Nos. 4 and 5 had agreed to sell the suit land and the suit houses to the appellant-plaintiff and accordingly a sale deed was drawn up on 1.9.1997 for a consideration amount of Rs. 9,700/-. However, the appellant-plaintiff was not ready to pay the said consideration amount on 1.9.1997. But on 22.12.1997, the appellant-plaintiff paid the said consideration amount to the proforma defendant No. 4 and 5 and the said sale deed was also registered on 22.11.1977 (exhibit-3). Accordingly, the appellant plaintiff became the owner of the suit properties i.e. Schedule-A and Schedule-B. Further, it is pleaded that the vendors put the appellant-plaintiff in possession of the suit land. Furnitures and the shop materials of "O.K. Store" of the proforma defendants Nos. 6, 7 and 8 which were under the custody of the proforma-defendant No. 4 and 5 were also purchased by the appellant-plaintiff for a consideration amount of Rs. 19,000/- on the same day i.e. on 22.12.1977 and the proforma defendant Nos. 6, 7 and 8 also issued a receipt and handed over those articles to the appellant-plaintiff on 22.12.1977. Thereafter, the appellant-plaintiff opened the shop on the suit land on 28.12.1977. hi the evening of that day at about 7.30 P.M. the principal defendant Nos. 1 and 2 who were the wife and husband respectively appeared in the new shop of the appellant-plaintiff and continued to overstay and refused to left the shop. It is also pleaded in the plaint that in the next morning the appellant-plaintiff informed one Nadir Bose and some other leading men of the locality. They sat in "mel" wherein the principal defendant Nos. It is also pleaded in the plaint that in the next morning the appellant-plaintiff informed one Nadir Bose and some other leading men of the locality. They sat in "mel" wherein the principal defendant Nos. 1 and 2 ultimately agreed to quit the suit properties forthwith but they behaved otherwise after the "mel" was over and they did not move out of the suit properties i.e. Schedule 'A' and Schedule 'B'. 6. The appellant-plaintiff further pleaded in the plaint that a case i.e. G.R. Case No. 3467/77 under Section 144 of the CrPC was initiated against the principal-defendant Nos. 1 and 2. In the said proceeding principal defendant No. 3, Sri Bhupati Bhusan Dey impleaded himself as a party and pleaded that principal defendant No. 3, Bhupati Bhusan Dey was/is the absolute owner of suit properties i.e. Schedule-A and Schedule-B. Principal-defendant No. 3 further pleaded that principal defendant No. 1 and 2 are in possession of the suit properties as his tenants under a deed of lease executed by him in favour of the principal-defendant No. 1. 7. The principal defendant No. 3, Bhupati Bhusan Dey filed written statement. In his written statement it is specifically pleaded that the suit properties were originally belonged to one Faizur Rahman and Habibur Rahman. Faizur Rahman and Habibur Rahman filed a title suit being Case No. 4/46 against the proforma defendant No. 4 Atowar Rahman and proforma defendant No. 5 Hamidur Rahman and some other in respect of the present suit land for a decree for declaration that Faizur Rahman and Habibur Rahman are the owners of the suit land i.e. the present suit land in the court of Sub Judge, Nagaon. The learned Sub Judge, Nagaon dismissed the Title Suit No. 4 of 1946. Faizur Rahman and Habibur Rahman being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the Sub Judge passed in Title Suit No. 4 of 1946 preferred an appeal being FA No. 17 of 1949 before this Court and this Court allowed the appeal and decreed the Title Suit No. 4 of 1946 in favour of Faizur Rahman and Habibur Rahman declaring that Faizur Rahman and Habibur Rahman have the ownership title and interest over the suit land i.e. the present suit land vide judgment and decree dated 22.6.1953 which was exhibited as exhibit-Ga. Against the judgment and decree of this Court dated 22.6.1953 proforma defendant No. 4 Md. Against the judgment and decree of this Court dated 22.6.1953 proforma defendant No. 4 Md. Atowar Rahman and the proforma defendant No. 5, Md. Habibur Rahman filed an appeal being Civil Appeal No. 266/56 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the appeal No. 266 of 1956 by affirming the judgment and decree of this Court dated 22.6.1953 passed in FA No. 17 of 1949 vide judgment and order dated 14.12.1960, which was exhibited as exhibit-Gha. As such according to the pleaded case of the principal defendant No. 3, Faizur Rahman and Habibur Rahman were the absolute owners of the suit properties. Faizur Rahman and Habibur Rahman sold the suit properties to the principal defendant No. 3 Bhupati Bhusan Dey by executing a registered sale deed dated 26.3.1967, which also exhibited before the trial court. The Principal defendant No. 3, Bhupati Bhusan Dey allowed the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 to occupy the suit properties i.e. Schedule-A and B land as his tenants by running the show shop. 8. On the basis of the pleadings of both the parties, for deciding the suit, the trial Court framed as many as nine (9) issues : 1. Is there any cause of action for filing the suit? 2. Whether Ataur Rahman and Hamidur Rahman were the owners of the suit land and the house? 3. Whether the proforma defendants Nos. 6, 7 and 8 were tenants under Hamidur Rahman and Ataur Rahman? 4. Whether the SiddikaKhatun was the owner of O. K. Shoe shop? 5. Whether the proforma defendant Nos. 5, 6 and 7 had any tenancy right over the suit property? 6. Whether the suit is barred by limitation and Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act read with Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC ? 7. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder and non-joinder of parties? 8. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? 9. Whether the parties are entitled to any relief? If so what? 9. Both the parties had adduced oral as well as documentary evidences in support of their respective cases by examining six (6) witnesses on each side. 7. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder and non-joinder of parties? 8. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? 9. Whether the parties are entitled to any relief? If so what? 9. Both the parties had adduced oral as well as documentary evidences in support of their respective cases by examining six (6) witnesses on each side. The trial Court while deciding the issue No. 2 had not only discussed the statement of the witnesses but also considered the said judgment and decree of this Court dated 22.6.1953 passed in FA No. 17 of 1999 (exhibit-Ga) and also the judgment and order of the Supreme Court passed in Civil Appeal No. 266 of 1956 (exhibit-Gha) and had come to a finding that the proforma defendant No. 4 Md. Atowar Rahman and proforma defendant No. 5 Md. Hamid Rahman were not the owners of the suit properties and also that the Faizur Rahman and Habibur Rahman were the Tiers of the suit properties as their right and title over the suit land had been declared by the competent courts i.e. High Court and Supreme Court in the cases mentioned above. 10. The learned trial Court further, after carefully appreciating the statements of the witnesses and also the documents exhibited by both the parties, had come to the finding that the principal defendant No. 3, Bhupati Bhusan Dey became the owner of the suit land after the same had been sold to him by Faizur Rahman and Habibur Rahman under registered sale deed dated 26.3.1967 and also that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are possessing the suit property as tenants of the principal defendant No. 3, Bhupati Bhusan Dey. After such finding the learned trial court dismissed the Title Suit No. 78/89/231/93 by passing the judgment and decree dated 28.1.1998. 11. Against the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 28.1.1998, the appellant-plaintiff preferred the first appeal being T.A. No. 8 of 98 in the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nagaon. Before the 1st appellate court the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-plaintiff had contended that in the cross examination of the DW i.e. DW No. 1, he stated that Faizur Rahman and Habibur Rahman gifted a portion of the suit properties in favour of proforma defendant No. 4, Md. Atowar Rahman and proforma defendant No. 5, Md. Before the 1st appellate court the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-plaintiff had contended that in the cross examination of the DW i.e. DW No. 1, he stated that Faizur Rahman and Habibur Rahman gifted a portion of the suit properties in favour of proforma defendant No. 4, Md. Atowar Rahman and proforma defendant No. 5, Md. Hamidur Rahman and as such the suit i.e. T.S. No. 78 of 89/231/93 should have been decreed in favour of the appellant-plaintiff. 12. On careful perusal of the pleaded case of the appellant-plaintiff in the plaint of T.S. No. 78 of 99/231/93, it is clear that the appellant plaintiff did not plead any fact as to how the proforma defendant No. 4 Md. Atowar Rahman and proforma defendant No. 5, Md. Hamidur Rahman became the owners of the suit properties and also that the appellant plaintiff did not plead in the plaint that principal defendant No. 3, Bhupati Bhusan Dey had gifted a portion of the suit properties in favour of the proforma defendant No. 4 Md. Atowar Rahman and proforma defendant No. 5. Md. Hamidur Rahman. Therefore, it is not the pleaded case of the appellant plaintiff that the proforma defendant No. 4 Md. Atowar Rahman and proforma defendant No. 5 Hamidur Rahman became the owners of a portion of the suit land under gifted deed executed by the defendant No. 3, Shri Bhupati Bhusan Dey in their favour. The learned 1st appellate court had carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-plaintiff that because of the admission by the witness of the defendant in the cross examination that a portion of the suit property was gifted by the principal defendant No. 3, Bhupati Bhusan Dey in favour of the proforma defendant No. 4 Md. Atowar Rahman and the proforma defendant No. 5 Md. Hamidur Rahman, Title Suit No. 78 of 89/231/93 should be decreed in favour of the appellant-plaintiff and held that the appellant plaintiff who must stand on his own legs cannot take advantage of the defects of the defendants' case and also that in the absence of pleading if any evidence produced by the party cannot be considered and no party should be permitted to travel beyond his pleading. Para No. 21 and 22 of the Judgment of the 1st appellate Court dated 11.8.1999 are quoted hereunder : 21. Para No. 21 and 22 of the Judgment of the 1st appellate Court dated 11.8.1999 are quoted hereunder : 21. It is also settled law that the plaintiff must stand on his own legs and cannot take advantage of the defects of the defendants' case. But in the present case, the plaintiff has sought to take the advantage of the defects of the defendants' case bringing into evidence that, after the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the earlier case, Faijur Rahman and Habibur Rahman gifted and relinquished a portion of the suit properties in favour of Ataur Rahman and Hamidur Rahman only during cross examination of the witnesses on the side of the defendants and that too without any pleading or beyond the ambit of pleading of the plaintiff. 22. In Ramsarup Gupta v. Bishnu Narain Inter College [1987] 2 SCR 792, it has been laid down as quoted hereunder : It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by die party in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should state the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise. 13. The Apex Court in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, reported in [2001] 251 ITR 84 (SC) held that the judgment of the 1st appellate court must display conscious application of mind and the record findings supported by reasons on all issues. The 1st appellate court being a final court of facts, the pure findings of fact by the 1st appellate court shall remain immune from challenging before the High Court in Second Appeal, the Apex Court in Santosh Hazari (supra) observed that : The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. The task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial court is an easier one. The appellate court agreeing with the view of the trial court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court, expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice (see Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhury). We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. While writing a judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial court must weigh with the appellate court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same Presiding Judge who authors the judgment. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies, on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate court is entitled to inter with the finding of fact (See Madhusadan Das v. Narayanibai). As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate court is entitled to inter with the finding of fact (See Madhusadan Das v. Narayanibai). The rule is and it is nothing more than a rule of practice-that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lie, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact. (See Sarju Prashad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Nazcain Singh). Secondly, while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate Court had discharged the duty expected of it. We need only remind the first appellate courts of the additional obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present Section 100 submitted in the Code. The first appellate court continues, as before, to be a final court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate court is also a final court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one. 14. 14. This Court also is of the considered view that the above findings/decision of the 1st appellate Court is sound under the law and accordingly accepted insamuch as it is well settled law in civil suits that the party cannot be allowed to adduce evidence for setting up a case inconsistence with the one pleaded in the pleading. Reference may be made in the case of Om Prabha Jain v. Abnash Chand reported in [1968] 3 SCR 111. A party is expected and is bound to prove the case as alleged by him and the party will not be allowed to succeed on a case not set up by him. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India v. Hari Prasad Jalan reported in AIR 1972 SC 1274 and Salig Ram v. Munshi Ram reported in AIR 1961 SC 1374 . Further a party cannot be allowed at the time of trial to change his case or set up a case inconsistent with what he alleged in his pleading except by way of amendment of the pleading under Order 6 Rule 17. On careful perusal of the impugned judgment and decree of the 1st appellate court dated 11.8.1999 for dismissing the Title Appeal No. 8 of 1998 filed by the appellant-plaintiff it is clear that the 1st appellate court display conscious application of mind and the record findings supported by reasons on all issues. Therefore, the concurrent finding of the fact of the trial court and the 1st appellate court are that proforma defendant No. 4, Md. Abdul Rasid and proforma defendant No. 5, Md. Abdul Hamid cannot sale the suit property to the appellant-plaintiff as they (Md. Atowar Rahman and Md. Hamidur Rahman) were not the owners of the suit properties and also that the principal defendant No. 3 Bhupati Bhusan Dey is the owner of the suit properties and the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are his tenants in respect of the suit properties. 15. The Apex Court in Surain Singh (dead) by Lrs. and Ors. v. Mehenga (dead) by Lrs. [1996] 1 SCR 1152 held that interference by the High Court in a second appeal with the findings of fact would be when there is diverse findings of fact recorded by the learned trial court and the first appellate court. 15. The Apex Court in Surain Singh (dead) by Lrs. and Ors. v. Mehenga (dead) by Lrs. [1996] 1 SCR 1152 held that interference by the High Court in a second appeal with the findings of fact would be when there is diverse findings of fact recorded by the learned trial court and the first appellate court. In the present case there is no diverse findings of fact by the learned trial Court and the first appellate court. 16. Interference with the concurrent finding of fact by this Court in an appeal under Section 100 of the CPC i.e. in second appeal should be only in exceptional circumstance where the learned courts below failed to consider the vital evidence and the learned courts below also relied upon inadmissible evidence. 17. The Apex Court in Hari Singh v. Kanhaiya Lai AIR 1999 SC 3325 held that the concurrent finding of facts cannot be interfered with merely because there are lack of details in the pleading and the concurrent finding of facts can be interfered with when there is perversity in the finding of facts or in other words finding of facts are based on no evidence. 18. The Apex Court in Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal AIR 2006 SC 2234 considered the circumstances under which the High Court in a second appeal interfered with the conci "Tent finding of facts. Paras 13, 19 and 24 (iii) of SCC in Hero Vinoth (Minor) (supra) read as follows : 13. Though as rightly contended by learned Counsel for the appellant the scope for interference with concurrent findings of fact while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC is very limited and re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible (Sic except) where the trial court and/or the first appellate court misdirected themselves in appreciating the question of law or placed the onus on the wrong party certainly there is a scope for interference under Section 100 CPC after formulating a substantial question of law. 19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. 19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, the one drawn by the lower appellate court will not be interfered by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere where it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring material evidence. 24 (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognized exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts below have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to decision based on no evidence, it not only refers to cases where there is a total death of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the findings. 19. The High Court while deciding the 1 second appeal by exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC cannot proceed to re-appreciate the evidence without adverting to the substantial question of law formulated at the time of admission and also that with, nit deciding the substantial question of law framed at the time of admission of the second appeal, the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC cannot set aside the findings of the subordinate courts by re-appreciating the evidence. 20. 20. There must be first a foundation for me substantial question of law in pleading and secondly the question to be considered in the second appeal should be the substantial question of law merged from substantial findings of fact arrived at by the court of fact and thirdly it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. The High Court, in the absence of substantial question of law that arose for consideration between the parties in the second appeal, cannot interfere with the findings of the first appellate court by taking different view on re-appreciation of evidence. Reference may be made to Hamida and Ors. v. Md. Kahlil AIR 2001 SC 2282 . Paras 6 and 7 of the AIR in Hamida and Ors. (supra) reads as follows : 6. The High Court has upset the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court, taking a different view merely on re-appreciation of evidence in the absence of valid and acceptable reasons to say that the findings recorded by the first appellate court could not be sustained either they being perverse or unreasonable or could not be supported by any evidence. The High Court neither framed a substantial question of law nor any such question is indicated in the impugned judgment as required under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The approach of the High Court, in our view, is clearly and manifestly erroneous and unsustainable in law. Para 10 of the impugned judgment reads : The appellate court although has decided the issue of personal necessity but from the judgment it appears that the appellate court has not decided this issue in its correct perspective. Since the trial court has not recorded any finding on the issue of personal necessity, the finding recorded by the appellate court cannot be said to a concurrent finding of fact, I am, therefore, of the definite view that in such circumstance, this Court can re-appreciate the evidence and scrutinize the findings recorded by the appellate court under Section 100 CPC when admittedly this issue was not decided by the trial court. ...The sons of the plaintiff for whose requirement the plaintiff sought eviction, have not been examined. The nephew of the plaintiff was examined as a witness who supported the case of the plaintiff. ...The sons of the plaintiff for whose requirement the plaintiff sought eviction, have not been examined. The nephew of the plaintiff was examined as a witness who supported the case of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has also not led any evidence to the effect that the house property where the plaintiff resides is not sufficient for their own use and occupation. There is also no evidence to the effect that suitable alternative accommodation is not available to the plaintiff for meeting the requirement, I am, therefore, of the view that the finding recorded by the appellate court on the issue of personal necessity cannot be sustained in law for want of sufficient evidence. As can be seven from the para extracted above, the High Court though that it could re-appreciate the evidence and scrutinize the findings recorded by the first appellate court under Section 100 CPC, this approach is plainly erroneous and against law. The High Court was also wrong in saying that the plaintiff did not lead sufficient evidence to establish his bona fide requirement. As observed by the first appellate court and noted above already, there is evidence of the plaintiff, his nephew and the neighbour. The finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court based on evidence could not be interfered with by the High Court, that too in the absence of any substantial question of law that arose for consideration between the parties. Para 7, We repeat and reiterate this position as stated by this Court time and again. In one such judgment in Smt. Satya Gupta (a), Madhu Gupta v.Brijesh Kumar [1998] 3 SCR 1183, this Court, in para-16, has stated thus : 16. Para 7, We repeat and reiterate this position as stated by this Court time and again. In one such judgment in Smt. Satya Gupta (a), Madhu Gupta v.Brijesh Kumar [1998] 3 SCR 1183, this Court, in para-16, has stated thus : 16. At the outset, we would like to point out that the findings on facts by the lower appellate court as a final court of facts, are based on appreciation of evidence and the same cannot be treated as perverse or based on no evidence That being the position, we are of the view that the High Court, after re-appreciating the evidence and without finding that the conclusions reached by the lower appellate court were not based on the evidence, reversed the conclusions on facts on the ground that the view taken by it was also a possible view on the facts : The High Court, it is well settled, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, cannot reverse the findings of the lower appellate Court on facts merely on the ground that on the facts found by the lower appellate court another view was possible. 21. Mr. K. Pathak, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents strenuously contended that this Court should keep in view of the parameter of Section CPC while deciding the present appeal. He also further submitted that the substantial question of law formulated in the present second appeal is not the substantial question of law contemplated in Section 100 of the CPC, but it is only a question of fact. It can never be the substantial question of law contemplated in Section 100 of the CPC. Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arijit Pasayat in Hero Vinoth case (supra) had observed that : 21. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Second 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with-technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code of Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code of Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta AIR 1928 PC 172 the phrase "substantial question of law" as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Sir Chunilal case, AIR 1962 SC 1314 , the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju AIR 1951 Mad. 969 (Sir Chunilal Case 1962 Supp. (3) SCR 557 58. When a question of law if fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law. This Court laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial : (Sir Chunilal Case, 557 SCR 58). This Court laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial : (Sir Chunilal Case, 557 SCR 58). The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled-and her falsify mere question, of-applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law. 22. In Dy. Commr.v. Rama Krishna Narain also it was held that a question of law of importance to the parties was a substantial question of law entitling the appellant to a certificate under (the then) Section 100 CPC. 23. To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case" there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case or not, the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any Us. (See Santosh Hazari v. l Purushottam Tiwari [2001] 251 ITR 84 (SC) ). 24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarized thus : (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a f substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to "decision based on no evidence", it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the findings. 22. Keeping in view of the pleaded case of both the parties and also the decision of the Apex Court in the cases discussed above, this Court is of the considered view that the appellant-plaintiff cannot succeed his case basing on some strayed admission made by the defendants' witnesses in the cross examination and also the appellant-plaintiff can only succeed his case on the basis of his case pleaded in the plaint. Over and above, the appellant-plaintiff had utterly failed to persuade this Court for interference to the concurrent finding of facts by the trial Court as well as the 1st appellate Court. 17, 23. For the reasons discussed above, it is further held that there is no substantial question of law contemplated in Section 100 of the CPC, which call for decision, by this Court in the present second appeal. The appeal is devoid of merit. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.